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## **“The Philosopher and the Reader. Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Love and Philosophical Method”**

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### **Abstract:**

In his diaries from the beginning of the 1930s, Ludwig Wittgenstein comments extensively both on Søren Kierkegaard’s view of philosophical method and on his view of love. The aim of this article is to show how Wittgenstein’s reflections on Kierkegaard’s view of love reveal a fundamental difference between the two thinkers’ views of philosophical method; a difference in their view of the role of the reader of and partner in doing philosophy, between Kierkegaard’s indirect communication *to* the reader and Wittgenstein’s dialogical engagement *with* the reader. The article opens with a presentation of substantial similarities between Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of philosophy. After this, I present an account of Kierkegaard’s view of love and marriage, an understanding of which is necessary in order to understand Wittgenstein’s reservations towards Kierkegaard. This in turn leads me to the main investigation which shows how a difference in Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein’s views on love connects to a fundamental difference in their views of philosophy. This difference between the two thinkers will finally be elucidated through the understanding of love developed by Stanley Cavell in his work on the so-called Hollywood remarriage comedies.

### **1. Introduction**

We know by now that Ludwig Wittgenstein was indeed very familiar with Søren Kierkegaard’s writings.<sup>1</sup> In an entry in his diaries, Wittgenstein notes how the engagement with Kierkegaard’s work directly influences his view of himself. Wittgenstein writes: “My conscience plagues me &

won't let me work. I have been reading in the works of Kierkegaard & that unsettled me even more than I already was. I don't want to suffer; that is what unsettles me" (2003: p. 175, 13.2.37). In the diaries, Wittgenstein also comments extensively on Kierkegaard's view of religion and philosophical method, and he enters several remarks on Kierkegaard's writings on love. The main aim of this article is to show how Wittgenstein's reflections on Kierkegaard's view of love reveal a fundamental difference between the two thinkers' view of philosophical method. The aim is, however, not to challenge the standard conception according to which there are substantial similarities between Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's views of philosophy, but rather to develop this conception. I will do so by showing where these similarities come to an end, namely in a difference between their views of the role of the reader of philosophy; a difference that is often overlooked in the relevant commentary, or if noted, explicitly rejected.<sup>ii</sup>

The article focusses on the similarities and differences between Kierkegaard's view of philosophy and the view of philosophy developed by Wittgenstein from his return to philosophy in 1929 to the writing of *Philosophical Investigations*. After introducing a rather uncontroversial sketch of the similarities between Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's view of philosophy, I will draw out some central elements in Kierkegaard's view of love which constitute the background for Wittgenstein's critical engagement with his writings. Wittgenstein's considerations will be presented in section five, before I discuss how the difference between their views on love connects to a fundamental difference between their respective conceptions of philosophy. In the final section, the distinctive character of the Wittgensteinian view of love and philosophical method will be elucidated by some points advanced by Stanley Cavell in his work on the so-called Hollywood remarriage comedies.

## **2. Similarities: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophical Method**

In a remark from 1931, published in *Private and Public Occasions*, Wittgenstein gives the following characterisation of Kierkegaard's philosophy:

On Kierkegaard: I represent a life for you & now see how you relate to it, whether it tempts (urges) you to live like that as well, or what other relation to it you attain. Through this representation I would like to as it were loosen up your life. (2003: p. 83, 6.5.1931)

Wittgenstein is interested in Kierkegaard's unusual approach of presenting particular ways of living through the characters that inhabit his works as well as his attempt to challenge his readers through engagement with these characters and his texts. This marks a noteworthy similarity between the philosophical method of Kierkegaard and that of Wittgenstein, which has already been highlighted by many of those who have compared their philosophical styles, methods, and aims, and to situate the following discussion, I will spell out three such similarities about which there is considerable agreement in the current commentary.<sup>iii</sup>

The first similarity is that both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein reject conceptions of philosophy according to which the main task of philosophy is to solve philosophical problems by presenting us with specific doctrines or forms of objective knowledge, and that they both develop alternative conceptions according to which philosophical activity concerns the way we address, engage in, and try to solve such problems. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is always directed at particular problems, something that we cannot understand and which puzzles and unsettles us; problems that arise when our words become divorced from meaningful use, "when language *goes on holiday*" (2001: §38). For this reason, philosophical problems cannot be solved by the construction of theory, rather they call for a thorough and clear description that provides us with an overview of the language use in question. Philosophy does not "advance theses," but is the activity of describing

forms of language use, of “assembling reminders for a particular purpose” and setting up “*objects of comparisons*” (2001: §128, §127 and §130).

In a similar vein, Kierkegaard’s main representative of a philosopher, the pseudonym of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* Johannes Climacus, distinguishes between two different forms of philosophy. The first is objective philosophy – aka Hegelianism – concerned with logic and world history, matters about which we can have and exchange objective knowledge. The second is a ‘simpler’ philosophy which is concerned with human existence and is responsive to its particular shape, that is, to existence as a continuous state of becoming. This simpler philosophy, Climacus insists, is primarily concerned not with the *what* of some particular content, but with the *how* of particular sayings, and it explores what it is to live in accordance with these sayings (1846/2009: p. 170). Consequently, this simpler philosophy must be communicated *indirectly*, through the particular *form* of the philosophical message because the reader must undergo a change of perspective before she will be able to see the need for change called for by a philosophy (we will return to this feature of indirect communication below). What we see is that for both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, the form of philosophical texts becomes integral to their purpose, as the aim of the text is to facilitate a process of change in the reader’s questions, perspective and, ultimately, in her way of living, not to deliver a philosophical theory or system.<sup>iv</sup>

Second, the reason why both thinkers focus on process rather than result, on form rather than content, is that their writings are essentially aimed at the reader. We find this reflected when Kierkegaard in his texts directly addresses his ‘reader’, his ‘listener’ that is the relevant recipient for his writings, ‘*hiin enkelte*’, “that single individual whom I with joy and gratitude call my reader” (1849/1998: p. 9). And we find it reflected in the dialogical form of Wittgenstein’s later writings and his continuous engagement with interlocutors in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where the investigations develop through questions, suggestions, and objections discussed by various voices.

Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein attempt to take the perspective of the reader as their starting point and to engage this reader, and more than anything this is what distinguishes their writings and marks the point where they part company with most other philosophers, even if we will later come to see that there are differences in their conceptions of the partner in philosophical activity.

