Is public steering of sport facilities the missing link in increasing sport participation

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Is Public Steering of Sport Facilities the missing link in increasing Sport Participation?

Abstract

This article argues that increasing utilization of sport facilities through the use of policy tools from the public administration toolbox can increase sport participation. The effects of different policy tools on the choice of strategy are assessed and it is discussed how they might influence the utilization of sport facilities. Further, it is argued that which strategies are developed is dependent on the role of the VSOs in the sport facilities. Using motivational theory together with rational and normative institutionalism we show which strategies are plausible. Which strategies that are chosen in the end is an empirical issue, but the conceptual framework developed can be used for new insights on how private non-profit sport facilities and similar organisations can be argued to react to changes in policy.

1.0. Introduction

The sport policies of many governments focus on increasing participation in sport. However, there is less focus on how policies can be used as a tool to increase sport participation through improved utilization of sport facilities. So far the literature has focused more on how the performance of sport facilities can be improved when measuring on economic performance and customer satisfaction (Howat, Crilley and Murray, 2005; Liu, Taylor and Shibli, 2009) and less on the crucial role that Voluntary Sport Organisations (VSOs) has in many sport facilities. By focusing on such performance measures borrowed from market-based approaches when analysing the use of sport facilities, there is a risk of not capturing that the behavioural dynamics of the VSOs are very different from the dynamics of the market. While policies based on economic performance measures might be adequate in relation to assessing how the sport facility is performing in general, such approaches might miss important learning points when it comes to implementing policies.
aimed at increasing utilization via increased use by VSOs. By introducing a conceptual framework we strive to set direction for researchers, politicians and bureaucrats who might consider making analysis and decisions on policies targeting VSOs without using tools that includes the perspective of the VSOs. Hence, we argue firstly, that there is a gap in the research literature and that it is necessary to include the role that VSOs play in sport facilities in order to assess the consequences of different policies directed towards sport facilities. We theorize how the possible connection between subsidies and utilization can be understood from a theoretical perspective.

Using examples from Denmark and Australia to illustrate the thoughts behind the conceptual framework we will argue that this is widely applicable for two reasons. Firstly, it is plausible that VSOs share some common traits (Cuskelly et al., 2006; Ibsen, 1992) that will make the role they play in sport facilities similar across different settings. They have a democratic structure, they rely on voluntary efforts and they are dependent on direct and indirect public subsidies. Secondly, we argue that it is a widespread phenomenon that sport facilities to a large extent rely on public funding and are dependent on having VSOs as user groups in their facility.

1.1. Why focus on Public Spending on Sport Facilities?

Using theories primarily from public administration we ask how the public sector as the main contributor to sport facilities used by VSOs can improve utilization of sport facilities through different types of policies. We define such different policies as different steering models. These are attempts by the local government to influence the development of the sport facility without dictating how the development has to be. The level of local government is chosen, as this contributes significantly to sport facilities. In a Danish context as much as 70-80% of the turnover of the sport facilities comes from city councils (Rasmussen, 2012). In Australia VSOs pay much less than the market based rent for leasing city council property such as sport halls and fields and similar and hence receives large amount of indirect subsidy (City of Gold Coast, 2013a). Further,
cautious estimates of public spending on sport facilities indicate that the public sector both in Denmark and Australia each year use more than 300 million EURO (Howat, Murray, & Crilley, 2005; Ministry of Culture, 2009).

Research on sports participation show that participation in sport and physical activities could be higher in both Denmark and Australia, as participation in sport in total is around 65% in both countries. (ABS, 2013; Laub, 2013). Even though this is a relatively high rate of participation, higher utilization could increase participation, as research has shown that there is locally a lack of sport facilities available for the sport that Danish citizens want to pursue (Laub and Pilgaard, 2012). If more persons can be granted access to the sport facility participation could be increased which is relevant for at least a couple of reasons. Firstly, it can a part of solving some of the health issues that is particular pertinent in the Western World (diabetes, heart conditions, cancer). Secondly, increased participation can also be seen as a way of improving the civic parts of society as increased participation in sport often takes place in VSOs and participation in that organizational setting is often argued to be one of the possible paths to increase social capital in different ways (Putnam, 2001; Østerlund, 2013).

1.2. Sport facilities need to be competitive

Being competitive is to have a strategy which can be defined as “...the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of conditions” (Porter, 2008, p. 53ff). The different activities in a successful strategy should point in the same direction. In this case we argue that the successful strategy for sport facilities considers the central role of the VSOs as well as servicing other users to maximize utilization as utilization is seen as the yardstick for the success of government policies and because subsidization of sport facilities are linked to utilization.

Hence, we argue that being competitive is showing a high degree of utilization, which seems to be a widely accepted goal for sport facilities. (Ministry of Culture, 2009; VicSport, 2006). It also seems
to be a logic goal in the sense that facilities that are primarily funded by the public sector should be used as much as possible in order to benefit as many as possible – and that it should be done as efficient and effective as possible. For example, it has been argued in the Australian context that: “As facilities become more sophisticated and elaborate, it's expected that they should be more efficient and effective and less draining on the public purse.” (Government of Western Australia, 2014). On that background sport facilities need to stay competitive. It seems to us that VSOs have had a privileged position as the public sector has uncritically invested large amounts in funding sport facilities that have benefitted VSOs. But that could be changing, as growth in sport participation outside VSOs is increasing (Laub, 2012). Adding to that the financial challenges of the public sector following changing demographics and the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis could heighten the expectations of sport facilities being competitive and more financially viable. Being a competitive sport facility is hence expected. (Alexandris, 2010; Porter, 2008)

In summary the sport facilities need to balance several competing expectations, as they need to maximize utilization in a manner that is economically viable. Maximizing utilization by increasing use by VSOs could be relevant as the labour cost of staff hired by VSOs are low. That might make it possible for the VSOs to increase utilization through offering activities cheaper than other providers of sport. But on the other hand VSOs might not be able to capture all trends that could be accommodated in the sport facility. Hence, the sport facilities need to balance the needs of VSOs with the goal of attracting other user groups to maximize utilization.

