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Neoclassical Realism's Contribution to the Study of NATO
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MOVING ‘BEYOND THE STATE’:
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM’S CONTRIBUTION
TO THE STUDY OF NATO

Michael Keith Agner, Jr.

Ph.D. dissertation
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Introduction
The Puzzle of NATO’s Out-of-Area Cooperation

The continued existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the Cold War has effectively brought an end to the often-debated question over the “survival” of the transatlantic alliance.¹ To be certain, few scholars now question that the Alliance has indeed survived the initial shock brought about by the secession of the East-West conflict. Since 1999, twelve Eastern European states have joined the Euro-Atlantic community, and one additional is currently participating in the Alliance’s Membership Action Plan (MAP).² A variety of forums have likewise been established to promote enhanced cooperation with neighboring states (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the NATO-Russia Council). Moreover, NATO is arguably more active than ever; it has extended its mandate to new areas such as crisis management, policing, and the fight on terrorism, and it has also expanded its reach to go “out-of-area,” reflecting greater cooperation in its operational scope.³ Thus, while some observers still question the long-term viability of an alliance absent a discernable threat, few take issue with the claim that the Euro-Atlantic community has not only continued, but that in some respects has in fact flourished.

Despite NATO’s arguable renaissance, out-of-area operations in both Southeastern Europe and the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) since the end of the Cold War have demonstrated that the nature and degree of cooperation among Alliance partners differ considerably across space and time.⁴⁵ While some explanations for such variation focus on the

¹ Within the context of this study, NATO will be referred to interchangeably also as the Alliance or the Organization.
² Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO on 12 March 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became members on 29 March 2004; and Albania and Croatia followed suit on 1 April 2009. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is participating in MAP, pending resolution of a name dispute which has thus far blocked its accession.
³ Alliance members have actively undertaken a number of out-of-area operations, including many within the context of the Yugoslav wars: Operation Sharp Guard (June 1993-October 1996), Operation Deliberate Force (August-September 1995), Operation Joint Endeavour/IFOR (December 1995-1996), Operation Joint Guard/Joint Forge/SFOR (December 1996-2004), Operation Allied Force (March-June 1999), Operation Essential Harvest (August-September 2001). Four on-going operations include: ISAF (since August 2003), KFOR (since June 1999), Baltic Air Policing (since March 2004), and the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (since August 2004).
⁴ See, for instance, Terriff (2004).
⁵ Southeastern Europe refers here to the countries and provinces making up the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; this term will also be referred to interchangeably as the Balkans. The BMENA is a term coined by the G8 in collective reference to Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank/Gaza,
role of power or diverging strategic interests, a number of conflicts have arisen in both regions
since the beginning of the 1990s within which similar power constellations and shared interests
among Alliance partners nevertheless led to considerably different policy outcomes. The analysis
which follows explores this conundrum and argues that observers have thus far failed to offer an
adequate account for these discrepancies, because the study of NATO’s post-Cold War
developments has remained largely undertheorized. Specifically, scholars have devoted little
effort to theorizing the means by which power and interests are influenced by the policy-making
process (Deni 2007, 11). As the growing relevance of out-of-area missions underscores the central
importance of NATO’s “near abroad,” understanding trends in Alliance cooperation obliges a focus
on this fundamental topic.

0.1. The puzzle: Explaining variation in NATO cooperation

What accounts for different policy outcomes in key areas of engagement? Little attention has yet
been paid to explaining variation in Alliance cooperation since the end of the Cold War, although
collaboration among NATO partners has differed considerably. Within the Balkans, for example,
evident disparities underscored policy during the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. At the end of the
Cold War, political upheavals and ethnic nationalism wreaked havoc on Yugoslavia, a region
situated squarely on European members’ eastern flank. While many observers professed that Serb
military posture during the Bosnian conflict threatened to destabilize the region, the Alliance
initially remained surprisingly reticent. Although Alliance interests remained heavily divided
throughout the crisis, NATO did intervene decisively almost three years later, successfully
demonstrating according to Ellen Williams the “key institutional and military advantages of
alliance operations” and proving to many critics that NATO “had both the vision and the ability to
adapt itself to the new strategic environment by undertaking an out-of-area, non-Article V
mission...” (2008, 66). Less than five years later, Southeastern Europe once again fell into dismay
as Kosovo pushed for greater autonomy from Yugoslavia. This time, however, NATO acted swiftly
despite the fact that a significant rift still divided Alliance interests (Webber 2009, 453) and that

and Yemen. As Turkey is a member of NATO, it is not considered part of this group within this study; BMENA will also
be referred to interchangeably as the Greater Middle East, the GME, the Middle East, the ME, and the Mediterranean.
6 In this analysis, “policy outcomes” refer generally to the specific policies decided by Alliance partners as opposed to
the results of policies carried out.
the Serb exercise of power was arguably more reserved than was the case during the Bosnian conflict.

In a similar fashion, the GME has also been host to a series of security challenges which have resulted in divergent Alliance policies. The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 cast light on the threat posed by Iraqi power and led to a palpable convergence of interests among NATO members. The Alliance responded swiftly through both direct and indirect involvement, appearing to substantiate at first glance the rigor of explanations based on power and interests in accounting for NATO cooperation toward the region. However, such accounts fall short in offering a useful clarification for a second regional threat, namely Iran’s nuclear ambitions. At the end of 2002, Iran publicly disclosed the existence of a uranium enrichment program but has thus far failed to comply with existing IAEA guidelines. While Tehran claims its initiative is legitimate and intended solely for the peaceful production of energy, a number of Alliance partners have levied compelling charges suggesting that “likely military dimensions” underscore these plans. Member states as well as the Alliance itself has expressed fervent concern that even the potential of a nuclear-armed Iran represents an unacceptable shift in the regional balance of power which could provoke “a nuclear domino effect” throughout the GME (De Hoop Scheffer 2009), and consensus exists within NATO that preventing this is in the strategic interest of all Alliance partners (Kissinger 2009). Nevertheless, the Organization has played at most a taciturn role in confronting Tehran. This is all the more perplexing given the significant strides NATO has undertaken to institutionalize enhanced cooperation toward the GME in the post-Cold War era through endeavours such as the Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004), both of which seek to not only improve collaboration between the Alliance and third-party states, but also to advance a common strategy among NATO partners for tackling the more comprehensive array of security challenges emerging within the region. As in the Balkans, NATO policy toward the Greater Middle East has varied considerably since the end of the Cold War, and current approaches for understanding such developments based on either power or interest fail to present consistent explanations. The analysis which follows serves as a valuable contribution to the current literature.

It is worth noting that some disagreement seems to exist within NATO over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In an interview within the Guardian on 26 October 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan dismissed fears of a covert Iranian nuclear weapons program as “gossip” (Tait 2009).
on interstate security cooperation and the study of NATO, as it offers insight into both the theoretical and empirical implications of regional divergences in Alliance policy.

0.2. The state of the art: What we know (and don’t know) about Alliance cooperation

Alliance security cooperation has enjoyed substantial attention by scholars since the end of the Cold War, and two cardinal questions have inspired this research: Why has the Alliance persisted, and what changes can be expected given the evolving security challenges of the day? For example, Chernoff (1995) presents a disjunctive aggregate model of security cooperation to support his contention that states are prone to cooperate under changing environmental conditions even in the absence of a discernable threat. Based on this finding, he postulates that the chances for NATO’s persistence are rather good as long as it is able to adapt to the changing environment. In analyzing NATO transformation, Drew et al. (1991) articulate the need which arose at the end of the Cold War for reassessing the Organization’s forward defense posture. They argue that a “resilient defense” approach would enable the Alliance to develop strategies which could better accommodate the simultaneous pressures of reduced defense spending and the lack of a tangible military threat, thereby facilitating continued cooperation. Papacosma and Heiss (1995) released an edited compilation of articles which share as their common thread a focus on the problem NATO faced in defining its *raison d’être* with the fall of the Soviet Union and offer a discussion of the role cooperation between Alliance partners has played in bringing about changes necessary in confronting structural and strategic demands as well as inter-institutional relations. Carpenter (1995) examines whether NATO represents an anachronism in the post-Cold War era, and he maintains that the Organization’s persistence is due in large part to its ability to accommodate the conflicting agendas of its member states. He concludes by suggesting that the Alliance must transform itself to allow for cooperation in the face of an ever growing divergence of interests under a common institutional arrangement. In a more recent contribution, Sperling and Webber explore NATO’s evolution from “Kosovo to Kabul” and contend that the Organization has faced a number of existential crises throughout its history; its perseverance in the post-Cold War era stems from its “ceaseless process of transformation – of structure and organization, of operations, partnerships and memberships” (2009, 491). They conclude that crisis does not inevitably signal the impending dissolution of the Alliance, but NATO’s continued relevance will require significant
cooperation among the Allies to maintain this necessary process of change; NATO, so Sperling and Webber, is on a clear path toward such change.

In general, two conclusions appear evident across the numerous studies on NATO’s persistence and transformation. First, observers concur that answers to both these questions are fundamentally interrelated. The dissolution of the Soviet Union rendered the Alliance’s initial raison d’être moot, and no discernable threat has yet emerged in its place. Instead, the security environment within which the Organization now treads is riddled with more abstruse risks such as drug trafficking, human insecurity, migration, and terrorism. Such risks are not only less easily identifiable, but they affect Alliance partners to varying degrees and thus present a much greater challenge when seeking consensus on desirable policy objectives. In other words, a security environment dominated by vague, diverse risks arguably presents less incentive for alliance-type cooperation than is the case when a common enemy directly threatens a group of states. NATO’s continued existence as the West’s paramount political-military security organization will depend on its skill at both adapting to this new strategic environment while simultaneously appealing to member state interests in the process. Scholars have drawn attention to a number of areas within which Alliance transformation is required; the still daunting role of the Organization in “out-of-area” arenas (i.e., addressing security challenges beyond the Euro-Atlantic borders), transatlantic power disparities (e.g., questions of burden-sharing), and the US role in Europe are but three. As Cornish notes, although transformation is not sufficient to ensure the Alliance’s survival, a failure to address these core challenges would invariably be “fatal to this partnership” (2004, 73). Thus, if one wishes to gain insight into the reasons for NATO’s endurance, identifying and evaluating its process of adaptation since the end of the Cold War is an obligatory undertaking.

The second conclusion which can be drawn from such analyses is that debates on post-Cold War security cooperation within NATO have been informed by various directions, and two schools of thought suggest that the Alliance is particularly efficacious at promoting cooperation among its members. With its underlying institutional logic, neoliberal institutionalism purports that the Alliance is based on rules, norms and practices which lead to the existence of shared expectations.

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9 For a insightful introductory volume which explores various aspects of NATO transformation, see Hamilton (2004).
Once in place, strong rational incentives (e.g., sunk costs and path dependencies) advocate cooperation among its members, with dissensus coming only at extremely high costs (Wallander and Keohane 1999; Keohane and Martin 1995, 47). Social constructivist analyses, in turn, argue that the Alliance forms a social structure defined by a shared identity as well as a specific set of norms and ideas that not only constitute the participating actors but are also constituted by their interaction (Risse-Kappen 1996). As such, membership within NATO is directly intertwined with the values and identities of the member states themselves, thus facilitating cooperative policy outcomes (Farrell 2002).

In contrast, realists view prospects for long-term cooperation within NATO in the absence of a discernable threat with a degree of scepticism. They suggest that the Alliance’s persistence is best explained not by the cooperative disposition it promotes but rather as an instrument of national strategic interests. Waltz contends, for instance, that NATO serves as “simply a means of maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European states” (Waltz 1998). In like manner, Layne (1997) refers to a strategy of “extended deterrence,” according to which the US pursues a policy of preponderance and the negation of regional power (e.g., vis-à-vis Germany and Japan) to discourage potential challenges to US power; NATO functions thereby as one instrument in this strategy. Ratti (2006) concurs, arguing that Alliance cooperation can most readily be found when the motives of individual states coincide, thereby serving the broader, geopolitical interests of its members. In other words, realist scholars suggest that an alliance is likely to facilitate cooperation as long as a powerful rival sits on the horizon or if it favourably complements the domestic foreign policy interests of its participants.  

Despite the insight afforded by research on post-Cold War Alliance developments, a few areas remain understudied. For example, scholars have not yet comparatively explored variations in Alliance cooperation (e.g., across space and time). I address this topic below in three sections. First, I argue that structural realism provides a compelling basis for analysing regional dynamics in NATO. Neorealism has made particular strides in this regard, yet it has often been faulted for being one-dimensional, excluding a formative role for sub-systemic factors in security policy decision-making. In the second section, I therefore make the case that one variant of realism –

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10 These three approaches by no means exhaust the theoretical state of the art as regards post-Cold War NATO research. For example, Ivanov (2006) explores the relevance of security communities literature on the study of Alliance cooperation. Such alternatives do seem marginalized, however, with neoinstitutionalist, social constructivist and realist approaches representing the conventional areas of inquiry.
neoclassical realism (NCR) – offers an ideal theoretical backdrop for studying NATO cooperation, as it combines the parsimony and rigor of structural realism with intimate reflection of the policy-making process. I then conclude by presenting three neoclassical realist approaches to studying the alignment behavior of states. While NATO scholars have yet to engage extensively with neoclassical realism, these models present distinct explanations which may well shed light on not only the broader dynamics of NATO cooperation but more specifically on policy variations across time and space as well.

0.3. Theorizing NATO: How well does realism fair in explaining variation in cooperation?

Though many theoretical directions have contributed to analyses of Alliance cooperation, realism has arguably been the school of thought traditionally associated with the study of alliances and power politics. According to Walt, “The realist perspective offers a simple and powerful way to understand relations among political groups (including states) and offers compelling (albeit imperfect) accounts of a diverse array of international phenomena” (1997b, 934). Moreover, it has often been argued that realism is the dominant – albeit, certainly not unchallenged – approach to understanding interstate security cooperation. As Schweller notes, realism “forms a theoretical perspective that has achieved the status of the dominant research program in the study of world politics” (1997, 927). In like manner, Doyle contends that “realism is our dominant theory. Most international relations scholars are either self-identified or readily identifiable Realists” (1997, 41). With respect to the study of alliances and security cooperation, realism undoubtedly holds a revered position within the discipline. This would suggest structural realism serves as an ideal starting point for exploring interstate security cooperation in an organization such as NATO.

A second reason structural realism lends itself well to this analysis is that neorealist scholars in particular have made considerable strides not only at theorizing on the formation and maintenance of alliances (Snyder 1997; Kupchan 1988), but also at incorporating an understanding of regional dynamics within the study of security cooperation. Invariably, this is linked to neorealism’s underlying causal logic which views relative power distributions as the primary cause for international political outcomes (see Table 0.1). According to neorealists, imbalances in power

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11 For an inclusive overview of the “broad theoretical traditions” which address the future of NATO, see Walt (2000, 11-25)
lead to balancing behavior, just as power equilibrium tends to promote stability. Though neorealists have traditionally concerned themselves with system-wide power distributions such as those of the Cold War era, some noteworthy studies have explored the impact of regional power distributions on interstate relations. Advancing his argument for a hegemonic stability theory, for example, Krasner contends that systemic stability is owed to the presence of a powerful hegemon: “[Openness] is most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its ascendancy...It is the power and the politics of states that create order where there would otherwise be chaos” (1976, 323, 343). Consequently, regionalism or regional conflicts is the direct result of waning hegemonic power. Grieco (1999) and Crone (1993) also explore the impact of hegemonic power, asserting that patterns of regional cooperation in Europe and Asia after World War II can be directly attributed to contrasting US security interests within the two regions. Focusing on regional power disparities, Mattli (1999) claims that cooperation is only possible when a benevolent regional leader exists which seeks to “supply” cooperation, while Gruber (2000) and Grieco (1996) explore ways by which states can be coerced into cooperation by other regional actors. In Origins of Alliances, Walt notes that geographic proximity comprises a vital component in the perception of threat and encourages patterns of balancing and bandwagoning as well as alliance formation (1990, 25). Moreover, he argues that regional powers are indifferent to global balances of power and instead pursue strategies in response to threats from other regional powers (148). Van Evera makes a similar claim, suggesting that regional shifts in the offense-defense balance represents

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12 It is worth noting that while Walt considers himself a neorealist, he has in fact emphasized the importance of subsystemic variables in explaining international politics. In “Origins of Alliances”, for instance, he claims that state perception of aggressive intentions is a key element of threat (1990, 25-6). In like manner, Walt’s recent work with John Mearsheimer, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,” asserts that the Israeli lobby exerts significant influence over the policy-making process in Washington and has on occasion persuaded US foreign policy in such a way as to benefit Israel’s national interests to the detriment, however, of those of the United States (2007). In essence, this claim represents a variant on the “state capture” claims made by a number of neoclassical realists (Rathbun 2008, 321). Finally, Walt has advocated an epistemological approach known as “detailed narrative history,” arguing that “valid empirical tests require a sophisticated understanding of the historical record” (Walt 1997b, viii). To be certain, this approach has subsequently been adopted in various neoclassical realist research; see, for instance, Layne (2006). Despite his reliance on subsystem variables and the promotion of an epistemology à la NCR research, one explanation for why Walt nevertheless labels himself a neorealist could rest upon his disagreement with the Lakatosian notion of a “hard core” of shared assumptions within a particular research agenda. In response to Vasquez’s (1997) accusation that the realist paradigm represents a degenerative research program, Walt asserts, “…The historical record shows that scientists working in such a [research] program often disagree with its central elements” (Walt 1997a, 932). As such, he suggests that one could well explore the impact of subsystemic variables on international politics while still remaining a neorealist. Interestingly, Schweller frames his defense of realism somewhat differently, maintaining that political realism indeed has an irrefutable “hard core” and that variants on realism simply disagree on the “protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses” around this core (1997, 927).
the chief explanatory variable for war, and shifts in this balance are thus one major reason for the formation of alliances: “Balancing behavior rose and fell as the power and activism of the two traditional offshore balancers...waxed and waned. When either was strong..., conquest on the continent was difficult...But when [they] were weak or isolationist, continental powers could expand against less resistance, leaving all states less secure” (1999, 165).\textsuperscript{13} Mearsheimer (2001) likewise recognizes the significance of a regional dynamic to power politics as is evident in his conceptualization of offshore balancing (234-66) and the offensive realist assumption that great powers continually strive for regional hegemony (168-69). Indeed, neorealist literature has engaged itself actively with the impact of regional variations (e.g., geographical, regional power distributions) on power politics.

Despite such contributions, neorealist approaches are often faulted by observers who assert that they remain too “one-dimensional” to adequately grasp dynamics of security cooperation. Vasquez (1998), for example, criticizes neo-realists for not painting an accurate depiction of foreign policy decision-making within the state. He contends that neorealist theory envisages foreign policy taking place within a “black box,” in which the state is a holistic, impenetrable object. According to Vasquez, it thereby fails to consider the formative impact of domestic factors on foreign policy such as bargaining between bureaucracies, regime type and system, and the role of interest groups such as political parties. Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988) purport that while “most security policies result from the interplay of domestic and international factors” (24), domestic aspects of security affairs have been widely overlooked. Domestic political arrangements can not only limit the policy alternatives available to states, but they can likewise be influenced by external threat. They therefore assert that the interplay between systemic and domestic factors is vital for grasping the nuances of foreign policy decision-making.\textsuperscript{14} Even some realist scholars have joined in this line of critique. Levy (1989) has called for increased research on the role of domestic politics in international relations, and Snyder (1991) has sought to enlarge the discourse of IR by bridging the gap between domestic and international affairs in his analysis of overexpansionist foreign policy. Finally, Zakaria maintains that “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what

\textsuperscript{13} Most of the literature on the offense-defense balance is owed to Robert Jervis, who is credited for advancing this theory; see Jervis (1978). Quester (1977) also contributed significantly to this body of work. For a useful overview of offense-defense balance, see Glaser and Kaufmann (1988).

\textsuperscript{14} See also Keohane (1991) and Cohen (1990).
factors” (1995, 483). Structural theories have indeed come far in casting light on the dynamics of interstate security cooperation, but rationalist models within this school – e.g., Snyder’s alliance management model involving entrapment and abandonment – do not necessarily suffice when one considers different regional patterns of cooperation. While neo-realism’s relevance for alliance studies is unquestionable, many observers have thus taken issue with what they see as structural realism’s myopic focus on systemic explanations (e.g., balance of power), which exclude thereby other relevant variables in the study of foreign policy.

To be certain, the puzzle of disparities in NATO policy outcomes presented above seems to support such claims. Since the end of the Cold War, both the Balkans and the GME have been host to a number of security challenges whose dynamics do not appear to be fully answered by relying solely on systemic explanations. Conflicts in both regions have been given rise to power shifts, and in each case we find differences in NATO’s response. While the Alliance succeeded at establishing a “creative, coherent and very successful NATO policy toward Eastern Europe” (Lynch 2005), its impotence in achieving similar cohesion toward out-of-area conflicts suggests that systemic power alone fails to adequately capture the potential “multi-dimensionality” of interstate security cooperation.

Despite such critique, structural realists continue to assert the tenacity of their approaches in explaining dynamics of NATO cooperation. Two arguments dominate in this respect. One claim argued by a number of realist scholars is simply that the “story of NATO” is not yet said and done. While maintaining that in the absence of a discernable threat the Alliance will inevitably collapse, they contend that such change cannot be expected to occur at once. The Alliance continues despite being unchallenged, because the nature of the international system often lends itself to periods of deliberate and protracted change. While a correction is certainly inevitable, structural changes resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union will first transpire after an indeterminate period of adjustment. It is not a question if NATO will dissolve, but rather when (Hoffmann 2000); time, so the argument goes, is the main arbitrator which will vindicate realist claims. A second argument often made directs attention to the role of strategic interests in explaining NATO’s persistence and defending thereby realism’s venerable position. This group asserts that the demise of the Atlantic Alliance is, in fact, no certainty.\textsuperscript{15} As the original catalyst for NATO’s creation

\textsuperscript{15} See, for instance, Kuglar et al. (1999).
was the convergence of interests in the face of the Soviet threat, it is feasible that an Alliance without rivals can endure: “A conceptual way out of the problem is to counter-assert that prediction and prescription are not the same thing. By extension, an alliance can wish to exist as long as it wants to; there is no intrinsic limit to the duration of a military alliance” (Ong 2003, 89). States pursue a number of strategic objectives to maximize security or power, and though bereft of a monolithic threat, the Alliance might still promote such alternative aims. For example, NATO provides its continental partners with privileged access to the hegemon which they otherwise would not have. As such, NATO may well continue if the geopolitical interests of the Allies were to underscore its sustained relevance even wanting a clear challenge.¹⁶

What is common to both of these arguments is the implicit assumption that answers to NATO’s persistence and transformation can be ascribed to factors which antecede the policy-making process. In other words, it is not so much about what is going at the level of the Alliance as it is about what is happening at an “earlier” level. While the first account focuses on the third image and sees the deterministic nature of the international system as the formative factor in deciding the Alliance’s fate, the second in turn concentrates on the second image by looking at the individual interests of cooperating states. According to these assertions, NATO’s continued vivacity thus has little to do with developments at the level of the Alliance itself. Yet this then begs the question as to what causes discrepancies in NATO policy as demonstrated above if outcomes in security cooperation are exclusively dependent upon factors extrinsic to the policy-making process.