Thirdly, both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein think that the main aim of philosophy is to encourage the reader to undertake a change of perspective.<sup>v</sup> As Kierkegaard writes, philosophical reflections ought to “awaken and provoke men”, to “fetch them up out of the cellar, call to them, turn their comfortable way of thinking topsy-turvy”, and in the spirit of Socrates, the philosopher should “be a gad fly” (1967: p. 263).<sup>vi</sup> For Wittgenstein, “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (2001: §109) which enables us to see that “we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words” (§122). Philosophy is a way of changing what we expect and want from language. What we need from philosophy is help to overcome “the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people *want* to see”, to overcome “a resistance of the will” (2000: p. 275).<sup>vii</sup> According to both philosophers, philosophy should open up new possibilities for the reader, from a change of perspective to a change of life. “Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein both want the reader to *do* something”, as Genia Schönbaumsfeld puts it, before moving on to quote Wittgenstein for saying, “I don’t try to make you *believe* something you *don’t* believe, but to make you *do* something you won’t do”.<sup>viii</sup> On this view, the aim of philosophy is essentially practical and concerns the reader’s way of living which means that the activity of philosophy has an inescapable *ethical* dimension.<sup>ix</sup>

In what follows, I will investigate the ways in which Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein understand the intended engagement with the reader with the aim of showing that the two thinkers present us with two rather different forms of engagement. Central to this investigation are questions about how to do philosophy, and how to initiate engagement in a way that allows philosophy to

make a real difference in our practical lives. What we should take with us as the relevant background for the following is the understanding that on the views investigated here, philosophy is not to be characterised by advancing a specific form of content, but by being a specific form of activity, by having a practical aim: the aim of *doing* something, of engaging the reader.

### **3. Judge Wilhelm on Love and Marriage**

Wittgenstein's reflections on the engagement with the reader exemplified in Kierkegaard's writings will be at the centre of my investigation, but as they are tied to reflections on Kierkegaard's view of love, we first need to sketch this view. This is not a digression from our main investigation because discussions of love run through almost all of Kierkegaard's writings, which indicates that they are a central turning point of his philosophical project. Let us begin by looking at some of those lives which are presented in Kierkegaard's writings and which caught Wittgenstein's attention. One such life is that of Judge Wilhelm, the assigned author of the second part of *Either/Or*, and another is that of Wilhelm's addressee, the higher aesthete, A. In the next section, we will add to these examples the voice of Kierkegaard himself.

Judge Wilhelm is Kierkegaard's representative of the ethical perspective, characterised by choice, duty, and commitment, and Wilhelm fills this role amongst other things by engaging in his roles as judge, father, and husband. From this point of view, he offers some considerations concerning marriage and love, directed at the aesthete's particular perspective on life. What Wilhelm wants the aesthete to see, is that he, as any other human being, is placed before a fundamental question, "the question is under which qualifications one will view all existence and personally live" (1843/1987b: p. 169). To be a human being is to be placed under dual categories and to live in relation to both finality and eternity, both necessity and freedom, and this raises a

demand freely to acknowledge both the real and the potential self that one is, to choose the “absolute validity” of this, one’s particular self (1843/1987b: p. 219).

The problem is that A continuously withdraws from responding to the fundamental question of his self. When A reflects on his existence, he sees many interesting possibilities for pleasant and enjoyable experiences, of learning new skills, making new acquaintances, engaging in erotic relationships etc., but he also notes that none of these experiences present themselves as having in and of themselves any special weight or importance. He therefore concludes that the *raison d’être* of his life is to realise as many possibilities as he can and to do so in a way that does not prevent him from realising other possibilities. To succeed with this project, A strives to live out a number of extraordinary experiences while at the same time avoiding taking on any form of obligation. We see this approach realised in relation to love in “The Seducer’s Diary” in the first volume of *Either/Or*, presenting two of the aesthete’s central concerns. First, for an aesthete to be moved to realise a possibility, it has to be distinctly desirable in some way, and the object of the seducer’s attention, Cordelia, is indeed a particularly extraordinary young woman, beautiful, educated and intelligent, but also naïve with regard to love.<sup>x</sup> Second, the aesthete aims to realise romantic love with all its depth, but without this love being tainted by other, more mundane elements such as family involvement or wedding vows that would give rise to obligations obstructing the aesthete’s freedom.<sup>xi</sup> Therefore, it is important for the aesthete that the erotic relationship<sup>xii</sup> is broken off at the realisation of the sublime moment of love.<sup>xiii</sup>

Wilhelm raises two objections against the aesthetic view of love, also held by A. The first is that it involves a misunderstanding of what freedom is. Wilhelm agrees that freedom must involve the possibility to choose one option over another; to love freely is to love one woman rather than another. However, if one resists all forms of obligation and allows all possibilities available in one’s life to remain forever on an equal footing, then these possibilities also remain *indifferent*, but the



choice between indifferences is not really a choice at all, and because of this, it is not really free. When A refuses to obligate himself through his choices, he instead becomes completely dependent on the contingent success or failure of his projects. What A fails to see, according to Wilhelm, is that free choice is possible only when it is realised in unity with its anti-thesis, the in freedom annulled possibility, in other words, love is only free when it involves the exclusion of the possibility of freely finding another love.<sup>xiv</sup> Wilhelm's second objection is that A is incapable of loving because he has not as of yet developed a self from which such love could spring. A insists on acting out his will without making any commitments and avoiding obligations, but this really means that A resists having a will, becoming the particular self that he is. A thus represents a certain form of despair, namely that of not wanting to be a self, not out of lack of reflection, but out of lack of will.<sup>xv</sup>

According to Wilhelm, A's resistance against tainting romantic love with thoughts of marriage arises from a failure to understand that love from its very inception involves more than a sublime moment. What is extraordinary about the experience of falling in love is that it seems as if this love always has been and always will be, that is, even if love arises in a moment, as a form of gift, it is a moment that manifests something eternal. Romantic love is in this way connected to eternity, and because of this, it raises a demand that romantic love itself cannot meet; love involves a demand for permanence that can only be provided ethically and religiously, in duty and in a relationship with God.<sup>xvi</sup>

