The Civic Platform in Poland
- the first decade 2001-2011

Søren Riishøj
Associate professor
Department of Political Science and Public Management
University of Southern Denmark
Email-address: sr@sam.sdu.dk

Political Science Publications
No. 24/2010
Civic Platform (PO) is one of the new parties in Poland, established July 1, 2001 as a liberal soft protest party with a flat decentralized institutional set-up. Over time, that profile changed radically, not least after the party in 2007 took over government responsibility. The formation took place predominantly endogenously as a conflict inside the Democratic Union (UD), where the liberal Donald Tusk lost the election for party chairman to the social liberal Bronislaw Gemerek.

This paper first presents a short overview of the political parties and party systems in the CEECs, and second reviews the party’s history with particular emphasis on variables like party institutionalization, electoral support, party programme, policy and party strategies, party cohesion, coalition building, and the party type. In conclusion, I discuss the position of the party in a broader Central European context.

Key words: Party type, party systems, Civic Platform (PO), electoral support, coalition potential, party cohesion and institutionalisation, party policy, strategy and programme
Introduction:

Parties and party systems in the CEECs: a short overview

As in the “old Europe”, the parties and party systems in East Central Europe are decisive for consolidation of democracy. Often they are studied with particular emphasis on the party type. Mass parties have been contrasted to cadre parties (Duverger, 1954), and since the beginning of 1960s there have been much focus on catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 1966) with broad popular appeal, and cartel parties (Katz and Mair, 1994) with focus on relations between party and state. Furthermore, studies of parties and party systems often stress the number and the concentration of parties (the “party system format”) and the type and the strength of polarisation. The notion “relevant party” variously includes electoral support, representation and coalition potential, for example the bargaining power (Andrzej Antoszewski, in Migalski 2009:7).

Some parties were established endogenously after a divide within already existing parties, others exogenously without links to the already existing parties. The historic circumstances of party formation created a specific post-communist institutional pathdependence.

Party system polarization is closely connected to the most important cleavages in society, that be state-church, socio-economic, town-land or systemic (for or against the system as such).

There has been a general understanding among scholars that parties and party systems in the East cannot be studied by using the same concepts and approaches as in studies of the already established parties and party systems in the West. In the first “chaotic” stage of extraordinary politics after the fall of the old system, we were mainly dealing with proto-parties and loosely institutionalized forum parties. The communist parties as well as “re-born” socialist and historic social democratic parties were forced to transform themselves institutionally and after 40 years of state-socialism try to find a new profile and a much broader voter appeal.

At the same time, feelings of anti-politics were wide-spread. The anti-political feelings remained rather strong and were sometimes re-awakened due to the low legitimacy of political parties and widespread corruption, several political scandals and bad governance.
In the first stage broadly based anticommunist “Forum” parties came to play a great role, while the power of penetration of the historical parties, e.g. social democratic and agrarian, were low. After some years, in several countries post-communist “successor parties” obtained a “come-back” due to social frustrations. Later, new populist “leader-driven” parties came to the fore, that be right-wing nationalist like The League of Polish Families and Jobbik in Hungary, or neoliberal soft populist like Public Affairs (VV) and Freedom and Justice (SaS) in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Among the CEECs, due to the rather liberal national-accommodative post-totalitarian type of regime, the parties and party system format was rather well established in Hungary, where the ruling communist party had allowed the establishment of new non-communist parties already in 1987. Therefore, at the outset the party system in Hungary was more consensual than in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The legacy of “Goulash-Communism” and “soft dictatorship” paved the way for the historical compromise between “post-communists” and liberals in 1994. From the turn of the century, the elections in Hungary became more confrontational and polarized and the party system format close to bipolar, until 2010 with a high concentration.

In Poland, in the first stage of “extraordinary politics”, the party system was extreme multipolar, after the changes of the electoral system to become moderate multipolar and in the late 1990s close to bipolar. After the realignment of the party system in 2001, the party system format came close to bipolarism and high party concentration.

In Poland, for many voters the religious cleavage – for and against political interference of the church-became decisive on the election day, in particular at the 1993 election. The religious cleavage was never defreezed. Later, at the 2005 and 2007 election, the post-communist systemic cleavage became less significant and two different right-wing projects dominant with the solidaric Poland (“Polska Solidarna”), represented by Law and Justice Party (PiS) confronting the liberal Poland (“Polska liberalna”) represented by the Civic Platform (PO). From the outset, the socio-economic cleavage played a greater role in the Czech Republic and due to the legacy of (neo)Stalinism the systemic cleavage was difficult to defreeze in the Czech Republic.

The party system format remained predominantly moderate multipolar. In Slovakia, the party system in the 1990s was highly polarized and unstable and the political system to a large extent illiberal marked by adversary politics, several party divisions and the formation of new parties without any safe voter
base. Thus, in the late 1990s there was much talk in Slovakia about “blocked consolidation” and “Meciarization”. Socio-economic cleavages came to play a more important role at the 2006 and 2010 elections.

As put by Andrzej Orogváni, the exact classification of parties in the CEECs needs more empirical evidence and a complex revision of existing theoretically based party types and even new party types based on detailed and precise studies. As we shall see in the following, that statement also holds good in the case of the Civic Platform (PO). Moving closer to ordinary politics, some stabilisation took place the concepts used in studies of parties and party systems in the West became more relevant in the East, e.g. the distinction between mass parties and cadre parties, catch-all parties and cartel parties, however in a new post-communist context.

To determine the new party type, independent variables like the formation of the party, electoral support, coalition policy and coalition potential, party institutionalization and organization, party cohesion, party strategies and party policy and programs, characteristics of the political elite and party culture seem to be the most relevant. Those variables are therefore used in the following sections which focus on the Civic Platform (PO) in Poland.

Stage 1:
The beginning: The “light” institutional set-up

As the largest party and the party in government since 2007 and in possession of the presidency, the Polish Civic Platform (PO) is a highly relevant subject for investigation. Furthermore, the PO is in many ways representative of the new liberal parties in other CEECs.

Often the critical junctures and formative historical moments that led to the formation of political parties proved to have a long-term institutional pathdependent impact. In the case of the Civic Platform (PO), the presidential election in 2000 and the divisions within the Freedom Union (UW) provided the impetus to the despised presidential candidate Donald Tusk together with other people in UW to establish the new liberal “Platforma Ludzi Środk” (PO). The PO was formed endogenously, by already “established” politicians.

1 Underlined among others by Andrzej Orogváni, in his analysis of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic (Orogváni, 2006).
The leadership, also called the "triumvirate" (the "three tenors") included besides Donald Tusk, the marshal of the Polish parliament Maciej Plazynski and the former rather successful presidential candidate, Andrzej Olechowski. The request for registration was submitted in November 2001 and accepted by the authorities March 2002 under the slightly modified label, the Republic of Poland’s Civic Platform ("Platforma Obywatelska Polskiej Rzeczpospolita"). In the beginning there was a reasonable balance between the different factions within the new party.

**Political groups active at the formation of the PO:**

- The Gdansk liberals
- The group around Andrzej Olecowski
- The group of Artur Balacz
- The group of Aleksander Hall
- The group of Jan Rokita

Rafal Matyja, in Migalski, 2009:55.

Institutionally, the intention was so quickly as possible to transform Civic Platform (PO) from an election party into a "light" “American” type cadre party with a rather flat organizational structure. After the 2001 elections, the party convention became the supreme decision-making authority. Meetings between the party conventions were organized by the Governing Council and the Secretariat ("Rada Krajowa" and "Zasad Krajowa"). No person with the "impure" certificate in relation to the old system could become a party member, and the organizational core should be the parliamentary group.

The “flat” type of organization intended to avoid the creation of an autonomous party bureaucracy, but there were those within the party, e.g. from the conservative faction SKL, who rejected the “light-flat” cartel type model. At the regional level, the candidate who obtained the most votes was designated as the regional party leader. The local party organisation became the election committee.

Thus, formally the party institutionalization was “flat” with a considerable influence at the local level, but the party leadership, the “triumvirate”, was in possession of several means of intervention, e.g. by appointment of candidates at the elections.

---

As regards electoral support, from the outset the Civic Platform especially appealed to young well-educated residents in the major cities usually with weak links to the dissidents from the communist time. Popular support was especially great in the economic growth centres such as Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia at the Baltic Sea, where the party obtained several positions as mayors at the local elections.

In the beginning, the PO obtained a high support because of the widespread protest against the “party’ist type of democracy” that had evolved in the first decade of transition. Thus, in January 2001 the electoral support was no less than 17 to 20 percent. The question was, whether the high level of popular support would be maintained right up to the next election. At the election September 2001 the PO rather disappointingly obtained 12 percent of the vote. As the SLD-UP together with the Peasant Party (PSL) obtained a majority in the parliament, the PO’s votes were not to become decisive at the formation of the new (“post-communist”) government.