This is a complex discussion as changes in utilization can occur for many reasons. In order to have a discussion on advantages and drawbacks of the steering models we therefore need to make a few ceteris paribus assumptions. Firstly, that it is necessary for sport facilities to be interested in maximising utilization. Secondly, that the city councils are not to a large extent able to use different economic incentives in different steering models to influence which strategy the sport facilities
choose. In this article we solely deal with the dynamics of different steering models and ask: if a city council is to choose a steering model given that they have a certain amount of money to spend on supporting VSOs in sport facilities, which steering model would maximize utilization? As figure 1 illustrates this article aims to increase the understanding of the possible differences of different steering models on the strategies of sport facilities.

![Figure 1: Strategy as an intermediate variable](image)

X (steering model)  ➔  Z (different strategies)  ➔  Y (utilization)

Depending on which strategies the sport facilities choose, the outcome, utilization, might change. The core of the article is developing a conceptual framework for understanding how sport facilities develop strategies. The first part of the article will discuss to what extent the sport facility can be seen as a private or a public organisation. The next part of the article introduces a theoretical framework for understanding how strategies are developed. Thirdly, it will be assessed how different steering models influence strategies and how different strategies might influence utilization. Finally conclusions and ideas for empirical research will be suggested.

Methodologically, the article can be seen as a first step towards developing an even more precise conceptual framework through empirical testing. We strive to show which plausible conjectures for further research that could lead towards more general statements on the relationship between public administration and sport facilities.

**1.2.1. Definition of sport facility, steering model, strategy and utilization**

We define sport facilities as any indoor or outdoor facility with a field of play that needs maintenance in order to be used by VSOs. Examples are outdoor grass turfs for cricket, soccer, rugby or similar sports and indoor arenas for activities such as swimming, basketball and volleyball.
A common denominator is that continuous investments and subsidies from the public sector are expected. Focus is on cases where VSOs are a central part of the sport facilities – as owners, the responsible tenants or as the primary users – or where the VSOs have a similar central position in the sport facilities. Further, we limit the scope to sport facilities that are non-profit. This results in a different point of departure than for-profit sport facilities as any surplus is invested in the Private Non-Profit (PNP) sport facility instead of being paid to stakeholders. Finally, we only include private facilities with a board or a similar governing structure that in principle allows them to take decisions at arm-length of the public sector. Hence, in this article we look at what can be termed PNP sport facilities.

We define utilization as minutes of activity on the turf or sports hall floor. It could also be relevant to consider, for example, the number of active persons on the turf or floor using the facility at a given time or the proportion of the turf or floor in use. However, it seems to us that sport facilities often receive subsidies or income through renting out usable space without assessing how many participants that is on it or how much space is in use. Hence, a competitive strategy seen from the perspective of sport facilities seems to be one focusing on increasing minutes of activity on sport floor or turf.

1.2.2. Steering models applied

To show how different steering models result in different strategies within sport facilities, we consider three different theoretical streams: New Public Management (NPM), New Public Governance (NPG) and Neo-Weberian State (NWS) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). The content and consequences of these will be elaborated in the section below when applied.

1.2.3. Strategy of sport facilities

Competitiveness is frequently an expectation seen across different types of organisations even though it can come in different guises depending on the market in which an organization operates
(Porter, 2008, p. 9). In the perspective adapted here we define staying competitive as maximizing utilization. However, which strategy the PNP sport facilities might choose depend on whether it should be analysed as a public or a private organisation. We use the ‘publicness’ literature to argue PNP sport facilities can be argued to have traits similar to a public organisation.

2.0. How to analyse PNP sport facilities

Analysis of how the public sector in the most efficient manner can steer different public institutions has been comprehensive (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011; Le Grand, 2010). However, this has not been the case regarding sports facilities, even though sport facilities in many cases rely on public subsidies. One of the reasons for the lack of knowledge of consequences of steering models could be that there is a range of different steering models both within and across countries, which is also the case when comparing Australia and Denmark as the scope and scale of obligation on the public sector to subsidise the use of sport facilities by VSOs are very different (Olsen, 2013; City of Gold Coast, 2013a). However, as it is the case in other studies of public sector steering attempts, it is possible to classify different steering models and on that background discuss the consequences of the different steering models and contrast these with other steering models.

2.1. The publicness framework

Studies have shown that public and private organisations seem to differ on issues such as reactions on economic incentives, level of user satisfaction, commitment, economic efficiency and levels of organisational red tape (Andersen & Jakobsen, 2011; Bozeman & Moulton, 2011). Yet other studies of organizations has shown that it is less clear how public and private organisations differ (Aulich, 2011; Bozeman, 2013).

Bozeman (1987) argued that instead of a dichotomy between private and public, it is necessary to introduce a concept that can handle degrees of being under public or private authority. With public authority Bozeman makes a reference to the fact that many organisations, including private
organisations, are influenced by decisions made within the public sector. The influence can for example different level of subsidies or laws and other regulatory measures. With economic authority Bozeman refers to the fact that all organisations are under influence from the market. An example is that a public organisation is partially dependent on selling goods internally to other public authorities, to companies or to persons. (Bozeman, 2013; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994).

Following this analysis, Bozeman introduced the ‘publicness grid’ where the degree of political control is on the x-axis and the degree of economic influence by the market is on the y-axis and. By evaluating on these two dimensions it is possible to conclude the degree of publicness. These two factors are argued to have an influence on how the organisation will interpret the everyday life of the organisation (Bozeman & Moulton, 2011).

**Figure 2: Publicness grid – redrawn with inspiration from Bozeman (2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic authority</th>
<th>Privately owned firm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporation with publicly traded shares on stock market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation reliant on government contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private non-profit organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small voluntary association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-sponsored company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2. Publicness framework applied to sport facilities

We argue that the strategy pursued will vary depending on degree of publicness as we argue that the strategies pursued by a private and a public organisation are different.

PNP sport facilities are neither private nor public. Compared to commercial sport facilities such as bowling centres and rehabilitation facilities run by physiotherapists they do receive subsidies. But they are not to the same extent as city council sport facilities such as public parks or other sport facilities (almost) financed by the public sector.

The discussion in this section places the different types of sport facilities in the publicness grid. We base the analysis on insights from public administration literature as well as the knowledge about non-profit private institutions in general (Ibsen & Habermann, 2006; Thøgersen, 2013).

Figure 3: Different types of Sport Facilities in the publicness grid

Firstly, commercial sport facilities do not receive any direct public funding, but might have the public sector as a customer on the same terms as any other customer. Besides more overarching business and/or health policies there are no direct policies targeting commercial sport facilities and
there is almost no communication. If in trouble financially, they will normally be either sold or closed down. Hence, commercial sport facilities are under a high degree of economic authority and to a lesser extent under political authority, other than legal and regulatory requirements.