Neoclassical realism advances one plausible explanation to reconcile this inconsistency.¹⁷ Neoclassical realist scholars emphasize the seminal role of endogenous variables on the policy outcomes of individual states. In particular, they maintain that theories which focus merely on factors at the systemic level overlook the impact of domestic peculiarities through which they must be translated. Understanding foreign policy developments such as counterbalancing or alignment tendencies must invariably take into account those factors which intervene within the

¹⁶ See also Cornish (1997, 10).
¹⁷ It is worth mentioning that a third alternative noted by Ong which accounts for NATO’s persistence and is advanced by some is that “the Alliance is actually not unthreatened as one might suppose it to be” (2003, 89). While the end of the Cold War drastically reduced the Soviet threat, it did not eliminate it. While Russia may pose no immediate challenge to the safety of the Alliance now, this cannot be ruled out in the future. NATO’s expansion to include former Warsaw Pact states is one event frequently referenced to support this claim. See Yergin and Gustafson (1995).
policy-making process. It is therefore essential to consider not only the general characteristics of the external environment (e.g., relative material capabilities, distribution of power), but also those aspects specific to the domestic structure through which policy actually emerges.

Though a relatively new field of inquiry, neoclassical realism holds significant promise at complementing neorealist research. As demonstrated above, neorealists have greatly advanced our understanding of security cooperation by exploring the fine grains of balance of power, and efforts have also been directed at casting light on the regional dynamics of power politics. NCR scholars praise these contributions and agree that “in general, across time and space, states’ positions in the anarchic international system prove to provide the simplest, shortest guide to international relations” (Zakaria 1995, 483). To be certain, neoclassical realism is a realist approach to the study of foreign policy outcomes. As Schweller notes, “Like all research programs, political realism consists of an irrefutable ‘hard core’ and a surrounding ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary hypotheses that ‘bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and readjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core’ (Lakatos 1970, 133)” (1997, 927). Thus, proponents of NCR inherently recognize the strong deterministic nature of systemic factors such as ordering principle and the distribution of material power in explaining interstate security cooperation.

The value added of neoclassical realism, however, rests in its focus on the domestic variables affecting foreign policy. While they do not refute the import of structural constraints outright, neoclassical realists nevertheless argue that certain structural approaches remain underspecified due to their exclusion of key intervening variables at the sub-systemic level. As Rose notes, international politics is “driven first and foremost by...relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure” (Rose 1998, 147). NCR thus augments neorealism to offer a fine-grained understanding of foreign policy; it commends itself as a tool for understanding the security decisions of states by highlighting not only the relevance of power politics, but also by

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18 Neoclassical realism owes its roots to classical realism in the sense that it is based on an inherent assumption that states seek the greatest level of influence their respective power can afford. To be certain, this assumption later fed into the power transition school as well, which argues that states strive to become very powerful and that this power, once obtained, eventually wanes. For more on power transition theory, see, Organski (1960) and Tammen et al. (2000). Neoclassical realism buys into this assumption, which stands in marked contrast to structural realism’s defensive argument that power balances itself (e.g., Waltz 1979). For a useful introduction into the foundations of NCR, see Rose (1998).
exploring how people and institutions translate this power into policy. It does not, however, refute neorealism; instead, it “fill[s] out Kenneth Waltz’s sparse understanding of power.” While the system may still be biased against the influences of sub-systemic variables, neoclassical realism explains those instances within which power does not translate directly into policy outcomes (Rathbun 2008, 296). By bridging the relationship between power and policy, NCR thus reveals how factors inherent to the policy-making process influence actors’ behavior, allowing for a more nuanced picture of outcomes in Alliance cooperation. It is this contribution to which I now turn.

The promise of neoclassical realism: Making its mark “beyond the state”?
In this section, I elaborate on the prospective contribution of neoclassical realist theory to the study of NATO by introducing three different analytical models found within the literature. These approaches have applied neoclassical realist thought to shed light on patterns of alignment behavior and, in doing so, touch to different degrees on dynamics of interstate security cooperation within NATO. In general, however, NCR research has dealt limitedly with the study of NATO for three main reasons. First, neoclassical realism has thus far concerned itself with states’ foreign policies as its dependent variable of study (see Table 0.1). In contrast to neorealist theories which attempt to explain international outcomes based on relative power distributions at the systemic level, neoclassical realists – owing back to its “classical” heritage – are fundamentally interested in foreign policy. Second, NCR theorists have placed considerable emphasis on the role of intervening variables at the sub-systemic level (e.g., domestic constraint, elite perceptions) which ultimately mould such policy outcomes. While the relative distribution of power represents a key independent variable and the structure of the international system (e.g., implications of anarchy) is central in this respect – owing back to NCR’s “neo-” heritage –, foreign policy depends heavily on how these systemic factors are translated through the policy-making process. In contrast to neorealisists, NCR theorists thus take a differentiated view of units, and explicating such differentiation by focusing on the foreign policy of various states has therefore been the key area of inquiry for the neoclassical realist. The final reason neoclassical realism has yet to specifically explore NATO on a larger scale involves broader trends within the discipline itself since the end of the Cold War. Traditionally, the field of security studies has been dominated by a focus on short term policy questions, succinctly termed by Nye and Lynn-Jones the “policy fads of the day” (1988,
Since 1989, the discipline’s agenda has arguably placed priority to questions which address the military primacy of the US and the effect of unipolarity on international order. This is no different for neoclassical realism, as theorists have primarily examined issues dealing with hegemonic behavior and third-state responses thereto. For instance, Cha (2000) analyzes the impact of patron commitment and fears of US abandonment/entrapment on the foreign policies of East Asian countries. Dyson (2008) makes use of neoclassical realist theory to explain the process of military convergence among European states since the early 1990s, and Taliaferro (2009c) applies NCR to account for post-Cold War and post-9/11 US foreign policy. As this demonstrates, the apparent propensity of neoclassical realist scholars to focus on such questions of inquiry is a direct consequence of NCR’s emergence as a theoretical tool for studying foreign policy.

### Table 0.1 – Classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research agenda</th>
<th>View of international system</th>
<th>View of units</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Underlying causal logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical realism</td>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>Differentiated</td>
<td>Foreign policies of states</td>
<td>Power distributions or distributions of interests (revisionist vs. status quo) (\rightarrow) foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealism</td>
<td>Very important; inherently competitive and uncertain</td>
<td>Undifferentiated</td>
<td>International political outcomes</td>
<td>Relative power distributions (independent variable) (\rightarrow) international outcomes (dependent variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoclassical realism</td>
<td>Important; implications of anarchy are variable and sometimes opaque to decision-makers</td>
<td>Differentiated</td>
<td>Foreign policies of states</td>
<td>Relative power distributions (independent variable) (\rightarrow) domestic constraints and elite perceptions (intervening variables) (\rightarrow) foreign policy (dependent variable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lobell et al. (2009).
policy in a post-Cold War era. In other words, neoclassical realism has focused until now on that which it inherently does best: studying the decision-making process and outcomes of individual states.

If neoclassical realism has thus far focused on questions of foreign policy, it is certainly worth asking whether this approach promises any additional insight into variations in policy outcomes of an interstate organization such as NATO. In other words, can neoclassical realism succeed at moving “beyond the state”? At first glance, NCR seems an ill-suited approach for studying alliance politics. Its research has traditionally explored phenomena like the grand strategies, foreign economic policy, alliance preferences, crisis behavior and military doctrine of single states. Some therefore claim that NCR yields itself poorly to the study of “aggregate outcomes” such as the international consequences of individual actors’ strategies (Taliaferro 2000, 20). This being the case, how could one expect to apply such theories to study questions related to security cooperation in and the policy outcomes of NATO?

The answer lies in the fundamental nature of the Alliance itself. First, NATO has a policy-making process which resembles that found at the state level. For example, Dueck (2009) and Ripsman (2009) illustrate the pivotal role competition among various stakeholders at the domestic level plays in the formulation of foreign policy. In similar fashion, Bhatti and Bronson (2000) demonstrate how NATO member states have pursued individual, conflicting interests and aims in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In another vein of research, Taliaferro (2009c) reveals that the ability of a state to extract or mobilize resources directly influences its capacity to adjust and implement changes in grand strategy. Finlay and O’Hanlon (2000) likewise show that the inability of NATO partners to resolve the question of burden-sharing (i.e., to agree on the means of resource extraction) has impaired the Alliance in responding to new security risks at the start of the 21st Century. Finally, in exploring how domestic-level theorizing can be combined with realist systemic-level theory, Sterling-Folker elucidates how domestic actors come under pressure from external factors as well as domestic processes (1997, 20). In the same way, Barany (2009) explores the pressures the Alliance faces in Afghanistan in balancing internal demands (e.g., those of national leaders) with the requirements dictated by realities on the ground. Such examples

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19 Neoclassical realist scholars have focused on a wide variety of foreign policy dynamics throughout history. Wohlfarth (1993), for example, explores Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, while Christensen (1996) examines US and Chinese foreign policy during this same period. Schweller (1998), in contrast, looks into such dynamics before and during World War II.
demonstrate clearly that states and alliances share striking similarities; just as neoclassical realism has shed light on the process of foreign policy-making at the state level, it could conceivably cast clarity on outcomes in policy-making at the interstate level. With respect to security and defense policy, NATO indeed seems to be a promising candidate for neoclassical realist research. Until now, though, this has remained a surprisingly sparse undertaking, as the study of NATO security cooperation has yet to capture solid footing on the neoclassical realist agenda.

Nevertheless, a few noteworthy efforts have used NCR to study various forms of alignment behavior (i.e., behavior resembling to a large degree that found within alliances). In this analysis, I present three such models which paint distinct pictures for why states cooperate in the face of various security challenges. Only one of these models deals specifically with cooperation within the Alliance itself, and all three fail to address the empirical puzzle discussed above, namely variations in security cooperation across space and time. Despite this, each approach reveals neoclassical realism’s potential to contribute to disciplinary debates in two respects: by providing a theoretical framework for studying dynamics of NATO cooperation and by shedding light on the empirical puzzle of disparities in Alliance policy outcomes.

The first model of alignment behavior which makes use of neoclassical realist theory points to the role of strategic assessment in shaping patterns of cooperation. Looking specifically at NATO relations, Sten Rynning argues that changes in environment as well as the nature of threats have steered Alliance transformation since the end of the Cold War. According to his analysis, threats reminiscent of the Cold War era have increasingly become replaced by vaguer risks, and the recognition that these risks are in some cases shared reinforces the idea that “cooperation must be anchored within an overarching institutional framework” (2005, 170). However, he nevertheless maintains that cooperation varies based on the motives of individual states, and this leads to a greater or lesser degree of fit in the strategic assessments of Alliance partners; invariably, this affects the resulting form of security cooperation. Christopher Coker (2002) supports this argument, asserting that NATO is ever more tasked with issues of risk management and that the individual assessments of Alliance member states affect the dynamics of cooperation.²⁰

²⁰Coker’s analysis of NATO is not directly neoclassical realist in nature. However, his claim that the Alliance has faced a shift in strategic environment since the end of the Cold War fits in well with NCR arguments which emphasize the import of environment in understanding interstate security cooperation.
A second explanation put forward by another group of neoclassical realist scholars suggests that dynamics in NATO cooperation can be explained by the degree of elite consensus among policy makers. Discussing reactions to systemic changes, Randall Schweller notes that states assess and adapt to external factors “partly as a result of their peculiar domestic structures and political situations” (2006, 164). Whether a state is successful at appropriately addressing a specific security challenge depends then on the ability to mobilize support among key actors over the objectives, means and domestic risks of cooperation. When elites disagree on these aspects, it could conceivably lead to situations in which state under- or overbalance against an opposing threat, failing thereby “to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to... changes in their strategic environment” (199). Aaron Friedberg gives credence to the potential for maladaptive behavior based on domestic peculiarities in his analysis of British elites’ reaction to the relative decline of Great Britain at the turn of the 20th Century, noting that the foreign policy process within the country was “fragmented both intellectually and bureaucratically” with “many ‘eyes’ and with more (or perhaps less) than a single ‘brain’” (1988, 290).

A third explanation is based on the observation by Wohlforth that transatlantic relations since the end of the Cold War have been fundamentally shaped by American management over the international system. Particularly, Wohlforth proposes the notion of legitimate hegemony, according to which the US has strong incentives “to moderate the frequency with which it resorts to its unilateral option” despite the unmatched preponderance it currently enjoys (2004, 199). Along this line of thought, the long-term strategic interests of the hegemon are best served through an institutionalization of cooperation, which shores up support for its hegemonic position and promotes a stable interstate order. Christopher Layne concurs, suggesting that the US has pursued a “containment of Europe” since the end of the Cold War, seeking thereby to shore up support for its continental hegemony; NATO represents one instrument in achieving this objective (2006, 105-17).

While few studies have applied neoclassical realism to the study of alliances as a direct topic of inquiry in and of itself, the examples elucidated above represent three different scenarios which shed light on the relationship between dynamics of alignment and foreign or security policy outcomes. According to the first of these, security cooperation in its various forms is the result of assessments of the strategic environment within which cooperating states find themselves.
Various outcomes result depending on the degree of fit among partners as to the exact nature of their strategic challenges. In other words, cooperation is strategic in nature, ensuing from the aggregation of threat and/or risk assessments in the policy-making process. The second explanation argues that states choose to cooperate in matters of security and defense based on consensus among actors, and resulting collaboration can therefore be either adaptive (e.g., cooperation which underscores alliance objectives) or maladaptive (i.e., cooperation which undermines alliance objectives) in nature. Finally, the third argument sees patterns of alignment among states as a direct consequence of hegemonic politics. Specifically, security cooperation is a direct consequence of the status quo nature of the system itself. While the hegemon strives to maintain its legitimacy, its allies seek to keep the leader’s power in check. As such, alignment behavior is best seen as deliberative in nature, stemming from competition among those involved in the policy-making process. These three approaches provide the starting point from which I explore the applicability of neoclassical realist theory to the puzzle of variation in Alliance out-of-area cooperation.

0.4. The argument

This project’s point of departure rests on two observations, one of an empirical and one a theoretical nature. The empirical observation is that considerable differences accentuate the Alliance’s approach in key areas of engagement (i.e., the Balkans and the BMENA) as elucidated above. Observers have indeed noted the existence of such disparities, yet little effort has been made to account for this development and explore its impact on broader questions of NATO’s continued existence and transformation. Instead, contemporary analyses examine transformation as a uniform process of change across a gamut of policy areas and regions. According to such claims, NATO is indeed transforming and specifically, out-of-area cooperation along with it; however, this transformation has until now been perceived as “mono-dynamic” in character with only one discernable trajectory. In other words, conventional research typically rests on an assumption that NATO policy outcomes as a whole reflect either greater or lesser cooperation among the Allies. Such approach nevertheless seems lucidly inconsistent with the observation that both a regional and temporal component could well affect Alliance cooperation and thus the process of transformation itself.
The second observation rests on the claim that key dynamics of internal Alliance relations have not yet been adequately theorized. With its focus on power politics and its relevance for the study of alliances, realism stands well positioned to address this task, yet this has not been the case. While neorealist scholars have explored the impact of factors such as regional peculiarities on security cooperation, their focus on international political outcomes leads most to the conclusion that NATO’s persistence is an anomaly which will sooner or later be “corrected.” For this reason, Alliance studies rank relatively low on the neorealist agenda. However, one variant of structural realism does hold promise in this respect: neoclassical realism. NCR’s analytical focus on both systemic as well as sub-systemic (i.e., alliance-level) factors makes it well-suited for studying variations in NATO cooperation across space and time. Until now, however, its application to Alliance studies remains limited. While often applied to the study of the foreign policy decisions of individual states, far less attention has been given to studying security cooperation between states such as within alliances. To be sure, a few analyses have applied neoclassical realist theory to examine NATO cooperation, yet such studies have not explicitly touched upon the question of variation in cooperation in a systematic and comparative fashion. Neoclassical realism shows potential for contributing to nascent debates on the future and transformation of NATO, but it has thus far lacked a clear agenda as regards the study of alliances.

This project is therefore guided by two objectives. First, I seek to address the theoretical lacunae in alliance literature by systemically studying the internal dynamics of NATO security cooperation. By internal dynamics, I refer to those operating aggregately at the level of the Alliance itself rather that those which operate either: a) externally at the international level or b) subordinately within only one specific member state or group of member states. In other words, internal dynamics are those intrinsic to NATO which conceivably affect policy outcomes by either encouraging or dissuading specific types of cooperation. With respect to security cooperation, I refer to not only the coordinated use and threat of military force by two or more states, but also to the exercise of nonmilitary instruments aimed at promoting shared security interests. The premise for this rests on the claim that while NATO has been a relevant topic among IR scholars since the end of the Cold War, little effort has been directed to theorizing on the Alliance with a specific focus to the policy-making process.

21 This definition is in line with that used by many other scholars. See, for instance, Brooks and Wohlforth (2008).
As previously mentioned, various approaches have informed debates on the survival and transformation of NATO, any one of which could make for a valuable theoretical foundation upon which to proceed. Walt recognizes that theoretical pluralism has helped to refine the discipline, and competing research programs have proven “essential” for achieving progress in the study of world politics (1997a), and neoinstitutionalism and social constructivism have specifically advanced rigorous and insightful alternatives to realist explanations for post-Cold War Alliance cooperation. With this in mind, however, realism is arguably the school of thought most often associated with the study of alliance politics and security cooperation, and its ability to speak to the theoretical challenges NATO’s survival and transformation raise is not a question of convenience, but one of necessity. Thus, the first objective of this analysis is to explore the potential for neoclassical realist theories to contribute to this debate by bridging a broad focus on the systemic factors affecting cooperation – the hallmark of structural realist theory in general – with a select emphasis on factors intrinsic to the policy-making process itself (i.e., sub-systemic variables).

The second objective addresses the empirical puzzle highlighted above, namely why do we see divergences in Alliance out-of-area engagements across space and time. Since the end of the Cold War, most observers have dealt either with broad questions of NATO’s success (e.g., Will NATO as a forum for security cooperation continue to be relevant in the post-Cold War era?) or with the tangible aspects of Alliance transformation (e.g., How have changes to defense capabilities brought about, for example, by three recent initiatives – PCC, NRF, and the streamlining of the military command structure – contributed to the process of Alliance transformation since the Prague Summit in 2002?). In contrast, few scholars have explored how NATO policy itself has developed since the early 1990s (e.g., How has Alliance cooperation varied from the end of the Cold War?), and none have yet to look into disparities in cooperation across space and time. Our understanding of NATO’s endurance and process of transformation is inexplicably linked to a greater appreciation of this puzzle, and this project seeks to fill an analytical void by examining the impact of the policy-making process on disparities in Alliance out-of-area cooperation. In exploring the interaction between security environment and the policy-making process, the central question which thus guides this analysis is whether divergent

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22 There are notable exceptions; Rynning (2005) offers one such example.
outcomes in NATO cooperation can best be theoretically explained by focusing on: a) aggregated assessments of the strategic environment, b) elite consensus within the Organization, or c) the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the participating hegemon.

This work commends itself by contributing to closing two gaps within the literature: one specific to the study of NATO (i.e., the empirical puzzle discussed above) and one which deals more broadly with theorizing interstate security cooperation. First, divergence in security cooperation across space and time presents a sizeable conundrum for scholars of NATO. While many have sought to weigh in on general developments within the Alliance since the end of the Cold War, little attention has been paid to differences in policy outcomes from one engagement to the next and across regions. In order to adequately address questions on the Alliance’s future and transformation, such discrepancies in cooperation must be explored. The analysis at hand does just that. Second, this project’s empirical puzzle serves as one striking example that contemporary NATO dynamics have not yet been sufficiently theorized. Though often regarded as the standard bearer of IR theory in questions of alliances and power politics, realism has thus far failed to systemically address post-Cold War developments within the Alliance. While structural realists have peripherally approached questions of regional dynamics in security cooperation, a theoretical appreciation of the relationship between the policy-making process and policy outcomes in a comparative context is lacking. This work explores neoclassical realism’s potential for moving “beyond the state” and demonstrates that by elucidating the impact of both systemic and sub-systemic factors on Alliance policy outcomes, NCR indeed offers considerable value added for a) theorizing interstate security cooperation in a post-Cold War era and b) understanding NATO’s nascent transformation.

0.5. Overview

This work proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I explore the claim that current explanations for interstate security cooperation typically look to the role of interests or power to account for NATO regional policy differences. Chapter 1 begins by exploring the assertion made here that drastically different policy outcomes have characterized Alliance cooperation in two key areas of engagement (i.e., the Mediterranean and the Balkans). Five specific arguments are most often advanced which view primordial national interests as responsible for these disparities. As I illustrate, however,
similar interest constellations have exemplified conflicts in both regions at different times, resulting nonetheless in divergent Alliance policies. In chapter 2, I turn to a discussion of power, demonstrating first that explanations based on power alone likewise fail to adequately account for differences in NATO security cooperation. I propose that neoclassical realism could contribute to this debate by accentuating the role of sub-systemic variables inherent in the policy-making process. I follow this assertion by fleshing out three distinct models for explaining security policy outcomes based on a) aggregated assessments of the strategic environment, b) elite consensus within the Organization, and c) the degree of hegemonic legitimacy within the Alliance. While the first framework is applied specifically to the study of Alliance cooperation, the other two seek to explain foreign policy outcomes of individual states. For this reason, I elucidate the usefulness of each approach in studying interstate security cooperation within NATO. Finally, I conclude the first part by outlining methodological considerations, identifying hypotheses, and explaining case selection. The second part comprises the individual case studies. Chapter 3 explores NATO’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, while chapter 4 looks at the Organization’s reaction to the Bosnian conflict from 1992 to 1995. The final case study (chapter 5) turns to the analysis of Alliance policy vis-à-vis Iran’s uranium enrichment program. In the final chapter, I conclude by outlining the consequences of my findings for theorizing interstate security cooperation.
Part I
On Interest and Power
In the introduction above, the claim was made that outcomes in NATO cooperation have differed considerably across space and time since the end of the Cold War. Scholars have conventionally relied on either the role of power or that of interests in accounting for such developments. In this chapter, I survey one of these arguments more rigorously, namely the impact of interests on Alliance security cooperation in the Balkans and the GME. To be certain, the relevance of the “interest” literature for an analysis of regional differences in Alliance cooperation is fundamentally linked to the structural realist-neoclassical realist debate discussed in the introductory chapter. If one can demonstrate that material interests suffice in explaining divergent NATO regional policies, structural realism in essence suffices. If interests alone cannot account for such divergences, however, the value of neoclassical realism’s focus on sub-systemic variables becomes all the more relevant.

In the first and second sections below, I underscore the relevance to the Alliance of both the Balkans and the Middle East, introduce the respective inconsistencies evident in NATO’s approach toward each, and assess the common arguments used to explain such inconsistencies based on constellations of interests. This is done with two objectives in mind: to determine whether these regions represent comparable cases for analysis and to establish whether interest-based arguments advanced in the literature offer viable explanations for discrepancies in NATO cooperation as regards its near abroad. I conclude by arguing that none of the explanations offer a compelling account for discrepancies in Alliance policy outcomes if focusing solely on the explanatory power of diverging interests.

1.1. NATO and the Greater Middle East

Since 1989, the broader Middle East has become one of the chief areas of involvement for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Stressing that “security in Europe is closely linked to
security and stability in the Mediterranean,” transatlantic partners have recognized the growing need for a common framework in addressing the nascent security threats originating from within the Middle East, an agenda which had previously been defined by the East-West enmities of the Cold War. Post-Cold War efforts at forging greater Allied cooperation in dealing with states along the southern flank were first initiated in 1994 through the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), which sought to “contribute to regional security and stability” throughout the Mediterranean. Though proceeding at a modest pace throughout the 1990s, the institutionalization of this cooperation has advanced considerably in recent years. For example, steps were taken at the Prague Conference in 2002 “to upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue as an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security” (NAC 2002, 10). This subsequently paved the way for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) of 2004, which enhanced coordination under the MD, expanded the Dialogue’s scope to the Persian Gulf, and allowed for mutual assistance in areas such as counter terrorism and counter-WMD.