At this point, A objects that duty and faith are aspects of life that are incompatible with free, spontaneous love. But Wilhelm does not yield. What does duty demand with regard to love? The duty of love demands nothing beyond this that we love the other. However, in loving, not just as a response to spontaneous love, but to the call of duty, we do more than just love; we make our love for the other an object of our will.<sup>xvii</sup> A similar structure is at play with regard to religious belief. If

the lovers are – as Wilhelm phrases it – “religiously developed” (1843/1987b: p. 47) and refer to God in a thanksgiving for the love they have received, this alters, not their love, but the lovers, as they engage in the inwardly directed action, willingly to hold on to love. Viewed ethically and religiously, love involves elements of will and action in the form of a decision that provides love with durability, because it shows that the lovers understand the happiness of love as a continuous task and that task as providing the possibility of happiness, as Kierkegaard describes it in one of his upbuilding discourses (1845/1993: p. 33). The decision to love does, however, need a shared framework, and this framework is, according to Wilhelm, marriage; only marriage makes possible a form of love that does not alter “when alteration finds”, in Shakespeare’s famous phrase.<sup>xviii</sup> Or, as Wilhelm puts it, “How much more richness of modulation is in the marital ‘mine’ than in the erotic. It resonates not only in the eternity of the seductive moment, but in the eternity of consciousness, in the eternity of eternity” (1843/1987b: p. 58). For Wilhelm, marriage is in this way a paradigmatic example of how the fundamental task of existence, the task to will to become the particular self that one is, can be realised.

#### **4. Kierkegaard on Proper Love**

Until now, I have focused on the conceptions of love presented by A and Judge Wilhelm, but as with all of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, we should expect these characters to represent particular perspectives that bring out certain insights, but also have certain limitations. To get clearer about the strengths and limitations of Wilhelm’s view of love, I will contrast it with that of Kierkegaard himself, and I therefore turn to the treatment of love and marriage in the non-pseudonymous *Works of Love*.

Kierkegaard maintains in line with Wilhelm that love is the highest joy of earthly life, and that “only true love loves every man according to his individuality” (1847/2009: p. 252), but he also

raises the question of the relationship between romantic love and religious love, the love of one's neighbour. According to Kierkegaard, romantic love is love of *this* particular person, and as such, it involves *pre-love* (*Forkjerlighed*) or preference. Romantic love rests on preferences of the lover, and in this way, it is dependent on the contingencies of the subject and is a form of self-love, that is, "*erotic love and friendship are preferential and the passion of preference. Christian love is self-renunciation's love*" (1847/2009: p. 65). For Kierkegaard, this means that the distinction between preferential love and non-preferential love really is a distinction between proper and improper love.<sup>xix</sup> Only love of one's neighbour is a form of proper love, because here we let go of all forms of preference and reject anything contingent that may interfere with our love.

It is heavily debated within Kierkegaard scholarship whether Kierkegaard devaluates romantic love by identifying it with self-love, and whether he holds all forms of preferential love to be improper. Alastair Hannay argues that "the arguments of WL are directed mainly at showing that any form of love other than Christian love (neighbor-love) has no moral value, because it is self-love", adding that romantic love even has a negative moral value, as "all natural affection involves culpable self-interest in one form or another" (Hannay 1982: pp. 243 and 247). However, even if it is true that Kierkegaard considers all forms of preference and self-interest to be corrupting elements in love, the most promising account of his view of romantic love is still somewhat more complicated. Kierkegaard distinguishes between different forms of self-love, "proper self-love" and "selfish self-love" (1847/2009: pp. 35 and 150),<sup>xx</sup> and he only characterises selfish self-love as illegitimate. This means that there is a proper form of self-love which is to love one's neighbour and thereby to love God as if there were no distance between oneself, one's neighbour, and God (1847/2009: p. 113), and Kierkegaard furthermore points to the possibility that we root our romantic love in neighbour-love. The task is "to love the beloved faithfully and tenderly. But let love to your neighbour be the sanctifier in your covenant of union with God; love your friend honestly and

devotedly but let love to your neighbour be what you learn from each other in the intimacy of friendship with God!” (1847/2009: p. 74). Subjected to neighbour-love and the love of God, romantic love exemplifies proper self-love and becomes a form of proper love.

But how are we to root romantic love in love of our neighbour? Neighbour-love is, as we saw, to love one’s neighbour as oneself, and Kierkegaard takes this quite literally. To love one’s neighbour is not to love a particular, contingent other, because neighbour-love does not acknowledge human categories. Rather, in neighbour-love, we love the other’s ‘absolute validity’, her potential self. To make neighbour-love the sanctifying element in one’s love is thus to attempt, not to disregard, but to *move beyond* the distinctiveness of the loved one and to love him or her, as one may love all others, because of their common and universal potential for becoming a self and for loving God.

Kierkegaard also addresses the question of how to root romantic love in neighbour-love from a different angle, when he notes that proper self-love is possible only in connection with the love of God. Proper love does not rest on mutuality, rather in proper love, “God is the middle-term in judging love” (1847/2009: p. 113):

The God-relationship is the mark whereby love towards men is recognised as genuine love. As soon as the love-relationship does not lead me to God, and as soon as I in the love-relationship do not lead another person to God, this love, even if it were the most blissful and joyous attachment, even if it were the highest good in the lover’s earthly life, nevertheless is not true love. (1847/2009: p. 124)

In proper or true love, we are devoted to helping the other to come to love God, and even in special relationships of love or friendship, we should respond, not just to the distinctiveness or particularity

of the loved ones, but also and primarily to the eternal side of their selves, which for Kierkegaard is their potential for loving God.<sup>xxi</sup> What the lover should do, is to address the specificity of the loved one in order to provide him or her with assistance to come to love God. What the loved one will receive is a way of coming to true faith. “*For to love God is to love oneself in truth; to help another human being to love God is to love another man; to be helped by another human being to love God is to be loved*” (1847/2009: p. 113, italics in the original). Kierkegaard is acutely aware that this form of love may not be what our loved ones may want, and it may not even be something that they recognise as love. In demonstrating proper love, we therefore risk becoming the object of misunderstanding, of contempt or even hate from those whom we love, but for Kierkegaard these risks follow any form of love of our neighbour.<sup>xxii</sup>