As regards coalition building, a historical compromise according to the Hungarian model was not to implement, but some informal cooperation between the PO and the SLD-UP might come in place in case SLD-UPS cooperation with the Peasant’s Party (PSL) broke down⁴. In principle, the Civic Platform (PO) better than the Freedom Union (UW) could enter a compromise with the "post-communist" SLD, as the PO did not have the same roots as the Freedom Union (UW) back to the Solidarity movement of the 1980s⁵.

Thus the fact that the PO decided to be in stark opposition to the then “post-communist” SLD-UP government was not so much due to systemic cleavages in society but more the political scandals that hit the "post-communists" and, not to forget, the growing competition from the Kaczynski brothers’ radical Law and Justice Party (PiS).

As regards policy and programmes, in agreement with their liberal ideology, the PO required restrictions in trade union influence, direct elections of mayors, reduction in the number of seats in parliament, abolition of state support for political parties, simplification of the tax system and low linear “flat” taxation, just as the party vigorously embarked on a campaign against “bad politics”, corruption and party dominance within the public and semi-private sector. Unlike parties on the national-traditionalist right, the PO did not want to re-open old historic points of contention.

---

³ Jadwiga Staniszkis in Rzeczpospolita 22 May 2001 (“Polska potrzebuje rzadu SLD z Platforma Obywatelska”).
⁴ Argued by e.g. Jadwiga Staniszkis in an interview in Rzeczpospolita 22 May 2001 (“Polska potrzebuje rzadu SLD z Platforma Obywatelska”).
In the economic policy, the focus was mainly on the introduction of a "normal market economy" with a flat and low 15 percent taxation. The aim was to “release the energy of the Polish people” (Andrezej Antoszewski, in Migalski, 2009:19). On the EU policy, the programme stressed the defence of Polish national interests, e.g. when it came to voting weights in the EU Council of Ministers (the “square root model”) and discussions about formulations about Christian values included the new EU Treaty. At the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004 the PO obtained 24 pct. of the votes.

In the initial situation, the party did advocate modern secular European values, which were strongly opposed by the right-traditionalist the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the League of Polish Families (LPR). The programme terms of the PO aimed to reconcile the liberal principles, the minimal state and the moral and religious values under the common motto of "freedom, tradition and Christianity." Sharp criticism was directed against the trade union Solidarity and the leader of solidarity, Marian Krzaklewski.

After some time, the party tried to re-profile itself more social conservative. In other words, on the policy and programme level the Civic Platform (PO) developed into a centre-right soft “Thatcherite” liberal, anti-communist, soft Christian national and soft eurosceptic and populist party. However, within short time the new party experienced some divisions between conservatives and liberals.

Thus, at the programme level a special conservative-liberal synthesis came forth. The Civic Platform (PO) undoubtedly kept an eye to the Hungarian sister party FIDESZ, which in the 1990s successfully had transformed itself from a liberal into a conservative national and Christian party. Geographically and socially, the PO bet wider than the “old” Freedom Union (UW) (the "professor party") impacting both the party programme and the political language.

**Stage 2:**

**2001-2005: Opposing the “post-communists”, preparing for the 2005 election**

After the 2001 election, the move away from the flat “American” institutional set-up of the first stage became more striking. Thus the 2003 party statutes led to a separation between the party chairman and the chairman of the parliament group thus diminishing the dominant position of the parliament group in the first stage. The party convention (Krajowa Konwencja) became the supreme institution.

---

Later, at the 2009 EP election Krzaklewski ran as candidate for the Civic Platform (PO).
Likewise, the access of party members to the higher levels of the party organization was made easier by the new statutes. Some classified the more centralized approach in the selection and nomination of candidates and Donald Tusk’s proposal for elections in individual constituencies as being undemocratic.

Former president Aleksander Kwasniewski\textsuperscript{6} contended that the Civic Platform (PO) to some extent reminded him about the left alliance SLD - a lot of progress in electoral support but with loosely connected and politically un-homogeneous leaders, in short rather low internal cohesiveness and no clear-cut ideological profile.

As regards party-cohesion, some observers advocated that the party would indulge in the personal faction strife, which had precipitated the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) and other party alliances.

Within the party there were some division concerning the choice of procedures for the nomination of candidates; that was the case in the capital Warsaw, where non-party members were set on the party list. The party’s frontrunner at the election in the capital Warsaw was the former National Bank governor Hanna Gronkiewicz-Walz.

Rapidly after 2001, the former Minister Artur Balazs, withdrew from the Platform (PO) refusing to sign up to join the party Civic Platform (PO). Protesting against the rejection by the triumvirate of collective membership, he tried with a new party formation (“SKL-Ruch Polski”) covering various centre-right groups, mostly originating from the liberal SKL and the Christian Democratic PPChD, but his initiative turned out to be only one among several abortive attempts among parties to “unite the right wing forces”.

Furthermore, also one of the founders, Andrzej Olechowski, resigned from the “triumvirate”. Finally, in June 2003 also Maciej Plazynski withdrew from the Platform (PO) contending that the party had become elite dominated and therefore no longer supporting the ordinary Poles’ lot, contending that the PO-leadership did not adequately contribute to the creation of a broad sustainable centre-right alternative to the “post-communists. Some expected that Olechowski would bet on presidential elections in 2005 when the incumbent president Aleksander Kwasniewski according to the rules of the

\textsuperscript{6} Kwasniewski and Zukowski’s statements, \textit{se Polityka} 49 (2430) 6 December 2003:26
constitution had to resign. That plan was, however, thwarted due to Andrzej Olechowski’s defeat in the local elections in Warsaw in autumn 2002.

Finally, there was also some disagreement within the party on the EU policy. Thus the former Minister of Foreign Policy Andrzej Olechowski recommended a pro-EU policy e.g. on the new EU Constitutional Treaty, while the majority in the party wanted to maintain the "hard" eurorealistic policy according to the slogan about "Nice or die". Later, in spring 2007, the "Nice or die" slogan lost the original significance and a realist more pro-EU policy became pronounced.

As regards electoral support, at the 2001 elections, the “old” Freedom Union (UW) completely lost its representation in the Sejm. The new affluent middle class clearly preferred the new Civic Platform (PO), in part due to fear of vote wastage. After the 2001 election many voters, including several non-liberals, considered the Civic Platform (PO) as the most viable alternative to both the SLD-UP government and Lepper’s populist Self Defense (Samoobrona), almost in the same way as several voters before the 2001 elections considered the SLD as the best possible alternative to the government of the Election Action Alliance Solidarity (AWS) and the fractured right. A large part of the intelligentsia and the new private entrepreneurs liked Platform’s (PO) “financial language” which revolved around subjects like macroeconomics, low taxes, budget and introduction of a new employer-friendly labour code.

After the increase in the electoral support from late 2003 the PO obtained several new party members at the local level, a great part coming from the Freedom Union (UW). At that time the Platform’s (PO) good performance was primarily a result of the SLD’s rapid decline. In early 2004, the PO became the largest party with around 30 percent of the votes. According to the polls, the populist Samoobrona and not the SLD seemed to become the main opponent of the PO at the 2005 elections. The biggest problems within the PO might be on the leadership level, but the political “duo” Rokita and Donald Tusk so far seemed to work quite well.

In the months up to the 2005 elections, the party lost several votes to the "pure" and more "irresponsible" Law and Justice Party (PiS), which from the summer of 2005 overtook the PO in several polls. As the election came closer, PO regained some of “lost votes”.

---

1 Mariusz Janicki, Wieslaw Wladyka, “Kto wpuscil Leppera?”, Polityka 40 (2318) 6 October 2001:5
As regards policy and programme, at a meeting of the party in September 2003 new policies were launched in order to carry the party forward successfully by demanding changes in the constitution with a reduction in the number of members of the Sejm (460 to 230) and Senate (from 100 to 32), a weakening of parliamentary immunity of MPs and a new election law with elections in individual constituencies. The aim was to “release the energy of the Polish people”. However, some entrepreneurs and economists criticized the party’s tax policy\(^8\) and the outright rejection of the SLD government’s austerity program (the "Hausner plan")\(^9\). In addition, the time the linear taxation made the PO vulnerable to accusations of serving only the wealthiest’s interests. With greater focus on topics like EU policy, law and order and the fight against corruption and bureaucracy, the PO was no longer a "one leg” party emphasizing taxes and defence of the state budget.