At the same time, NATO’s continental partners have pushed forward with a similar agenda in a European context. In 1992, the Western European Union launched its own Mediterranean dialogue, which was vested with the task of exchanging “views on Mediterranean security and defence issues...[through] a series of activities, including seminars on Mediterranean security, occasional briefings by the WEU military staff and planning cells, information seminars involving military staff from WEU and Mediterranean partner countries, and visits to the WEU satellite center” (Lesser 1998, 40). This initiative was later expanded through the European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the Barcelona Process), a forum which endeavored to define “a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue.” Coinciding with the establishment of NATO’s ICI, the EU also augmented its cooperation with Middle Eastern states in 2004 through its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Though not limited strictly to the Middle East, ENP proposed expanded cooperation in “soft security” areas vital to the stability of the EU and its southern neighbors. Finally, the Union for the Mediterranean (UM) – a community of 38

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23 From the preamble to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, 1994.
24 First objective of the Mediterranean Dialogue laid out by the North Atlantic Council in 1994.
European and Mediterranean states conceptualized by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 that seeks *inter alia* coordination in areas of security and counter-terrorism – was established on 13 July 2008.

Though seeming somewhat duplicatory at first glance, NATO and EU initiatives in the Middle East have largely been seen as complementary, underscoring the importance of the region for Alliance partners. Indeed, one of the fundamental principles upon which NATO’s MD rests maintains that the Dialogue “is designed to complement and reinforce other international efforts...[including] the European Union’s ‘Barcelona Process’.” The EU resoundingly echoes these sentiments, maintaining that while the Union has established a unique institutional framework for Mediterranean relations, the Council intends “to work together and co-ordinate with the US in the framework of the Transatlantic Partnership [i.e., NATO]. The Union should define a complementary but distinct approach. The Union should adopt a proactive approach on this matter. The Presidency, High Representative and the Commission should maintain active engagement with the US...” (Union 2003, 13). Scholars likewise note the two-dimensional character of these transatlantic efforts. As Lesser et al. point out, “No single initiative can address the longer-term and proximate sources of instability in the region—but now a number of overlapping (and in some cases, moribund) cooperation frameworks are in place...In this regard, Barcelona and the NATO Initiative are emerging as complementary frameworks with the most to offer...” (1998, 41). In fact, Dokos argues that this arrangement presents the greatest prospects for success in addressing challenges within the Mediterranean area. As both institutions contribute a distinct set of comparative advantages, their joint efforts achieve together what “no single initiative can address: both the longer-term and proximate sources of instability in the region. Only a combination of institutions and policy tools can produce most of the desired results” (2003, 2).

Surprisingly, however, few overarching results have emerged from transatlantic Mediterranean engagement. Launched initially in the context of the Middle East peace talks, the MD was established as a basis for the normalization of Israeli-Arab relations. Subsequent talks at Prague as well as the ICI did succeed in upgrading this dialogue to theoretically tackle the more comprehensive array of threats emerging within the region, yet the specific content
of this “enhanced cooperation” remains inadequately defined. Moreover, NATO stands poorly equipped to deal with the prevalent “soft security” problems of the Middle East, as noted by the Parliamentary Assembly’s Mediterranean Special Group: “The main security problems in the region are rather “soft” – that is, political, economic and social – than “hard” ones. NATO is therefore ill suited to deal with these challenges” (MSG 2000). Though many observers had envisaged the EU’s Barcelona Process and EMP serving as much-needed complements to Alliance institutions, Volpi contends that European attempts appear to offer little value added, being “at best a piecemeal process that does not have momentum of its own, and its impact is mostly cosmetic.” (2004, 160). While scholars contend that Alliance developments have clearly underscored the growing significance of the GME for NATO partners since the end of the Cold War, the institutionalization of Mediterranean cooperation has failed to yield tangible results in tackling the nascent security challenges of the GME.

Explanations for NATO’s southern malaise

What accounts for this transatlantic malaise in formulating a coherent Mediterranean policy? Explanations within the literature can roughly be divided into two groups, one arguing that this lack of coherence in policy outcomes can be found in diverging, a priori interests of Alliance partners while a second maintains that the cause is instead related to questions of power. This chapter will address the first of these groups by exploring the impact of interests on interstate security cooperation in NATO. According to this camp, NATO members approach cooperation with preconceived objectives. Problems in establishing a coherent policy toward the BMENA occur, because member states enter into the Alliance’s policy-making process with individual goals which inherently stand in conflict with each other. For example, Hunter (2004) acknowledges that the interests of transatlantic partners diverge not only as regards short-term strategic calculations, but that fragmentation in the “basic common interests” of security objectives has undermined the “essence of the NATO alliance.” Commenting in the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon,25 Henry Kissinger (2006) concurs, noting that Middle East engagement by NATO partners differs fundamentally across the Atlantic and represents

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25 Also known widely as the July War or the Second Lebanon War.
the degenerative “sense of common purpose” which plagues Alliance policy. This therefore 
begs the question as to which interests create said conflict among the Allies with respect to 
Middle Eastern policy. Aware of the risk of oversimplification, five strands can be detected 
within the literature which can roughly be divided into two broad categories. The first category 
contends that differences in value-based interests jeopardize Alliance cooperation toward the 
GME, while the second sees conflicting material considerations as the culprit. I look at each of 
these in greater detail below.

1.1.1. Divergent value-based interests?

Contrary to many predictions, the end of the Cold War did not bring about a rapid dissolution of 
the Alliance. Many observers were puzzled by NATO’s perseverance in the absence of an 
external threat and sought to account for this development. One group explained this 
phenomenon by suggesting that norms, values and identity played a formative role in shaping 
not only the creation of the Alliance but its persistence as well.26 According to these scholars, 
NATO must not be seen as a military alliance which remained active due merely to a common 
Soviet threat; instead, they contend that it also represents a community with a shared set of 
liberal democratic norms and values (Risse-Kapp 1995, 1996; Schimmelfennig 1999; Brenner 
1998; Waterman and Zagorcheva 2001). As such, the continued existence of NATO in a post-
Cold War era is owed to the Organization’s ability to promote these values, and continued 
cooperation can therefore be expected even with no discernable security challenges 
threatening its members.

As Sjursen notes, however, “against the backdrop of the second enlargement of NATO 
and the serious disagreements within the organization about the legitimacy of the war in Iraq 
[2003]” (Sjursen 2004, 687-8), the claim that values alone may work to hold the Alliance

26 Of course, value-based interests do not figure into structural realist arguments and are therefore not directly 
relevant in determining whether structural realism can account for the “whole picture” of regional variation in 
Alliance policy outcomes as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. However, I have included the widest 
possible definition of interests – thus including value-based interests – to give structural realist-like rationalism the 
greatest opportunity to demonstrate the efficacy of interest-based arguments for explaining policy divergence.
together in a post-Cold War era came under considerable critique. In fact, a number of observers began to explore the possibility that divergent value-based interests might in fact exist which hamper cooperation among transatlantic partners toward vital regions such as the Middle East. Moïsi contends that while transatlantic partners do indeed share common democratic values, the West is nonetheless moving farther apart. A unique “European way to be Western” has emerged, which in some respects contradicts the idea of Westernness held by Americans. The result of this is the real potential for “a mutual decoupling of the United States from Europe” (2001, 152, 154). Kagan also sees a “divisive trend” in transatlantic relations, but he locates its origins not so much in a shifting European weltanschauung. Stark material and ideological differences on the role of power underscore transatlantic ideas toward post-Cold War security in ways which may be impossible to reverse (2003, 11). Observing such tensions in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Kagan contends that US engagement within the Middle East is essentially a means to project its power to shore up a basis for its continued hegemony. Europe, on the other hand, remains more concerned with international legal values and the promotion of Westphalian diplomacy. Both seek stability within the region, yet the values underlying this desire for stability are distinct. While the United States strives for stability to underscore its own position in the world, European partners are instead concerned with facilitating effective, multilateral diplomacy and enhancing the rule-of-law. These differences, so Kagan (2004), culminate in making agreement on a common ME policy all but impossible.

Puchala offers a similar take on transatlantic relations and points to a deeper and more boding political-cultural schism surfacing across the Atlantic. In his opinion, NATO policy suffers from intra-alliance disagreement over perceived threats (e.g., terrorism vs. migration) and desired outcomes (e.g., support for democratic reforms, nation-building). He suggests that such differences are best understood as the result of a fragmentation in Alliance values, placing transatlantic interests drastically at odds and undermining thereby “sentimental ties.” As long as NATO members base their objectives within the region on such divergent values, Puchala (2005) predicts that the prospects for effective cooperation within the region in the near future remain bleak. Kaye presents a similar conclusion, maintaining that differences in US and
European approaches within the GME can best be explained by contrasting strategic cultures. Her analysis argues that “Europe’s postwar experience has contributed to a strategic culture – stronger in some European states than others – favoring negotiation, commerce, international law, and multilateralism whereas the US global position has favored a strategic culture supporting coercive diplomacy, the use of force, unilateralism, and the projection of US values abroad…” (2004, 185-186). According to Kaye, these differences in strategic cultures lead to a corresponding disparity in desired objectives within the Middle East.

Much speaks to the veracity of such claims. Writing on the American policy of non-proliferation at the end of the 20th Century, for example, Andreani describes the US mentality toward security threats as being one which “tends to emphasize military, technical, and unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly at the expense of cooperative and political ones” (1999, 51). Some observers argue that this American “mindset” stands in stark contrast to that of Europeans and is based not only on the “consequences of the transatlantic power gap,” but more fundamentally on a “broad ideological gap” (Kagan 2002, 6). Transatlantic disagreements over the rationale for the 2003 Iraq War highlight this ideological gap and the relevance of values in such debates (Haass 2009).

1.1.2. Divergent material interests?

In contrast, many scholars suggest that NATO’s inability to effectively cooperate on issues pertaining to the BMENA rests not so much on value-based but rather material-based interests. According to this line of thought, shortcomings in formulating a common Alliance approach within the region can best be explained by the fact that desired policy objectives are shaped by material concerns of individual members within the Alliance and that these differ, if not compete, among the Allies. NATO partners therefore approach alliance-based cooperation with certain fixed reservations which prevent consensus on key policy. Four arguments are commonly put forward to explain conflicting material interests within the literature and will be discussed in greater detail below.
The resurgence of great power politics

Among those theories attributing the origins of NATO’s sluggish ME policy to differences in material interests, one group focuses on the venerable dilemma of great power politics. A claim commonly advanced among realist scholars, this argument claims that policy incoherence is the consequence of geostrategic balancing tendencies, whereby actors seek to limit the potential relative power gains of other states within the region. States acting in the Middle East are thus positional actors participating in a zero-sum game (Grieco 1988) and are concerned with competition for “power and plenty” (Viner 1948). In order to maintain (e.g., in the case of status quo actors such as the US) or increase (e.g., for the second-tier or revisionist state) their influence within the GME, states are motivated through competition rather than cooperation. This not only leads to competitive relations between great powers at large, it invariably affects the dynamics of relations between NATO members as well. The resulting implication of this competition is that transatlantic partners fail to agree upon desired policy outcomes within the Mediterranean.

Historically, the importance of great power politics within the Mediterranean seems to indeed hold weight. The region’s strategic significance for the superpowers throughout the Cold War is well founded. As early as 1947, the Truman Doctrine promised military and economic support for Turkey and Greece to prevent their falling under Soviet influence, eventually leading to the accession of both states to NATO in 1952. Observing developments at the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Gasteyger noted that “the Soviet Union has established a political and military presence,” and that “it would be shortsighted to deny that the new Soviet presence will have considerable political and military effect” (1968, 676). Undoubtedly, great power politics formed the basis for the superpowers’ security policy toward the Middle East up to 1989.

It is worth noting, however, that great power politics in the GME was not only limited to the US and Soviet Union. European powers have traditionally held vested interests within the

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27 As expected, proponents of this argument tend to fall within the realist tradition. Despite this, very few studies have examined the influence of great power politics on regional security. For examples, see Evron (1994) and Hurrell (1995).

28 For an informative review of Turkish-NATO relations, see McGhee (1990).
Middle East as well. Since the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Europe has actively sought to assert its influence over the region. France, the United Kingdom and Italy, for example, all held substantial territorial claims throughout the region, and this often led to heated contest between the powers to exercise a degree of authority unmatched by their rivals. Even during the Cold War, the predominance of the US and Soviet Union did not prevent European states from attempting to project sway over Mediterranean affairs. On the contrary, the events during the 1956 Suez Crisis demonstrate how great power politics have occasionally led to conflicts between European powers such as France and Britain and other powers wielding influence within the region like the United States. As the first significant dispute among its members after the establishment of NATO in 1949, the Suez Crisis clearly illustrated two things: a) the continued importance of the region for European players despite their relative decline in power and the concomitant rise of the US and Soviet Union and b) the potential for conflict within the Alliance, threatening the very coherence of NATO’s GME policy from very early on.

Despite this, great power competition has rarely produced clashes of the magnitude witnessed during 1956 between the US and its NATO allies. As a consequence of the Suez Crisis and the resulting British withdrawal east of Suez in 1961, the US asserted itself as the primary security guarantor within the area (Blackwill 1997, 3). Many scholars perceive this as the turning point at which France and Britain finally acquiesced to American supremacy within the region and assumed a notably passive role, limiting intervention within the Greater Mediterranean to areas related mostly to trade or commercial policy. Consequently, US strategic interests eclipsed those of the European great powers, mitigating thereby the likelihood for transatlantic great power conflict in issues pertaining to the GME. Ironically, however, this US dominance and corresponding European passivity served to actually reinforce NATO’s policy malaise within the region throughout the Cold War. This happened in two distinct ways. First, it guaranteed that “transatlantic policy” would for all intents and purposes be dictated out of Washington, which had solidly established a “right to policy primacy” in Euro-

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29 Another example of European states asserting their will within the region includes the “Great Game,” a strategic rivalry between Britain and Russia for influence over the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, which lasted for the better part of the 19th Century. A lesser resurrection of the Great Game followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

30 For an informative review and analysis of the Suez Crisis, see Louis and Owen (1989).
Atlantic security matters within the region. Second, a preference (and precedence) actually developed for the US to circumvent the Alliance and instead formulate policy on a unilateral basis. This not only ensured that US interests would be most directly served, but perhaps more importantly, it reduced the potential for future transatlantic conflicts that could once again tarnish Euro-Atlantic cooperation as had happened during the Suez crisis. For this reason, very little of a European component to great power politics was present within the Middle East after 1961, yet there was also no significant Atlantic cooperation either; US dominance and European acquiescence ensured that the GME remained squarely off the Alliance’s policy radar screen throughout the Cold War.

How, then, did the end of the Cold War affect the dynamics of great power politics within the Middle East? Some observers claimed, in fact, that the post-Cold War era signaled something of an “end” to great power conflict altogether, yet many argue that this is not the case. Increasingly, Russia seeks to underscore its long-held interests within the region, having established since 1989 closer relations with several Gulf states regarded within NATO circles as primary security concerns. For example, Russia assisted Iran in upgrading and transferring modern weapons systems to Syria at the end of the 1990s (Benson 1997). Since 1995, Russia has also made good on an agreement with the Iranian government to aid in its completion of the Bushehr nuclear facility, and in 2006, a decision was taken by Russian representatives to sell Tor-M1 surface-to-air missiles to the Tehran. In his analysis, Satanovsky concludes that recent events within the region have signaled a Russian policy shift toward the Middle East which is decidedly independent and divergent from that of the West. Satanovsky thus contends that Russian influence within the region is as relevant as ever.

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31 Fukuyama (1992), for instance, argued that the end of the East-West conflict represented an “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

32 Since final reactor testing started in October 2009, Bushehr I has come under increased scrutiny by Western governments because of concerns over possibly broader Iranian nuclear aspirations. Although the agreement between the Russian Federation and Iran calls for spent fuel rods to be sent to Russia for reprocessing, the US has expressed growing concern that Iran may seek to reprocess these rods itself in an effort to obtain plutonium for atomic weapons. In December 2007, Russia began deliveries of nuclear fuel to Bushehr I.

33 For an analysis of the controversy surrounding Tor M-1 sales to Iran and its implications for Russia-US relations, see Babakin and Ivanov (2006).
At the same time, other third-party powers have also begun vying for influence within the region.\textsuperscript{34} Vakil (2006) examines the growing relationship between Iran and China as a means to counter the political and economic influence of Europe and the US. As it also becomes an increasingly global player, India has likewise assumed a more assertive presence in its dealings with the Middle East (Kumaraswamy 2008). In similar fashion, Brzezinski (2004) explores the role of Israel as a regional great power, arguing that despite seemingly obvious close ties between the two countries, Israeli and American interests are not entirely congruent, and Israel thus struggles to aver its own security agenda. Many scholars from within the realist tradition watch such developments with considerable pessimism and maintain that great power competition between the US and third-party states is far from dead.\textsuperscript{35}

Perhaps more threatening for NATO, however, is the claim advanced by some observers that the end of the Cold War has in fact sparked renewed interest on the part of European states to play a more active role in the region. As the Cold War stand-off between the superpowers came to an end, Europe once again sought to assert its historical influence within the Middle East. Two reasons have been put forward to account for this interest on the part of European states, with each painting a different picture for the implications such activism could have on transatlantic cooperation. First, many scholars argue that this starker presence is primarily motivated by the desire of European states to promote security within its own borders. As it is situated directly on Europe’s southern flank, political or social unrest within the Middle East could have far graver consequences on the security of European states than on that of other powers such as the US or China, which are buffered by their greater geographical isolation. A more proactive European policy within the GME can thus be expected in the future. Indeed, recent developments such as the Barcelona Process, the ENP, and the Union for the Mediterranean point to such a trend, yet many agree that such examples of European intervention have thus far seen progress within the “economic and financial” as well as the

\textsuperscript{34} For an excellent analysis on the role of China in the Middle East, see Radtke (2007). For a study of India’s influence in the region, see Mudiam (2007).

\textsuperscript{35} See, for example, Mearsheimer (2001), p. 141-143, 168-170, 236-37.
“social, cultural and human baskets,” posing thereby little threat to NATO’s primacy in security affairs.36

In contrast, the second explanation for increased European activism foreshadows a far greater threat to NATO coherence. According to this argument, Europe’s renewed presence is not so much motivated by objectives related to internal security considerations as much as it is by a desire to check the untethered authority of the US within the GME. Proponents of soft balancing theory, for example, contend that European states, unable to check American preponderance of power through military means, make increasing use of non-military tools to “delay, frustrate, and even undermine” the potential for unilateral US action and that such efforts can most readily be seen within the Middle East (Pape 2005).37

These scholars tend to agree, however, that European states do not seek direct conflict with their transatlantic partner, but instead hope to play a more influential role in shaping (transatlantic) policy within the Mediterranean area that had been lost after the Suez Crisis. Where they disagree, however, is on what they see as the end goals of this European assertiveness. One group of observers argues that while more expressive of its individual policy interests, Europe desires nothing more than a consensus-based “division of labor” with the United States. For example, Hollis sees this influence articulated in mostly economic areas: “Europe lacks a distinct and unified military capability and in this respect cannot challenge the United States’ role [in the region]. On the economic front, however, it is moving incrementally, and in that sense by stealth, to a point where its own economic weight counts for more than that of the United States in most of the countries of the Middle East” (1997, 29). In like manner, Del Sarto and Tocci (2008) purport that Italy’s stronger Mediterranean focus has been conditioned by the joint objectives of securing Italian interests within the region (e.g., promoting investment and trade, reducing organized crime) and guaranteeing direct influence over the “Euro-Atlantic spectrum.” In other words, Europe is keen on enhancing its influence in areas such as trade and commerce while leaving questions of security to the purview of NATO

36 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established a number of objectives for cooperation and divided these goals into three main “baskets”: the political and security basket; the economic and financial basket; and the social, cultural and human basket. Volpi (2004) contends that progress has been rather limited within the security realm with most cooperation being found in the second two baskets.

37 For more on soft balancing and its precursors, see Paul (2004, 2005) and Walt (2002).
and, more specifically, the US. While this may indeed complicate transatlantic cooperation, such a division of labor would not necessarily undermine the ability of the Alliance to promote an effective and coherent GME policy.\(^{38}\)

On the other hand, another group of observers contends that European aspirations are far more zealous. They see Europe’s current efforts in the Middle East as part of a wider process of achieving a greater degree of power parity within a currently “unbalanced” region. In her analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Saleh argues that Europe has indeed been motivated by a desire for power and has thus used the Barcelona Process as a means by which to increase its capabilities. Saleh maintains that the central objective for European states is to “increase capabilities and level the playing field on which the United States…and the EU compete with each other” (2007, 87). Under this scenario, the goals of European action would therefore be to both constrain American hegemonic power in general and to reduce its potential for unilateral policy action within the region in particular.

To be certain, however, the prospects of a more assertive Europe do not necessarily imply an imminent chilling of relations within the Euro-Atlantic area that could potentially jeopardize the viability of the Alliance itself. Many policy areas exist within which transatlantic cooperation is indeed alive and well.\(^{39}\) However, such scenarios raise due misgivings on the potential for effective NATO coordination in BMENA policy. Some members such as France have promoted the notion of a “status quo” NATO, which would preserve the Alliance while simultaneously limiting its role to the territorial defense of the Euro-Atlantic area as was the case during the Cold War.\(^{40}\) Carpenter (1994) examines this status quo tendency among certain European member states and concludes that “the reaction among policy experts to such dilemmas has largely been evasion, delay, and obfuscation.” The inability of transatlantic partners to agree on the desired scope for NATO’s post-Cold War involvement leads invariably to policy areas which remain “disturbingly vague” and incoherent. Early developments in NATO’s Partnership for

\(^{38}\) In fact, some researchers argue that such a division of labor would help in closing the capabilities gap within NATO, which is fundamental to ensuring Alliance coherence over the long-term. See, for instance, Ruehle (2003).

\(^{39}\) For an excellent study on the question of NATO’s long-term viability, see Rynning (2005).

\(^{40}\) With the latest French efforts at a rapprochement with NATO under President Sarkozy, France now seems more willing to accept an out-of-area role for the Alliance than was the case under the previous Mitterrand and Chirac governments. For example, France rejoined the military command structure at the April 2009 NATO Summit and has since made additional commitments to out-of-area engagements such as in Afghanistan.
The impact of strategic resources

A further argument focusing on material interests contends that NATO's difficulty in the Mediterranean is essentially a question about strategic resources. It is argued that transatlantic partners have difficulty in reconciling their policy preferences because of the inherent competition in securing access to natural gas and crude oil. As energy security becomes a theme of ever growing importance, NATO states have a solid interest in maintaining unhindered access to energy resources in the GME. This, in turn, exacerbates policy divergence within the Alliance. Both the US and Europe currently import upwards of 70% of their oil, and a
significant portion of this originates from Middle East supplies.\textsuperscript{41} Guaranteeing access to the region’s rich oil and gas reserves and ensuring price stability has been a cornerstone of both American and European policy toward the Middle East since the 1973 oil crisis (Satloff 1997).