The way Kierkegaard understands the relationship between romantic love and love of one’s neighbour raises a problem for Wilhelm and his account of genuine love, love in marriage. According to Wilhelm, marital love requires the acceptance of the particularity of the beloved, it places you before an unending task, and it is dependent on an exercise of will, of obligating oneself to this particular love. What Wilhelm wills in marital love is the love of his wife in all her particularity and distinctiveness; he loves her moderation, devotion, and her lullabies that are to Wilhelm “more beautiful than any other song” (1843/1987b: p. 324). Wilhelm is here faithful to his description of love as the realisation of something universal through something particular, and he is in line with Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the importance of the particularity of the loved one. However, on a Kierkegaardian approach, Wilhelm fails by not addressing the eternal self of his wife, by not helping her towards loving God. A similar point applies to his love of his friend. This love is also tied to A’s characteristics, his “bizarre qualities, [...] intensity, [...] passions, [...] frailties” (1843/1987b: p. 6), but it is directed at an attempt to aid A to become the particular self that he is, not to further his relationships with God. In this way, Wilhelm’s love is preferential and

self-interested in a way that becomes an obstacle for the movement towards proper love, the love of one's neighbour. Wilhelm thus appears to be incapable of grasping religious love.<sup>xxiii</sup> That is, even if Kierkegaard, in portraying Wilhelm, is presenting us with a possible and appealing view of love, it is a view that Kierkegaard himself in an important sense considers to be wanting.

## 5. Wittgenstein on Kierkegaard I: Love

Kierkegaard's complaint against Wilhelm is that his understanding of love does not go beyond what is preferential, but as we shall see, this complaint is not Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein discusses Kierkegaard's view of love in his diaries of the early 1930s. His reflections are prompted by personal considerations regarding his relationship with Marguerite Respinger,<sup>xxiv</sup> but Wittgenstein also examines the philosophical value of Kierkegaard's view of love and connects this to his own reflections on philosophical method.

Wittgenstein positively acknowledges several of Kierkegaard's insights, such as the insight that one cannot rest one's life on contingent occurrences, not even the occurrence of love.

Wittgenstein writes:

Have reason to suppose now that Marguerite does not particularly care for me. [...] One voice in me says: Then it's over, & you must lose heart. – And another one says: That must not get you down, you had to anticipate it, & your life cannot be founded upon the occurrence of some, even if greatly desired case. (2003: p. 79, 1.3.1931)

Wittgenstein's admonition of himself parallels the point that Wilhelm raises with address to A, namely that we cannot be free, if we let our existence be utterly dependent on outer occurrences, even such a precious occurrence as the love of another person. Instead, we must live in a way that

springs from an acknowledgement, or, in Wilhelm's vocabulary a choice, of ourselves and our circumstances, no matter how discouraging. Wittgenstein goes on to develop this line of thought: "Someone who cannot entrust what he loves into the hands of the gods but wants to keep tinkering with it himself, doesn't have the right love for it after all. For this is the severity which is supposed to be part of love" (2003: p. 79). What Wittgenstein is struggling to do, is to accept love as it presents itself to him. That is, he is trying to accept that love is not something that he can bring about, secure or alter; it is a gift that may or may not be granted, and that may be granted in a form different from what he had hoped or expected. In a much later remark, Wittgenstein writes:

'Blessings come from above in their own guises etc.' I say that to myself whenever I receive the love of B. For I know well that it is a great and rare gift; [...] – and also that it is not entirely of the sort of which I had dreamed. (MS 132 27-28, 29.9.46. Quoted from Monk 1991: p. 492)

What we want is not always what we get – and in Kierkegaard's writings, Wittgenstein finds the resources to see that if we let ourselves be disappointed or even despaired by this, it is a corruption of our attitude to the love we may in fact be granted in life, that is, he finds help to come to clarity over the notion of love as a gift and to receive and respond to love in the right way.<sup>xxv</sup>

Wittgenstein is, however, rather more critical of two of Kierkegaard's other suggestions, that proper love moves beyond preferentiality or self-interest, and that the most important element of love is that of aiding the loved one to come to love God. Wittgenstein expresses his reservations in a longer remark in his diaries:

One could say: What you call love for one's Neighbour [*Nächsten*] is self-interest. Well, then I don't know any love without self-interest, for I cannot intervene in the eternal salvation of another. I can only say: I want to love him as I – who cares for my soul – wish he would love me.

In a certain sense he cannot want what is eternally best for me; he can only be good to me in a worldly sense & show respect for all that seems to reveal in me a striving for what's highest. (2003: p. 131-133, 7.11.31, translation revised)

The remark is part of a longer discussion of Kierkegaard's writings, and when Wittgenstein writes 'One could say', he might just as well have written 'Kierkegaard would say' as he re-states Kierkegaard's central point, that what we call neighbour-love is most often just self-interest, guided by our preferences.

This is the first point that Wittgenstein challenges, and he does this by questioning whether there is any form of love that does not involve partiality. Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein hold that love involves concern for the individuality and distinctiveness of the loved one, but Wittgenstein is questioning whether it is possible to be concerned with the loved one's particularity without involving one's preferences, without being partial. Wittgenstein thinks that he should love the other as he himself wants to be loved, that is, as *this* particular person, but to do so, the other's individuality must be one that he appreciates and is partial to, and this means that love is and ought to be specific *and preferential*. Importantly, our preferences are not static, they are subject to will and responsibility, and the partiality of love may place real demands on us because the particularities of the loved one may not be "entirely of the sort" we hoped for. What we should do in love according to Wittgenstein is not to strive to rid ourselves of our preferences, but rather to develop preferences that can accommodate the qualities of the loved one. This point also applies to



neighbour-love. If we follow Wittgenstein, then neighbour-love does not require of us that we rid ourselves of all preferences, but rather that we strive to cultivate preferences that would allow us to see something loveable in the person in front of us (something that may of course be extremely difficult). In answer to the question of whether love essentially involves a partly self-interested gratitude for the loved one's distinctiveness or rather involve the attempt to move beyond such partiality, Wittgenstein clearly and with explicit reference to the notion of neighbour-love takes the first view, the view of Wilhelm, not of Kierkegaard.