It is (almost) the other way around with the city council sport facilities. Its dominant funding source is public resources. They may earn some minor income from other sources to the extent that it is legal in the local context of law (Olsen, 2012). As they are embedded in the public sector policy goals will be formulated more directly. Only a very limited part of their revenue may come from philanthropists or foundations.

PNP sport facilities receive a large and dominant part of their revenue via direct and indirect public subsidies and income from selling goods and services to the public sector. There is little to no tradition of competition attracting the primary users to the PNP sport facilities as many of the VSOs have been a part of the creation of the PNP sport facilities and / or responsible for its daily operations helping out on issues such maintenance and cleaning. There is often some geographical distance between the different facilities, which reduce competition. There is often a dialogue between the PNP sport facilities and the public authorities on matters such as everyday challenges and repairs.

Even though the PNP sport facilities might attract support from philanthropists or foundations, they seem to only receive a marginal income from clients other than the public sector and fees paid by the VSOs. When they have a financial problem they often call the city council, which will often provide support or assistance.

Well aware that there might be empirical nuances we hence conclude that even though the PNP sport facilities are privately owned and managed, they are so closely related to the public sector,
that it should be analysed as an organisation under a high degree of public authority and to lesser
degree under economic authority.

3.0. Strategies of sport facilities

As a next step we develop an understanding of how the logic of public organisations and public
organisation employees can be applied to the setting of PNP sport facilities.

We consider how overall strategies in terms of maximising participation are influenced by three
primary groups of persons with a close and direct association to the sport facility: the managers of
the PNP sport facilities, the chairpersons of the boards of the PNP sport facilities and the president
of the VSOs. We use ‘PNP sport facilities’ to denote the managers and the chairpersons of the
board as we assume that these will choose similar strategies as they are both deeply involved in
running and developing the PNP sport facilities. They are the persons most exposed to the attempts
of public steering and we assume that they will form similar strategies due to their common
interests in the wellbeing of the PNP sport facilities. We use assessments of the strategies pursued
by VSOs to develop the analysis, but the output of the article is to suggest which strategies the PNP
sport facilities choose. We further acknowledge that it is not a given that the managers of the PNP
sport facility and the chairperson of the board will be pursuing similar strategies as they might have
different interests in for example focusing on keeping the VSOs happy or to focus on doing
business focusing on increasing profits. When the conceptual framework is to be tested empirically
it is therefore important to choose a design that will be able to capture any dynamics between the
two. However, we want to keep focus on how public steering influence the strategy of the PNP
sport facility on an aggregate level and we will therefore in this context do not go further into how
the possible dynamics between chairmen of boards and managers may influence strategy.
Firstly, we use normative and rational institutionalism to grasp the structural influence on the different groups, as different institutional structures can be a part of the explanation for why performance information such as knowledge of level of utilization is not used (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). We argue that the institutional setting matters for the impact of steering models on performance of an organisation, such as for example on the utilization of sport facilities.

To grasp the influence of the actor perspective we use motivation theory to assess how employees influence choice of strategy in an organization with a high degree of publicness. It has been argued that different types of motivation can influence performance (Andersen, 2013; Andersen & Pallesen, 2008; Bøgh Andersen & Holm Pedersen, 2012). Hence, motivation seems to play a crucial role in the formation of the strategy of PNP sport facilities.

We suggest that the strategy of a sport facility can be grasped using the model below. This will help us understand what influence strategy and will help us conceptualise how differences in steering models (X) will influence difference in strategies (Z) and how strategies will influence the utilization (Y).

**Figure 4: How can strategies of sport facilities be understood?**

The arrows do not indicate causality. However, they do indicate that differences in the structural and actor determinants of strategy will often, but not always, result in different strategies. What we
strive for is not causalities, but rather plausible conjectures following Rhodes’s interpretation of Boudon (1993). A plausible conjecture is based on the argument that a claim can be made within social science which results in an attempt to be: “...making general statements which are plausible because they rest on good reasons and the reasons are good because they are inferred from relevant information“ (R.A.W. Rhodes, 2013). Hence, it is not the expectation that the model depicted in figure 4 will result in completely accurate predictions of strategies, but rather that it will be possible to argue that choosing one type of strategy is more likely than others (Gerring, 2007, p. 71). Hence, we argue that putting forward plausible conjectures and not hypothesis testing as it is known from the quantitative social science tradition (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994), is the most appropriate approach here. This is due to the fact that we are trying to understand which strategies are most likely to be chosen when the conceptual framework is confronted with empirical realities. In the sections below the different parts of the model above will be elaborated and explained starting with the role of motivation.

3.1. Impact of motivation on strategy

We use Le Grand (2003, 2007, 2010) to consider the motivation of public employees as his work has been widely used in analysis of the consequences of different motivations among public sector employees (Andersen, 2013; Bøgh Andersen & Holm Pedersen, 2012). Le Grands basic tenet is that public sector employees when described in the simplest of terms can be either a knight or a knave. If he or she is a knight their reasons for working towards a particular goal (such as increased sport facility utilization) is mainly that they are altruists and that they basically want to do good things for other persons. If he or she is a knave, they mainly want to do good things for themselves (Le Grand, 2007, p. 18f). However, most often the motivation of employees is some combination of the two (Andersen, 2013; Le Grand, 2003, 2007, 2010). Le Grand introduces four types of approaches that he argues interacts with motivation (Le Grand, 2010). The four principles underpinning Le Grand’s
four approaches are: ‘Trust’, where employees with a professional background are trusted to spend the budget efficiently. ‘Targets’, where accomplishing politically decided goals result in better performance. ‘Voice’, where the users can express their (dis)satisfaction. And ‘choice and competition’ where user choice is coupled with provider competition.

In the conceptual model we argue that the strategies of the primary persons in the sport facility will be influence by a mix of knavish and knightish motivation. Some strategies chosen might be inspired by a knavish motivation and some may be inspired by a knightish motivation. For example VSOs might choose a knightish strategy where the VSOs want to contribute to the use of the PNP sport facilities and accept that it is necessary that they contribute economically and / or through doing voluntary work for the PNP sport facilities. Alternatively the VSO may have a knavish motivation, which means that they will be more focused on the economic and organisational wellbeing of the VSO rather than the economic and organisational wellbeing of the PNP sport facilities.