As with supporters of the great powers politics claim above, proponents of the strategic resources argument trace the tendency for transatlantic conflict back considerably farther than simply the last thirty years. At the end of World War I, access to oil was the most contentious points of friction between the US and United Kingdom, on the one hand, and France and Britain on the other. In 1920, for example, a secret accord was signed at the San Remo Conference to end an Anglo-French dispute over the division of Mesopotamian resources. Initially, however, this arrangement sparked concern on the part of Washington, thus forcing Britain to “concede to the US a ‘fair share’ in Mesopotamia” (Noshab 2003). In 1928, another attempt was made to resolve conflicting claims on resources, and this resulted in the so-called Red Line Agreement. This agreement attempted to settle existing disputes among the major Western states over Middle Eastern oil. Most specifically, those staking claim over exploration rights included the British Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Royal Dutch/Shell of the Netherlands as well as German, French, Italian and American oil concerns. To be certain, access to strategic resources as a definitive factor in transatlantic relations grew all the more salient during the Cold War. As a US State Department analysis at the end of World War II summarized, Middle Eastern oil constituted “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history – probably the richest economic prize in the world in the field of foreign investment” (Kretzmann 2003).

Though some scholars contend that intra-Alliance disputes over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 were essentially based on differences in values (e.g., right to preventive strike on the part of the US), Vesely maintains that cleavages within NATO over Iraq were, in fact, due to the struggle over access to strategic resources. In his opinion, the acquired rights held by France’s oil giant Total over the Majnoon oil field in southern Iraq – a mammoth reserve with

\textsuperscript{41} Data obtained from 2008 CIA World Factbook and the International Petroleum Monthly, published by US Energy Information Administration. Canada, Denmark, and Norway are the sole NATO members which are net oil exporters. European oil production is actually quite complicated, as its relatively stable “domestic” supply rests on Norwegian production. Without Norway’s vast resources, Europe would be much more import-dependent than the United States, producing only 19% of its own supplies.
up to 30 billion barrels of crude oil – is only one example of the many resource entanglements which complicated the picture for transatlantic relations in the run-up to the invasion. Under December 2002 Oil Ministry plans, Majnoon would have made France “by far the biggest trading partner of Iraq” and Total “one of the few biggest oil producing companies in the world.” Vesely (2002) maintains that France’s hostility toward US plans and the resulting deadlock within NATO circles reflected French unwillingness “to concede without US assurances that its national oil companies will have a piece of any future exploitation...with or without UN resolution.” This argument is further substantiated by the fact that other European states also had various purchasing agreements or diverse commercial contracts, which were to certainly be threatened by a US-led invasion.42

While Europe responded to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 by successfully diversifying its sources of imported oil and gas and becoming relatively less dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas since the beginning of the 1980s, trends suggest that the GME will invariably become increasingly vital to Europe’s energy security in the years to come. This urgency can be felt both in Brussels and in the national capitals. Published in March 2006, an EU Green Paper entitled “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” identified the security of energy supplies as one of three central objectives for a common EU energy policy. Though framed as part of a broader “energy policy” by the Commission, the Green Paper nevertheless recognized the fundamental strategic importance of unhindered access to global oil supplies, including specifically those of the Middle East, and noted that “with indigenous oil supply moving below 10% of consumption in maybe less than ten years from now, the EU security of oil supply is fundamentally a question of the security of supply to be expected from the global oil market” (2006b, 19). For this reason, EU endeavors have sought to enhance “energy partnerships” as a strategic element of EU initiatives such as the ENP (Commission 2006a, 37).

More telling, however, Hoogeven and Perlot purport that the relevance of oil and gas resources is most noticeable in the foreign and security policies of individual member states. They write, “[E]nergy is again viewed as a strategic commodity, which needs to be part of

42 Some countries which had lucrative agreements over government-controlled oil nevertheless supported US action in Iraq. For example, two staunch supporters of American intervention were Spain and Italy, despite the fact that the Spanish oil company Repsol as well as Italy’s AGIP had similar arrangements as France.
foreign and security policies, in addition to economic policy. Bilateral relations between consumer and producer countries have always been very important in oil and natural gas and...the extent of strategic bilateral relations is largely determined by the general foreign policy and economic strategy of an actor.” Hoogeven and Perlot conclude by noting that while there “is no direct link between the EU’s energy interests and its military and security involvement,” this is indeed the sanction of individual states (2007, 498).

Energy security undeniably plays a seminal role in the strategic considerations of all NATO partners, and many observers maintain that lack of cooperation on GME policy is a direct consequence of the region’s strategic resources. Focusing on the potential for international cooperation in the Middle East, van der Linde argues that states do seem keen on common endeavors through organizations like NATO, “but on the condition that the state’s long-term political, strategic, and economic national interests are served” (2005, 13). Yet Hoogeven and Perlot harbor fundamental doubts about NATO’s ability to reconcile starkly divergent interests, especially with respect to energy security, and instead see a trend “away from the mores of the US” (500). Accordingly, these arguments suggest that NATO’s incoherent policy toward the GME is most easily explained by the presence of intra-alliance competition over strategic resources, with member states pursuing objectives not in the interests of the Alliance as a whole but instead based on their own national interests.

**Hard vs. soft security: A transatlantic divide?**

A fourth approach to understanding the Alliance’s incoherent ME policy argues that the crux of the problem lies not in conflicting, yet identical, interests shared on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g., contradictory interest on the part of all member states to ensure individual access to oil and gas), but instead in a transatlantic divide over the objectives which are deemed to be of greatest strategic importance for the security of the Alliance. In other words, this view purports that incoherent policy is not the result of intra-NATO rivalry (either over values, power or resources) as argued by the previous three approaches, but is instead the result of disagreement over the issues which pose the greatest challenges to the Alliance as a whole and the policies necessary to combat them. Proponents of this claim contend that the question at
hand is fundamentally one about hard vs. soft security and the differences in priority placed upon these by NATO states. Specifically, while the United States is mostly concerned with hard security threats in formulating GME policy, Europe, on the other hand, is increasingly driven by more soft security concerns. This, according to the argument, creates deadlock over the desired objectives NATO sets for itself within the region, thereby preventing the realization of a common and coherent Middle Eastern policy.

If this claim does indeed hold, what then are the reasons for this transatlantic divide in the emphasis on hard or soft security objectives? First and foremost, it is argued to be a fundamental question of geopolitics. Due to its sheer geographical proximity with the GME, Europe faces a number of potential security threats from the region which are considerably different than those challenging the United States. While transatlantic partners certainly share a common and real interest in the “new risks” of failed states and terrorism, instability within the Middle East affects neighboring Europe in unique ways. As Yaphe (1999) notes, the spectrum of GME security risks confronting NATO’s continental partners most directly involves a litany of soft security problems, covering issues such as “rapid population growth, slow economic growth, illiteracy, poor governance, lack of political transparency and accountability, high external debt, and an ability to control violence by opposition elements.” Since traditional hard security approaches have widely been deemed ineffective in combating these issues – not to mention the obvious deficiencies on the European side with respect to hard security capabilities –, the promotion of stability through “soft security strategies” has increasingly gained priority in the Middle Eastern agenda of many European states.

Undoubtedly, the soft security issue of primary concern for NATO’s European members involves migration. Since the 1960s and 1970s, there has been a significant surge in the number of immigrants making their way to Europe from the GME. Specifically, immigration from Northern Africa to Southern Europe, from Turkey to Germany and from India and Pakistan to the United Kingdom has brought with it repercussions for European demographic and economic coherence (Satloff 1997, 20-21). As a result, migration has become a growing priority among Europe’s policymakers, specifically in the realm of security policy. While the 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated the potential nature of security threats common to all NATO members in
the post-Cold War era, Brouwer (2002) contends that it equally accentuated the “new emphasis on internal security in EU and national policy [within Europe] which can have in the long term a far reaching impact” on immigration and asylum. Yaphe observes that this flow of people from the Greater Middle East to Europe has been “continuous” and “unbalanced” and that European states – primarily, those bordering on the Mediterranean – therefore recognize migration as their primary security challenge at the beginning of the 21st Century. According to Perthes (1997), a second effect of this trend is the rise in xenophobic movements within a number of European countries. He argues that the large influx of Muslim immigrants and refugees is increasing negative sentiments toward these groups, particularly in those countries hardest hit by this development. This trend – coupled with corresponding domestic problems such as high unemployment – leads to greater political instability and increased violence against minorities.

Though migration certainly takes center stage in the security agenda of European actors, other soft security concerns abound. Hatipoglu (2004) contends that the role of the Greater Middle East as a supplier of large volumes of illicit drugs has become a topic of growing significance in European-GME relations. In like manner, Cebeci (2006) identifies not only drug trafficking, but also arms trafficking as a problem across the “North-South divide.” Finally, organized crime – specifically organizations involved in human smuggling – is another soft security threat originating from within the region (Icduygu 2004).

The effects of such soft security issues can be seen not only in security policy developments at the EU level, but at the national level as well. Within the context of the Barcelona Process, for example, representatives from the EU member states now meet with their Mediterranean counterparts on a regular basis to encourage “tangible reinforcement” for the Process and to delineate “concrete initiatives” in achieving chief objectives, specifically those related to questions of migration. During the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Valencia, Spain at the end of April 2002, delegates reiterated the foremost significance of the third Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration by endorsing a Framework

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43 See also van Solinge (1998), who identifies certain states of the GME (e.g., Turkey and Morocco) as central originating states for illegal drugs within Europe.
44 The third Chapter of the Declaration of Barcelona is concerned with aspects of social, cultural, and human partnership.
Document to promote intensified “cooperation in the field of Justice, in combating drugs, organized crime...as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movements of people” (2002, 14). Moreover, the parties also agreed at Valencia to a regular Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Migration and Social Integration aimed at dealing with migration-related issues such as social integration and the management of migratory flows. National governments all but echo these sentiments and have proposed similar measures. In response to an inquiry by Parliament on Europe’s Common Mediterranean Strategy, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs commented that “issues arising in the Mediterranean, such as migration flows, drug trafficking and organized crime, are already affecting the United Kingdom...Our purpose should be to influence EU policies which suit our national priorities in...countering crime and the trafficking in drugs and people” (Common Mediterranean Strategy 2001). As this demonstrates, soft security concerns now dominate security policy priorities across Europe.

For the United States, on the other hand, soft security concerns – though no doubt relevant – still take backseat to hard security threats, which have historically played an a priori role in American security policy. As with the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), for instance, the revised 2006 NSS still emphasizes the “inseparable priorities [of] fighting and winning the war on terror...” as its central theme. For this reason, the first objective for US security policy within the Middle East is to “defeat global terrorism,” the chief destabilizing force threatening both the direct security of the US as well as stability within the region itself (8, 12). Other objectives for GME policy include the defusing of regional conflicts and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In contrast, a number of soft security issues are completely missing from the Strategy. While the problems of migration do appear once within the report, this is limited merely to the agenda set out for the Western Hemisphere: “We must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere to reduce illegal immigration...” (US NSS 2006, 37). While the need to confront specific challenges such as illegal trade in drugs and

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45 It is worth noting that other objectives are also put forward, which suggest a growing complexity of US strategic interests within the region (e.g., prevention of genocide in regional conflicts, need for global economic growth through free markets and free trade). Moreover, the 2006 US NSS is far more multilateral in nature than its 2002 predecessor. Nevertheless, the central focus of US interests remains centered on hard security objectives.
humans indeed earned an entire section all its own (Section X), this was limited to fewer than three pages, framed such objectives as a necessary “reform,” and discussed merely its general relevance, not its specific importance for broader Middle Eastern strategy. As this demonstrates, a discernable hard/soft security divide exists in the GME security objectives advanced by the US, on the one hand, and NATO’s European member states on the other.

A second reason for this transatlantic divide in emphasizing hard or soft security objectives has undeniably much to do with the evident disparity in security capacities of the respective actors. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the US stands second to none in its ability to harness hard security capacities; its European partners, on the other hand, have far fewer resources and likewise suffer from a problem of duplication. Thus, Europe is much more dependent on soft security instruments if it wishes to wield influence in areas of strategic interest. Interestingly enough, some contend that this gap is in fact growing. As Smith argues, this disparity has become “more differentiated than at any time in the development of the ‘Euro-American system’…” (2004, 6). Smith concludes that the main consequence of this is diverging transatlantic security interests; while the US remains a “warrior state,” its European partners have become “trading states.” It is worth noting, however, that the basis for this rift – according to this line of thought – is not a question of divergent values. Instead, the desired objectives of the US and Europe for Mediterranean policy differs, because both the security challenges member states face as well as the instruments available at their disposal for combating these threats are dramatically different.

To summarize, European partners have become increasingly active in tackling issues which lay beyond the scope of NATO’s traditional emphasis on territorial defense and its more recent commitment to combating terrorism. While scholars may indeed differ on the degree to which they see soft security as having eclipsed hard security considerations for continental partners, the drastic repercussions of factors such as demographic change in societies which have traditionally been far more homogenous than the United States have no doubt led to a discernable transatlantic divide on the identified security priorities for the Middle East (Peace

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46 According to Christopher Hill, this trend toward soft security capacities owes itself in part to the so-called “capabilities-expectation gap,” whereby the expectations for what the EU should be capable of doing falls victim to the realization of the true limitations of its capabilities. See Hill (1993).
and Gunther 1995). To be certain, hard security areas of common interest remain; specifically, terrorism, the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and guaranteeing regional stability are shared interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite this, the unique challenges identified above lead Europe to identify a set of unique security objectives not shared by its North American Allies, and according to the proponents of this argument, such differences could well lead to disagreement over a common approach toward the region.

**Dynamics of bilateral relations**

Finally, some scholars contend that difficulties in establishing a coherent NATO policy in the BMENA are best explained through the dynamics of member state relations with individual Middle Eastern states. Due mostly to geographical and historical considerations, certain NATO members have specific connections and corresponding interests within the region which invariably affect their desired security objectives for the area. For example, Paris has considerable ties to the francophone states within the Maghreb, as does Italy to a lesser degree with Libya. Moreover, Satloff observes that traditional “ospheres of commercial interest play an important role in German-Iranian relations, French-Iraqi relations, and British-Gulf state relations” (1997, 21). These individual ties create a complex, and sometimes contradictory, set of interactions between European NATO members and Middle Eastern states, which may therefore account for problems in producing common policy preferences within the Alliance.

Perhaps no relationship between a NATO member and Middle Eastern state complicates the picture more than does that between the United States and Israel. For no other NATO partner is the security of Israel more fundamental to its own perceived strategic concerns as is the case for the US (Satloff 1997). Much has been written on the origins of the Israeli-American “special relationship.” In “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,” for example, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) examine this relationship, arguing that neither strategic nor moral arguments can adequately account for the strong degree of American commitment to Israel. Instead, they purport that the explanation for this is “the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby” (2007). While agreeing in principle on the overwhelming significance of the US-Israel relationship on US

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47 From October 1911 to 1947, Libya was under the colonial authority of Italy.
foreign policy, Mead nevertheless contends that this rests not so much on the unbridled strength of Israeli influence over American domestic affairs, but rather on American strategy since the end of World War II of preventing “any other outside power from gaining a strategic foothold” in the region (2007, 167). As Israel represents the dominant military power within the Middle East, maintaining and supporting this association is in line with wider US foreign policy objectives for the area.

Though the underlying origins of the US-Israeli relationship may still be debated, what is certain is that relations between the other NATO members and Israel have been much more varied. For instance, Greece has historically maintained an apprehensive stance toward Israel. Spain also maintained fairly cold relations with Israel until the end of the Franco era in 1975, at which point it sought to improve its ties with other Western countries, specifically the US, leading to a Spanish-Israeli rapprochement (Abadi 2004). Dutch relations, in contrast, have usually been quite cordial. Other European states show a much greater deal of complexity in their relationships with Israel. For the United Kingdom, policy with respect to Israel has been marked by a high degree of ambivalence. During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, for example, the conservative government of Edward Heath negotiated an arms embargo against the warring sides, adversely affecting most notably Israel’s position in the conflict. The embargo lasted for more than one decade and was seen by many as a response out of London’s fear of the Arab “oil weapon.”\(^{48}\) Though relations improved considerably during the Thatcher, Major and early Blair governments – with the British even inaugurating an era of “strategic cooperation” between the two nations in the 1990s –, noticeable areas of tension have once again arisen (Spyer 2004). Similarly, France undertook a period of enhanced partnership with Israel in the 1950s and early 1960s. Paris supported the Israeli attack on the Sinai Peninsula during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and more generally pursued a close alliance with the Middle Eastern state throughout the decade. This changed dramatically following de Gaulle’s rise to power and has since reflected a more reserved and critical approach toward relations with Israel. Finally, Germany’s relationship with the Israelis has accurately been described by Satloff as sui generis.

\(^{48}\) The Labour shadow government led by Harold Wilson as well as a number of conservative members of parliament opposed Britain’s embargo. Their efforts were futile, however, and parliament endorsed government policy by 251 to 175 votes. For an insightful account of British-Israeli relations in the 1970s, see Wilson (1982).
Having been shaped by events surrounding the Holocaust as well as efforts at expiation on the part of subsequent political figures like Konrad Adenauer, German foreign policy toward Israel has been marked by intensive economic, military and social commitments, strong political sensibilities to the Israeli position, and a reserved posture in expressing any potentially Israel-critical views (Satloff 1997, 21).

If one were to sum up these various policies, however, it could generally be said that European relations with Israel have traditionally been quite instrumental in nature, reflecting a more cautious tendency to balance support for Israel with an expressed appreciation for the interests of its Arabian neighbors, particularly with respect to the Palestinian question. Understandably, proponents of this argument maintain that this presents a palpable dilemma for NATO’s GME policy. With the US usually offering unwavering support for Israel in matters of security, greater European skepticism often presents a roadblock to the formulation of common Mediterranean objectives. As Kemp notes, “The fact that Americans are far more supportive and protective of Israel than Europeans has far-reaching ramifications and is a clear obstacle to better [transatlantic] cooperation” (2003, 168). Many observers thus note that Israeli relations represent a large impediment to NATO cooperation in Middle Eastern policy. More generally, however, whether one focuses on the US-Israeli relationship or the myriad of other relationships involving member states and Middle Eastern partners, conflicting bilateral relations seems to be a reasonable argument to account for NATO’s Mediterranean malaise.

1.2. NATO Cooperation in the Balkans

Whether one supports the value-based or material-based explanations presented above to account for NATO’s Mediterranean malaise, evidence of diverging or even conflictual interests would envisage at the very least an alliance under pressure and at the worst one on the verge of collapse. This therefore begs the question as to whether these explanations accurately reflect Alliance dynamics since the end of the Cold War. Two questions are particularly relevant. First, can the existence of divergent interests also be found in other areas of NATO engagement, or are they useful only in understanding Alliance cooperation in the GME? Second, do divergent, primordial state interests – even if present – invariably necessitate
Alliance policy failure? In this section, I turn to the first of these questions and explore whether divergent interests can in fact be found in a second area within which NATO is significantly involved, the Balkans.

Few regions of the world have seen as extensive an engagement by NATO states since the end of the Cold War as has southeastern Europe. Alliance members were active within the area as early as 1992 to help end fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and brokered a final resolution to this conflict with the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. They once again engaged militarily in 1999 to end fighting in Kosovo and are still present today to maintain the peace, promote democracy and ensure the rule-of-law. Moreover, they have on occasion provided economic and political support to newly-emerging Balkan states and have likewise pushed for productive and long-term cooperation with the Republic of Serbia. This in no doubt speaks to the fact that other than the Middle East, the Balkans is the region of greatest strategic significance for the Alliance at the beginning of the 21st Century. The section which follows draws upon the five arguments presented above which attempted to account for malaise in NATO cooperation toward the Mediterranean. The objective thereby is to determine if a similar pattern of primordial, diverging interests can also be found within the Balkans that could present comparable challenges for Alliance cooperation in its policy toward southeastern Europe.

1.2.1. Divergent value-based interests?

As in the Middle East, arguments are often advanced which suggest that there are in fact conflicting value-based interests among NATO members within the Balkans. Indeed, looking back at Alliance involvement within the region in the 1990s, there is little doubt that values played a key role in NATO’s decision to intervene. Commenting on the reasons for NATO action in Kosovo in spring 1999, Tony Blair emphasized the seminal role of such interests, declaring, “In this conflict we are fighting not for territory but for values.” Such sentiments beg the question as to whether values were in fact decisive and, if so, shared by all NATO partners. In
other words, can differences in values be found among the Allies which could suggest the potential for conflicting interests in post-Cold War policy toward the Balkans?

Proponents of value-based approaches to understanding NATO’s role in the Balkans since 1989 contend that two core values have formed the basis for continental policy toward southeastern Europe: the promotion of human rights and a normative notion of a united Europe. Donnelly contends that international human rights norms have increasingly shaped the security preferences of continental states, noting that “west European states in the 1980s and 1990s increasingly emphasized human rights in their foreign policies...” (1998, 15). Accordingly, human rights have become part of the “post-Cold War calculus of political legitimacy,” and protection against genocide now represents “the core of an emerging post-Cold War minimum standard of civilization” (16, 20). The case of the Balkans represents no exception to this trend, and Donnelly argues that Europeans’ desire for intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was due to a “genuine humanitarian concern over, for example, ethnic cleansing, rape as a tactic of warfare, and the plight of Sarajevo” (16). French President Jacques Chirac seemed only to confirm the relevance of such value-based interests to account for Europe’s intervention in Kosovo during a NATO Summit in April 1999, arguing that Kosovo represented a “just war” and declaring it “a great victory for human rights, a grand idea, that has developed step by step in this century with setbacks and tragedies along the way.” According to proponents of this position, human rights thus played a central role in the formation of European interests within southeastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.

The second value which has shaped the policy of continental NATO states in the Balkans is the normative desire to once again establish a united European continent. As argued by some observers, one underlying motivation for Europe’s support of engagement in the Balkans was based on the normative vision of a fundamental reintegration for states which had been separated by the shadow of dictatorship for over 40 years (Neumann 1998). O’Brennan contends that European policy toward the Balkans is fundamentally driven by this historical context: “[F]or the European states emerging from the shadow of the Soviet monolith, there was a clear normative aspiration – a “return to Europe”, the Europe from which, it was frequently asserted, these states had been forcibly separated for over four decades” (2008,
In contrast to critics who argued that European policy toward the Balkans was simply an expression of imperialistic aspirations, these scholars assert that Europe instead felt obliged to intervene, with the objective being first and foremost to achieve for the region “freedom, prosperity, and a secure place in the international community” and thereby pave the way for an eventual return to Europe. Indeed, rhetoric from within European circles supports such claims. At a press conference on 20 November 2008, for example, UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband maintained that Kosovan compliance with transitional agreements demonstrate “Kosovo’s future in the European family…Kosovo needs to keep building bridges with its neighbors as it moves closer to the EU.” To be certain, NATO activism within the region continues to be seen as a vital avenue by which to accomplish these objectives.

In contrast, scholars who accentuate value-based differences in transatlantic policy within the Balkans argue that US interests were much more instrumental than those of their European counterparts. A more pragmatic approach emerged within Washington, according to which intervention was based less upon normative values and more upon the strategic consequences of engagement or the lack thereof. According to US defense analyst William Arkin, American grounds for intervention in the Balkans have never echoed “European concerns” with questions over human rights, the need for a united Europe, or sovereignty. Such issues no doubt played a secondary role in US policy deliberations, yet the larger questions were more calculated: Could an emerging humanitarian crisis weaken regional stability? Could a crippled engagement by “united Europe” jeopardize transatlantic coherence and propagate risks for the Alliance? Do questions of sovereignty undermine US or allied interests within the Balkans? Thus, as Arkin candidly notes, American appeal to normative values to formulate policy objectives within the Balkans was much more exploitative: “When we care about sovereignty, we care about it, and when we don’t, we don’t.” This therefore begs the question as to how values were concretely expressed in the formulation of US policy interests within the Balkans.