Likewise, sociologist Tomas Zukowski\(^10\) emphasized the great weight placed on economic issues, but to this effort was eventually added a nice dose of economic populism, focusing on the social burden and fight against corruption and restrictions on the number of employees in the public administration. With growing electoral support the style became more "popular" ("ludowe") and "catch all" and less liberal radical ("soft-Thatcherist"). The PO strived to maintain a non-populist moderate profile, at least as long as the main opponents in the next election seemed to be Andrzej Lepper and his populist movement Samoobrona. The party would not, as Samoobrona, simply be “against” (all the others), what with reasonable certainty would have made the party life rather short.

In parliament, several times there were disagreements among the parties in opposition to the “post-communists”, for example on personal appointments and at parliamentary voting. The Civic Platform (PO) felt itself forced to accept parts of the former SLD-UP Government’s proposals for restructuring and savings on public finances (the "Hausner plan"). Furthermore, under Marek Belka’s government the party felt obliged to support the proposals for changes of social support and in the health system, while the more intransigent Law and Justice Party (PiS) consistently voted against (almost) all proposals coming from the government.

\(^8\) E.g. the 15 per cent linear taxation proposal.
\(^10\) Kwasniewski and Zukowski’s statements, se Polityka 49 (2430) 6 December 2003:26
The Civic Platform’s (PO) “four times yes”:

- Lower number of seats in parliament
- Removal of immunity for MPs
- Abolition of the Senate, the upper house
- More power to the president

Thus in opposition to “the post-communists”, the Civic Platform (PO) faced several challenges on the way to reach internal clarification whether the opposition to the SLD-UP government should be unbiased and selective or, as by the PiS, total and uncompromising. Thus, on party strategy the party put itself "between two chairs" sending too vague and confusing signals to the electorate.

Before the 2005 election there was talk about a “well-considered break” with the corrupt bureaucratic practice that had characterized the “post-communist” SLD-UP government. A populist profile might scare some middle-class voters away from the party and move some of them closer to the new moderate Democratic Party (PD).

From November 2004 the more tough uncompromising opposition strategy took over, maybe because the new Democratic Party (PD) did not become any viable alternative to the centrist minded part of voters. That same month, the party took the initiative to have collected at least 300,000 signatures calling for a referendum on the party’s key issues such as abandonment of the Senate, elections in individual constituencies, reduction of the number of MPs and the removal of immunity for the MPs. 3000 educated party people took part in gathering subscriptions in 500 selected cities. Thus, before Christmas 2004 the party succeeded in collecting 700,000 signatures under the common slogan of "four times yes."

Deciding on party strategy, the PO leadership understandably kept an eye on the public opinion poll figures, which, however, showed a high volatility. Support of more than 30 per cent of the voters could tempt the party to form a minority government. The PO opted for vote maximisation, preferably at the expense of the PiS, but this effort drew the lot in the direction of intransigent opposition and PiS-like
policies, e.g. on the laws on cleansing "post-Communists" and "agents" and establishment of a new fourth Republic.

Thus, opposition towards the SLD-led government became tougher despite the fact that the programmatic differences between the PO and the SLD were not very large. The fact that Poland in 2003 faced tough negotiations on EU accession, spoke in favour of a “political truce” between the pro-EU integration parties. The economic programme, the "Rokita-plan", while still talking about the need of lower linear taxes and reduction in public administration, was not "clear-cut" neoliberal due to too many ambiguities.

As regards coalition-building and coalition potential, before the elections in 2005 plans circulated concerning governmental cooperation with the Law and Justice Party (PiS), perhaps also the Peasant Party (PSL). The "Law and Justice" party (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO) tried their best to head over the political differences, e.g. on the EU policy. But cooperation locally between the two parties faltered, in particular in the capital (Warsaw.) In an interview Donald Tusk called the PiS a severe and highly unpredictable partner. However, when competing with the PiS at the elections, the Civic Platform (PO) could rely on a more efficient party organization. The "soft" Donald Tusk was destined to become the party’s candidate at the presidential election in 2005, and the more "hard" Jan Rokita the candidate for prime minister.

The alternative to the PO-PiS alliance, a broad non-partisan ("ponadpartyjny") coalition with representation from also the SLD and the SDPL in order to isolate and marginalize the League of Polish Families (LPR), Samoobrona and the Law and Justice Party (PiS), might be attractive to some within the party, but the plan turned out to be unrealistic because of the populist sentiments in the population and the centre parties’ and the Left’s sharp decline. Hence, for the PO the election competition increasingly came from the right and primarily the PiS, what inevitably was decisive for the choice of party strategy before the 2005 election.

In the 2005 election campaign Donald Tusk aimed to present himself as a moderate Catholic, who condemned abortion, euthanasia and marriage between homosexuals. He dismissed that there was a need for a "revolution" as required by the PiS. In the years since 1989, profound structural changes had taken place in the Polish society, therefore Poland’s international position remained strong. Therefore,

11 Rzeczpospolita 9 September, 2003, "Sojusz z Solidarnosc to zly pomysl".
most crucial, he said, was to build a stronger and fairer country with better functioning police and courts and less corruption and to reduce the still too high unemployment. In short, Donald Tusk launched himself as the man who was neither leaning to the old establishment nor to the extreme right populism. The party favoured the strategy of "soft populism" forced upon the party by the growing competition from the Kaczynski brothers’ new and radical Law and Justice Party (PiS).

To conclude, before the 2005 election, the PO was placed in a dilemma as a too "responsible" moderate line might bring loss of voters to the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and a too activist populist line might bring a loss of votes to the centre-left. After the establishment of the Democratic Party (PD) and the strengthening of Selfdefence (Samoobrona), the slogan for more "accountability" and "fairness" in politics became pronounced. In short, the political language of the PO was less confrontational and the EU policy less eurosceptical moving away from "Nice or die".

Stage 3:
2005-2007: The 2005 elections and the failed PO-PiS project

The move away from the flat “American” institutional set-up decided upon in 2001 and 2003 was further enhanced by the adoption of new party statutes in 2006 that cleared the way for collective party membership, gave more rights for individual party members with formation of a mass party-like structure with party organisations established locally and regionally and with wide powers to the central leadership (Migalski, 2009). Party unity was high on the agenda. Thus, several times, for instance at the 2006 party convention, there were many calls for party unity and solidarity.

As put by Witold Gadomski, the first stage of openness to political “outsiders”, e.g. experts and scientists without much political experience, was substituted by closer selection procedures most beneficial to party members with previous political experience. Therefore, the local and regional “party barons” gained an increasingly strong position within the party. Under those circumstances, political clientelism might become a serious problem. The “political missionaries” and “soft populists” of the first stage who tried to change public policy were left out.

---

12 Gazeta Wyborcza 20 September 2005, “A nie rewolucja”.
At the 2005 election, Poland became divided into two different camps - one in the East who voted "traditionalist", and one in the West, who voted "modern" ("Polska solidarna" versus “Polska liberalna”). The old post-communist divisions that had impacted Polish politics in the 1990s were gradually passing into history (Szczerbiak, 2008:428). Many former social democratic voters preferred the "law and order" party (PiS) with its clear social profile and distrust towards Europeanization and globalization. In addition, the lower election turnout at the 2005 election was to be more detrimental to the Civic Platform (PO) than to the Law and Justice Party (PiS).

As regards electoral support, at the election 25 September 2005 the PO gained rather disappointing 24 percent of the votes, i.e. an increase in the share of votes but a lower share than for the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Therefore, the party could not "automatically" fill the position as prime minister and for sure not should Donald Tusk win the presidential election that took place shortly after the national election, but that in fact did not take place. Like in 2001 the PO electoral support was in particular strong among young well-educated living in the larger cities. However, some core voters were discouraged by the "smooth" and professionalised and almost “U.S. type” of election campaign.

At the 2005 election, the middle-class was well represented in the 132 member parliamentary group and among the 34 senators. Many had some local political experience, and many were scientists, entrepreneurs, or lawyers, in short, highly educated people.

At the regional and local elections autumn 2006, Civic Platform (PO) became the largest party achieving the triumph to win the presidency in Warsaw, where the party's candidate Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz overtook Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in the second round of the election. But the party did not gain the desired success in all the major cities, especially not at the local and district level (powiaty), where the party was poorly organized and without sufficiently suitable party candidates. The PO’s share at those elections (along with the PSL peasant party) reached 44 pct. share of the votes (against then ruling PiS-Block’s 35 percent).

After the local elections in November 2006 there was some talk about the beginning of a new much different "Fifth Republic" introduced by the PO. But the PO wavered on the question of a political coalition with the new centre-left alliance (LiD), which received about 14 percent of the votes in the regional elections and more than 20 percent of the votes in the capital Warsaw. Such liberal-socialist cooperation “a la Hungary” might intimidate several right-leaning voters right away. The fact that the
polls conducted from early 2006 gave the Civic Platform (PO) almost the same support as the Law and Justice Party (PiS), was to some extent conducive to the higher party cohesion and centralization.