Wittgenstein's second point is related to the first. When Wittgenstein says that he does not "know any love without self-interest" this is because, as a lover he "cannot intervene in the eternal salvation of another" (2003: p. 131-133). According to Wittgenstein, the lover cannot move beyond the individuality of the loved one and come to love that person's potential for loving God, because the lover is not involved in the loved one's relationship to God, and for this reason the lover can only love the way this potential reveals itself in the actions and character of the loved one. The other's salvation or love of God is not itself a possible object of love because it is a relation, not between lover and loved one, but between every single person and God. Wittgenstein thus objects to the possibility of a more fundamental form of love, the love of the 'absolute validity' of the other suggested by Kierkegaard, where priority lies with furthering the loved one's relationship to God and where "*to help another human being to love God is to love another man*" (1847/2009: p. 113). That is, Wittgenstein is arguing that Kierkegaard's notion of proper love does not single out anything that we can meaningfully conceptualise as being a form of love, or that we can meaningfully come to realise in our lives.

What could Kierkegaard reply to Wittgenstein? Wittgenstein's first claim, that all forms of love involve partiality, is a point of real disagreement between the two. However, Kierkegaard would in fact partly agree with Wittgenstein's second point that we "cannot intervene in the eternal

salvation of another” – or rather, Kierkegaard would agree that we cannot do so *directly*. Instead, Kierkegaard thinks that it is possible to intervene in another sense, namely indirectly, via indirect communication. To love someone as one’s neighbour, as a self, is to provoke that person to come to care about her eternal salvation, but we cannot bring about such incitement directly, by simply telling her, because any relevant change would have to spring from herself. Therefore, we have to bring about incitement indirectly, by “awaken and provoking” her to come to see that she has the potential to become a religious self. Neighbour-love is thus the attempt to awaken the other’s awareness of this potential.<sup>xxvi</sup> Kierkegaard’s word for this process is to ‘opbygge’, to build up, to edify, that is, to relate to the other in a way that presupposes and thereby builds up her potential. His prime example of up-building is the way that the loving person in love assumes the potential for love in the loved one, “that his love means he presupposes love in you and that you are built up precisely by this; that precisely by this is love built up in you” (1847/2009: p. 211). Through indirect communication and edification, we can concern ourselves with the “eternal salvation” of the other and love her, not as a particular other, but as our neighbour, as a potential self.

This is, however, precisely the assumption that Wittgenstein challenges, that we can intervene in the other’s relationship to God. We should, he admits, respect the other’s “striving for what’s highest”, but in love we cannot want “what is eternally best”, rather we have to be good to each other “in a worldly sense.” In view of this, we could see Wittgenstein as objecting against Kierkegaard’s view of proper love that it is unrelated to our lives, because it is divorced from our partialities and from our actual challenges and aspirations. There is, of course, nothing in my discussion that settles the issue of whether it is possible to have a love without partiality, as Kierkegaard takes it. What I have shown is rather that Kierkegaard’s affirmation and Wittgenstein’s denial of the appeal and possibility of non-preferential love is a sign of a definite difference between their views of love.

## 6. Wittgenstein on Kierkegaard II: Philosophical Method and the Reader

What does this disagreement about love have to do with philosophy? For both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, quite a lot. For Kierkegaard, the connection is forged by a parallel between the edifying potential of love and the aim running through all his writings, the pseudonymous works, the simpler, subjective philosophy championed by Climacus and the religious works published in Kierkegaard's own name, namely to build up the reader. To edify, one must reflect, not just on one's own perspective, but on the perspective of the reader as well. An edifying philosopher will therefore have to engage in double-reflection, she must, in Climacus' words, "pay attention to the message's form in relation to the receivers' misunderstanding" (1846/2009: p. 64). What the philosopher cannot do is to reveal this duality between the form of the message and the perspective of the reader because the very point of her communication is to awaken and strengthen an awareness of possibilities in the reader that the reader herself cannot yet (fully) appreciate. In this way, there is a *secret* at the heart of all edification and indirect communication.

The ordinary communication, objective thinking, has no secrets; it is only with doubly reflected subjective thinking that secrets arise, i.e., all of its essential content is essentially secrecy because it cannot be imparted directly. (1846/2009: p. 67)

In indirect communication, Climacus maintains, the author must always take the perspective of the reader into account, but she must also keep the secret of the distance between this perspective and that of the philosopher.

The same ideas, that the author should strive to approach the viewpoint of the reader, and that deception is needed to enable her to move on from here, reappear in Kierkegaard's considerations

on his authorship where he also presents his reasons for making deception a crucial part of his method. In *The Point of View* and *On My Work as an Author*, Kierkegaard notes that his method is necessitated by that fact that most people are caught in an “Enormous Illusion” (1859/1998: p. 41), the illusion that most people in Denmark live Christian lives. This illusion is what his authorship is meant to counter, but to do this Kierkegaard must understand the nature of the illusion; he has to understand where the reader is because “if you can very accurately find the place where the other person is and begin there, then you can perhaps have the good fortune of leading him to the place where you are” (1859/1998: p. 46). The problem is that Kierkegaard cannot from the outset reveal the difference in perspective between himself and the reader because the reader would then simply turn to a defence of the illusion. Instead, his communication must be indirect and the method must be “to deceive the other person into the truth” (1847/2009: p. 258), “to *deceive into the truth*” (1849/1998: p. 7, italics in the original).<sup>xxvii</sup> What justifies this deception is twofold: that deception is necessary to guide the reader out of the illusion, and that Kierkegaard knows *where to guide the reader*, because, as he writes, “I have understood the truth I am presenting” (1859/1998: p. 25), “*I know what Christianity is*” (1849/1998: p. 15). The difference between the perspectives of Kierkegaard and his reader is thus motivated by the fact that Kierkegaard has an insight that the reader cannot acquire as long as she is caught in the enormous illusion.

The ideas of secrecy, deception and the distance between perspectives are central to indirect communication and they organise much of Kierkegaard’s work. Kierkegaard often writes letters, speeches, sermons, manifestos; forms of texts which are addressed to someone in particular, the friend, the listener, the reader, but which also highlight the difference in perspectives between the author and the reader. Even if Kierkegaard emphasises that he is speaking “without authority”, he also holds that the whole of his authorship is religious, and that his Socratic maieutics have “the religious as the *telos*” (1849/1998: pp. 15 and 7): it is meant to awaken the reader to Christianity. In

his comparison of the authorships of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, D. Z. Phillips gives the following description of this aspect of Kierkegaard's work:

Kierkegaard's special purpose concerned his hope of freeing people from 'the monstrous illusion'; from confusions concerning what it means to become a Christian. This aim was his main priority. To be sure, philosophical clarifications was provided in the course of pursuing it, but these, for Kierkegaard, are a secondary consideration. From the outset he saw himself as a religious writer in Christianity and he speaks of his *tactics* in his pseudonymous works. (Phillips 1992: p. 185)