Observers generally divide US policy in southeastern Europe into two distinct periods. The first of these views the Balkans as an area of peripheral interest for the United States. In the immediate period following the breakup of the Soviet Union, US intelligence assessments

49 See, for example, Bieler (2002), Chandler (1999), Knaus and Martin (2003), and Paris (2002).
forebodingly predicted the impending breakup of Yugoslavia and emphasized the emergence of widespread humanitarian plight and violent nationalism. Despite this, Washington saw no cause for military intervention, as US national interests were not at risk. According to James Baker, “...our vital national interests were not at stake...The greater threat to American interests at the time lay in the increasingly dicey situation in Moscow, and we preferred to maintain our focus on that challenge...” (1995, 636). As interests early on in the Balkans were framed in a humanitarian context, American engagement remained minor (Daalder 2000b). This position continued under the early Clinton administration as well.

As the situation in Bosnia progressively worsened, however, the consequences of the crisis on broader US interests became much more poignant. Specifically, it was obvious that the continuing failure posed two risks which the US was unwilling to accept. First, a lack of engagement on the part of the US raised questions as to the credibility of US foreign policy. Daalder notes that “while the conflict itself may not have affected American national interests, the failure to end it clearly had...[The credibility] of the United States and its president were at stake, and that had profound implications for US interests” (2000b, 9). Having justified its response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 in the protection of the “rule of law..., the shared responsibility for freedom and justice..., [and] the rights of the weak” (Bush 1990), many viewed US complacency in Bosnia with dismay. A second risk the US confronted involved the potential consequences for inaction on the transatlantic relationship. With a progressively deteriorating situation, it became increasingly apparent that the Europeans were unable to efficaciously deal with the situation. Though European calls increased for a US role in Bosnia, Washington first responded unenthusiastically. This led to frustrated accusations on the part of some US allies that America’s absence signaled a de facto decline in transatlantic cooperation. French President Chirac, for example, declared that “the position of leader of the free world is vacant” (2006, 112). With the US remaining on the sidelines despite growing calls for the contrary, a threatening rift began to emerge between transatlantic partners. According to some observers, the perceived unwillingness on the part of the US to help ensure the stability of the broader European continent signaled a potential end of the Alliance itself, and for Washington,
this proved to be an intolerable option. In light of these risks, the US opted to take a leading role in bringing peace to the Balkans.

As this discussion points out, the values which underscored NATO states’ policies and their decisions to engage within southeastern Europe throughout the 1990s were fundamentally different. While continental partners were concerned with pan-European stability as well as humanitarian considerations, their US counterparts supported a more pragmatic approach which first left room for intervention when direct strategic interests came into play. Though European objectives had a strong normative undertone which remained consistent over time, American interests were instrumental and fluid, dependent upon the strategic environment. As one top White House official observed, the US position maintained that “[a]ny comprehensive view is just destined to be wrong” (Gellman 1999), dismissing the impulse to universalize the Kosovo War – or to find in it a precedent for action elsewhere (e.g., in the case of a future Balkan intervention). Thus, the case can be made that differences in the value-based interests held by allies has underscored the desired policy objectives of individual member states. Unsurprisingly, this at times led to conflict between Alliance members as demonstrated above, suggesting that values may indeed have some impact on NATO cooperation with respect to southeastern Europe.

1.2.2. Divergent material interests?

*Great power politics*

As is the case in the Middle East, great power politics has historically played a significant role within the Balkans as well. Prior to NATO’s creation, the end of World War II saw discussions between the West and the Soviet Union in October 1944 over a suitable division of Yugoslavia into corresponding realms of influence. This led to an arrangement between Churchill and Stalin known as the “Percentages Agreement,” which envisioned a distribution of the Balkans according to which one-half would fall under Western (i.e., mostly British and American) influence and the other half would come under Soviet authority (Resis 1978; Churchill 1986). In the course of the Cold War, the Balkans continued to prove contentious for the superpowers.
As Guttman (1999) notes, the Cold War years became a battleground of “bloodshed, betrayal and bewilderment” between the Soviet Union and the United States. Campbell (1973) draws a similar conclusion, arguing that Tito’s Yugoslavia became the ground for a series of “shocks and conflicts...bound to increase both local and global insecurity.” As such, the Balkans was a strategic realm of influence for the great powers prior to 1989.

To be certain, the end of the Cold War in no way mitigated the degree of great power entanglement within the Balkans. In fact, some scholars argue that great power conflict within the region may have actually increased since 1989. First, the Balkans has become the post-Cold War “danger zone of Europe” (Hammond 2005). With widespread ethnic conflict and extreme nationalism following the end of the East-West rivalry, many contend that the potential for future violence on par with that seen within the region throughout the 1990s is a strong likelihood. The presence of external powers would therefore likely serve as a vital stabilizing factor at mitigating such risks. Second, the end of the Cold War also signaled the emergence of a more assertive Europe, wary of the prospects for armed conflict on its own backdoor. At the same time, Russia continues to exercise its influence within the region, often in contradiction to the expressed interests of NATO allies. Light et al. (2000) maintain that NATO’s presence and growing influence within southeastern Europe is in some respects leading to calls within Moscow for a correspondingly strong Russian presence. In fact, some argue that Russia’s role in the Georgian crisis of August 2008 was owed in part to “the decision by [some Alliance members in] Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia” (Friedman 2008).

Great power politics is still present within the Balkans and involves not only a steady role for Washington and Moscow within the region, but for European actors as well. As certain events demonstrate, these intra-Alliance interests do not always align, and US and European involvement within the Balkans at times led to evident disagreement during the 1990s. Owen and Meyer (1989) astutely note that central Europe and, in particular, the Balkans were “second only to the Middle East in its potential for conflicts that could embroil the great powers.” Emerging as significant stakeholders within the region, European states have sought

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50 For an insightful analysis of Cold War great power politics within the Balkans, see Boll (1984).
to actively pursue their own security policy agenda since the end of the Cold War, and the Balkans has invariably become a source for potential conflict among transatlantic partners.

The role of strategic resources
At first glance, the potential impact of strategic resources in affecting NATO security cooperation within southeastern Europe pales in comparison to its dominant role in Middle Eastern affairs. Indeed, most experts agree that no significant oil or gas deposits are to be found within the Balkans, and little effort has thus far been made to undertake future resource exploration. As a February 2006 report of the US Energy Information Administration concluded, “The countries of the Balkans region are neither major energy producers nor consumers. Although the region does hold some important fossil fuel deposits, these resources are not significant on a world scale, and the political and economic instability in the Balkans in recent years has discouraged any substantial foreign investment in the respective countries’ energy sectors.” While the question of strategic resources no doubt affects Alliance politics within the Middle East, the lack of oil and gas in the Balkans seems to mitigate any such influence within this region.

However, energy security does play a discernable role in transatlantic policy toward southeastern Europe. Though not directly resource-rich, the Balkans region is key to securing Western access to oil and gas resources. Reports on the significance of strategic resources within the Balkans first drew marked attention in the debate surrounding Alliance involvement in the Kosovo War. In the spring of 1999, Australian journalist John Pilger published a provocative article which claimed that NATO’s pretense of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in fact obfuscated the real motives for Western involvement, namely “the impatience...to complete their most urgent post-cold war project: the establishment of an oil protectorate all the way from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea.” Critics like Pilger and fellow journalist Jonathan Freeland asserted that NATO involvement was undeniably about securing...
Western access to energy resources. As they point out, a proposal by oil giants BP and Halliburton was advanced in 1997 which sought the creation of the AMBO pipeline running from Burgas, Bulgaria across Macedonia and on to the Albanian port of Vlore. According to industry experts, the pipeline would provide a primary channel for the transportation of oil from the Caspian basin into European markets (Monbiot 2001). There was certainly no question that this infrastructure project generated considerable support in Western capitals. As one senior official within the Clinton administration noted, the pipeline was affectionately referred to in governmental circles as the “new Silk road...linking Europe and Central Asia” (Ramsay 1999). Thus, it was claimed by some observers that the central objective of NATO operations in the Balkans was “to pacify Yugoslavia so that transnational oil corporations can secure the oil transportation route from the Caspian Sea through Yugoslavia, into Central Europe” (Gökay 2002).52 Both Alliance and national officials were quick to counter such assertions. In the words of Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, “…we are willing to undertake military action, not to seize territory, not for expansion, not for mineral resources. There is no oil in Kosovo” (Lloyd 1999). Official sources unequivocally dismiss such allegations, and claims by commentators like Pilger and Freeland are clearly misleading at best. Nevertheless, such discussion did serve to accentuate the impact of strategic resources on NATO cooperation toward the region.

In particular, southeastern Europe is increasingly vital as a point of transit for natural gas and crude oil resources to Western Europe. According to a report of the International Energy Agency, the importance of the region “resides in its geographical location, halfway between two major oil and gas supply regions – Russia and the Caspian – and large markets” (2000a, 17). Specifically, two pipelines are currently under construction within the Balkans: the above-mentioned AMBO pipeline and the Pan-European pipeline (PEOP), which is planned to run through Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia on to Italy, Austria and Germany. European states have already expressed the importance of such projects for their broader energy security needs. In a EU Green Paper, it was determined that cooperation on oil and gas transit within broader southeastern Europe is “essential for the security of transit into the Community...” (1995, 38, 46). As Cornell notes, there has likewise been “increasing governmental interest in the region”

52 See also Schwarz (1999) and Gowan (2000).
within the US (2001, 372). At a hearing before the US House Committee on International Relations on 12 February 1998, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Doug Bereuter, testified on US strategic interests in Caspian oil, asserting thereby the importance of transit routes through the Balkans: “Stated US policy goals regarding energy resources in this region include fostering the independence of the States and their ties to the West; breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes; promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers; encouraging the construction of east-west pipelines that do not transit Iran; and denying Iran dangerous leverage over the Central Asian economies.” Thus, some observers contend that NATO states recognize the vital role of the Balkans in the provision of energy security for Euro-Atlantic states and that this consequently shapes their primary policy objectives for the region, namely guaranteeing that regional conflict not threaten the security of oil and gas transport routes (Ögütcü 1995; Fisher 2002).

There are also growing signs that Balkan infrastructure projects and the delivery of said energy resources could serve as points of friction for transatlantic partners. The US has assumed an increasingly decisive role in the investment of these projects in an effort to secure access to diversified energy resources. According to a paper commissioned by the US Trade and Development Agency in May 2000, such investments will “provide a consistent source of crude oil to American refineries,” “provide American companies with a key role in developing the vital east-west corridor,” and “advance the privatization aspirations of the US government in the region.” The report continues by emphasizing not only the role of such projects in guaranteeing US energy security, but the prospects for lucrative contracts to additionally fuel US exports. To be certain, passionate adamancy for such projects has been echoed within Europe. During an EC hearing, for example, UK’s European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, recognized the Community’s “position on the importance of resources from the Caspian Sea region for European energy supplies, [and] the need to have a number of safe supply routes to the European and international markets...[The Community] has facilitated the emergence of a variety of projects linking the Caspian Basin to European markets...” (2000, 7). Examining the collapse of former Yugoslavia and the conflicts which broke out throughout the Balkans since

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53 According to one forecast within the report, simply the AMBO pipeline would produce an estimated $500 billion in US exports.
the early 1990s, Gökay observed that there is an important, underlying threat shared in common. He writes, “Although these various wars and conflicts have/had certain regional dimensions... all have been connected to one big central course of action: the maneuvers of the US, and its allies in Europe, over the division of resources” (2002, 11). The strategic relevance of the Balkans for Euro-Atlantic energy security indeed opens the potential for conflict among partners which have individual interests in securing both access to energy and trade contracts. As energy security grows in relevance for states increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, the potential for transatlantic conflict is no doubt more nascent than ever.

**Soft Security Considerations**

Indisputably, the Balkans has been host to some of the most violent and persistent conflicts of the post-Cold War era to date. The Bosnian and Kosovo Wars wreaked untold havoc on the region, which arguably had disastrous consequences on the long-term prospects for both human and economic development in southeastern Europe. Similarly, the emergence of a number of independent states and the resultant sensitivities apparent throughout the Balkans presents political and diplomatic challenges of their own. Such developments have undoubtedly given rise to countless hard security threats. Of equal importance, however, this also created a number of soft security challenges which could likewise jeopardize Alliance interests in the area. Thus, the question remains whether the presence of such soft security concerns led to divergent objectives among NATO members within the Balkans.

One such soft security challenge which deserves mention here is the episodic, yet dramatic surge in rates of emigration from the Balkans since the end of the Cold War. Depicting the situation in the region at the beginning of the 1990s, a 2006 report of the UN High Commission on Refugees noted, “Three months following Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence in 1992, the number of Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons soared to 2.6 million.” This situation first improved with the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, yet problems with emigration persisted. Moreover, the end of the 1990s signaled a catastrophic reversal of post-Dayton progress in emigration, as the Kosovo War once again provoked large waves of displaced persons to seek refuge. By the end of official NATO combat
operations on 10 April 1999, well over one million refugees and asylum-seekers from the province had been registered with the UNHCR (Suhrke 2000).

Due to its geographical proximity to the Balkans, Europe was particularly hard hit by these trends, and this had a conspicuous impact on European policy preferences within the Balkans. For example, a 2007 UN report estimated that 640,000 people had successfully immigrated to Western Europe from the Balkans since 1991. As Peshkopia observes, these developments had direct consequences on European asylum policy: “The Balkans affects directly or indirectly most of the EU reforms in the field of asylum…[F]or the EU, preventing refugee and illegal migration flow has turned out to be a major question” (2005, 237). However, asylum was not the only policy area affected; Immigration from the Balkans thrust itself to the top of the agenda in a number of European – both in Brussels and nationally – policy areas, including social services, employment, integration and security (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). As could be expected, the issue likewise made its impression on European objectives within NATO. Specifically, continental partners actively sought to influence Alliance policy in such a way as to enhance stability within southeastern Europe, curtailing thereby trends in immigration to Western Europe. Thus, the “soft security issue” of migration has assumed central priority in the policy objectives of European NATO states since the beginning of the 1990s.

To be certain, immigration is not the only soft security issue which has made its way onto Europe’s agenda for NATO. With migration comes an array of concomitant challenges which similarly threaten continental member states. Organized crime and human trafficking are two such problems. Offering a European perspective on the issues confronting NATO, Sens (2006) uses the Balkans as a case in point and asserts that “[t]aken together, these issues present a much more complex security challenge for NATO’s member states…intrastate conflicts and failed states are breeding grounds and safe havens for organized crime…and are sources of refugee flows and illegal migration.” He then continues by noting the growing relevance of soft security issues for an effective NATO transformation: “These security challenges are predominantly socio-economic, not military-technical, in character…As a result, NATO must become a more effective instrument for the analysis and discussion of the socio-economic conditions that drive the security threats it faces and the policies designed to meet them.”
Indeed, developments within the Balkans have been pivotal in shaping a growing European emphasis on soft security threats in its preferences for NATO cooperation.

The United States has remained comparatively unscathed by the effects of emigration from southeastern Europe. In fact, estimates suggest that fewer than 15,000 displaced persons from the Balkans have sought asylum in the United States (UNHCR 2007; Backus 1999). The question of asylum has therefore been considerably less salient within US public debate than has been the case in Europe: “...[I]n contrast with some parts of Europe, the word ‘asylum-seeker’ has no particular negative connotations in America...[T]he issue of asylum is lower on the public’s radar screen than in Europe” (Economist 2008b). As a result, migration and resulting soft security concerns (e.g., organized crime and human trafficking) have remained eclipsed by traditional hard security considerations among Washington’s policymakers. As noted above, the hard security goals of legitimizing US power and guaranteeing the vitality of the North Atlantic Alliance have remained at the core American policy interests within the region. In the formation of Balkan policy objectives, a hard-soft security divide has emerged among transatlantic partners which resembles to a considerable degree that found in the BMENA.

**Bilateral Relations**

As with other regions, southeastern Europe has likewise been host to a number of bilateral agreements, which at times have complicated relations, or even provoked tension, between NATO partners. One early example involved German recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence in December 1991. With the outbreak of war within the two republics in June 1991, reports of the “mounting atrocities” quickly made their way back to Europe. German reaction to the violence was swift; widespread public indignity “provided a powerful impetus for a shift in the German government’s attitude toward the continued existence of Yugoslavia” (Libal 1997), and Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, ominously declared that “the hour of recognition moved closer.” Opposition to Bonn’s threat of recognition drew heavy fire within NATO circles. French President François Mitterrand visited the Federal Republic in mid-October to dissuade any potential unilateral action by the German government. In
November, a French-British draft resolution was discussed within the UN Security Council which sought to deter a German recognition, and the US passively signaled its initial acceptance of such a draft (NY Times 1991).\textsuperscript{54} Within the then 12-member European Community, all but Belgium, Denmark, and Italy were strongly opposed the Genscher’s position. Although other NATO countries rapidly followed suit in recognizing the republics’ independence, it quickly became evident that Germany’s posture had jeopardized intra-Alliance relations. Early in 1993, a coarse diplomatic exchange played out between the Clinton Administration and the Kohl government, in which a high-ranking US official allegedly assigned complicity with Bonn for its role in provoking violence in former Yugoslavia. This was echoed in an interview with USA Today by then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher in mid-June 1993. In December 1994, Christopher’s predecessor, Lawrence Eagleberger, declared Germany fully responsible in its “insistence in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia at all costs.” According to Eagleberger, Bonn’s diplomatic faux pas had overshadowed NATO relations and would continue to do so within the Balkans for years to come.

A second example of bilateral interests which exposed risks for NATO cooperation on Balkan policy involves the recognition of Kosovan independence. Kosovo’s declaration on 17 February 2008 generally enjoyed broad acceptance by Alliance members. In a State Department brief on 18 February, the US formally recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state, pledging its support as a “close friend and partner.” UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared the decision as “a step forward for the international community,” and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner called it “a victory for common sense, for peace…” Within the immediate days following the Kosovan declaration, the majority of NATO states followed suit and formally recognized the province’s independence. Four member states, however, expressed grave concerns over the province’s move toward independence. Spain swiftly stepped forward in denouncing the development, maintaining that “the Government of Spain will not recognize the unilateral act proclaimed by the assembly of Kosovo...this does not respect international law.” In similar fashion, Slovakian officials asserted that Kosovo’s declaration without Serbian approval “was not in line with international law.” On 18 February, Romania’s parliament in joint

\textsuperscript{54} Though placing political pressure on Bonn, the draft resolution never made it to a vote. With Germany adamant to go ahead with its recognition, France and the UK retracted the resolution.
session voted against recognition of Kosovo, and Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced in September 2009 that “[Kosovo’s] unilateral recognition is a flagrant violation of international law” (ANA 2009). This lack of consensus has created a complex dynamic within NATO, and Alliance officials have had to act cautiously in an effort to avoiding exacerbating rifts between its member states. In the words of former British Minister of State for Europe Dennis MacShane (2008), Spain, Greece, Romania, and Slovakia had undoubtedly weakened both European and transatlantic unity by refusing to recognize Kosovo, and the blocking of such NATO ambitions “bodes ill for the notion that a united…diplomacy of weight” can develop.

While these two cases highlight the problems facing NATO in establishing a common Balkans policy, these are not the sole bilateral relations which have complicated Alliance policy within the region; Greece’s veto on Macedonian membership despite strong consensus on the part of other NATO states as well as Turkey’s unwillingness to allow joint operations between KFOR and EULEX are but two such examples. As such instances demonstrate, southeastern Europe has its own unique bilateral relations which have proven to be complex, thereby complicating intra-Alliance cooperation in the process.

1.3. Room for cooperation despite divergence?

The two sections above examined five arguments often put forward within the literature to account for discrepancies in NATO regional policies. To summarize, the first of these views value-based interests as the root of the problem, with observers pointing to a rift between transatlantic partners over the perceived basis of legitimate Alliance policy. While the US locates the basis for NATO’s legitimacy (as well as its own) in the use of power, Europe has increasingly sought to link the legitimacy of a post-Cold War Alliance within the context of an international legal framework and multilateral diplomacy. In contrast to value-based approaches, the four remaining arguments see material-based interests as the root cause of inconsistent policy outcomes. Four explanations are most often advanced in this regard, passing the lack of coordination off to great power politics, ensuing competition over strategic resources, divergence in the recognition of hard or soft security threats as the central priority
for regional policy, or difficulties arising from bilateral relations between Alliance members and GME states.

Two questions were posed earlier to guide the subsequent discussion on the impact of diverging interests. The first of these asked whether divergent interests can be found in various areas of NATO engagement. Indeed, dynamics within the Greater Middle East and the Balkans appear to indicate this is the case. In fact, constellations of both value- and material-based interests underscored discrepancies in the policy objectives of Alliance partners toward both regions. Despite their evident differences, the five arguments share two common assumptions. First, they all maintain that such divergence could well lead to irregularities in NATO cooperation. The Alliance is faltering because the goals sought by the individual member states lack a common objective and are, in fact, at times fundamentally in conflict. More importantly, however, they view these interests as based on primordial state objectives. As the argument goes, these differing interests originated at the state-level and not at the level of the Alliance. NATO members cannot reach agreement on Alliance policy due to preconceived national interests, and policy-making within the Alliance can therefore best be seen as a forum within which states seek to advance their individual strategic goals. Inherent in this claim is the idea that for an alliance, differences in desired outcomes necessarily lead to policy stalemate. If NATO states seek different ends, so goes the argument, the Alliance as a whole will fail to produce cooperative policy outcomes; divergent interests are inevitably the origins of policy failure.

This paints a fairly bleak picture for transatlantic cooperation. Not only do such claims anticipate little hope for effective cooperation as regards GME and Balkan policy, but it more generally envisions little chance for a coherent and viable Alliance as a whole. As long as members disagree over the desired security objectives for regions as significant as southeastern Europe and the Greater Mediterranean, the once solid basis for cooperation could easily erode, leaving NATO as little more than a symbolic relic with little substance. Heisbourg expressed

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55 It is also worth noting that the simultaneous existence of value- and material-based interests would suggest that these may in fact not be distinct phenomena after all. Instead, various constellations of interests could often blend together, with the impact of each being accentuated to a greater or lesser degree from one instance of cooperation to another.
such sentiments at the height of the 2003 Iraq crisis, emphasizing the growing “diversity of use and the nuances” within the Alliance. On the ability of NATO to remain viable with such diverging objectives, he concluded, “The Atlantic alliance will remain as a bureaucracy. It will continue to produce a number of public goods, standardization of military equipment, that sort of stuff, which are important, and it will continue of course to serve as a talking shop. But as an alliance, yes, it’s effectively dead.” Whether one gives credence to claims that either value-based or material-based interests are the cause for NATO’s policy malaise, evidence of diverging or even conflictual interests would envisage at the very least an alliance under pressure and at the worst one on the verge of collapse. This then leads to the second question posed earlier: Do divergent, primordial state interests – even if present – invariably necessitate Alliance policy failure?