As regards the policy line, during negotiations about the formation of government after the 2005 election, the party paid much attention to requirements of privatization, “streamlining” the public sector and new procedures for the design of the finance laws and for the employment in the public sector. For state employees detailed information about private financial situation would be demanded, and the immunity for parliamentarians be abolished or as a minimum limited. It would also be easier for parliament to bring cases against the President and the National Bank Director to the court, what may blur the separation between the legislative and executive power. The reckoning with the past (“lustracje”) which the PiS so forcefully demanded had less appeal to the Civic Platform (PO). In the election campaign the Civic Platform (PO) claimed that the prime minister’s Chancellery should have more to say power over the economic policy, what in turn might weaken the otherwise strong position of the Ministry of Finance.

In early 2007, the slogan "IV Republic YES, but deformation “NO” appealed to many. Furthermore, the party council decided to introduce a more pro-European policy. Thus, the slogan about "Nice or die" was effectively shelved. The key political slogans concentrated on the deepening of European integration, introduction of market economy, competitive and efficient economy, rural development, support to families, respect for historical traditions and Polish patriotism, in short, traditionalist-liberal slogans added soft right-traditionalism.

As regards coalition building and coalition potential, the establishment of a PO-PiS government would have been a risky endeavour hardly lasting beyond the election period. That the Law and Justice Party (PiS) became the largest party and also won the presidency came as a shock to the PO, and aroused a debate within the party about the advisability of going into government with the PiS.

The negotiations on a PO-PiS government formation ended without result. Notwithstanding some rapprochement between the two parties on certain points, the political distance between the two parties turned out to be too large, when applied to the extent of central government expenditures. More importantly, groups within and outside the Law and Justice Party (PiS), e.g. Tadeusz Rydzyk and Radio Maryja, vigorously opposed a government with Civic Platform (PO) instead aiming for a PiS minority government with the support of Selfdefence (Samoobrona), the League of Polish Families (LDR) and
the Peasant Party (PSL), and those circles within the PiS got their way when it came to the crunch. Therefore the PO leadership recommended to be in opposition to the PiS led government, reject confidence to the PiS government, draw up an alternative political programme and establish a shadow Cabinet.

If there had been a “PO-PiS coalition”, the problems would probably have been greatest for the Civic Platform (PO), which encompassed a heterogeneous group of different "platforms" ranging from from “pure liberals” to national nominee Catholics. The party leadership was more homogeneous and disciplined within the PiS, where the Kaczynski twin brothers led their party with firm hands.

At the confidence vote in parliament in October 2005 Civic Platform (PO) voted against Marcinkowski’s new minority government, leaving the role of support to the government to the peasant party (PSL), Selfdefence (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), in the long run hardly a stable coalition. The decision to vote against the government did not lead to any major rift within the PO, but compared with party chairman (Donald Tusk), Jan Rokita spoke in favour of a conciliatory line toward the new minority government consisting of the Law and Justice Party (PiS).

Thus, as regards party cohesion, in early 2006 there was some talk that at the party congress later that year, Tusk would be confronted with a candidate from the conservative wing of the party, for example Deputy Chairman of Parliament Bronislaw Komorowski or maybe the more “soft” Jan Rokita. However, despite some opposition and different political "clubs" within the party, Donald Tusk apparently seemed to be the only one able to maintain party cohesion and reconcile the various factions within the party, and for that same reason, he decided decline to the position as speaker of parliament (Sejm). As chairman of the parliament there would, he said, be too far a distance away from the leadership duo Tusk-Rokita and down to the next level.

Despite the increase in the share of votes inevitably there was some post-election frustration. The fact that Andrzej Sosnierz voiced concern by his request that the PO should go into government and was excluded from the parliament group was laid out in the press as a sign of internal division. It also attracted some criticism within the party that during the campaign Donald Tusk had not prepared election manifestos sufficiently attractive to the electorate. Furthermore, some party members felt that Tusk had been too passive in the late phase of the election campaign.

The council meeting in June 2006 once more stressed the significance of the party unity regardless of the fact that the Civic Platform (PO) at that time in fact allowed much internal democratic debate. Criticism of the PiS government’s “brutalisation” of the political life went on undeterred, but the policy line was not entirely consistent. The guns were especially targeting at some MPs from the PiS, especially. Jacek Kurski, who had accused the PO of illegal funding of the presidential campaign in 2005, but also the “slaughter” of the Minister of Finance Zyta Gilowski, a former member of the Civic Platform (PO). Also Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga received harsh words due to her unprofessional management of the ministry. Agricultural Minister Andrzej Lepper was met with a vote of no-confidence that did not receive the adequate support.

Donald Tusk’s position as chairman of the party was strengthened after the 2006 local elections, while Jan Rokita’s and other rivals’ position within the party weakened. So far, the right-leaning Jan Rokita stayed within the party, but in a weakened position.

As regards the party programme, at the convention in May 2007, it once more was claimed the strategy of distancing itself from both the time during SLD (Leszek Miller) as the PiS (Kaczyński brothers), and old programmatic themes such as linear taxation, however, a moderated version, and the introduction of elections in individual constituencies were re-launched. At the meeting Bronisław Komorowski spoke about modernization of Poland ”in accordance with the national traditions and values”, whatever that might mean precisely. Furthermore, the slogan about unity and cohesion was also repeated several times.

As regards the party strategy, with the establishment of a PiS-led government, the PO had to follow a balancing act, being in opposition and simultaneously with a political distance from the other opposition party (the SLD). Apparently, the Civic Platform (PO) chose the strategy of selective rather than outright opposition, aiming to pre-empt accusations from especially PiS that the PO was blocking efforts to fight corruption and reform the state. This meant supporting key elements of the PiS government’s legislative programme e.g. the establishment of the new anti-corruption bureau (CBA), reform of the military intelligence service, and the extension of the scope of lustration (Szczerbiak, 2008).

---

15 www.pap.pl 26 June 2006, ”PO ma nowy zarząd, manifestuje jednoscia zapowiada ofensywne wyborcze”.
17 Vetting individuals for their ties to the communist era security services.
In fact, the PO chose a strategy of tough but "unbiased" opposition politics launching its own policy on topics like health care, taxes, privatization and reform of state administration, but for the time being the PO was not interested in provoking new early elections. However, the precondition for entering governmental cooperation with the Law and justice Party (PiS) was that the PiS definitively abandoned cooperation with Andrzej Lepper and Samoobrona.

The strategy was to make sure that the next election would primarily be a showdown between the PiS and the PO - with the SLD, Selfdefence (Samobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) placed in a marginal position. The party tried to strengthen the social profile and invest more in the rural areas, especially support the more affluent and modern part of the peasants, thus avoiding the lot of being regarded as the party for the cities and socially most advantaged and best educated. Thus, on the one hand, the Civic Platform (PO) aimed to broaden the electoral base beyond the middle class and strengthen the catch-all profile. On the other hand, a too moderate “broad” policy could mean that the political line and the "political language" became too vague, opportunistic and too unclear and therefore confusing to many voters.

In other words, after the 2005 elections, the party had to position itself somewhere between the liberal and national-conservative pole. The first real test of strength between the different factions within the party might take place the day the PiS minority government would run into political difficulties, and the PO had to choose between either early elections or negotiations for a “PO-PiS” coalition government. As mentioned above, the option of a common "PO-PiS" government came to nothing due to the escalation of the PiS' political “wars on all fronts”.

In addition, important for the party strategy was, which political line Lech Kaczynski would follow as president. After the election, Lech Kaczynski proclaimed that his aim was to "close" and "bury" the many issues related to the past, to be president of all Poles despite the fact that his votes mostly came from rural areas. He also spoke about a new and reasonable relationship with Germany and Russia and to use the powers the office gave him to be more active in foreign policy than had been the case of his predecessor (Aleksander Kwasniewski).

However, those plans were far from realized. His plan to call early election on the 2006 budget and the government’s own war against the National Bank and Leszek Balcerowicz aroused great indignation among the opposition parties. Thus, in practice, Lech Kaczynski became president, not for the whole
people, but mainly his own party (PiS) and the twin brother Jarosław Kaczyński. The strategy of the PO mainly became reactive, being “against” (the president and the PiS) thereby weakening the policy and programme profile.

With the prospects of early election, the PO had to prepare for a quick take over of government responsibility and at the same time keep the door open for some form of cooperation with the SLD and Left Democrats (LiD), but any formal cooperation with the centre-left was not acceptable yet. As mentioned before, the PO had to conduct its “wars” on two fronts – being against the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the “post-communists” (SLD and LiD).