In some cases whether one strategy is preferred rather than another might be due to the internal dynamics and power games within the sport facility or the VSO. However, in this context we choose to focus on how steering models influence of the PNP sport facilities.

In summary we have argued that the PNP sport facilities should be primarily analysed as a public organisation that needs to stay competitive. We have firstly dealt with the formation of strategy from an actor perspective arguing the choice of strategy is influenced by either a knightish or a knavish motivation. The next step is to deal with how strategy is influenced by the structural perspective by introducing two different approaches to institutionalism, which has shown its relevance in other studies of public organisations (Moulton, 2009).

3.2. Impact of institutions on strategy

Institutional theories sees institutions as structures that influence the behaviour of actors such as the
primary persons in PNP sport facilities. Following Scott (2001: 54ff) institutions consist of three pillars:

- Firstly, institutions have a regulatory pillar that consists of rules and sanctions such as laws, subsidies and other external regulations.
- Secondly, there is a normative pillar that is a part of the informal frame. In this part of the institution expectations about which behaviours are appropriate and expected in a given situation are formed.
- Finally, there is a cultural-cognitive pillar according to which the behaviour an actor chooses is decided under the influence of cognitive structures established over time. These cognitive structures make some actions more probable than others.

For the PNP sport facilities a part of the formal institutional frame consists of the law and regulations connected to the subsidies it receives. While in some countries this is highly institutionalised through law and law-like structures, the way that public subsidies flow to PNP sport facilities in other countries is much less structured. In Denmark it is mandatory by law for city councils to financially support the VSOs and their use of sport facilities (Olsen, 2012). In Australia the institutional structure of funding sport facilities is somewhat looser, as there is no law on that matter and hence the way that subsidies are paid varies across the different city councils (City of Gold Coast, 2013a).

The informal frame consists of the norms, routines and the cognitive structures developed by actors over time. These are harder to observe directly, as they are not written down and in that sense not directly observable. But on the background of the institutional theories dealing with the informal parts of the institutional frame expectations to strategy can be developed. The next step in order to explain which strategies are chosen therefore is to introduce first rational and then normative institutionalism and then assess how strategies can be influenced by such structures.
3.3. Rational Institutionalism

Even though it can be difficult to separate the different new institutionalisms, one clear distinction is whether actors are thought to be acting rationally (Peters, 2012, p. 50). Proponents of rational institutionalism hence argue that actors exert rationality similar to that of the actors in the ideal market. But rational institutionalism also acknowledges that the market has imperfections that must be taken into account (Peters, 2012, p. 47). For example, North states that: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North, 1990, p. 3).

Scott (2001) and North (1990) hence focus on the formal rules but reach the conclusion that there are uncertainties attached to implementing and enforcing these rules. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to decide the cost of not fulfilling a formal institutional frame and afterward to decide whether and what should be paid in penalty (North, 1990: 11ff). North concludes that one should look at the informal parts of the institutional framework to find the most decisive reasons for behaviour (North, 1990, p. 24f).

The mix between the formal and informal institutional framework is according to North important when assessing the efficiency of the institutional frame. The efficient institutional frame is accepted by the actors and results in the actors being primarily self-governed. This is positive as such self-governance results in fewest possible costs to control the behaviour of the actors and without having to enforce and penalise any unacceptable behaviour (North, 1990, p. 61ff). North argues that actors have attributes other than rationality following interactions on the market and gives two examples. Firstly, the actor is not solely wealth maximising. Secondly, it is difficult to collect and decode sufficient amounts of information to gain an overview of all possible actions. However, the assumption of rationality is not discarded, as the tendency to follow the conviction will be higher, when the costs of doing so are lower and vice versa. However the individual actor needs the
institutional frame to collect sufficient amounts of information to get an overview over possible actions (North, 1990, pp. 21-23).

3.3.1. Rational choice institutionalism and strategy

The formal institutional frame is hence the law and the regulations of subsidy that secures the VSOs a privileged position in PNP sport facilities. As the funding of PNP sport facilities is closely connected to the VSOs use it seems plausible that an informal institutional frame resulting in a strategy in favour of the VSOs could be expected. To continue to have the VSOs as important user groups is a way of securing the continued subsidization of PNP sport facilities, as such a reaction can be seen as a way for the sports facility to secure funding.

Depending on the steering model, there will be different incentives. If the formal institutional frame gives an economic incentive to sell more hours to VSOs, it is expected that PNP sport facilities will have more focus on this, while a lesser economic incentive will result in less focus on getting more VSO activity in the PNP sport facilities and they might instead focus on selling products on the commercial market to other users.

The rational choice institutional perspective explains why PNP sport facilities choose a particular strategy to increase utilization. The subsidy scheme will influence how much they focus on increasing utilization.

3.4. Normative institutionalism

Contrasted with rational institutionalism normative institutionalism presupposes that actors are not rational. Instead, focus is on what Scott (2001) terms the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of the institutional frame. From this perspective the choice of strategy is better explained by focusing on the informal institutional frame: ”Action…is seen as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. The appropriateness of rules includes both cognitive and normative components” (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 689).
A central tenet for the normative institutionalism is the 'logic of appropriateness', which makes a reference to the norms and routines leading to some strategies being perceived as more correct and expected than other strategies. The reason for one type of strategy being preferred is not based on a rational approach where pro et contra is weighed against each other is argued to be very different from a 'logic of appropriateness' and is coined a 'logic of consequentiality' (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 23). The 'logic of appropriateness' manifests itself in actors asking themselves questions like: "What kind of situation is this? What kind of person am I? What should a person such as I do in a situation like this?" (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 690). The strategies of the organisation are to a higher extent created on the backdrop of the actor’s intuitive perception of what is right or wrong, rather than based on strategic and rational rule based considerations.

### 3.4.1. Normative institutionalism and strategy

From a normative institutionalist perspective the strategies possible to pursue for PNP sport facilities are limited due to the 'logic of appropriateness'. Such appropriate strategies can be created partially in the interplay with the actors that contribute financially to the PNP sport facilities (primarily the city council) and partially with the primary user groups (VSOs, public organisations and institutions).