At first glance, anecdotal evidence seems to support this contention. As previously mentioned, few overarching results have emerged from transatlantic GME cooperation, with neither the Mediterranean Dialogue nor the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative yet offering the degree of “enhanced cooperation” which they initially sought to foster. Additionally, the caustic transatlantic rift which erupted over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 emphasized quite well how differing interests can divide Alliance partners with respect not only to out-of-area policy, but also – as the “guarantees to Turkey fiasco” of February 2003 demonstrated – when it comes to territorial defense as well (Howorth 2003, 242). Of course, transatlantic engagement in southeastern Europe has not been without its challenges either. In particular, operational results under UN mandate and European command during the first several years of the Bosnian conflict proved quite dismal. Similarly, some scholars maintain that NATO’s record in KFOR is indicative of the Alliance’s sub-optimal operational performance (Bandow 2000), and Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov even suggest that “a review and reform of KFOR...structures is essential” to ensure effective out-of-area cooperation in the years to come (2006, 55-6).

Despite this, other developments suggest a more balanced picture of NATO cooperation. According to some observers, efforts at institutionalizing cooperation within the GME have indeed borne fruit:
“Despite significant political impediments and a continuing degree of ambivalence on the part of participants, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative has...been a key vehicle for information-sharing and dialogue, ...[has provided] a framework for confidence-building that can be given additional substance..., has opened the possibility of moving from discussion to practical cooperation in areas of comparative advantage for the Alliance, and...has encouraged Alliance members themselves to focus on Mediterranean security issues. As our analysis suggests, the question of NATO’s strategy toward the south is acquiring greater importance, and is reflected in the new Strategic Concept...” (Lesser et al. 1998, 43).

Moreover, NATO has been notably successful at coordinating out-of-area maritime activities among its member states. Since October 2001, for instance, Operation Active Endeavor has patrolled the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping in an effort to “detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity.” Under the auspices of Active Endeavor, the Alliance has hailed more than 100,000 ships and investigated over 150 suspect vessels (NATO 2009b). At the request of the UN and with relatively short notice, the Organization also carried out Operation Allied Provider from 24 October to 12 December 2008 to escort UN vessels and “bolster anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden” (Military Technology 2009). NATO’s ability to coordinate such maritime missions is seen by many as essential to wider Alliance objectives of combating terrorism, especially as regards the smuggling and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, several encouraging developments within Afghanistan also deserve mention. According to Sherwood-Randall, the Organization has been instrumental from the beginning of US-led combat operations, providing “underlying alliance commitments that over the decades have coordinated national policies and prepared participants to operate effectively together.” Moreover, NATO has helped to build and maintain “consensus on ends and means” in Afghanistan through “ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior” (2006, 55). Examining NATO’s command over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since August 2003, Hallams asserts that the Alliance has in fact proven “a more appropriate mechanism than the US-led coalition to carry out post-reconstruction and stabilization operations in Afghanistan...NATO’s role in charge of the ISAF mission has demonstrated many of the key advantages to be derived from operating within and through the alliance” (Hallams 2009, 53). Though intervention in Afghanistan is undoubtedly riddled with serious challenges and “success” is still far from certain, NATO has successfully
demonstrated it offers considerable value added in the areas of “post-war strategy” and multinational coordination.

Observers have likewise been generous in noting Alliance accomplishments in its policy toward the Balkans. One distinct area has seen particularly positive results, namely the role of NATO’s Balkans involvement in promoting intra-Alliance cooperation. Commenting on conditions at the end of the Cold War, for instance, Hoffman observes that the need to establish security in southeastern Europe ushered in an opportunity for NATO – whose future had been called into question by the abrupt end to the East-West conflict – to become “a field for US-European relations.” The Balkans not only proved to be a successful forum for Alliance cooperation, but it also raised awareness on the part of NATO’s continental members of the urgent need to reaffirm its commitment to this cooperation by addressing their evident capabilities gap with the US:

“Cooperation prevailed in the Balkan crisis, at least after 1995, when NATO played a considerable role in the military intervention against Yugoslavia...Meanwhile, the sum of difficulties the Europeans had encountered with the Americans in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, and the evidence provided by these conflicts of the huge technological gap between the military establishments of the United States and the European nations, led to a greater desire on the part of the latter to reinforce military cooperation among themselves” (2003, 1031).

Speaking to the role of NATO cooperation in promoting wider Balkan stability, Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos commented that “within the NATO framework, southeastern European countries have developed a stable and productive collaboration.” He further noted that in its engagement within the Balkans, the Alliance has likewise played a seminal role in “the development and improvement of bilateral relations among the members” (Danopoulos 2001, 110). This consequently suggests that intra-Alliance cooperation was effective in two fundamental ways; not only was it successful in enhancing the ultimate goal of regional stability, but it also led to increased NATO visibility within the region despite possible divergences in the national interests of its members.

Thus, Alliance cooperation toward the GME and Balkans show signs of both cooperation and conflict since the end of the Cold War. To be sure, differences in interests were evident in both regions, not only between the US and Europe, but also among the respective continental
partners as well. A number of observers have claimed the relevance of such factors in accounting for lapses in NATO cooperation. Benantar (2006) argues, for instance, that while we have seen “multiplication of partnerships” and a “shared vision” for out-of-area engagement, no common security agenda yet exists due to competing initiatives based on different national interests among Alliance partners. Musu shares similar sentiments, noting that the existence of such initiatives “reflects the divisions among the allies within NATO, and particularly the different American and European approaches” to these regions (2006, 424). Asmus (2003) likewise draws attention to the problem of transatlantic consensus: “The key to today's transatlantic divide is not power but purpose...[T]he United States and the European Union must forge a new grand strategy capable of meeting the great challenges of the era...” These claims highlight how NATO’s inability to formulate coherent policies in dealing with its near abroad arguably has much to do with diverging interests.

Yet interests alone do not seem to explain the whole story. In fact, while clear – and often fervent – differences can be ascertained in regard to the interests of individual member states, some notable successes can be identified in both arenas. Perhaps the most poignant instances which speak to this involve NATO’s mixed responses to various security challenges in each region. As regards the Middle East, Alliance partners were quick to join US action against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but many Allies sternly denounced US-led intervention against Hussein in 2003. Moreover, though NATO states have displayed collective commitment to ISAF involvement in Afghanistan, efforts at developing an “Alliance approach” to deal with Iran’s nuclear program have encountered serious setbacks. A similar picture emerges in the Balkans. While NATO at first seemed sluggish in responding to the Bosnian War at the beginning of the 1990s, its swift and effective position in the Kosovo crisis has widely been regarded as a model of Alliance fortitude. Such examples therefore point to varying degrees of NATO cooperation from one case to the next, despite the presence of diverging Allied interests in all. According to the five explanations outlined above, discrepancies in member state interests would invariably lead to policy impasse, and we would therefore expect to see NATO slow to respond to any of these challenges. This, however, has not been the case. The Alliance did not simply grind to a halt when faced with contradictory Allied interests, but it has in fact
responded actively to a number of regional security challenges in both the GME and the Balkans. As the focal point of transatlantic security increasingly shifts toward the Alliance’s periphery and the success of NATO grows ever more dependent on its ability to confront the diverse security challenges within these regions, scholars would benefit greatly from exploring alternative explanations for policy variation in key regions of NATO engagement. This is the objective of the chapter which follows.
Chapter 2
Explaining regional variances in security cooperation:
Making the case for power and policy-making

At the beginning of this analysis, the observation was made that most explanations for disparities in NATO cooperation have been based on the role of either interests or power in Alliance policy outcomes. The previous chapter explored the impact of interests on policy toward the Greater Middle East and the Balkans and argued that primordial state interests alone do not offer a comprehensive picture of the observed patterns of NATO cooperation toward each region. This chapter turns now to the second camp, exploring whether power holds promise in shedding light on dynamics of Alliance cooperation. To achieve this, the following chapter is organized in four parts. In the first section, I examine various security challenges which have emerged in both regions since the end of the Cold War and argue that – as was the case for primordial state interests – power alone as a systemic variable fails to adequately account for NATO policy in either arena. Instead, I propose that power coupled with dynamics intrinsic to the policy-making process might offer greater insight into patterns of Alliance cooperation. In particular, I claim that NATO’s policy-making process represents a distinct realm in and of itself, within which sub-systemic variables may well affect policy outcomes. Until now, however, the impact of Alliance-level variables has yet to be adequately theorized within the literature. In the second section, I introduce neoclassical realism and argue that its focus on the interaction between systemic and sub-systemic variables in explaining security policy outcomes could indeed contribute to the debate on dynamics of NATO cooperation. In the third part, I explicate three neoclassical realist approaches which offer distinct accounts for variation in policy outcomes based on an intervening role of three sub-systemic variables: a) aggregated strategic interests, b) elite consensus, and c) hegemonic legitimacy. I review each of these approaches in detail and discuss their applicability to the study of NATO policy-making. I then end in the final section by presenting methodological considerations for the subsequent case studies.
2.1. Power and Alliance cooperation

As mentioned previously, power is one of two explanations – the other being interests – frequently proffered to account for dynamics of interstate security cooperation. Finding particularly warm reception among realists scholars of IR, such arguments claim that outcomes in alliance policy are directly dependent upon relative distributions of power. Applied to the study of NATO, relative power shifts resulting in a net power loss for the Organization and/or its members should be expected to provoke an effort to counter such shifts on the part of the Allies (e.g., engagement of a threat). In contrast, in the absence of a power shift or if faced by a low-degree relative power shift causing no discernable net power loss, no such change in policy would be expected, and alliance partners would instead, for example, seek to maintain the status quo.

Upon closer inspection, however, this argument seems to lose much of its explanatory rigor as regards developments since the end of the Cold War. Within the GME, power considerations do appear to explain the decision by NATO states to swiftly intervene following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, power alone fails to give adequate explanation for the failure of the Alliance to yet address the arguably emerging power shift in favor of Iran since the beginning of the 2000s. Moreover, such claims appear ill positioned to elucidate the vigorous engagement of Alliance members in Afghanistan since 2001, although no concomitant regional power shifts had occurred. A similar picture emerges in southeastern Europe. With widespread political havoc signaling the impending breakup of Yugoslavia in 1990, Belgrade pushed to maintain unity within its republics. Though representing no immediate or discernable power loss for the Alliance, Serb objectives did conflict with NATO’s newfound influence within southeastern Europe following the end of the Cold War, threatening thereby to undermine the Alliance’s regional authority. Contrary to systemic predictions, however, NATO initially remained reticent. In contrast, many observers regarded the crisis in Kosovo in the late 1990s as an internal civil strife within Yugoslavia proper rather than an international conflict. Moreover, drastically weakened militarily and still recovering economically from the consequences of the Bosnian War, many scholars argue that Serbia demonstrated no revisionist
tendencies which could result in a regional net power loss for the Alliance. Despite this, NATO was quick to intervene militarily.56

What do such discrepancies mean for the role power plays in shaping interstate security cooperation? Can one dismiss its influence as indeterminate, or has our assumption of a direct interaction between power and security cooperation glimpsed over key dynamics inherent in the policy-making process which could affect the interaction between these two variables? Neoclassical realism posits one answer to these questions, and this is the topic to which I turn now.

2.2. Neoclassical realism: Bringing the sub-systemic back in

Neoclassical realism (NCR) emerged as a distinct approach among realist scholars in the early 1990s. Sometimes regarded as the third wave of modern realism,57 NCR conjectures that “systemic pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy behaviors” (Schweller 2006, 164). To be certain, neoclassical realism is a realist approach to interstate politics, which recognizes that foreign policy decisions are fundamentally driven by a state’s position within the international system and particularly by its relative material power capabilities (Rose 1998, 146). However, NCR theorists further maintain that external variables are complex and influence foreign policy indirectly, because they must first be translated sub-systemically (e.g., at the unit-level, thereby yielding itself to the individualities of each particular state). Thus, while retaining much of the theoretical rigor of neorealism, neoclassical realism at the same time incorporates a classical realist proclivity to focus on variables located at the first and second image as well.

56 For the sake of brevity, substantiation for the claims made here will first be given for the individual cases selected in the empirical analysis which follows.
57 The first wave of modern realism, classical realism, surfaced at the end of World War II and had its focus on the fundamental role of man in influencing states to act in certain ways. Classical realism was characterized in the works of scholars such as E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau, who viewed the desire to dominate and the pursuit of power as core aspects of human nature. The second wave of modern realism, neorealism, owes itself in part to the behavioralist trend in IR, which sought to establish law-like principles for explaining state behavior. Instead of focusing on human nature as the primary factor pushing states to act, observers like Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and Robert Gilpin argued that the causes for state action could be found in the nature of the international system itself, thus making the state a black box within which sub-systemic variables such as domestic actors became irrelevant.
Despite its relatively short existence, neoclassical realism has identified a number of variables arising at the unit level which can account for variations in the way states react to conditions in their external environment. For example, the distinct qualities of individual government and societal structures as well as actor preferences within these structures influence political outcomes in discernable ways. Specifically, observers have put forward explanations based on sub-systemic variables for unfettered overexpansion (Snyder 1991), extraregional hegemony (Layne 2006), normal expansion (Zakaria 1998), how balance of power perceptions influence foreign policy (Wohlforth 1993), the impact of external threat framing on internal mobilization efforts (Christensen 1996), and state acclimation to relative decline (Friedberg 1988). As such analyses demonstrate, proponents of NCR have argued for a need to focus not only on the systemic factors which may influence international political outcomes; instead, they contend that the institutions and actors involved in the policy-making process are relevant as well because of their role in interpreting the specific challenges which resulting policy outcomes are expected to address.

With NCR’s predominant focus on foreign policy, sub-systemic variables have often concerned actor interests and institutional constraints at the domestic (i.e., state) level and has seldom been applied to the study of alliances. Some observers have nevertheless sought to explain patterns of alignment using NCR perspectives. Taliaferro (2006), for example, advances a “resource-extraction” model which explores internal balancing strategies and the trends in cooperation among states. In two separate works, Schweller similarly investigates domestic constraints on balancing (2006) and state motives for bandwagoning (1994). Despite this, the elaboration of explanations for interstate security cooperation based on neoclassical realist thought remains in its infancy. This can be understood as a consequence of the fact that NCR accentuates the seminal role of domestic variables such as government regime type or political party organization in the formation of policy outcomes.

With respect to the study of NATO, however, NCR conceivably allows us to consider both the domestic interests promoting cooperation – i.e., the motivation for states to cooperate – as well as their interplay with a second set of sub-systemic variables, namely the forum within...
which interstate cooperation takes place. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, NATO’s
ability to coalesce around a coherent regional policy appears to not only be about national
preferences formulated prior to policy-making; instead, it may more importantly be about how
these interests are channeled through the policy process itself. Thus, neoclassical realism holds
considerable promise for informing the debate on NATO’s regional policy by highlighting the
relevance of intra-alliance politics in explaining interstate security cooperation such as that in
NATO (see Table 2.1).\footnote{In contrast to “traditional NCR,” the revised framework for neoclassical realism proposed in this analysis contends that one cannot differentiate between domestic and alliance-level dynamics within instances of interstate security cooperation. For example, the three NCR models presented below all accentuate the role of political leadership in shaping policy outcomes, with the implication that this leadership cuts across borders. For this reason, revised NCR draws together intervening variables both at the state and alliance levels into one group labeled intra-alliance politics.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Dependent variable} & \textbf{Traditional NCR} & \textbf{Revised NCR} \\
\hline
\textbf{Independent variable(s)} & systemic (e.g., relative power distributions, ordering principle) & systemic (e.g., relative power distributions, ordering principle) \\
\hline
\textbf{Intervening variable(s)} & state-level & intra-alliance politics \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Levels of analysis in neoclassical realist theory}
\end{table}

\subsection{2.3. Neoclassical realist models of interstate security cooperation}

While neoclassical realism has said little as regards interstate security cooperation, a few
noteworthy exceptions exist. The following section presents three models which paint distinct
pictures for how cooperation varies based on the interaction between changes in security
environment and intra-alliance politics. These arguments are competing in the sense that they
recognize distinct, intervening variables at the sub-systemic level to account for variations in cooperation. At the same time, however, each model underscores neoclassical realism’s potential to contribute to debates on alliance cooperation in two respects: by providing a theoretical framework for studying the process of Alliance cooperation and by presenting alternative explanations to account for disparities in NATO’s out-of-area policy. I first present the two most common explanations representing the conventional wisdom on security policy-making in neoclassical realist theory: the alliance adaptation and the alliance mobilization models. After elucidating these arguments, I present an alternative approach which has not yet been explicitly fleshed out within the literature, the hegemonic legitimacy model. For each, I put forward a general overview of the model and present the mechanisms proposed for explaining variation in policy outcomes given specific arrangements of power. I conclude, where appropriate, by elucidating how each approach could conceivably be aggregated to the study of cooperation within alliances.

2.3.1. Follow the challenge: The alliance adaptation model

One model of alignment behavior emerged as a heuristic undertaking to specifically account for developments within NATO since the end of the Cold War. The argument is based on two core observations: the endurance of NATO in a threat-free environment and the diversification of cooperation within the Alliance since 1990. In the immediate aftermath of the East-West conflict, some realists were adamant that transatlantic cooperation had indeed outlived its purpose, predicting not only a grim fate for the Alliance with the collapse of its eastern adversary (Waltz 1993, 272), but also a return to contentious great power relations in Europe (Mearsheimer 1990). Others, while still decidedly sober in their take on the prospects for sustained NATO cooperation, nevertheless purported a clear need for continued US engagement as a sort of “fire insurance” on future European conflicts (Art 1996, 36). What seemed certain coming out of the Cold War was the general assertion among realists that an end to NATO was inevitable – it was merely a question of when. After an interim period directly following the conflict, however, it seemed growingly apparent that the Alliance had not only
continued, but that, in some respects, it was prospering. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept (SC-91) reaffirmed the “particular position” of the Alliance as the central forum for security and defense commitments in the Euro-Atlantic area and provocatively asserted that North American interests were “permanently tied” to the security of Europe (NATO SC-91, pt. 21). France, long seen as the reluctant transatlantic partner, seemed eager for rapprochement with the Alliance and has in fact subsequently rejoined NATO’s integrated military command. Finally, NATO is more active than ever, having enlarged its mandate to cover not only national defense, but also crisis management, policing, and the fight on terrorism, and it even expanded its reach to go out of area.

The second observation was that the end of the Cold War brought about a substantial diversification in security cooperation within the Organization. First, cooperation increased horizontally as the Alliance sought intensified dialogue with non-member states in matters of security and defense. As previously mentioned, various forums were established for enhanced cooperation with its neighbors such as the Partnership for Peace program, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The Alliance also sought to deepen relations with the Russian Federation, establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 as a mechanism by which to promote consensus-building, consultation, joint decision, and joint action between member states and Russia. A number of Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) have also been set up on a bilateral basis with countries seeking to deepen their relations with the Alliance. In addition, twelve Eastern European states have joined the Euro-Atlantic area since the end of the Cold War with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia currently participating in the Alliance’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), a program of “advice, assistance and, practical support” which seeks to lay out a path toward NATO membership based on the individual needs and conditions of the specific countries participating in MAP. In all, NATO engages 29 non-member states in horizontal cooperation on a regular basis through the programs described above. Finally, NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept (SC-99) foresees

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60 The NRC replaced the Permanent Joint Council established by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
61 In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in its fourth round of enlargement. A fifth round came in 2004, with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joining the Alliance. The final round of enlargement took place in 2009 with the entry of Albania and Croatia into the Organization.
intensified collaboration with other like-minded international organizations, thereby paving an additional path for gains in horizontal cooperation.

Concomitant efforts have sought to expand vertical collaboration within NATO as well, as member states now have a far greater range of options available at their disposal in collaborating with one another. Specific developments in this respect are evident in NATO’s institutional and force structures, the range of and participation in operations as well as political and diplomatic arrangements. As part of the Alliance’s transformation, for example, the Organization has begun to reshape its integrated command structure, having reduced the number of major Alliance commands from three to two by 1994 and integrating Allied Command Channel into Allied Command Europe (ACE) (Wallander 2000, 719). There was also a reduction in the number of command headquarters from 65 to 20 to enable a more unified command for future operations. Moreover, SC-91 greatly expanded the type of missions which could be undertaken by the Alliance (e.g., crisis resolution, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance) and initially addressed the “out-of-area” question, and the 1999 Concept broadened the Organization’s agenda to recognize “asymmetric threats” such as illegal immigration, narcotics trafficking, and international terrorism. Finally, the ability of member states to participate to varying degrees in NATO engagements has also increased horizontal cooperation. One such example is the ever growing autonomy of the Alliance’s European pillar since the end of the Cold War. At the NAC meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996, NATO agreed to “support the development” of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO structures, which would allow European member states – acting through the Western European Union (WEU) – to make use of Alliance assets and capabilities for conducting missions independently of the Organization (NATO 1996). In December 2002, this agreement was

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62 The negative experience NATO had in Operation Deny Flight during dual command operations with the UN from 1993 to 1995 was a paramount catalyst for this change.

63 In light of the conflict in the Balkans, debate ensued throughout the 1990s as to the exact geographical limits of the Alliance’s security commitments. This was reflected in the SC-99 by the shift in emphasis away from the “North Atlantic area” and instead toward the “Euro-Atlantic area.” Though this remained largely undefined at the time of the Strategic Concept and while there was general consensus at the time that out-of-area did not yet mean “out of Europe,” this did serve to illustrate the importance of flexibility with which members sought to vest the Alliance. Since NATO’s assumption of command over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003, its interest in and ability to go out-of-area has been substantially solidified. For additional background information on this NATO’s out-of-area debate, see Medcalf (2006).
modified to allow the European Union (EU) to draw directly upon Alliance resources through its recently-established European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).\footnote{The final framework for cooperation became known as the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements and was adopted on 17 March 2003.}

Taken in unison, these two observations posed a considerable challenge to structural realists who had supposed that the post-Cold War era would bring about the inevitable decline of NATO. What in fact explained not only the Alliance’s perpetuation but also this substantial expansion of both horizontal and vertical cooperation despite the absence of a clear threat? According to supporters of the alliance adaptation model, the answer to NATO’s continued relevance lies in its success at adopting a flexible approach to cooperation. The root of their argument rests on the claim that changes in the strategic environment at the beginning of the 1990s led to a reevaluation of NATO’s purpose on the part of its member states. Though no single, clear threat has yet to jeopardize the security of member states to the degree that the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, allies are nevertheless increasingly confronted with “non-conventional, non-national, non-contiguous” risks (Burgess 2007). This has in essence provided a new \textit{raison d’être} for the Alliance, which is now vested with the task of managing these novel risks.

However, states assess the gravity of risks based on their own unique position rather than the needs of the Organization. While risks may in some cases pose a challenge to the Alliance as a whole, they may also be state-specific, thus assuming a higher or lower priority from country to country. NATO therefore stood at a crossroads at the end of the Cold War. It could continue to position itself as a security institution acting in unison against a (non-existent) threat (i.e., a challenge to the territorial integrity of the Alliance) and risk thereby its obsolescence. On the other hand, it could transform itself into a security institution aimed at governing risks and based on a highly flexible organizational and participatory scheme. As the argument goes, NATO chose this second option, assuming a more coalition-based posture and ensuring thereby its continued relevance in a risk-oriented environment.

The alliance adaptation model is based on three core assumptions. True to its structuralist assumptions, the model first contends that the external environment plays a formative role in the type of cooperation which emerges. In other words, changes in the distribution of power in
a regional or systemic context influence the decision of states to cooperate. A second shared assumption is that state motives likewise play a formative role in shaping the security policy of states, and this is even more critical with respect to interstate cooperation. The ability of states to cooperate requires not only the presence of a clear security threat but also certain agreement on the desired objectives of the alliance as a whole. As Schweller notes, the “compatibility of political goals” is the single most relevant determinant of patterns of alignment (1998, 22). Supporters of the alliance adaptation model give credence to this claim:

“Realist critics argue that some states promote change because they seek profit and, in consequence, that ‘revisionist powers are the prime movers of alliance behavior.’ This does not mean that the balancing thesis by definition is wrong because status quo powers may indeed balance and prevail: it does mean, however, that we should examine a greater range of alliance behavior” (Rynning 2005, 12).