The difference in the perspectives of the author and the reader is also central to Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication. The concept of communication ordinarily implies a mutual activity, that of making something common, but Kierkegaard uses the Danish word 'meddelelse', which, akin to the German 'Mitteilung', actually means with-sharing and thus implies two asymmetrical roles, that of a sender, the one sharing something, and that of an addressee, the one with whom something is shared. Kierkegaard's 'meddelelse', his communication, takes into account the standpoint of the reader, but it is asymmetrical, just as the great majority of the relationships portrayed in his writings are asymmetrical. Wilhelm builds up his friend, the lover builds up the loved one, Kierkegaard builds up the reader, but the friend, the loved one, and the reader do not influence the form or aim of the process of edification because edification is directed at *an already identified oversight* on their part, the 'enormous illusion'. The addressees only become active partners in the process of edification if they acknowledge and address this illusion, by willing their love, by becoming a true self, by loving their neighbour and God.

In his diaries of the early 1930s, Wittgenstein also sees an intimate connection between an adequate understanding of love and an adequate understanding of philosophical method. In fact, Wittgenstein's critical reflections of Kierkegaard's notion of non-preferential proper love follows a longer remark on Kierkegaard's method, where Wittgenstein writes:

There is something teasing about Kierkegaard's writings & that is intended, of course, even though I am not sure whether they are intended to have precisely that effect that they have upon me. There is also no doubt that one who teases me forces me to deal with his concern & if this concern is important, this is good. – And yet, there is something in me that condemns this teasing. And is this only my resentment? (2003: p. 131, 7.11.31)

Wittgenstein acknowledges that the teasing character of Kierkegaard's writings is intended, because it is a necessary and integrated part of the attempt to 'awaken and provoke' the reader and the aim of leading the reader to neighbour-love. It may be Wittgenstein's admiration of this aim that motivates his high regard for Kierkegaard as a thinker and a human being, reflected in his remarks that "Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint" (Drury 1984: p. 87).<sup>xxviii</sup>

Nonetheless, Wittgenstein still has serious reservations about precisely this feature of Kierkegaard's writings: that they have a particular aim, because this means that Kierkegaard in a certain sense 'forces' him as a reader to deal with his concern. In this way, Wittgenstein opposes the manipulative nature of Kierkegaard's provocation caused by the deception at the heart of his indirect communication. After a short reflection on Kierkegaard's style, Wittgenstein continues:

The idea that someone uses a trick to get me to do something is unpleasant. It is certain that it takes great courage (to use this trick) & I would not – not remotely – have this courage; but it is a question whether if I had it, it would be right to use it. I think that aside from courage it would also take a lack of love of one's Neighbour [*Nächsten*]. (2003: p. 131, 7.11.31; translation revised)

Courage is a highly regarded and much discussed ideal of Wittgenstein, and in his eyes Kierkegaard's courage in committing to his aim is what marks him as being on a different plane from most of us, giving him a right to demand something of his readers. What Wittgenstein is questioning is whether Kierkegaard should make use of this right. It is one thing to earn a right, but it is quite another thing to insist on exercising it, and even if Kierkegaard has come to have a more profound understanding of what it is to be a human self and of "*what Christianity is*" (1849/1998: p. 15), it is questionable whether he has any right to trick his readers to change in accordance with an understanding that is not yet available to themselves.

In addition, Wittgenstein also questions whether Kierkegaard, by deceiving and forcing his concerns on his reader, shows a lack of love of them, of whom they actually are in contrast to whom they may become. It shows a lack of trust in them, especially a lack of trust in the possibility that they will find their own way to God. The Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup makes a related point.

[T]o take responsibility for the effects of one's communication [‘meddelelse’] is the same as intending to force the other human being to accept the communication. True, it is Kierkegaard's stated intention with indirect communication to make the other human being free. But the opposite happens. It seems that the communicator wants to free the addressee of any dependence of himself in order to place the addressee alone before God. However, this is

precisely what the communicator will not leave to the addressee, instead he wants to ensure that this will happen through the indirectness of the communication. (Løgstrup 1968: p. 153; translation by the author)

What we have found is that Wittgenstein reacts to the secret at the heart of Kierkegaard's philosophy and his aim "to deceive the other person into the truth" (1847/2009: p. 258), because he, as Genia Schönbaumsfeld phrases it, "seems to regard it as in some sense 'unethical'" (2007, 27).<sup>xxix</sup> We are now in a position to add a little more precision. Wittgenstein sees Kierkegaard's certainty that he has the *right* to trick his readers and the *deception* at heart of the method of indirect communication as a lack of love that is ethically reproachable.

This difference between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein is reflected in a difference between the ways in which they do philosophy. One way to draw out this difference is to ask whether we can see Wittgenstein as attempting to build up his readers, that is, whether edification could be the aim of his philosophical method. As in Kierkegaardian edification, Wittgenstein's therapeutic understanding of philosophy also means taking into account the readers' actual starting point; as we noted at the beginning, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein share the view that the philosophers must address the perspective of the reader and go all 'the bloody *hard way*' from there.<sup>xxx</sup> We can, however, appreciate the uniquely dialogical nature of Wittgenstein's view of philosophy that distinguishes it from that of Kierkegaard if we consider two of Wittgenstein's guiding ideas.

The first is that for Wittgenstein, our need for philosophy springs from our potential to get lost in language, from our discovery that we do not have any clear understanding of the meaning of our words. As he phrases it, "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (2001: §123). Importantly, we are all equally at risk here, none of us can claim to be safe from possible confusion. The possibility of getting lost in language and of finding one's way is a



possibility open for both philosopher and reader, or maybe we should say that here the roles are not fixed, here we are all philosophers and readers, we are all potentially lost, and we all have access to the resources that will help us find our way back. O.K. Bouwsma has also noted this difference between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein:

In the work of Kierkegaard there corresponds to ordinary language in Wittgenstein the language of the Scriptures, which Kierkegaard understands. Without this latter assumption Kierkegaard cannot be effective. And this is not how it is in Wittgenstein. There ordinary language is taken to be language we all understand. Here, there is agreement. (Quoted from Phillips 1992: p. 186)<sup>xxxix</sup>

In Wittgenstein's philosophy, we find no epistemological asymmetry between the philosopher and the reader, every form of understanding available to Wittgenstein is also available to the reader. In this sense, "nothing is hidden" (2001: §435). Furthermore, if the philosopher is the one who initiates the investigation, then she is also the one who does not know her way about; she is *in fact* lost, which means that she does not (at least not at the outset) have special insight into how the philosophical confusion can be dissolved. We can see the dialogical structure of Wittgenstein's writings as arising from the philosopher's need for help to transcend the perspective from which this confusion arises. This also means that there cannot be any deception or distance between the philosopher and the reader, between the different voices of the dialogue because they are engaged in a shared investigation of uses of language in relation to the perspective that leads the philosopher – or the reader – into difficulties.