An important player is the VSOs and the leaders and coaches within these organisations. These users will often be present in PNP sport facilities and will be in a continuous dialogue with the PNP sport facilities. Their attitude towards what is the most appropriate strategy of PNP sport facilities will influence the choice of strategy. A study of volunteer motivation in a Danish context showed that the motivation of volunteers within sports is connected to an interest in the activity or the cause of sport (Habermann, 2000, p. 36). An Australian study of volunteer motivation in sport showed that altruistic development, personal development, community concern, ego enhancement and social adjustment (Wang, 2004) all are important motivations for volunteering in sport. What seems
to be in common is hence that volunteers seem to be driven by a mix of altruistic and egoistic motives that either benefit their VSOs or themselves. Even though some of these motives could be interpreted in a wider sense and be used to argue that volunteers would focus not only on VSO or themselves, but would also take into consideration the needs of PNP sport facilities, we here put forward the argument that the just as the volunteers so will the board of the VSOs focus on the VSOs needs to have better facilities, better and more timeslots and increase their own revenue flow. On that background it is plausible that representatives for VSOs will focus on promoting the agenda of the VSO. Through the frequent dialogue with PNP sport facilities they will promote the view that the PNP sport facilities primarily should adapt to the demands of the VSO.

The importance of VSOs as user groups is stressed by the fact that the cost of using PNP sport facilities due to public subsidies in most cases is lower that what they would be if the fees for using them were market based. Further, in many PNP sport facilities customs is to assign each club a timeslot for a full season – for example that soccer has the right to play indoor all year on Fridays from 4pm to 5pm even though they use the outdoor turf most of the time. The consequence of operating with such a booking system is that deviations from the standard week are not taken into account, which result in lower levels of utilization. Examples on deviations from a standard week could for example be away matches, out of season cancellation and other types of cancellations. Over time such a way to measure the use of the PNP sport facilities could have been established by it being considered a fair way of treating the VSOs demand for sport facilities according to the reigning ‘logic of appropriateness’.

Hence, the relation between the PNP sport facilities and the VSOs is influenced by the close interaction between them. In the Danish context the PNP sport facilities is often established on the basis of a considerable voluntary initiative (Larsen, 2006; Svendsen, 2003). The board often reflects who built the sport facilities, as the VSO are often members that have a substantial number of
members and sometimes the majority. In an Australian context VSOs are often a leaseholder of facility property owned by a city council and hence are not a part of running PNP sport facilities (City of Gold Coast, 2013a). VSOs are often closely intertwined with the daily business of the PNP sport facilities. Following the normative institutionalism, the special relation and connection between the PNP sport facilities and the VSOs, could result in a stagnating or even decreasing utilization as the PNP sport facilities will develop strategies focusing on existing user groups and the demands of these users. Such a strategy might exist because it is seen as appropriate that the current users, primarily the VSOs, are seen as the dominant user of a sport facility.

After having developed a more general framework for understanding how the strategies of the PNP sport facilities are established on the background of public administration theories, we will now develop expectations to which strategies may emerge from applying different models of steering on PNP sport facilities. We will now consider how steering models (X) influence strategy (Z) and how different strategies influence utilization (Y).

4.0. The three different steering models

We use three different steering models, that have theoretically and empirically been used widely in analysis of the public sector in different parts of the Western World. Firstly, New Public Management (NPM) which focus on market, performance, targets, competition and quasi-markets. Secondly, New Public Governance (NPG) which focuses on networks, partnerships and interdependent stakeholders and finally the Neo Weberian State (NWS) which focuses on authority being exercised through a disciplined hierarchy of impartial officials (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 22).

It is often difficult to find examples of steering models that are identical to a theoretically developed steering model (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Instead, steering models can often be found in hybrid models that incorporate different elements of different steering models (Christensen & Lægreid,
2011). On that background we both assess the consequences of ‘purer’ steering models (NPM and NWS) and a more ‘blurred’ steering model (mixed NPM/NPG).

The structure of the sections below is first an introduction of the basic theoretical elements of each steering model. Then it will be shown to what extent the empirical versions of the steering models fit the theoretical descriptions and on that basis, together with the assumptions developed in the model above, plausible conjectures on the strategies of the sports facilities will be put forth.

Inspired by an overview from Le Grand (2010), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) and from Burau and Kjær (2008, p. 267) three different steering models can be differentiated in three different theoretical approaches (see table 1).

**Table 1: Characteristics of different steering models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of steering</th>
<th>NPM</th>
<th>NPG</th>
<th>NWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means (in prioritized order)</td>
<td>Choice and competition</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of city council</td>
<td>Decides market-boundaries</td>
<td>Influence network-boundaries</td>
<td>Control mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows how the model developed can interact with the three steering models. Firstly, on the backdrop of Le Grand (2003, 2007, 2010) we argue that different means can be coupled to different steering models and used to assess the likelihood of different strategies occurring. Secondly, the role of the city councils shows us to what extent the public sector directly controls the effects of the steering models or whether they are more dependent on other factors such as the market.

**4.1. Steering through the use of New Public Management (NPM)**

With inspiration from Hood (1991), who originally invented the term, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) along with other authors including Goldfinch and Wallis (2010) argue that some of the defining
characteristics of the NPM-way of steering are:

- Motivation based on financial incentives.
- Customer-focus.
- Quasi-market mechanism to imitate market competition.

These are foci based on what Le Grand (2010) called competition and choice. Financial incentives indicate that there is a producer of a given good that wants to sell that good at a given price depending on the relationship between supply and demand. This gives a customer focus as the supplier needs to adapt to the customer’s needs in order to maximize the amount of goods that he or she can sell. Finally, this indicates some kind of market competition, where more than one supplier tries to sell the same or a similar good.

The basic idea of the NPM approach is to introduce mechanisms known from the private sector to the public sector in order to make them run better and become more efficient. One of the primary mechanisms the private sector introduced in a NPM oriented reform is a degree economic incentives to perform better (Van Dooren et al., 2010).

In this case we ask what kind of a difference does an economic incentive make? Evidence indicates that when using economic incentives on policy-areas that receive little public attention and that is not popular in the broad population (such as roads and libraries) the effects of economic incentives on an organizational level are significant (Blom-Hansen, 2003). In contrast, the effect of economic incentives are not to the same extent significant when applied to policy areas that politicians perceive to be of higher salience and greater importance such as schools, care of the elderly or childcare (Andersen, 2013; Anderson, 2012; Jakobsen & Pallesen, 2012). It is theorised that the reason for this difference could be that it always remains an open question how credible public sector incentives are (Van Dooren et al., 2010). It is possible for politicians to change their mind or to simply react on to a single case brought up in the media. Media-driven stories could, for
example, make politicians less willing to accept the consequences of economic incentives if the result is closing of institutions, poor service for what is perceived to be important user groups (such as VSOs) or other politically unviable outcomes.