Thus, about the stage between 2005 and 2007 we can conclude that the Civic Platform (PO) before the 2007 election aimed at streamlining its institutional set-up striving to appear to the electorate as the unified and relevant party which takes responsibility for the future of the country, takes not only liberal but also national Christian values seriously and is able to distance itself from the radicalism of both the Right and Left and the PiS-government’s aim to strengthen the state and target individuals, e.g. by sharpening the “cleansing laws” (“lustracja”) and laws on moral issues and introducing more control of the mass media. By the institutional changes introduced in 2006 the Civic Platform (PO) became a centralized top-down party with a soft liberal-conservative “Thacherite” policy and an almost catch-all profile.

Stage 4:
2007-: The Civic Platform (PO) in government

In the summer of 2007, the political atmosphere in the country became heavily polarized. Thus, the PO sharply criticized the government’s strategy before the EU summit in June, which adopted the principles of the new reform treaty. Shortly after that meeting, Samoobrona’s leader Andrzej Lepper was expelled from the PiS government accused of corruption Therefore the PO announced proposals for early elections and a “self-dissolution” of parliament. Before the election the PO decided to introduce a non-confidence vote against the most unpopular ministers, which, however, did not get the sufficient supporting votes in parliament. On the other hand, the PO did not provide support LiD’s demand for setting up two parliamentary committees dealing with justice, including an investigation of the circumstances surrounding Barbara Błida’s suicide in connection with her arrest by the police.
In the end, a majority was established in parliament to demand self-dissolution and holding early election. The election campaign started dramatically with Jan Rokita's withdrawal from politics, formally because of disagreement concerning the composition of the PO’s list in Krakow. His wife, adviser to president Lech Kaczynski in family matters, ran for the PiS at the 2007 election. The PiS tried to win voters by attacking the PO project about privatisation (“commercialization”) of hospitals and accuse the MP of the PO, Beata Sawicka, of corruption, but according to most polls the majority of Poles had the feeling that the anti-corruption bureau (CBA) was too politicised mainly engaged in finding compromising material on the PiS’ opponents (Szczerbiak, 2008:423).

Institutionally, after the adoption of new party statutes in 2006, the decision making of the PO became more centralized with great power to Tusk and a loyal inner circle around him. The National Council (“Rada Krajowa”), consisting of parliamentarians, leaders of the regions and delegates elected by the party Convention was the most influential. Between meetings in the National Council, the party was governed by a 14 person governing body (“zarzad”). The election of Bronislaw Komorowski as president in July 2010 forced the party to introduce some institutional adjustments.

Thus, in summer-autumn 2010 the number of members of the governing body (“zarzad”) and the National Council (“Rada Kraja”) was expanded. The next level was the basic party units on the powiaty and the regional level. There are app. 1,900 basic party units (“podstawowa jednostka”) consisting of as a minimum seven party members.

The number of party members increased from 28,000 in early 2008 up to 46,000 in 2010 (the number of members of the PiS was app. 22,000). In 2008, the PO obtained about 38m zł in state support. Those who were elected for the party have to pay a special “party tax” of 10 pct., each party member pays (2009) 5 zł per month

As regards party cohesion, after the 2010 presidential election many observers expected that some factionalization inside the party may take place. Thus, Komorowski was likely to establish his own autonomous platform allying himself with Grzegorz Schetyna (new marshal of Sejmen) and some “independents” on the left like Aleksander Kwasniewski, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Wojciech Olejniczak. In other words, after the presidential election the “hegemonic” position of Donald Tusk

---

could not be maintained. Shortly after the election, some disagreement erupted between Schetyna and Tusk concerning the proposal of Donald Tusk about a (moderate) increase in VAT in order to improve the state budget.

Civic Platform, data about party members:

| Number of party members (2010): | 46,000 |
| Share of women among party members: | 13.5 pct. |

Attitudes among the party members:

On the party chairman: 95 pct find Donald Tusk a “fine leader”

The members’ opinion about the church:

60 pct. share the opinion that the influence of the church in politics is too great in Poland today

on party democracy:

53 pct find the communication within the party “not good”, and 30 pct find that decision making in the party are not democratic

Education: 90 pct. Of the party members are high educated

Age: Only 6.5 pct are less than 30 years old

Political self-identification:

30 pct see themselves as “centrist”, 50 pct “centre-right”, 13 pct as “right”.

Source:

A survey conducted by Civipol Wolnego Uniwersitetu w Brukseli in cooperation with Universytertu Wloclawskiego, results included in Janicki 2010, see note 18.

In the 2007 election campaign the PO made bold pledges that adopting the “Irish model” and abandoning excessive regulation would bring about an “economic miracle” that would pay for improved public services and infrastructure, thereby preventing Poles from being forced abroad to improve their standard of living. Thereby the Civic Platform (PO) tried to transcend the “liberal versus social-solidaristic Poland” dichotomy that had cost the victory in the 2005 election arguing that the party supported a “liberal economic policy and a solidaristic social policy” (Szczerbiak, 2008:422-423). Furthermore, the party tried to associate itself with the “liberal” members of the Episcopate as a counter measure against the support of Radio Maryia to the PiS.
As regards electoral support, at the start of the election campaign many polls did not suggest a victory for the PO, but the party succeeded on the way to mobilize young voters in the larger towns, while the turnout remained low among PiS’ core voters outside the towns. So at the election the Civic Platform (PO) became the largest party winning 41.5 per cent of the votes and consequently started negotiations with the Farmers’ Party (PSL) about the formation of a new government. The electoral success was expressed by the influx of new party members, but the size of party membership remained low by European standards, around 46,000 in 2010.

Negotiations with the PSL peasant party ended with the establishment of a common government without problems with receiving the necessary vote of confidence in parliament. As regards policy and programme the radical elements in the PO’s programme, such as the desire for a low flat tax, were not to be realized in cooperation with the Peasant Party (PSL). In his inaugural statement Tusk showed a new style with special appeal to the "modern" Poland, a more "diplomatic" and nuanced foreign policy, better relationship with Germany, more "normal" relations with Russia and a more "commercial spirit" in the relations with the US. The EU line became more positive, but Donald Tusk ran into a serious rivalry with president Lech Kaczynski, who did not intend to let the government have the final word on questions about foreign policy, including the EU policy.

In the relations with the United States, Donald Tusk laid a critical distance to the Kaczynski brothers’ "permissive" line, e.g. in the question of Polish participation in the US missile defence system. In return for the participation of Poland in the war, the new government demanded American political and financial support for reinforcement of Polish air defence system. Domestically, the difference between the president and the prime minister was most evident with regard to the political style that under the rule of Donald Tusk became less confrontational resting on pragmatism, prudence, temperance, liberalism and Catholicism and conservatism seen as a move toward non-ideological “post-politics”. Under PO-rule Poland should be protected against “great projects”, “great leaders” and “great conflicts” as under the Kaczynski-twin brothers’ fourth Republic (Lech Rubisz, in Migalski, 2009:89).

Tusk carried out some substitutions in key administrative positions to the detriment of the PSL, but when it came to policy and legislation, Tusk behaved cautiously. The PO-PSL government opened up to privatization and simplification of the tax system. Savings in the 2008 state budget were used to raise the wages in the health sector. However, several election promises, for instance economic incentives for Poles wishing to return home from work abroad, could not be fulfilled. Some law proposals were met
with a presidential veto, and Donald Tusk was not much interested in seeing the veto’s from the President reversed by the support of the Left (LiD). After the 2011 presidential election, the cohabitation problem between the president and the prime minister was minimized by the election July 2010 of Bronislaw Komorowski as president.

Despite the widespread failure of legislation, the PO maintained a solid lead over the PiS in the opinion polls, but it creaked in the government coalition because of the different policies of the PO and the PSL on state support to parties and allegations from the side of PO of nepotism among some ministers of the Peasant Party (PSL). In April 2008, disagreement broke out in the government on savings in transfer income to farmers and in 2010 on increase of taxation (VAT) aiming to lower the deficit on the state budget.

In February 2008, a discussion opened up on constitutional amendments, mainly on the PO’s old key issues of abandonment of the Senate, limiting the number of parliamentarians and the immunity of parliamentarians. In late 2009 he came forward with a proposal about indirect election of the president and abolition of the presidential veto. Tusk, maybe more controversially, proposed “commercialization” of the health system and a gradual rise of the retirement age with some restrictions of the rules for early retirement for particular advantaged groups (e.g. teachers). Some increase in the retirement age passed the parliament, but otherwise the government was accused of inaction, in particular when it came to the reforms of the public finances that were a condition for the introduction of the euro, which according to the plan should take place already in 2012. A plan for the reconstruction of public finances was published in January 2010, but the proposals were rather imprecise and contradictory. Before the 2010 presidential election, neither Tusk nor Kaczynski dared to provoke the electorate by presenting “great reforms”. After the 2010 presidential election, the government once again proposed some reforms, e.g. as regards the health sector and the pension system.