The second guiding idea of Wittgenstein's view of philosophical investigation is that any meaningful aim for philosophy is essentially connected to and defined by the problem investigated;

the idea that in philosophy, “description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems” (2001: §109). Philosophical activity cannot be directed towards an independent, substantial aim, such as that of edifying the reader for example, because the investigation gets its point from the philosophical problem at hand, and even if we always strive for clarity in philosophy, the clarity pursued is just the one which will make our present problem disappear (cf. 2001: §133). “As in philosophy so in life we are led astray by seeming analogies (to do what others are permitted to do). And here, too, there is only one remedy against this seduction: to listen to the soft voices which tell us that things here are not the same as there” (2003: p. 97). A consequence of this is that in philosophy, we cannot know beforehand where we are going, we should rather be going anywhere our questioning takes us. And this means that no one, not Wittgenstein, not the philosopher, not the author, not the lover, has any privileged claim about where we are going.

Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy is in this way a truly communal activity that can only succeed if the philosopher and the reader, or rather, the interlocutors, engage in a mutual effort to understand each other’s perspectives in a shared search for clarity, something that can only succeed through symmetrical dialogue. In line with this, David G. Stern describes dialogue as the core of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy:

The *Investigations* is best understood as inviting the reader to engage in a philosophical dialogue, a dialogue that is ultimately about whether philosophy is possible, about the impossibility and necessity of philosophy [...]. This result is best understood, I believe, as emerging out of the reader’s involvement in the dialogue of the *Philosophical Investigations*, our temptation into, attraction toward, philosophical theorizing, and our coming to see that it

doesn't work in particular cases, rather than as the message that any one voice in the dialogue is conveying. (Stern 2006: p. 220)

I noted at the beginning of this article that both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein value philosophy's potential for bringing about a change in the life of the reader, but what we have found now is that there is a limit to this agreement. In Kierkegaard's work, this change of life must take a particular form, and he therefore organises his writings in light of the overall aim to lead the reader to neighbour-love and to faith. Wittgenstein strikes a truthful note when he says – as recorded by Drury – that Kierkegaard keeps “on saying the same thing over and over again” (Drury 1984: p. 88).<sup>xxxiii</sup> In contrast, in Wittgenstein's work, there is no *one* road in philosophy, because any new philosophical problem will require a new form of investigation, and it may lead the reader as well as the philosopher to new forms of change of life. For Wittgenstein, the activity of philosophy is therefore also a personal endeavour because it puts into question the philosopher's own perspective. As Wittgenstein writes: “Work on philosophy [...] is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects from them.)” (1998: p. 24).

## **7. Philosophy and Marriage. Un-concluding Cavellian Postscript**

What we have seen is that Wittgenstein has serious reservations about Kierkegaard's view of proper love and of edification as a guiding principle for a philosophical engagement with the reader, and that he instead favours forms of intervention that involve the preferences of the lover and the philosopher's own perspective. In closing, I want to consider whether there is a conception of love that may serve as a model for Wittgenstein's philosophical engagement with his reader.

A good candidate is the view of love presented by Stanley Cavell in his investigation of the classical Hollywood 'remarriage' comedies. For Cavell, any contemporary investigation of love and

marriage will have to start with the insight that the relationship of marriage is not in and of itself a given thing. Ever since Luther changed the world by getting married, and Henry the 8<sup>th</sup> changed it again by getting a divorce, we have been forced to accept that we do not have a settled understanding of what legitimises neither marriage nor divorce, and that we have no settled view of what love in marriage entails. Cavell is interested in Hollywood comedies because they portray (of course highly privileged) couples who consider divorce to be a real possibility, and who in light of this are forced to ask the question of the legitimacy of their love and their marriage. In this way, the movies allow us to follow how a number of characters strive to make themselves, their selves, meaningful in their loving relationships with each other.

In his readings of the remarriage comedies, Cavell deals with central human experiences such as losing one's confidence in one's worldview, of not being able to identify one's place in the world, of a fundamental obscurity in one's conception of oneself and one's relations to others, and of losing confidence in one's love. Cavell's point is that the problems faced by these characters arise because they lack *clarity* about what they may come to want or will. Moreover, this lack of clarity is connected to the characters' need to find a place within a social setting that does not offer absolute – or even stable – roles or institutions that they can will to inhabit, which gives them the additional task of establishing such institutions in a coming to clarity about what it is they may want these institutions to be. And finally, given the lack of clarity and absolute institutions, Cavell's point is that these characters, like anyone else trying to realise love or marriage today, face the challenge of coming to clarity of how they *as these particular persons* could be understandable within *this love and this marriage*.

The problem in the Hollywood comedies is *not* that the characters are preferential in their loves and lives, the problem is rather that they do not have a settled understanding of their own partiality and of how this partiality can be reconciled with the partiality of the loved one. Cavell's

most important point is that these questions are not ones that anyone can settle alone, it calls for the perspective of and dialogue with someone else, a person who is also genuinely concerned with these questions, and to whom one can be said to owe justification such as your lover or your spouse.<sup>xxxiii</sup> That is, Cavell portrays the only possible legitimisation of marriage as the mutual involvement in the process of making one's love understandable, in the mutual striving to become meaningful together. The legitimacy of marriage arises through "the mutual willingness for remarriage, for a sort of continuous reaffirmation" (Cavell 1982: p. 142) that establishes a new reality, not just of the self, but also of a fellowship, the reality of *this* marriage, in Cavell's words, "that they exist" (Cavell 2004: p. 47).