4.1.1. NPM as a steering model for sport facilities

With inspiration from NPM, a steering model could focus on granting a subsidy based on the utilization of the PNP sport facilities by VSOs. This means that the PNP sport facilities only receive a subsidy, when a VSO delivers an activity in the PNP sport facilities.

Figure 5: NPM oriented steering model

What makes such a steering model primarily NPM is the linear relationship between hours used in a sport facility by VSOs and the total subsidy given to the PNP sport facilities from the public sector. The idea is that this gives a clear economic incentive to maximize efforts to increase the activity level in a sports facility. The economic incentive according to NPM is a part of introducing competition between the sports facilities in order to attract new VSOs as customers and where the different sports facilities work hard to attract new activities from the VSOs to the sports facility. PNP sport facilities compete on leasing floor or turf space to VSOs. Such a good seems to be relatively homogenous, which should leave room for competition between PNP sport facilities. But the question is to what extent the public sector will enable competition to have its full impact. Subsidisation of sport and sport facilities where VSOs are major user groups seems to be a policy area with little to no focus on economic incentives (Ibsen and Ottesen, 2000). Any cutting of
expenditure targeted at VSOs can be argued to be met with protests – just as it is the case with cut backs in other welfare areas (Andersen, 2013). Hence one of the factors that might decrease the probability of the NPM-oriented steering model resulting in increased facility utilization could be that the credibility of the incitements is limited. We argue that it is not certain that the public sector will react to poor utilization and demand that PNP sport facilities will have to close, or attract more funding for itself, if such a development results in worse conditions for VSOs. Following the rational institutionalist approach the actors involved will react to the economic incentives but they will do so knowing that the city council might not be too harsh on them if they later on get in trouble because they do not react as expected to economic incentives.

It might be a challenge to sell timeslots to customers other than the VSOs because it can often prove difficult to get a price just as high as the price the VSOs are willing to pay due to their subsidization. This could lead to a knavish rational institutionalist strategy that will result in more timeslots being sold to the VSOs instead of trying to attract other groups of customers. If there is available space in a PNP sport facility a part of a knavish, rational strategy could as well to attract users from other PNP sport facilities in order to increase subsidy and revenue.

From the perspective of the rationalist institutionalist approach NPM has its advantages as it could lead to either a knightish or a knavish strategy and both would result in increased utilization. Following a knavish motivation the PNP sport facilities want to sell more timeslots in order to increase the income and would tend to focus on attracting more subsidized VSOs. A PNP sport facility with a knightish motivation wants more people to gain access and would tend to strive to attract more users. Seen from those perspectives one might expect a strategy with an increased focus on marketing, sales and attracting new customers and increasing the level of usage by existing customers.
Conversely, there is a possibility that PNP sport facilities are to a lesser extent influenced by the economic incentives in a steering model. In that case it is expected that the normative institutionalist approach has more explanatory power. Following the normative institutionalist approach the attention towards the interaction between the relevant actors around PNP sport facilities matters more than the economic incentives. In this case a knavish approach might be to care more about how others perceive actions and results rather than genuinely live up to the expectations the other actors have of appropriate behaviour. For example, a PNP sport facility might focus on what the expected appropriate actions are from both the city council and the users. If these are overlapping the result might be an increased utilization. An example is that if there are sufficient available time slots that could be sold without resulting in any problems for VSOs, these might be sold to other users. If there are not overlapping expected appropriate actions, then a knavish behaviour might result in attempts to influence the perception that the other actors have of a PNP sport facility. Seen from such a normative knavish perspective a PNP sport facility might form a strategy focusing on that the utilization it achieves has a certain level and that this is very difficult to increase.

A normative knightish strategy would instead result in PNP sport facilities being genuinely interested in increasing utilization because that is perceived to be the appropriate strategy. Not because that would result in higher subsidies, but rather because PNP sport facilities perceives the appropriate action to be the one that is open to the highest number of users and user groups. In doing such appropriate actions, the PNP sport facilities tries to meet the expectations of both the city council, who expects maximum utilization, the VSOs who expect a good dialogue and priority access and the new user groups who would like to have timeslots in primetime. In balancing those different demands, the PNP sport facility would be focused on the knightish priorities, which should
result in the appropriate actions being those, which result in higher utilization. Table 2 below gives an overview of the strategies the PNP sport facilities might pursue under a NPM steering model.

Table 2: Possible strategies (Z) and consequences for utilization (Y) under a NPM steering model (X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of new institutionalism</th>
<th>Rational institutionalism</th>
<th>Normative institutionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Knightish</td>
<td>Knightish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies (Z)</td>
<td>Focus on selling, marketing and attracting customers (+)</td>
<td>Focus on how to gain most income with smallest possible effort (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+) indicates that this strategy is argued to increase utilization (-) indicates that this strategy is argued to decrease or stabilize utilization

4.2. Steering through the use of NPG

In a broader perspective NPG and similar steering models has been used for many different purposes such as analysis of the European Union, International Relations and Local Community Dialogue (Burau & Kjær, 2008; Kjaer, 2004). We focus on the type of NPG that is the process of including several different actors in the process of making, coordinating and implementing policy (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 22). Such network steering is seen as (a part of) the response to the hollowing out of the state, accepting that the state to a lesser degree can solve the wicked problems societies face in a globalised world (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).

The characteristics of a given network can be described by placing it on a continuum between being a policy community and an issue network (Rhodes, 2006). In a policy community a limited number of participants interact and share resources. They do so through meeting often and discuss different matters with relevance to a policy issue. They share resources as all members of the community have some resources. Hence bargaining on equal terms is a part of a policy community (Rhodes, 2006, p. 427). At the other end of the policy network continuum is the issue network. The characteristics of the issue networks are in many ways the opposite to that of a policy community. It can have many members and the members might not share many resources. They meet less often and the matters they discuss in relation to the policy-issue are limited. The amounts of resources
between actors are more unevenly distributed and there is a higher degree of conflict rather than negotiations (Rhodes, 2006, p. 428).

The network created will have different characteristics depending on the number of participants in the network, how the power between the actors is distributed, how dependent they are on each other’s resources and how often they meet. The larger the network, the higher the chances are that steering will have broader effects regarding policy-goals; under the assumption that the members of the network agree on the policy goals. It is these dimensions that will be primarily analysed below.