Thus, as put by Jaroslaw Makowski20, the lack of legislative initiatives was not only due to divisions within the government and veto from the president. The slow progress of the privatization process and the state budget deficit were to a large extent caused by the “election anomie” shortly before the presidential election.

---

A fall in popular support for the government might be caused by the growing loss of Polish soldiers’ lives during the unpopular war in Afghanistan or new political scandals like “afera hazardowa” in October 2009 with accusations from the side of the anticorruption bureau (CBA) about corruption and illegal lobbyism that involved leading PO members in the preparing stage of the new law on “gambling” (“hazardowe”). This issue led to a political crisis and a reconstruction of the government and a full-fledged “war” between the Prime Minister Donald Tusk on the one side and CBA and the head of that organisation (Mariusz Kaminski) on the other.

An advantage to the PO government and the position of Tusk was that Poland (compared with other post-communist countries) was less affected by the international financial crisis 2008-2009 than other CEECs. In contrast to the PiS Donald Tusk was indeed not to advocate the introduction of larger aid packages to the financial sector. The fiscal discipline and the fastest possible introduction of the euro was the reply to the crisis. However, improvement of the state budget was impossible to carry through due to declining state revenues and even the proposal about moderate tax increases was met with resistance also inside the PO.

As mentioned above, the election of Bronislaw Komorowski as president removed the cohabitation problem between president and prime minister. Thus the barriers for implementation of the promises given by the PO in the 2007 election campaign could easier be overcome. However, as argued by Witold Gadomski, nothing indicates that the PO after the presidential election is intended to carry through deep and in many ways unpopular reforms of e.g. the pension system, reforms of the health sector and privatisation of the financial and sector and energy. Too many people close to the PO had obtained lucrative jobs in the (semi)public sector, and the interest to “provoke” the electorate shortly before the local and regional elections and the 2011 national election was (and is) modest, - to put it “mildly”. In addition, on introduction of a more free market economy the Peasant Party (PSL) was no easy partner.

More about the party type and party profile

At we have seen, from the outset the Civic Platform (PO) launched itself as an election party with a distinct and rather soft populist liberal party programme and with a rather flat institutional structure and weak central control. From the outset, the PO was neither a mass party nor a historical nor a “post-

Witold Gadomski, “We władzy lewicowych populistów”, Gazeta Wyborcza 7-8 August 2010:15.
communist” party. As we have already seen, over the years the PO moved away from the first stage cartel and electoral type of party.

As put by Pawel Spiewak22, after government take-over in 2007 the PO came closer to an “anti-program party” mainly appealing to the “satisfied” Poles and without major long-term political visions and programmes. This, however, reflected very well the attitudes of the Polish population where polls evidenced an increase among the population in the level of satisfaction with the tangible reality and an aversion to new “shocks” and “great changes”. The present, not the past and the future, was to be most important, administration to come before politics and step by step policy before reforms. Like other countries in Europe, Poland moved closer to “post-politics”.

As put by Mariusz Janicki (Janicki, 2010), the Civic Platform (PO) was first established as a cadre unit and a institutional party of power but later changed the party type. Not surprisingly, several times the former “tenor” and later defector Maciej Plazynski23 accused the Civic Platform (PO) of being a top-down controlled and centralist governed “leader driven” party (”partia wodzowska”) and thus not at all the “light” open and democratic electoral party at the time of the establishment of the party back in 2001.

Rafal Matyja contends that the party today is seen mainly as a mean for “disciplization” and support for the leadership, not for creating a “modern” party for better communication and coordination24. Institutionally, in the beginning the PO reminded of a cartel party (the great power to the parliament group), later coming closer to the mass party as regards the institutional structure (K. Sobolewska-Myslik etc., in Migalski, 2009:51) and the electoral party as regards vote maximisation, centralization of decision making and (at least formally) better access for party members to party leaders (Sobolewska-Myslik, in Migalski 2009:50-51).

Slawomir Sierakowski25 considers the PO as a party that received much electoral support, but not able to obtain political hegemony. In contrast to the PiS, the aim of the Civic Platform (PO) was no to dominate the state, the media and the economy. In that sense, cartel characteristics became less striking than in the case of the PiS. Political marketing and focus on the “reality” (not ideologies) was the most

23 E.g. in an interview with Plazynski in Gazeta Wyborcza 11 August 2009:16, “Stoje z boku partyjnej polityki”. Maciej Plazynski was among those who died 10 April 2010 at Smolensk.
important. Right and left populism will probably decline provided the economy performs well and the 
opposition, that be the right (PiS) or Left (SLD), remains weak and compromised. Under those 
circumstances Civic Platform (PO) may obtain electoral success simply by using the old slogan of “us 
(PO) or “them” (PiS and SLD). But it is no easy task to persuade so many disparate groups of voters 
only united in their dislike of the former governments of Jaroslaw Kaczynski and the “post-
communists”, but disagreeing on policy as well as programme.

Piotr Stasiak considers the PO a new “quality” in the political life in Poland, institutionally appearing as 
a “modern” and “innovative” party, aiming to “change and modernize” life by using American type 
primaries by appointment of candidates at elections\(^\text{26}\). This happened when choosing the (“new”) 
candidate for the 2010 presidential election. Here it was possible for the 46,000 party members to vote 
online (via internet) on either Radislaw Sikorski or Bronislaw Komorowski. Komorowski was the 
winner of the primary as well as at the presidential election in June 2010.

Thus, the fact that the PO fared well ahead in the polls and also became the winner at the European 
Parliament elections in June 2009 and the presidential election in July 2010 was apparently due to the 
fact that the desire for "evolution" and not "revolution" had a firm hold in the Polish electorate. The 
decision of Donald Tusk not to run for the 2010 presidential election apparently was an advantage for 
the Civic Platform (PO). As said, the party could to profit from the slogans about “de-politicization” 
and "anti-radicalism", at least as long as memories of the conditions under PiS ‘government from 2005-
2007 and the post-communist from 2001-2005 were fresh in the minds of the voters. The tragedy 10 
April 2010 in Smolensk did not reverse the memory of the failed project of “the fourth republic”, at 
least not in the short run. However, the unexpectedly high share of votes for Jaroslaw Kaczynski at the 
June-July 2010 presidential election made the prospects for the outcome of 2011 national election more 
doubtful than before 10 April.

In short, after the 2007 election basically three political poles became dominant: the liberal, the centrist 
and the (hard or soft) right- or left populist (see the figure). The policy line of the PO became centrist, 
almost “post-political”. The left populists had almost disappeared from the political scene. The PO 
succeeded in appealing to some centrist politicians on the left like Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Wojciech 
Olejniczak and Jerzy Hausner. The Olechowski-Piskorski initiative for re-vitalization of the Democratic 
Party (SD) in order to create a sustainable alternative to the PO was not successful and therefore did

not constitute a serious threat. In short, in the beginning of 2010 and also after the presidential election in July 2010, the position of the Civic Platform (PO) looked rather stable. The greatest problem might become the coalition potential at the 2011 national election.

Figure: the three main political poles after the 2007 elections

![Political poles diagram]

**Final remarks, Civic Platforms’ position in a Central European context**

As shown in the previous sections, in its short 10 year history the Civic Platform (PO) ran through great changes. In the longer run, the original flat and open almost bottom-up type party institutionalization could be maintained. By changing the party rules in 2003 and 2006 the PO came closer to the mass party with a high concentration of power around the party leadership and in particular the party chairman (Donald Tusk). At the same time we find some catch-all and cartel characteristics, however the centralisation of power with less influence to the parliamentary group deviated from the ideal type of cartel party. The changes in the institutional set-up toward more centralization on the leadership level and top-down procedures were inevitable much due to the higher electoral support and the take-over of government power.

The coalition potential of the PO varied over time. Before the 2005 election there was talk about a common government with the Law and Justice Party (PiS), but that coalition came to nothing. After the 2007 election the Peasant Party (PSL) was the only viable coalition partner despite several divisions between the two parties on policy and programme. After the upcoming 2011 election the SLD might become a “third force” in Polish politics and the party that decides who – the PO or PiS- to form the new government.
Nevertheless, in the year 2010 the Civic Platform (PO) looked like a “success story”. The aim to appear to the electorate as a centrist catch-all party by broadening the electoral profile has been striking ever since taking over office of government in 2007 appealing to the “modern” part of farmers and the moderate part of the Church.

However, the PO can not in the long run be a great party only by being “against” the compromised left (SLD) and the right (PiS). The outcome of the 2010 presidential election proved that the PO has to change somehow the own political profile. Inevitably, one day “the shock” of two years of “Kaczyński rule” 2005-2007 will fade away.