Cavell's view of love can be used as a model for Wittgenstein's view of philosophical activity, because in Wittgenstein's later writings we find an attempt to realise a view of philosophical activity as the reality of dialogical endeavour between people on equal footing, who are genuinely concerned with the same problem, and who can be said to owe each other justification in their mutual activity of striving to come to clarity about their place in language. This view of philosophy accords with Wittgenstein's view of love, and it is what necessitates the dialogical and symmetrical character of his writings. And this is where his method diverges from that of Kierkegaard.

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<sup>i</sup> See especially Schönbaumsfeld 2007, chap. 2.

<sup>ii</sup> See endnote xxix.

<sup>iii</sup> See e.g. Schönbaumsfeld 2007, Conant 1993, Creegan 1989 and Goodman 1986. In the commentary, comparisons of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's writings primarily concern two topics, their views of religion and of philosophical method. Here we will leave the first topic aside and focus exclusively on the second.

<sup>iv</sup> See e.g. Schönbaumsfeld 2007: p. 39, Conant 1993: p. 195 and Goodman 1986: p. 345.

<sup>v</sup> Cf. Wittgenstein's critical assessment of Ramsey's way of doing philosophy: "I had a certain awe of R[amsey]. He was a very swift & deft critic when one presented him with ideas. But his criticism didn't help along but held back & sobered" (2003: p. 15, 27.4.30).

<sup>vi</sup> See also Goodman 1986: p. 345.

<sup>vii</sup> Translation by the author. An alternative translation can be found in Wittgenstein 1993: p. 161.

<sup>viii</sup> Rhees 1970: p. 43. Wittgenstein's remark is quoted in Schönbaumsfeld 2007: p. 54.

<sup>ix</sup> See Conant 1993. Conant argues that the main connection between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein's views of philosophy is the similarity between the Tractarian distinction between 'what can be said' and 'what can only be shown' (see e.g. Wittgenstein 1921: 4.1212) on the one hand, and Climacus' notions of direct and indirect communication on the other (e.g. 1846/2009: pp. 62-68) as well as their shared aim to expose philosophical tendencies to try to communicate something that is incoherent and thus collapses into nonsense. This way of arguing for a similarity between the writings of Kierkegaard (especially 1846/2009) and the early Wittgenstein is criticised in Lippett 2000 and Rudd 2000. I will not engage in these discussions, as I only deal with Wittgenstein's writings after 1929 and

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do not consider the question of what can or cannot be communicated according to Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, but solely investigate their views on how to bring about engagement in a reader.

<sup>x</sup> What Cordelia represents is precisely the opportunity for the seducer “to delight in the loveliness, all the lovableness with which nature has so abundantly equipped her” (1843/1987a: p. 376).

<sup>xi</sup> See 1843/1987a: p. 296-298.

<sup>xii</sup> To call the seducer’s involvement with Cordelia a *relationship* is in a certain sense a misrepresentation in so far as a relationship requires some form of reciprocity. In the story, Cordelia falls in love, she loves, but she does so within a framework already settled by the seducer.

<sup>xiii</sup> See 1843/1987a: p. 298.

<sup>xiv</sup> This is what Hall calls Kierkegaard’s ‘dialectics of paradox’, the idea that certain practical possibilities – such as freedom – can be realised only together with their opposition – here a lack of freedom – in a unity where the opposition is not dissolved, but is maintained and accentuated (Hall 1994).

<sup>xv</sup> See also the opening of *The Sickness unto Death* (1849/1980) and Dalsgaard 2010.

<sup>xvi</sup> See e.g. 1843/1987b: pp. 21 and 42-46.

<sup>xvii</sup> See also Solomon 2008: p. 88-89.

<sup>xviii</sup> Hannay 2008: p. 116.

<sup>xix</sup> 1847/2009: pp. 65-70; this way of describing Kierkegaard’s distinction is presented as standard in Lippett 2013: pp. 17-19.

<sup>xx</sup> See also Ferreira 2008: p. 97.

<sup>xxi</sup> As one of Kierkegaard’s most prominent Danish critics K.E. Løgstrup notes: “In Kierkegaard’s writings, the love of one’s neighbour [...] comes to consist solely in helping one’s neighbour to love God” (Løgstrup 1968: p. 54; translation by the author). See also Hannay 2008: p. 118.

<sup>xxii</sup> See e.g. 1847/2009: pp. 132-4. See also Løgstrup 1968: p. 47.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Or, rather, that Wilhelm is not capable of fully realising the possibility of religious love, something which is also indicated by the fact that Kierkegaard makes him supplement his letters to A with a sermon by an unknown priest entitled “The Edifying in the Thought that Against God We Are Always in the Wrong”.

<sup>xxiv</sup> For the story of Wittgenstein’s relationship to Marguerite Respinger, see Monk 1991: pp. 238-41, 281, 294, 334 and 339.

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<sup>xxv</sup> Here we find a striking parallel to the work of Løgstrup who, in response to Kierkegaard's writings, notes that the way to relate properly to God, relate properly in religious faith, is to take care of the gift that we have received from God, which to Løgstrup is our own life and the life of the other in our mutual interdependency. See Løgstrup 1997, *passim*.

<sup>xxvi</sup> This is, in Kierkegaard's terms, to open the possibility of despair (*fortvivlelse*).

<sup>xxvii</sup> See also 1859/1998: p. 53: "One can deceive a person out of what is true and – to recall old Socrates – one can deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only this way can a deluded person actually be brought into what is true – by deceiving him".

<sup>xxviii</sup> According to Drury, this remark was made during a discussion after a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club, which dates it to Wittgenstein's 1929-36 Cambridge-period.

<sup>xxix</sup> Schönbaumsfeld offers an interpretation of Wittgenstein's reservations towards Kierkegaard, according to which we should explain them *away* – for example with reference to Wittgenstein's problems with 'feeling inferior', see 2007: p. 22. In contrast to Schönbaumsfeld's interpretation, I present a reading that takes Wittgenstein's reservations towards Kierkegaard's writing seriously. For an interpretation of the relationship between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein that differs from both that of Schönbaumsfeld and the present author, see Conant 1993 and 1996.

<sup>xxx</sup> Rhees 1969: p. 169. Here quoted from Conant 2002: p. 85. See also Plant 2004.

<sup>xxxi</sup> The remark originates from Bouwsma's "Notes on Kierkegaard's 'The Monstrous Illusion'" (1986: p. 83).

<sup>xxxii</sup> The remark is from Wittgenstein's last stay in Dublin nearing the end of his life.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> See Cavell 2004: p. 42.