A high degree of resource dependency will result in higher probability that the network steering will be successful, as all of the involved actors will be motivated to work toward the same policy goals. Finally, the type of network management implemented also matters. The tighter the steering is from the public authority, the higher the influence the public authority will have on keeping focus on the initial policy-goals (R.A.W. Rhodes, 2013) Such a management strategy, however, risks being ineffective as the persons involved in the network might perceive it as a decrease in their chances of gaining influence. In order to manage the network better the steering should be based on trust (Klijn et al., 2010) and on strategic signposting that sets the broad parameters for what the network should be steering towards (R.A.W. Rhodes, 2013, p. 17f). Steering based on such principles heightens the likelihood of the network increasing its performance.

4.2.1. Network steering of sport facilities

As an example of how the network steering can be implemented we look at the case where the PNP sport facilities continues to receive the funding on the bases of how many timeslots it sells to VSOs. Hence, the NPM steering is working parallel with the network-steering. This increases the risk of not having enough focus on the network part of the steering and instead focusing on the NPM-part of the steering model. Such a mix can be problematic as it has been be argued that marketization undermines the effectiveness of networks (R.A.W. Rhodes, 2013, p. 8). However, we do so in order
to also assess the possible consequences of steering models that are more ‘blurred’ as we argue that this is more often than not the case in the empirical reality. Analytically it has been chosen to first describe the network parts of the model and then discuss the possible side-effects of having network steering and NPM-steering intertwined.

**Figure 6: The effect of network-steering on utilization**

What makes the steering model network based? The basic idea is that the city council asks sport facilities to apply for being selected to have a master plan for the development of the PNP sport facilities. The PNP sport facilities invites other local partners to be a part of the work of establishing a master plan with the aim of maximizing utilization of the PNP sport facilities. The local partners could, for example, be local businesses, local NGOs from both within and outside sports, local public institutions and local private institutions. The focus of network-steering is, in this context, on including the relevant partners around the facility in a collaboration focused on maximizing the level of utilization. Through dialogue, deliberation, participation and innovation these groups can, as figure 6 shows, increase utilization. (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Power is hence fragmented and for the network steering to function according to plan, new partners must be included and accepted as relevant partners in the network. As trust plays a vital role in achieving policy goals, it can be detrimental if the VSOs involved in a governance-oriented steering do not trust each other or the
PNP sport facilities. VSOs may become concerned about who will get the best timeslots and on that basis have the best chance to attract new members. Such considerations could also result in potential new partners being excluded, for example, new VSOs that would like to gain access to the facility.

In order for the networks to contribute to increase utilization performance the local organisations involved in the master plan should have contributed to the process and want to continue their contribution to the process. If they choose to do so there seems to be evidence of a certain degree of resource-dependency as this could be seen as an indication of the actors being interested in interacting in order to exchange resources. However, if there are few new user groups invited into the process or they choose to leave the process after the master plan is produced, this would indicate a lack of resource-dependency or trust.

Furthermore, the role of the city council can influence outcomes in different ways. Firstly, the strength of the role of the city council not being a direct part of the process is that the local parties could feel, that they genuinely have the responsibility for the PNP sport facilities and that they need to contribute. However, it is not a given that neither the PNP sport facility, nor the participants in the network, believe that increased utilization is a good outcome. They might like to continue with business as usual and in those cases the introduction of network steering could result in enforcing existing collaborative structures between the PNP sport facilities and the VSO. The result could be that instead of getting new users and increasing utilization the focus will be on the needs of existing users.

A knightish strategy from the normative institutionalist perspective could include a partial opening toward local actors with which the PNP sport facility already has a dialogue. For example local public institutions and VSOs not in the PNP sport facility today that fits with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, while no or few other user groups such as business or private institutions are
deemed as ‘appropriate’ users by the PNP sport facility. However, the PNP sport facility will do an effort to make the ‘appropriate’ users happy and on that background maximize utilization. Seen from a normative institutionalist knavish perspective the PNP sport facility might focus on how it can increase what can be expected from the other ‘appropriate’ users and work to make them expect less from the PNP sport facility. That might result in a drop in utilization as the PNP sport facility will reduce efforts to maximize utilization.

From the rational institutionalist perspective and a knightish motivational approach the advantages of working together with new user groups could be a higher income and/or more subsidy, more users and that the PNP sport facility ends up playing a more important role in the local community.

Finally, a knavish strategy under the influence of rational institutionalism would try to show good will and invite new user groups into the work with the master plan. But when it comes to giving them influence and timeslots the PNP sport facility turns more sceptical as it is tempted to rely on the existing users buying time in the PNP sport facility. Instead there might be a strong focus on how changes can be made without making any of the existing users worse off and giving priority to existing users when allocating any available timeslots. Table 3 below summarises the strategies described above.

**Table 3:** Possible strategies (Z) and consequences for utilization (Y) under network-steering (X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of new institutionalism</th>
<th>Rational institutionalism</th>
<th>Normative institutionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation</strong></td>
<td>Knightish</td>
<td>Knightish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies (Z)</td>
<td>Focus on collaborating with all possible user groups to increase income (+)</td>
<td>Focus on maximizing income by showing good will to new users but instead mainly focusing on existing users (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 (+) indicates that this strategy is argued to increase utilization (-) indicates that this strategy is argued to decrease or stabilize utilization

4.3. **Steering using NWS**

Steering through budget is what some researchers call Old Public Management (OPM)
(Christensen, 2006, p. 448). Concepts discussed are for example elements like due process, open and transparent decisions, accuracy in dealing with public matters and the idea that the public employee should be a neutral representative taking care of the interests of the citizen within the framework of the laws and the policy goals set by the politicians. This is the kind of approach that Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) term NWS which they use to denote that their analysis show that even though many of the classical traits of OPM continues, in the modern state new tendencies develops without the old traits necessarily disappear.

However, we here focus on the core of the classical traits of OPM. One of the critiques of OPM has been that it too often results in ‘red tape’. Proponents of the presence of ‘red tape’ will often argue that it is difficult to avoid if standards of due process and thorough consideration of different perspectives are to be maintained. The critics of ‘red tape’ see it as the public sector being inefficient and that market like incentives are better.