Furthermore, the political “metal fatigue” may hit also the PO and the prime minister, the Polish economy may one day again be in recession and force the government to introduce unpopular reforms. The Left may regain strength as proved by the rather high share of the vote by SLD candidate Grzegorz Napiralski at the 2010 presidential election, and, finally, the Civic Platform (PO) may be exposed to new political “scandals” (like the “afera hazardowa” October 2009) and maybe also destructive intra-party divisions.

The decision of Donald Tusk not to run for presidency at the election in 2010 that would have forced him to resign as party chairman, seemed to be grounded in the fear of division and disruption within the PO, not the fear of election defeat\(^7\). The victory of Bronisław Komorowski at the 2010 presidential election removed the cohabitation problem, but the more “soft” centrist policy of Jarosław Kaczyński in the presidential election campaign may improve the prospects for the PiS at the 2011 national election. However, the “soft policy” of PiS and Jarosław Kaczyński, became “harder” after the presidential election evidenced during the “war of the cross” and the hardening of the political rhetoric of Jarosław Kaczyński in general. In other words, after the presidential election the “true” and “old” Jarosław Kaczyński from 2005-2007 came back. Thus, the PO may win the upcoming 2011 election mainly by the widespread fear among the electorate of a return of the PiS to power, not by new “great reforms”.

As said, the main problem might become the coalition potential as the PO after the 2011 election hardly enter a coalition neither with the PiS, and the Peasants Party (PSL) at that election may not pass the election threshold. A coalition with the SLD and Grzegorz Napiralski might be seen a “provocation” by a great part of the electorate and lead to the establishment of new and successful neoliberal protest

\(^7\) Many comments on that issue in Polish press, e.g. Renata Grochal, Co Wybierze lider Platformy, Tusk na rozstajnych drogach”, Gazeta Wyborcza 22.1. 2010:22-23.
parties as in the case of the SaS (“Freedom and Justice”) in Slovakia and the VV (“Public Affaires”) in the Czech Republic.

As regards the centralisation of decision making the Civic Platform (PO) and top-down decision making comes close to the Civic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic and FIDESZ in Hungary. Like the PO, the ODS and FIDESZ are office seeking and centralized cartel type parties with a rather broad almost catch-all profile, but while the ODS moved closer to “non-ideological post-politics”, the FIDESZ tried (and succeeded) to activate new-old systemic cleavages. As young party with weak bonds to the Solidarity tradition, the party culture of the PO has been is still rather weak.

Thus, the centralist post-political technocratic stance, the hallmark of Civic Platform (PO), we do not find in Hungary, where FIDESZ from 2009 faced stiff competition from the right-extremist party Jobbik. The right-wing populism in Hungary was mostly due to the economic recession in the wake of the global financial crisis.

In addition, we must not forget that the position of the political left is stronger in the Czech Republic (and Slovakia) than in Poland and Hungary. After the 2005 election (Poland) and the 2010 election (Hungary) the political scene became dominated by the right, in Poland the PO versus the PiS, in Hungary FIDESZ versus Jobbik, and without the bipolar party system format known at previous elections.

Polish politics was not in every respect consistent with “mainstream” politics in Central Europe. The experience from the first two decades after the fall of the Berlin wall has amply demonstrated that politics in Central Europe has been (and is still) determined by specific national path-dependencies and path-ways.
Annex:
Development of political parties in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>The Czech Republic</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Post)Solidarity versus (post)communists</td>
<td>Civic Forum (OF) versus (post) communists (KSCM)</td>
<td>Establishment of the movement party Alliance against Violence (VPN)</td>
<td>Political parties formed over two years, i.e. from 1987 in a rather consocietational political culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the beginning mostly exogenously established parties</td>
<td>Rapid move away from movement parties, party fragmentation in the first years</td>
<td>Fragmentation, the VPN soon divided in several non-standard party formations</td>
<td>The important role of intellectuals, “sofa”-type parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternately party merger/fusion and divisions</td>
<td>New parties based on anti-politics (e.g. 4Koalice) versus standard parties (e.g. the ODS and CSSD)</td>
<td>Reformed (post)communist party (SDL)</td>
<td>Few new parties in parliament, until 2002 only the MIEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The many “wars in the top”</td>
<td>Low party institutionalisation in most non-communist parties (ODS as an exception from that rule)</td>
<td>Since 1993 several new successful new parties (e.g. ANO) and protest parties (e.g. Smer), almost all with an unstable voter basis</td>
<td>Mainly exogenously created parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Until 2005:</td>
<td>Anti-system right wing party (SPR-RSC) 1992-1998</td>
<td>Standard type parties side by side with non-standard parties and party alliances</td>
<td>From the outset a &quot;social democratised” communist party (MSZP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More party cohesiveness on the Left than on the Right</td>
<td>An authentic historical</td>
<td>Rather strong ethnic minority parties</td>
<td>Agrarian class party (FKGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Post-communist” (SLD) transformation to standard party, post-communist political comeback 1993, the second come-back in 2000-2001, after that a sharp decline</td>
<td></td>
<td>Many party splits, but</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in voter support and internal division took place followed the establishment of the new social democratic party SDRP in 2004

**Party-alliance AWS 1996-2001**

The Liberal Platform (PO) and the two populist party formations Samoobrona and the LPR in the parliament at the 2001 and 2005 elections.

Election defeat for the left at the 2007 election, the PO in government. Samoobrona and the LPR lost representation in parliament

---

social democratic party (CSSD) and a weakly reformed communist party (KSCM)

Fall in electoral support of CSSD at the 2004 elections

Weak right-traditionalist parties

Several fragile party alliances e.g. the Left Blok (LB) (1992), 4K, the later Coalition (K) (2006)

The Green Party (SZ) in parliament at 2006 election.

The TOP9 and the new VV party in parliament 2010

(Clientelistic charismatic and internally much divided non-standard parties both on the Right and the Left, new neoliberal soft populist party (SaS) gained representation in parliament

(Hungarian)

Unstable party alliances, several new parties and fragile party alliances up to the 2002 election

Communist party (KSSS) came in parliament at the 2002 election, but did not pass the election threshold in 2006

Internal divisions of the SDKU after the 2002 election.

---

high political stability, No extraordinary “snap” elections

Broad based “umbrella” type political parties, e.g. MDF, FIDESZ and SZDS

Rather weak anti-systemic extremist parties, mostly represented by the MIEP

No new parties enter the parliament in 2006 election

2009-

Turn to populism, Jobbik as a “third force” FIDESZ political hegemony

The Socialist Party (MSZP) election defeat 2010
Figure: Party systems in Poland, the Czech Republic Slovakia and Hungary 1989-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme multiparty system, party non systems 1991-93</td>
<td>From start systemic “We” (Civic Forum (OF) versus “Them” (post)communists)</td>
<td>After the division of Czechoslovakia high polarisation (for and against Vladimir Meciar and the HZDS)</td>
<td>The party system format stable and moderate multiparty since 1989 with five or six political parties in parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate multiparty systems at the 1993 election</td>
<td>Dominant party systems 1990-1996 due to the OF and the ODS’ strong position</td>
<td>Adversary politics from after independence in 1993</td>
<td>Populist-urbanist cleavage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive polarisation and a new “cold wars” between president and government</td>
<td>Moderate multiparty system format, pluralistic polarisation</td>
<td>No clear left-right party division because of the Meciar-anti-Meciar divide</td>
<td>Majority governments with four years governmental periods all years since 1989, historic compromises between socialists and liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate, i.e. partly de-freezing of ideological cleavages, the “We versus Them”, but mostly on the electoral level</td>
<td>Socio-economic cleavages strong from the beginning</td>
<td>Standard and non-standard parties, at et same time broad negative party alliances (against Meciar)</td>
<td>Governmental system with strong power to the prime ministers (“Kanzler-rule”) rather weak presidential influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist second comeback from late 1990s, first at 2000 presidential election, and second at 2001 parliamentary election</td>
<td>Anti-politics versus liberal standard type politics (Havel versus Klaus)</td>
<td>Volatile elections, moderate multiparty system</td>
<td>The populism versus urbanism cleavage re-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Closer to bipolar party system

2001: Dealignment with new parties on the Right after the demise of the AWS

Dealignment of the party system in 2001, still a moderate multiparty format

More unstable party system after the 2002 election due to the split within the SLD with formation of the SDPL

A moderate party system format at the 2005 election

The liberal versus solidaric Poland divide at the 2007 election. The LPR and Samoobrona lost their representation in parliament. PO wins the presidential election in July 2010 (Bronislaw Komorowski).

CSSD

Bipolar polarised party system with centrist orientation from the mid 1990s

Moderate de-freezing of old “We-Them” cleavages, non-consensual type of politics

Polarized pluralism 1996-1998

Power sharing agreements

Short-term polarisation from 2000 – for or against the power sharing agreements

Stabilization of the party system at the 2002 election party.