In other words, this model is based on the premise that state motives for security cooperation can vary considerably. While it concedes to two core contentions of neorealism – namely that 1) structural constraints have a decisive impact on state behavior and 2) certain states indeed seek to maximize their security in an anarchic world by maintaining the status quo –, it nevertheless contends that actors interpret such constraints in different ways (e.g., due to unique domestic-political structures), therefore leading to more varied manifestations of state motives. Finally, the alliance adaptation model holds to the neoclassical realist assumption that the interaction of external environment and state motives leads to distinct policy outcomes which could not be captured without the inclusion of sub-systemic variables. Whereas structural realist models of security cooperation suggest that alignment strategies are guided solely by systemic dynamics (e.g., distribution of material power and the systemic ordering principle), this approach asserts that sub-systemic variables play a significant role in guiding patterns of cooperation among states.

As to the role of sub-systemic variables, the alliance adaptation model hypothesizes that developments in security cooperation are influenced by an intervening variable called assessment fit. Assessment fit is the degree of compatibility in individual member state evaluations of the threats, risks, or opportunities produced by a given shift in relative power. For the status quo alliance seeking to maintain the current international order, assessment fit concerns the estimation of threat and risks which could jeopardize this stability. Do members
agree on the potential sources of insecurity they seek to address or do various allies recognize different sources of instability? For the revisionist alliance, assessment fit instead concerns the level of agreement among cooperating states of the chances for affecting a change in the international order. The alliance adaptation model thus rests on the claim that when state assessments are aggregated at the interstate level, a degree of fit emerges which yields itself either to a more inclusive or flexible approach to cooperation. As such, the nature of this aggregation becomes the relevant factor in understanding patterns of cooperation, with the Alliance “adapting” its policy outputs accordingly. Two scenarios emerge. As Rynning notes, alliance partners may experience a split over assessment, and “if [this] split is modest, the alliance will be loosened,” thus leading to flexible cooperation (2005, 13). If, however, shared assessments underscore Allied interest for collaboration, inclusive cooperation is the result.

Two additional observations are worth mentioning here. First, in the study of NATO, the assessment fit variable as well as its mechanism (alliance adaptation) look at the impact of aggregated assessment on security cooperation. To be certain, the focus of this analysis is on interstate-level dynamics, and the collective drivers of cooperation are the subjects of investigation. One could certainly choose to focus on other drivers; for example, the role of individual state assessments on alliance cooperation specifically comes to mind. However, this would be more a case of foreign policy analysis rather than the study of interstate security dynamics. In other words, it is the sum of the strategic assessments expressed on the part of cooperating states that is relevant within this framework. A second observation is that states must not necessarily be in complete harmony with respect to their strategic assessments for cooperation to take place. Actors may indeed choose to actively take part in a security organization while not necessarily sharing a common perception of security challenges – and,
thus, the desired objectives of specific intervention – or seeking to act in unison. While such differences of perspective are not typically acrimonious in nature – otherwise, states would end cooperation and potentially become rivals instead –, cooperation under this scenario nevertheless assumes a more relaxed form to allow such variance in interests to be accommodated. As a result, flexible cooperation inherently lends to broader forms of cooperation than is feasible under an inclusive approach.

**Table 2.3. – Possible outcomes in security cooperation in alliances (alliance adaptation model)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>low fit</th>
<th>high fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shift in</td>
<td>flexible cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative net</td>
<td>inclusive cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power</td>
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</table>

Several observers have recognized the utility of the alliance adaptation model in the study of security cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance. For example, Williams asserts that a “conceptual shift” started at the end of the Cold War as the Alliance identified a need to focus on the “management of security challenges and risks as a key organizational task” (2008, 58). The 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review remarked on the emergence of a new strategic environment, noting that “stability based on the active management of these risks” required a adaptation in key NATO policies (1998, para. 40, 54), and the US 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review likewise maintained that security challenges were indeed becoming more abstract in nature: “The [challenges] we face are not nation states, but rather dispersed non-state networks, ...which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict” (2006, 1, 20). The Review ended by recommending that the US and its allies cooperate in managing these risks by adapting NATO policy accordingly. Finally, the most notable scholarly work exploring NATO

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65 Although the alliance adaptation model has often been applied specifically to the study of NATO, it is worth mentioning that the framework could very well be used to study other instances of interstate security cooperation as well.

66 See also NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept.
cooperation using this framework is Rynning’s 2005 analysis. Rynning looks at the evolving nature of security cooperation within NATO since the end of the Cold War and argues that cooperation within the Alliance has indeed varied with changes in the strategic environment based on the degree of aggregate compatibility (fit) of member state assessments. In exploring NATO’s evolution since the early 1990s, he presents a compelling argument for the application of the alliance adaptation model to research on NATO and maintains that the Organization has in fact adapted to environmental demands in such a way as to make continued cooperation – and thereby, its existence itself – viable.

2.3.2. Follow the elites: The alliance mobilization model

A second model of alignment behavior is based on a groundbreaking analysis by Randall Schweller, in which he observed that in many instances states have failed to identify an evident danger, have not sought to keep this danger in check, or have simply responded imprudently to the source of this hazard (2004, 159). Though balance of power theory anticipates that threatened states should attempt to counter perilous asymmetries of power through either internal (e.g., amassing arms) or external (e.g., forming alliances with other states) balancing, Schweller in fact observes many cases of “underbalancing” throughout history, which opposes the systemic logic of neorealist theory. For example, Britain was the only power to consistently counter Napoleonic France’s accumulation of power. In like manner, the great powers of the 1930s sat idly by during the rise of Nazi Germany, choosing relatively ineffective policies aimed at buck-passing, appeasing, or bandwagoning with the resurgent power (160). For this reason, Schweller takes issue with neorealist assumptions and seeks to advance a theory of state behavior to account for such anomalies in alignment strategy. This article and Schweller’s subsequent book (2006) laid the foundation for the alliance mobilization model of state alignment behavior.

The root of this approach rests on the claim that systemic explanations which suggest states pursue alignment strategies (e.g., balancing) in discernable, law-like ways remain highly underspecified. Specifically, various factors confound the logic of propositions such as the
balance of power theory, thereby altering the conditions under which its proper operation can be expected. The reason why such comprehensive, law-like theories get it wrong some of the time is due to the realist assumption that units are coherent actors: “The closer the policymaking process and actual state-society relations approximate a unitary actor, the more accurate realism’s predictions. Conversely, when states are divided..., they are less likely to behave in accordance with...[law-like] predictions” (Schweller 2006, 11). This argument is thus based on the assumption that states are not unitary actors, and to understand why states pursue certain foreign policy strategies and why variation arises among states faced with a similar external environment, one must focus on intervening variables at the domestic level.

According to the alliance mobilization model, states formulate and advance their foreign policy at the domestic-political level in response to developments in their external environment. The resulting outcomes of this domestic-political process and variation in state policies are affected by a mechanism known as state mobilization capacity. He then identifies four specific variables based on elite and societal elements which play a role in influencing this mobilization. The two most influential of these are regime type and the degree of elite consensus toward foreign policy objectives. 67 With respect to regime type, the argument is that weak or vulnerable regimes enjoy less domestic policy capital than those which are relatively strong. As such, one would expect authoritarian regimes to in fact have greater mobilization capacity than consensus-based regimes within which competition or dissensus reign. The second variable, elite consensus, measures the level of agreement with respect to the nature of the external environment and the desired strategy for achieving specific foreign policy objectives; the higher the degree of consensus among elites, the greater a state’s mobilization capacity.

While the alliance mobilization model shares a number of assumptions with the alliance adaptation model, 68 this second variable, elite consensus, underscores a core distinction between these two approaches. The alliance adaptation model argues that the seminal factor influencing policy outcomes is the degree of aggregate assessment fit. Do actors within an

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67 For a more thorough discussion of all four variables proposed, see Schweller (2006).
68 These are the importance of changes in the distribution of power, the key role of state motives in policy outcomes, and the general relevance of sub-systemic variables in the decision-making process.
alliance view a particular challenge in the same light or is there a misfit in the assessment of this challenge? Regardless of consensus among key actors, the first model contends that a high fit in the aggregate strategic assessment will lend itself to inclusive cooperation, while low fit results in flexible cooperation. In contrast, the alliance mobilization model places emphasis on the role of key actors in responding to a specific strategic challenge. Although recognizing the importance of strategic assessment, the alliance mobilization model maintains that the degree of elite consensus is the fundamental driver shaping policy outcomes, without which cooperation would not be possible based on assessment alone.

Changes in relative power are thus interpreted at the sub-systemic level through these intervening variables which combine in one of several ways, presenting thereby domestic obstacles (e.g., through fragmentation) or opportunities (e.g., due to consensus) for specific policy outcomes. In cases where mobilization capacity is relatively high – due either to a strong regime and/or solid elite consensus –, changes in foreign policy are adequately adaptive to developments within the external environment. In such instances, one would therefore expect to see balancing (i.e., among status quo states) or other alignment strategies (e.g., bandwagoning strategies among revisionist states) materialize which reflect the essence of the foreign policy objectives put forward by the state in question. Such policy outcomes would be in line with systemic predictions and are likely to position the state optimally for achieving its individual policy goals. This outcome is known as adaptive behavior, a response to explicit situational conditions (i.e., structural factors of the international system) deemed prudent or efficient in achieving the foreign policy objectives (i.e., state motives) of the actor in question. In other words, adaptive changes in foreign policy correspond to structural expectations based on changes in relative power distribution at the systemic level. When mobilization capacity is low (i.e., due either to a weak regime and/or elite dissensus), however, policy outcomes might fail to adequately promote the desired security objectives of the state in question. This results in suboptimal alignment tendencies (e.g., underbalancing, overexpansion) known as

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69 Strategic assessment plays an indirect role within the alliance mobilization model because of this model’s focus on the motives underlying alignment behavior. This will be discussed in greater detail below.
Maladaptive behavior is defined as a response to explicit situational conditions deemed imprudent or inefficient in achieving the foreign policy objectives of the actor in question. In other words, changes in foreign policy do not correspond to structural expectations based on changes in relative power distribution at the systemic level.

At this point, three observations deserve specific mention. First, state motive manifests itself primarily as either revisionist or status quo in nature. Specifically, the revisionist actor values that which it covets more than that which it already possesses (Schweller 1994). Though potentially holding security under the current international order, some revisionist states may strive for the spoils and fortune promised by expansion (i.e., profit motive), while other revisionists may insatiably covet the accumulation of absolute power (e.g., the offensive realist state). Thus, the motivation for revisionist state behavior is based on an inherent dissatisfaction with the systemic order, and their expected foreign policy outcomes aim at a revision of the system itself. For this reason, revisionist objectives may therefore lead to bandwagoning rather than balancing tendencies. In contrast, status quo actors are motivated by a desire to maximize their security and thus seek to maintain their relative power positions vis-à-vis that of potential adversaries: “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals...The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their security.”

Indeed, Schweller maintains that elite consensus represents the proximate cause affecting state mobilization capacity and is a necessary condition for effective state mobilization. At the same time, however, he also concedes that all variables act together to present “jointly sufficient conditions” for specific balancing tendencies.

Various motives have been put forward by scholars to account for state foreign policies. Morgenthau, for instance, speaks of states which seek to maintain the status quo, pursue imperialism, or demonstrate prestige (1993, 27). Aron advances three similar objectives, arguing that units can be driven by conservative status quo objectives, expansionist objectives, or motives of glory (2003, 81-102). Wolfers likewise recognizes three broad policies of state action: self-preservation, self-extension, and self-abnegation (1951, 50-53). Finally, Schweller notes four objectives and categorizes states accordingly as strong/weak status quo actors or strong/weak revisionist actors (1994, 100). See also Rynning (2005, 189n58).
positions within the system” (Waltz 1979, 126). Status quo states invariably value that which they possess (i.e., security) more than that which they covet (e.g., relative or absolute power gains). Because of this, the alliance mobilization model does not view balancing strategies as the optimal policy outcomes in all cases. Instead, while status quo actors are far more likely to pursue balancing strategies, revisionist states may seek to bandwagon in the pursuit of profit or material power gains. Schweller focuses specifically on the impact of state mobilization capacity on patterns of balancing – and underbalancing –, and his analysis is therefore directed primarily at the study of status quo actors. It would nevertheless be possible to analyze the impact of state mobilization on the foreign policy outcomes of revisionist states as well. As such, not only balancing strategies are relevant in a discussion of adaptive and maladaptive behavior; other alignment strategies such as bandwagoning are equally significant. One must therefore be aware of individual state motives (i.e., status quo or revisionist) when studying the policy outcomes of any particular actor.

A second observation deserving mention is that maladaptive behavior is not synonymous with pathological behavior. For the defensive realist, expansionism represents an anomaly attributed to first or second image factors which requires the formulation of auxiliary hypotheses or assumptions to explain its occurrence (Rose 1998, 150; Rynning and Guzzini 2001). For example, van Evera argues that the potential for a return to conflictual relations in post-Cold War Europe is highly unlikely, because “aggressor states will be rare in the new Europe, because both domestic and systemic factors will provide little stimulus to aggression, and powerful dissuasion.” As such, he maintains that war could occur in such a setting only “by accident or misunderstanding” (1990, 32). Similar arguments are also advanced by Kupchan (1994), Snyder (1991), and Posen (1984). In other words, defensive realism portrays a world dominated by security-oriented states who balance against threats. When other alignment strategies manifest themselves, such outcomes are usually deemed pathological, with the

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72 One exception here is the weak state which chooses to bandwagon with a threatening state to ensure its security. See, for instance, Baker-Fox (1957, 186-197), Rothstein (1968, 11), Walt (1990, 29), and Mearsheimer (2001).
causes for deviance originating at the domestic level (Rynning and Ringsmose 2008, 26). For neoclassical realists, however, alignment behavior is influenced not only by structural factors but also by state motives and sub-systemic variables (e.g., the domestic-political system). They argue that state behavior is much more nuanced, and diverse alignment strategies are possible depending on the constellation of variables in each case. The neoclassical realist therefore fails to consider specific outcomes as pathological; rather, outcomes can be “suboptimal” in achieving particular foreign policy goals. While perhaps imprudent, maladaptive behavior does not represent an unexplained anomaly. Instead, the origins and causes of such policy decisions are explained by way of intervening (i.e., sub-systemic), not auxiliary, variables.

Finally, the neoclassical realist notion of maladaptive behavior also differs from the concept of bounded rationality. Common in organizational theory, bounded rationality contends that an actor’s ability to make optimal decisions is greatly limited by the amount of information available as well as potential time and decision-making constraints. While rational choice theory typically reflects a world in which rationality is optimized (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002), bounded rationality implies that actors can seldom make perfectly rational decisions due to the finite resources at their disposal: “Boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information” (Simon 1957). Though often applied to the study of decisions by individuals, scholars have increasingly explored the relevance of bounded rationality on the study of states. Jones (1999) emphasises the value of studying bounded rationality in political-institutional contexts, and Kahler (1998) looks at bounded rationality specifically in relation to IR theory. In like manner, Keohane (1988) analyzes how this concept has influenced the debate between reflective and rationalistic theory in the study of international institutions. Bounded rationality thus has its place in studying foreign policy, yet it is not synonymous with maladaptive behavior. While bounded rationality looks at suboptimal outcomes resulting from

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73 Neorealists concede that other alignment strategies may occur for non-pathological reasons (e.g., for the weak state which bandwagons with a threatening state to mitigate the threat to its security). See, for instance, Mearsheimer (2001).

74 Rational choice theory presupposes that state actors, for example, are not only rational, but that they likewise have access to large enough quantities of information to make decisions which reflect their true preferences.

75 See also March (1978).
constraints posed by finite resources, maladaptive behavior, in contrast, involves suboptimal outcomes caused by the peculiarities of the domestic-political structure itself. For example, a status quo state may have ample information to determine that a rival poses a true threat, but if elite consensus is fragmented, the state may nevertheless lack the necessary mobilization capacity to act accordingly in balancing this threat.

The alliance mobilization model has seen its application within a number of empirical analyses of state behavior. As previously mentioned, Schweller (2006) applies this approach to the study of underbalancing. He specifically examines interwar British and French defense policies vis-à-vis Germany, French grand strategy between 1877 and 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance in South America from 1864 to 1870. In all cases, Schweller determines that the aforementioned variables account for both patterns of underbalancing (e.g., British interwar appeasement of Germany) and hypermobilization (e.g., in the case of Paraguay in the 1860s). In similar fashion, Friedberg (1988) examines British reaction to its relative decline at the beginning of the 20th Century, arguing that elite dissensus hindered Britain’s capacity to produce an “integrated national response” to this decline. Snyder (1991) demonstrates that unitary states are much more capable of objectively evaluating their external environment, thus reducing the likelihood of overexpansion. Fragmented or “parochial” states, on the other hand, often logroll interests in a way which is often incompatible with both the strategic environment and the foreign policy objectives of the state. Taliaferro (2006) explores the impact of differences in extractive and mobilization capabilities on variations in great power policies, and Ripsman (2004) examines how elites within legislatures provide an “access point” for narrow interests, confounding the ideal preferences of the state in the formulation of peace treaties. Van Evera (1994) elaborates on self-serving “cults of the offensive” made up of military and political leaders who can encourage specific foreign policies that often lead to suboptimal outcomes for the state. Finally, Christensen (1996) looks at Sino-American relations and suggests that political leaders may adopt more hostile foreign policy positions in isolated instances than otherwise desired (or than are even optimal) in order to secure public support for their fundamental grand strategy. This begs the question, however, as to whether the
alliance mobilization model can provide insight into interstate security cooperation as found within alliances such as NATO. This is explored in the section below.

Applying the alliance mobilization model to the study of NATO

Indeed, the elite consensus model yields itself to studying Alliance cooperation in two ways. First, this model seeks to specifically account for alignment behavior between states. Though Schweller (2006) focuses on internal balancing in his first three case studies, he turns to the dynamics of alignment in his fourth case, focusing on the War of the Triple Alliance from 1864 to 1870, in which Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay collaborated against a rising, dissatisfied Paraguay. In this case, Schweller elucidates how external alignment tendencies are also affected by domestic mobilization capacity. He astutely demonstrates that by 1865, domestic cohesion had coalesced to such a degree within each of the three allied states that it made mobilization capacity sufficiently strong to affect an optimal alignment strategy targeted against Paraguay. As shown here, alignment strategies and cooperation between states – whether in the form of balancing, bandwagoning or any variation thereof (e.g., underbalancing or hypermobilization) – thus make up a core consideration in the study of state mobilization. A second reason the elite consensus model would be useful in analyzing NATO cooperation is that political structures within the Organization may well influence Alliance policies in a way similar to the influence of domestic structures over a state’s foreign policy. Political leadership from the various member states meet in various NATO bodies – for example, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as well as two senior level committees, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), are often considered the troika of central decision-making authority within NATO – on a regular basis to formulate Alliance strategy. This demonstrates that the alliance policy-making process itself as well as specific institutions within the process have an impact on policy outcomes (Schweller 2006, 70), and the degree of NATO’s mobilization capacity is one plausible explanation for variations in such outcomes.

How then does mobilization capacity function at the level of the Alliance? Before exploring this further, two remarks deserve mention. First, for the purposes of this analysis, NATO is regarded as a status-quo oriented security organization. As with states, alliances can
likewise be motivated by revisionist or status quo ambitions as demonstrated by Rynning and Guzzini (2001). Yet NATO in its current form most closely resembles the status quo alliance. Levy notes that “whereas alliances were generally ad hoc in nature..., the nineteenth century was characterized by more permanent alliances formed in peacetime for the purposes of maintaining the status quo and enhancing deterrence” (1981, 605). Similarly, Dinerstein (1965) has examined the “status quo alliance system” of the post-World War II era. The second observation involves the measure of “mobilization capacity” when applying the alliance mobilization model to the study of alliances. In this case, the sub-systemic mechanism, alliance mobilization capacity, is a function of aggregate, not country-specific, mobilization. Indeed, alliances can exist within which states have varied motives and wish to cooperate to different degrees. Dinerstein (1965), for example, has observed that alliance systems can actually be hybrid in nature, including both status quo and revisionist states. Liska (1962) observes a similar tendency among moderate states that may seek to promote security by establishing an inclusive alliance in order to constrain a more revisionist state through membership. Despite this, alliance policy-making yields itself to discernable outcomes which speak to the collective capacity of the alliance in dealing with specific shifts in relative power. This model thus refers to aggregate alliance dynamics, casting light on both the sub-systemic variables (i.e., alliance regime type and alliance elite consensus) and the resulting outcomes (i.e., changes in security cooperation).

How can these intervening variables be measured and what outcomes could one expect in alliance policy from corresponding changes in the external environment? As previously mentioned, the alliance mobilization model contends that outcomes are chiefly affected by regime type and mobilization capacity. At the interstate level, alliances can be divided into

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| shift in relative net power | alliance state regime type, alliance elite consensus | change in security cooperation |
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authoritarian and consensus-based regimes. The authoritarian regime is found in alliances within which one actor dominates in determining a) the policy-setting agenda and/or b) the policy-making process itself. Policies emerging from authoritarian alliances can best be understood as an extension of the dominant actor’s own foreign policy, and such regimes are therefore quite efficient in realizing policies which prove adaptive to changes in the external environment due to the authoritarian state’s dominance over policy outcomes. In other words, elite consensus within an authoritarian alliance is taken as given. In contrast, policy-setting and -making in a consensus-based regime are shared endeavors among the cooperating states, requiring agreement on the part of all those involved. Thus, outcomes are dependent upon achieving elite consensus within the organization, measured by the ability of member states to reach agreement on desired policy outcomes. In a consensus-based alliance with high mobilization capacity (i.e., elite consensus), outcomes are expected to be adaptive, while an alliance with low mobilization capacity (i.e., elite dissensus) leads to maladaptive behavior.

*Table 2.2. – Possible outcomes in security cooperation in alliances (alliance mobilization model, consensus-based regime)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>shift in relative net power</th>
<th>low elite consensus</th>
<th>high elite consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>maladaptive cooperation</td>
<td>adaptive cooperation</td>
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To be certain, NATO has a long tradition of operating on a basis of consensus. Apart from specific treaty obligations which in fact oblige Alliance partners to reach decisions by collective agreement, a number of scholars and practitioners have recognized the immutable role of

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76 Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, for instance, states that “the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”
consensus within the Organization. Leo Michel observes that over the years, NATO has unwaveringly adhered to its consensus-based heritage and contends that this “rule” has endured despite multiple rounds of enlargement and numerous episodes of disagreement. He concludes by arguing that this consensus rule “reflects the NATO structure as an alliance of independent and sovereign countries, as opposed to a supranational body” (2003, 2). Similarly, de Wijk (1997) analyzes the decision-making processes of NATO’s military and political structures and determines that consensus has indeed been the cardinal driver of all major policy decisions within the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. Yet perhaps the most revealing recent example of the actual strength of this consensus-based tradition can be seen in the period immediately prior to the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. In February 2003, Turkey requested NATO assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (mutual defense clause), asking for Alliance surveillance aircraft and missile defense systems in the event of war with Iraq. Despite staunch US support, initial NATO negotiations ended in an impasse when only 16 of the 19 Allies agreed to the deployment of defensive assets. Louis Michel (2003) asserts that France, Germany, and Belgium specifically blocked continuous requests by Washington, maintaining that such a move “would signify that we have already entered into the logic of war, that...any chance, any initiative to still resolve the conflict in a peaceful way was gone.” As then Secretary General Lord Robertson noted, while “the majority of the NATO countries reiterated the urgency for NATO to take a decision,” no action was possible as the Alliance had not reached a stage “where we can achieve consensus.” Eventually, NATO members were able to unanimously agree on authorizing assistance to Ankara on 19 February, and *Operation Display Deterrence* was carried out from 20 February to 16 April. However, this case clearly underscores the relevance of all Alliance members in setting and making the Organization’s policy and illustrates all too well how hegemonic interests can at times be defeated within the Alliance if other actors do not follow suit. For this reason, NATO can best be defined as a consensus-based alliance in the context of this analysis.