As there is less focus in OPM on how much is produced compared to the input, there is often little reason to change the size of the budget from year to year. This is due to an incrementalist logic (Christiansen, 2008), where the city council uses the budget from the year before as the main guideline for next year’s budget. This approach to steering is what we label ‘budget’ steering. The advantage seems to be that this secures that (most of) the actors which received (almost) the same subsidy last year will be just as satisfied this year when receiving a similar amount. That results in fewer political disagreements. In that way the city council controls the budget of PNP sport facilities without relying on market structures under the influence of supply and demand.

According to some scholars this might not be a bad thing. It can be argued that the logic of the kind of products that the public sector produce and subsidize is not well suited for the simple dynamics
of the market (Pierre, 2011). Hence, a possible advantage of steering more through budgets might be that complex tasks are better solved than they would have been using market mechanisms.

4.4. Budget steering of sport facilities

Under such a budget steering regime the subsidy is not influenced by the numbers of timeslots the VSOs buy. Hence, the PNP sport facilities incentives to increase utilization by attracting more VSOs seem to be low. Firstly, increased utilization would result in no extra income. Secondly, increased utilization of the PNP sport facilities result in higher level of wear and tear and higher level of expenditure for water, electricity and heating.

As a rule of thumb following the OPM perspective the PNP sport facilities will be more interested in the input, rather than outputs or outcomes. Hence, they will be expected to argue that the subsidy is not sufficient and that if they received better funding they could do more. The strategy of the PNP sport facilities will focus on due process and on the rights of the primary users and less on the dynamics that might secure increased utilization.

Figure 7: NWS – steering through the budget

From a rational institutionalist perspective, there is little to no incentive to maximize utilization. However, from a rational institutional perspective the incentive to attract customers other than VSOs into PNP sport facilities is stronger as the number of timeslots sold to VSOs in this model
does not influence the subsidy while selling timeslot to other customers increase income. Hence, the budget steering model could result in a stronger focus on attracting customers other than the VSOs.

A stable level of subsidy has the consequence that the board and the management can focus on securing a stable situation for the VSOs that are interested in using the PNP sport facility. In that sense the PNP sport facility can support the main interests of VSOs, namely to develop and refine the sports offers that is the core business of the VSOs (Habermann, 2000).

Seen from a knavish rational institutionalist perspective the PNP sport facility would look for ways to have the PNP sport facility appear to be busy, even though that might not be the case. The PNP sport facility will do so by reporting use of the facility that might not have taken place and by not putting any effort in maximizing utilization by VSOs. The PNP sport facility will be focused on the fact that existing users have got a time slot dedicated to them and that it is their right to continue to have it. However, the PNP sport facility may sell goods and services to other groups and that VSOs as this will result in higher income.

A PNP sport facility with a rational knightish motivation might focus on keeping existing users satisfied. On one side it is not necessary to attract more VSOs, because there are few economic incentives to do so. However, the PNP sport facility might be interested in seeing local VSOs grow and thrive. However, due to the focus on due process and on the fact that the VSOs has a sometimes formal and sometimes informal right to get the timeslots appointed to them in the beginning of the year, PNP sport facilities will be reluctant to be too aggressive in finding other users.

Having a normative institutional knavish motivation, it is possible that PNP sport facilities will be concerned with what the other actors see as the ‘appropriate’ actions. Hence, the strategy of PNP sport facilities will be influenced by the dialogues they have with existing user groups and public
institutions. This dialogue will result in being more interested in satisfying these user groups rather than looking for new users.

PNP sport facilities with a more normative knightish approach will be interested in maximizing utilization. The PNP sport facility will be influenced both by current user groups and the city council and other parties who will argue that it is necessary that the sport facilities are opened up and is more widely used (City of Gold Coast, 2013b; Ibsen, 2010). Hence it will be seen as due process to try to increase the number of users even though there are no or few economic incentives attached to do so. Table 4 summarizes the strategies described above.

**Table 4: Possible strategies (Z) and consequences for utilization (Y) under budget steering**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of new institutionalism</th>
<th>Rational institutionalism</th>
<th>Normative institutionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Knightish</td>
<td>Knightish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies (Z)</td>
<td>Focus on new activities and users to the extent it can be done without harming existing users (+)</td>
<td>Focus on maximizing utilization by living up to city council aim of maximizing utilization (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on manipulating measurement so it seems more busy than what is actually the case. Attract new users if income can be generated (-)</td>
<td>Focus on taking care of existing users rather than looking out for new ones. (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+/-) indicates that this strategy is argued to increase or stabilize utilization. (-) indicates that this strategy is argued to decrease or stabilize utilization

5.0. Conclusion

In this article we have developed an understanding of what influence the strategies of sport facilities. We have shown that PNP sport facilities analysed using the concept of publicness is to be logically analysed as a public organisation. Further, using institutionalism and motivational theory we have argued that it is plausible that the management and the chairman of the board of sport facilities will choose different strategies depending on which steering model (X) is chosen and that it matters for utilization (Y) which strategies (Z) the sport facilities choose to pursue. Table 8 below summarizes the conceptual framework and can be used as a backdrop when developing more precise and nuanced hypothesis.
We have also shown that introducing policies aimed at increasing the utilization does not necessarily results in higher utilization. For policymakers it seems to be wise to consider the particular role of existing VSOs in the PNP sport facilities. But giving subsidies is not only a matter between public policymakers and VSOs. Subsidies is also given by philanthropical organisations, companies or similar organisations who might also would like to have a say in which strategies are chosen on the background of their subsidy. Such organisations could also consider the findings in this article when they plan how to give a subsidy.

We have also argued that it gives interesting new insights to depart from public administration theory; others might argue that departing from organizational studies is more relevant. Others might
also argue that we are too optimistic on the extent to which the conceptualisation can be expanded geographically and culturally. At this point we admit that we might be too optimistic, even though we do insist that the context of sport facilities dominated by VSOs in Denmark and Australia shares more commonalities than differences. In conclusion we therefore argue that there are some common traits in the intersection between sport facilities and VSOs that makes it plausible that the strategies PNP sport facilities pursue will tend to be more similar in different cultural and geographical settings than might be expected.

Finally, we argue that if sport participation is to be increased through an increased utilization of sport facilities, the consequences of different types of policies in the intersection between public administration, sport facilities and VSOs need to be analysed in more detail than has been the case to date. More research on the relationship between public spending and the performance of sport facilities and VSOs hence seem to an important focus point for sport governance-research in the years to come.

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City of Gold Coast. (2013a). Interview with Gold Coast City Council Recreational Officer.