Moderate multiparty (four party) after the 2006 and 2010 election. Political stalemate in 2009, centre-right wins the 2010 election

between president and prime minister, Michal Kovac versus Vladimir Meciar

Ethnic cleavage difficult to defreeze, but that cleavage seemed to play a minor role at the 2010 election.

2001: realignment of the party system because of the dissolution of the SDK, the formation of the SDKU and the Smer-SD, in 2004 division of SDKU and formation of new parties

Moderate multipolarism at the 2006 and 2010 election

Stabilization of the bipolar party system format at the 2006 election, the polarisation “reborn” after the 2006 election.

The socio-economic cleavage became most decisive at the 2006 election

activated at the 2002 election

Symbolic policy and ethnic cleavage related to Hungarian questions about minority rights for Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania

Lower consensualism after the 1998 election, higher polarization - urbanist-populist (Fidesz versus MSZP)- at the 2002 election

Stabilization of the bipolar party system format at the 2006 election, the polarisation “reborn” after the 2006 election.

Realignment of the party system at the 2010 election mainly due to FIDESZ’ “hegemony”
Relevant literature


Duverger, Maurice (1954), *Political Parties*, London:Methuen

Grabowski, Miroslaw, "Political Parties: Social Representative or Agent of Change?", *Polish Sociological Review*, 4 (116), 1996.


Hanley, Seán, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton and Brigid Fowler, “Explaining the Success of Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist East Central Europe”, Sussex European Institute, SEI working paper No 94.


Jarosz, Maria (ed.) (2007), Transformacja Elity Społeczeństwo, Warszawa:Institut Studiów Politycznych PAN.


Kosiewski, Piotr (ed.) (2008), Polska Tuska, Warszawa:Fundacja Batorego


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/1988</td>
<td>Mogens N. Pedersen</td>
<td>Fluctuations in Recruitment Patterns in Connection with a Critical Election: Denmark 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1988</td>
<td>Henrik Larsen</td>
<td>Business and Politics in Denmark. A policy mosaic without pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1989</td>
<td>Karsten Ronit</td>
<td>The Danish Bankers Association Facing De- and Reregulation: Effects on Neo-Corporatist Interpretations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1989</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Organizational Development and Environmental Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1989</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Fungerer idrættens organisationer? Om organisering, brugergrupper og behov i idrætten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1990</td>
<td>Mogens N. Pedersen</td>
<td>European Topics in the Curriculum of European Political Science: Structural Peculiarities and National Idiosyncracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1990</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Political Integration and Institutional Change. The Nordic countries and the EEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1990</td>
<td>Karsten Ronit</td>
<td>Micro-Corporatism and the Political Strategy of Large Corporations: The Case of Novo-Nordisk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1990</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Convergence or Divergence? Consequences of Strategic Choice in Small Voluntary Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1990</td>
<td>Erik Beukel</td>
<td>Integration og Kulturpolitik: Autonomi vs. 'Spill-over’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/1990</td>
<td>Henrik Larsen</td>
<td>Evaluering af erhvervsfremmeordninger i Danmark: Muligheder og problemer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1991</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen &amp; Lars Thore Jensen</td>
<td>EF og kommunerne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1991</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Om teoretiske problemer ved studiet af frivillige organisationer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1992</td>
<td>Lars Thore Jensen</td>
<td>Decentral Internationalisering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1992</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Paragovernmental Organizations, the Extension of the Welfare State - voluntary and nonprofit centers for women in Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1992</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen</td>
<td>Danish Research on Europe. Proceedings from a conference held at Odense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1993</td>
<td>Kurt Klaudi Klausen &amp; Lars Thore Jensen</td>
<td>”Primærkommunerne og EF”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1993</td>
<td>Erik Beukel</td>
<td>Global miljøbeskyttelse som kollektivt gode i international politik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1995</td>
<td>Erik Beukel</td>
<td>America Approaching the Soviet Successor States: Between Idealism and Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1996</td>
<td>Erik Beukel</td>
<td>Miljø og handel. En introduktion til samspillet mellem miljøpolitik og handelspolitik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1999</td>
<td>Erik Beukel</td>
<td>Greening the GATT/WTO Regime? Trade Governance, Environmentalism, and Structural Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1999</td>
<td>Anne Marie &amp; Peter Dahler-Larsen</td>
<td>Fokusgrupper i Teori og Praksis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2001</td>
<td>Johannes Michelsen &amp; Villy Søgaard</td>
<td>Policy Instruments Promoting Conversion to Organic Farming and Their Impact in 18 European Countries - 1985-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/2001</td>
<td>Mogens N. Pedersen</td>
<td>The Interplay of Nominations and Elections in Danish Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Authors/Editors</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2004</td>
<td>Søren Riishøj</td>
<td>National Identitet, Europæisering og Euroskepticisme - erfaringer fra Tjekkiet og Polen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2004</td>
<td>Gunvor Vincents Olsen &amp; Morten Balle Hansen</td>
<td>Fælles sprogs anvendelse i kvalitetsstandarder i den kommunale ældrepleje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2004</td>
<td>Anna Leander</td>
<td>Globalisation and the State Monopoly on the Legitimate use of Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/2004</td>
<td>Anna Leander</td>
<td>Private Agency and the Definition of Public Security Concerns: the Role of Private Military Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/2004</td>
<td>Kasper Møller Hansen, Morten Balle Hansen &amp; Poul Skov Dahl</td>
<td>Spørgeskemaundersøgelse af brugen af Fælles sprog i de danske kommuner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2005</td>
<td>Morten Balle Hansen &amp; Jens Ringsmose</td>
<td>Fælles sprog og ældreplejens organisering i et historisk perspektiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/2005</td>
<td>Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Robert Klemmensen og Martin Ejnar Hansen</td>
<td>Blokpolitik og det ”samarbejdende folkestyres” fire gamle partier, 1953-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/2005</td>
<td>Henrik D. Jørgensen &amp; Morten Balle Hansen</td>
<td>Fælles sprog og hovedproblemerne i ældreplejens organisering. En undersøgelse baseret på fokusgruppeinterviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2005</td>
<td>Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard</td>
<td>The equivocal “will of the people”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2005</td>
<td>Anna Leander</td>
<td>A Minestrone of World Order Constructions: Reflections on Disciplinary Change in IPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2005</td>
<td>Anna Leander</td>
<td>Enduring Conscription: Vagueness and Värnplikt in Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2005</td>
<td>Jens Ringsmose &amp; Morten Balle Hansen</td>
<td>Programteorier om Fælles sprog og organiseringen af ældreplejen i Danmark. En tekstanalyse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/2005</td>
<td>Michael Baggesen Klitgaard</td>
<td>Welfare State Regimes and Public Sector Reforms: Searching for the Connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/2005</td>
<td>Sten Rynning</td>
<td>Return of the Jedi: Realism and the Study of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2005</td>
<td>Rens van Munster</td>
<td>Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/2005</td>
<td>Rens van Munster &amp; Claudia Aradau</td>
<td>Governing terrorism and the (non-)politics of risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2005</td>
<td>Rens van Munster</td>
<td>The EU and the Management of Immigration Risk in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr.</td>
<td>Afsnit</td>
<td>Authører/tegnere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/2005</td>
<td>Morten Balle Hansen &amp; Gunvor V. Olsen</td>
<td>Et komparativt perspektiv på Fælles sprog og organiseringen af den danske ældrepleje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/2005</td>
<td>Erik Beukel</td>
<td>DIIS’ udredning om Danmark under den kolde krig og den efterfølgende mediedebat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/2006</td>
<td>Morten Balle Hansen</td>
<td>Teorier, modeller og begrebsdannelser i Offentlig Organisation og Forvaltning – et struktureringsperspektiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/2006</td>
<td>Søren Riishøj</td>
<td>Konsolidering af demokratiet, partier og partisystemer – træk af forandringerne i de central- og østeuropæiske lande siden 1989 (del I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/2006</td>
<td>Søren Riishøj</td>
<td>Valgene i Polen og Ungarn i 2005 og 2006 – partier og partisystemer (del II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/2006</td>
<td>Søren Riishøj</td>
<td>Tjekkiet og Slovakiet – partier og partisystemer (del III)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2009</td>
<td>Søren Riishøj</td>
<td>Transition, Consolidation and Development of Parties and Party Systems in Central Europe 1989-2009 - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/2010</td>
<td>Søren Riishøj</td>
<td>National identitet, europæisering, euroskepticisme - Status 2010 og erfaringer fra Tjekkiet og Polen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Søren Riishøj is Associate professor, MA at the Department of Political Science and Public Management specializing in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe. Reads Russian, Polish and Czech.