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77 Article 4 states that the “Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

78 A second component focused on civil emergency planning was added to the Turkish defense plan on 3 March in the event of a chemical or biological attack against Turkish civilians. This component was overseen by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).
2.3.3. Follow the leader?: The hegemonic legitimacy model

A final approach emphasizes the central role of the hegemon and the corresponding, sub-systemic perceptions of its legitimacy as key intervening factors in accounting for security policy outcomes. Hegemonic legitimacy as a sub-systemic variable of interest emerged as a neoclassical realist endeavor to understand the implications of American power preponderance after the end of the Cold War. As Ikenberry notes, since the beginning of the 1990s, “the US has emerged as an unrivalled and unprecedented global superpower. At no other time in modern history has a single state loomed so large over the rest of the world” (2003, 533). In fact, US power had become so dominant, many observers made reference to the world’s “Colossus” (Ferguson 2004) and its global empire (Rosen 2003; Cox 2004). With the post-invasion troubles in Iraq, however, the limits of US power abruptly thrust itself onto the scholarly agenda (Ash 2005). As most agreed that such limitations had certainly not resulted from a loss in relative material capability (Jervis 2006), researchers began to look elsewhere in their effort to explain constraints on US power. True to the study of power politics, many explanations focused on systemic constraints including, inter alia, new counterbalancing (Layne 1993; Waltz 1997; Layne 2004), soft balancing (Paul 2005; Walt 2005), and economic interdependence (Keohane 1990; Nye 2002). On the other hand, certain scholars took issue with a solely systemic focus, advocating instead the need to explore sub-systemic constraints on US power. Some of these, including neoclassical realists, took up the concept of hegemonic legitimacy to explain American restraint in a unipolar world. It is this background to which the hegemonic legitimacy model of security cooperation traces its roots.

Before discussing the application of hegemonic legitimacy to the study of alliances, two points should be accentuated. First, there are a number of theoretically-informed approaches to evaluate the impact of perceptions of hegemony legitimacy on foreign policy outcomes. Constructivists, for example, often point to the role of legitimacy as a mechanism of hegemonic constraint. Legitimacy reduces the costs a hegemon incurs when translating capabilities into desired outcomes. As Finnemore notes, “Much of unipolar politics is thus likely to revolve
around the degree to which policies promoting the unipole’s goals are accepted or resisted by others. Other states and foreign publics may need to be persuaded, but often influential domestic constituencies must also be brought on board” (2009, 64). For this reason, hegemonic states can be expected to “act in accordance with the formal and informal rules of the current institutional order” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 171), and the expected outcomes would therefore reflect a policy of self-restraint. Another group of scholars focuses on how patterns of security cooperation are affected by rhetorical action. Schimmelfennig (2003) explores the process of NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era and observes that Eastern enlargement “was not a rational, efficient institutional arrangement” for the Alliance. While the US enjoyed no discernable benefits by inviting countries of the former Soviet bloc under the NATO umbrella, he contends that applicant states made use of rhetorical action – that is, “the strategic use of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences” (5) – to secure promises of accession. In other words, Eastern European candidates buttressed their claims to NATO membership on the argument that America’s reputation as a promoter of democracy and the rule of law would be undermined if it failed to support CEEC candidacy, therefore leading to staunch US advocacy for the subsequent Eastern enlargements. Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon (2009) observe that Congress felt compelled to support the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 policies in the War on Terror due to the “evocative and evasive rhetoric” emanating from the White House which legitimized executive action. Krebs and Lobasz (2007) reach a similar conclusion, demonstrating that the Administration was successful in garnishing legitimacy for its intervention in Iraq by portraying the US as a victim attacked for “who we are” (i.e., leader of the free world) rather than for “what we did.” Such rhetoric provided advocates on Capitol Hill with sufficient weight to guarantee a policy outcome in favor of intervention. Finally, institutionalists argue that a hegemonic state is likely to acquiesce in its foreign policy to underscore its reputation among partner states. When presented with the option of complying with institutional obligations, hegemons – like all states – would “pay a serious price for acting in bad faith and, more generally, for renouncing their commitments. This price comes...from the decline in national reputation as a reliable partner” (Lipson 1991, 79)

For further intriguing perspectives on the process of NATO enlargement, see also Asmus (2002), Gheciu (2005), and Goldgeier (1999).
Thus, self-serving hegemons will likely “comply with the rules of international regimes [even] when they view these rules as in conflict with...their ‘myopic self-interest’” (Keohane 1984, 99). As this demonstrates, a number of theoretical perspectives approach the role of hegemonic – or unipolar – legitimacy in explaining security cooperation, but these do so mostly by focusing on legitimacy as a restraining factor which impedes the hegemon from pursuing specific foreign policy goals.

The second point worth mentioning is that scholarly research on the impact of hegemonic legitimacy tends to focus on how the hegemon’s perception of this legitimacy influences its own policy outcomes. In other words, how does the US adjust its foreign policy based on perceived gains or losses in its legitimacy? This carries with it two implications. First, analyses of hegemonic legitimacy are essentially concerned with sub-systemic explanations (i.e., how domestic perceptions affect policy decisions). In contrast to systemic explanations such as soft balancing – which contends that imbalances of power linked to aggressive intentions lead to balancing efforts even on the part of allied states –, arguments which explore hegemonic legitimacy contend that a hegemon’s perception of its own authority intervene at the domestic level, influencing thereby the interpretation of changes in the external environment (independent variable) and resulting policy outcomes (dependent variable). Second, hegemonic legitimacy explanations are primarily used as a tool for foreign policy analysis and are thus concerned specifically with hegemonic (e.g., US) policy outcomes. As such, they have dealt very little with the assessment of hegemonic legitimacy on the part of third states. As will be demonstrated below, this is not the case when applying this concept to the study of interstate security cooperation.

**Underpinnings of the concept**

The neoclassical realist conceptualization of the “legitimate hegemon” is built on three assumptions. First, a state which enjoys hegemonic legitimacy or experiences a relative gain in this legitimacy reduces the costs associated with translating capabilities into desired outcomes. In contrast, a state which lacks legitimacy or suffers a loss thereof experiences a concomitant increase in the costs of translating its capabilities into action. As legitimacy presupposes a
widespread acceptance on the part of other states, the hegemon often has a much easier time pursuing individual security policy objectives through cooperation. This nevertheless comes with the significant caveat that to maintain this legitimacy, the hegemon must necessarily exercise discretion in its action. As Cronin notes, if the hegemon fails to act within established boundaries, its credibility may be weakened and its legitimacy undermined and threatened. If such erosion persists, it could indeed lead to a decline in the hegemon’s privileged position (2001, 113). Thus, a second proposition is that hegemonic legitimacy produces opportunities and constraints for cooperation with other states. While the notion of legitimacy has typically been used in studying foreign policy, this substantiates the claim that hegemonic legitimacy invariably has much to do with interstate security collaboration. Finally, the third assumption is that the hegemon whose legitimacy is under analysis represents a status quo power seeking to maintain its relative position within the international system. For the revisionist hegemon (e.g., Nazi Germany from roughly 1940 to 1943) craving power gains or plenty, legitimacy is less influential at wielding influence over its security objectives.

How then do we define hegemonic legitimacy? To be sure, there is considerable ambiguity inherent in defining that to which legitimacy in fact refers. Scholarly literature is riddled with variations on the notion of legitimacy in international relations, ranging from distinctions between “descriptive” and “prescriptive” legitimacy (Steffek 2003), “formal” and “substantive” legitimacy (Howse 2001; Applbaum 2003), and even the idea of normative legitimacy (Brown 1992). Even realists identify a seminal role of legitimacy in international politics, arguing that it fundamentally involves the recognition (and acceptance) of power asymmetries between states. In their analysis of American primacy, Brooks and Wohlforth put forward a persuasive definition of legitimacy, terming it “a set of beliefs about the propriety, acceptability, or naturalness of an action, an actor/role, or a political order” (2008, 173). This definition holds for the neoclassical realist as well; hegemonic legitimacy can thus be understood as beliefs about the propriety, acceptability, or naturalness of the hegemonic role of any given state. One caveat concerning NCR’s view of this legitimacy is that while other approaches tend to view legitimacy as a constraint on the behavior of the hegemon,

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80 See also Mulligan (2005).
neoclassical realism recognizes that it may very well be an instrument of hegemonic power. For instance, the United States as the nascent hegemon can make use of its abundant resources to underscore its individual security interests, and this naturally includes the exercise of military might. Such options may nevertheless fare comparatively expensive considering the potential gains to be had, especially being that its central objective as a status quo actor is to maintain its relative position. As such, a reliance on “non-tangible power” (e.g., diplomatic and economic instruments) may prove an effective and less costly option. This requires, however, that the hegemon have the necessary political clout to persuade other states to cooperate and support its aims. This is the quintessential role of legitimacy from a NCR perspective.

How does hegemonic legitimacy function as an intervening variable in the foreign policy-making process at the domestic level? As with other neoclassical realist models of foreign policy, the impact of an intervening variable such as hegemonic legitimacy is first and foremost related to shifts in the distribution of power. In other words, the result of legitimacy varies when faced with shifts in relative power. When encountering a discernable power shift, the hegemon with high legitimacy takes an activist role in countering its adversary. This could involve an expansionist foreign policy, according to which that state seeks to overwhelm and optimally eliminate the threat. When the hegemon perceives its position as weak, however, its response is much humbler. Rather than pursuing an overtly activist policy, it is instead motivated primarily with the desire to maximize security by maintaining the status quo (i.e., its hegemonic position). This most likely leads to a tit-for-tat strategy vis-à-vis an adversary and a simultaneous effort to increase its legitimacy (e.g., through diplomatic engagement) to potentially allow for a more aggressive course of action against its rival in the future. Thus, the

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81 Arguments based on hegemonic legitimacy similarly share the two additional assumptions inherent in both of the above-mentioned approaches, namely the importance of state motives in policy outcomes and the general relevance of sub-systemic variables in the decision-making process.
foundation for the hegemonic legitimacy argument, while indeed embedded in the logic of the distribution of power, is based on a sub-systemic variable (Finnemore 2009, 58). While ample research has looked at the role of hegemonic legitimacy in influencing foreign policy outcomes at the state level, neoclassical realists have yet to explore the efficacy of this framework in studying interstate cooperation. The section below seeks to flesh out such a framework.

**Applying the hegemonic legitimacy model to the study of NATO**

Aggregated to the alliance-level, the first two approaches outlined above (i.e., the adaptive behavior and alliance adaptation models) imply that regional cooperation can best be explained by examining the aggregate interests of cooperating states (i.e., the fit of strategic assessment for the alliance adaptation model and the strategy for cooperation in the case of the alliance mobilization model). In contrast, the hegemonic legitimacy model examines the impact of the hegemon as the primary motivating factor affecting interstate security cooperation and accordingly claims that the most definitive factor in explaining this cooperation is the desire of the hegemon to maintain or increase its legitimacy vis-à-vis its allies. Thus, the decision of an alliance to act is not so much dependent on a convergence of interests among participating states, but rather on the salience of such action in underscoring hegemonic power and the corresponding response of allied states to this influence.

The hegemonic legitimacy model lends itself particularly well to the analysis of NATO security cooperation. Wohlforth, for instance, proposes the notion of legitimate hegemony, according to which the US has strong incentives “to moderate the frequency with which it resorts to its unilateral option” despite the unmatched preponderance it currently enjoys (2004, 199). According to this line of thought, the long-term strategic interests of the hegemon are best served through an institutionalization of cooperation, which shores up support for America’s hegemonic position and promotes a stable international order. Layne concurs, suggesting that America has pursued a “containment of Europe” since the end of the Cold War, seeking thereby to shore up support for its continental hegemony; NATO, he argues, represents
one instrument in achieving this objective (2006, 105-17). In line with this, the following discussion seeks to answer two questions: 1) how does legitimacy function at the alliance level? and 2) how do shifts in relative power affect cooperation according to this model?

At the level of the alliance, hegemonic legitimacy functions somewhat differently than at the state level. In particular, the assessment of legitimacy is not only dependent upon the perceptions of the hegemon itself, but also upon those of its allies. This is for two reasons. First, policy outcomes within alliances are fundamentally dependent upon the recognition by those states involved of a clear need for interstate cooperation. While domestic actors have the final say over eventual policy outcomes at the national level, the greater number of players drawn into policy-making means that all states must perceive of the alliance – and thus, also its participating hegemon – as legitimate; otherwise, cooperation is jeopardized. In other words, the perceptions of all members of an alliance influence a hegemon’s ability to affect policy change. The second reason underscores the first in that policy decisions within an interstate forum are often taken on a unanimous basis among all participating states. NATO is a prime example, as decisions within the North Atlantic Council are reached solely by consensus, requiring agreement by all partners. As such, perceptions of hegemonic legitimacy on the part of both the hegemon and its allies play a crucial role in the policy-making process.

This model for interstate security cooperation shares a core proposition with the state-level analyses of hegemonic legitimacy in conceding that legitimacy can indeed produce constraints on the hegemon. In certain instances, allies can use the alliance to “check” hegemonic influence. For example, institutionalized interstate cooperation can be used as a forum to a) resist efforts by the superpower to “multilateralize” national strategic objectives (by way of veto), b) promote multilateral cooperation if the hegemon prefers unilateral
engagement on issues deemed relevant to the allies, and/or c) oversee the superpower’s domestic security policies. Where this model differs, however, is in the fact that it also recognizes hegemonic legitimacy and its expression through an alliance as a potential instrument which can be used by the hegemon to in fact accentuate its position. As Suchman notes, legitimacy is an operational resource extracted – often competitively – from one’s environment and employed in the pursuit of one’s goals (1995, 6). An alliance provides the hegemon – which arguably enjoys some degree of legitimacy simply due to the sheer import of its relative material power – an opportunity to participate in rule making, to mitigate legitimacy costs through side payments, and to negotiate exceptions to undesired stipulations. These factors arguably serve to reinforce its legitimacy, thereby reducing policy costs, facilitating cooperation (e.g., promotion of hegemonic policy interests), and providing oversight of alliance – and, thus, its allies’ – policies. In this manner, legitimacy often advances the hegemon’s domestic foreign policy objectives and can in certain cases therefore be seen as an extension of hegemonic power itself. Finally, the hegemonic legitimacy model by definition is only applicable to the study of asymmetrical alliances. In other words, one assumption of this model is that an alliance has a participating hegemon rather than being made up merely of similarly placed peers.

How do shifts in relative power affect security cooperation from the perspective of the hegemonic legitimacy model? As with the previous two models, policy outcomes differ based on changes in the external environment (independent variable) and a distinct intervening variable, in this case alliance hegemonic legitimacy. It is worth stressing that cooperation can be seen from two perspectives: one based on the objectives of the hegemon and the other on those of its allies. Hegemonic legitimacy affects these two groups in different ways, and this can be observed when exploring the policy-making process. Under high hegemonic legitimacy, a form of legitimated cooperation emerges according to which the alliance pursues policies marked by hegemonic prescription. In other words, the hegemon is the primary partner who sets the agenda, determining the specific security challenges to it and its partners and assessing the most effective policies to counter said threats. The allies, in turn, exhibit deference to the strategic objectives of the hegemon, supporting the hegemon’s desired policy without much
objection. Policy-making then most accurately resembles a case of the alliance “following the
hegemon.” However, this does not necessarily imply hegemonic activism per se; the hegemon
can, in fact, “outsource” an alliance response. This hegemonic policy is known as prescribed
delegation, according to which it seeks to pass the costs of addressing low-grade challenges on
to its partners when perceptions of a given security challenge as well as an assessment of the
efficacy of the outsourced response suggest a positive end result. To be sure, allied states are
usually eager to assume this responsibility, as delegation provides an institutional basis by
which to pursue parochial security objectives that might now be shared by the hegemon
through the use of alliance mechanisms. By doing so, partner states enjoy advantages not
possible from unilateral action alone (e.g., organizational economies of scale, division of labor),
with the added benefit of an apathetic hegemon which does not seek to prescribe policy.
Nevertheless, prescribed delegation still remains loosely coordinated under the watchful eye of
the hegemon and can therefore best be understood from the perspective of the partner state
as a case of “asking the hegemon.”

In contrast, low hegemonic legitimacy leads to a form of legitimizing cooperation,
according to which the hegemonic seeks to shore up support among allied partners. Seeing
illegitimate power as a potential threat in and of itself, Allies are apt to “check hegemonic
power” to keep domestic security objectives of the superpower at bay, undermining thereby
the ability of the hegemon to respond to specific security challenges. As such, the hegemon is
most likely to respond by pursuing a policy of hegemonic positionalism. This involves the
hegemon engaging its partners multilaterally in hopes of underscoring its legitimacy and
successfully extracting at a lowest common denominator sufficient alliance resources to
counter the security threat(s). Depending on the nature and degree of the challenge, the

82 It is worth noting here that hegemonic prescription is not synonymous with the authoritarian regime discussed
in the context of the alliance mobilization model above (pg. 90). Although seemingly similar at first glance, the
basis for cooperation under an alliance characterized by hegemonic prescription is the recognition of and
deference to the legitimated authority of the participating hegemon on the part of alliance partners. In contrast,
the basis for cooperation under an authoritarian alliance is the recognition of and acquiescence to the coercive
exercise of the authoritarian actor’s power.
83 This claim represents an interesting twist to the conventional wisdom in club theory, which in its application to
the study of alliances typically assumes a “free rider” tendency by partner states to consume security (i.e., the
public good of the alliance) while the hegemon takes on a proportionately high share of the costs in producing this
security.
hegemon could in fact show complaisance to the security preferences of allied states, even if these potentially stand in contradiction to its own. After all, it remains in the interest of the status quo hegemon to preserve its position of privilege over its partners. Positionalism does not imply, however, that the hegemon necessarily rules out independent engagement of a threat. As security remains its primary concern, the hegemon may very well respond unilaterally to given challenges. Yet two factors speak against such a course of action. First, unilateral responses by an illegitimate hegemon risk its further alienation. At the very least, this results in an added deterioration of hegemonic influence and would stand in contradiction to the strategic interests of a status quo power. Second, if the hegemon can offer enough concessions (e.g., side payments, symbolic diplomatic gestures) to extract needed military, economic, or political resources, this increases its ability to effectively respond to security challenges. It can therefore generally be said that unilateral action is more likely to occur under legitimating cooperation (i.e., in alliances with high hegemonic legitimacy) rather than legitimizing cooperation (i.e., in those with low hegemonic legitimacy).

Table 2.4. – Possible outcomes in security cooperation in alliances (hegemonic legitimacy model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shift in relative net power</th>
<th>Low legitimacy (legitimizing cooperation)</th>
<th>High legitimacy (legitated cooperation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic positionalism</td>
<td>(“check the hegemon”)</td>
<td>Hegemonic prescription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“follow the hegemon”)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(“follow the hegemon”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4. Methodological considerations

This analysis seeks to assess the scope conditions and validity of three competing neoclassical realist models of interstate security cooperation applied to the study of NATO. At this point, two observations deserve particular mention. First, as this analysis is interested in cause and
effect (i.e., how does power affect interstate security cooperation?), one central problem is determining that covariation in fact reflects a causal relationship. “Causal process observations” provide additional support to this end (Levy et al. 2004, 12), and testing NCR theories of Alliance cooperation thus lends itself particularly well to the process tracing method. According to Roberts, this method involves “the minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more certain” (1996, 66). As Levy notes, “Process tracing has a comparative advantage in the empirical analysis of decision making...including the analysis of leaders’ perceptions, judgments, preferences, internal decision-making environment, and choices” (2008, 11). To be certain, a number of scholars have insightfully made use of process tracing to explore the decision-making process and preferences of domestic and institutional actors (Bates et al. 1998, Brams 1994, Bueno de Mesquita 2000).

The second observation is that possible variations on the independent and intervening variables in this study give way to a number of policy outcomes. This makes a comprehensive analysis of cases covering all possible combinations impractical for a study of this scope. As Lijphart points outs, however, this degrees of freedom problem can be overcome by choosing a small number of cases based on select criteria (1975, 163). As the three theories presented above provide precise predictions, Eckstein (1975) advocates the crucial case studies method, according to which cases are selected based on the inferential leverage they provide in testing the theories under investigation. This method gives way to two types of cases based on least likely and most likely designs. According to the least likely design, inferential leverage is afforded if theoretical priors “suggest that a particular case is unlikely to be consistent with a theory’s predictions” but the data coming out of the case in fact support this theory. In a most likely design, by contrast, cases are selected according to which “one’s priors suggest that a case is likely to fit a theory...If the data confound our expectations, [these] results can be quite damaging to the theory” (Levy 2008, 12). In line with the theory testing approaches proposed

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84 For more detailed discussions on process tracing, see George and Bennett (2004) and Gerring (2004, 2007).
85 See also Levy (2008).
86 Levy refers to the least likely case design as the “Sinatra inference” – if I can make it there I can make it anywhere – and the most likely case design as the inverse Sinatra inference – if I cannot make it there, I cannot make it anywhere (2002, 442).
by Lijphart and Eckstein, this analysis will thus make use of a comparable-case research design which applies both process tracing and the crucial case studies method to study Alliance cooperation.

The following section addresses methodological considerations of this analysis and is divided into four parts. I first define the variables under study (independent, dependent, and intervening) and discuss the means by which they are to be measured as well as available data sources. In the second part, I generate a series of hypotheses to test the respective models of interstate security cooperation presented above. The third part discusses case selection, and the chapter then concludes by outlining the structure of the individual case studies to be explored in Part II.

2.4.1. Defining and measuring variables

The independent variable
Reflecting the study's focus on the impact of power on Alliance regional cooperation, the independent variable within this analysis is regional shifts in relative net power. A regional shift in relative net power can be defined as a development in the distribution of power which challenges NATO's authority as a status quo actor in any given region of influence; only a change presenting such a loss (i.e., one which challenges the Organization's authority) is deemed significant enough to represent a shift in relative power. Several possibilities present themselves for measuring net power loss. One obvious option is a quantitative measure of power shifts. With criteria established to differentiate these, a number of data sets exist which could feasibly serve as a starting point for such measurement. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) and the National Material Capabilities data set, both from the Correlates of War project at the University of Michigan, as well as the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database provide a few such sources. Yet none of these provide complete data for the universe of cases available in this analysis, limiting thereby the usefulness of a quantitative approach to measuring the degree of power shifts. For this reason, the researcher relies on a qualitative measure for net power loss based on two indicators: the change must a) be regionally
destabilizing, in the sense that it demonstrates the potential to lead to a prolonged political or security conflict between two or more states\textsuperscript{87} and b) directly limit the ability of the Alliance to either pursue its specified strategic interests or ensure the security of any one of its member states.\textsuperscript{88}

As this division represents a conceptual boundary, regional shifts can indeed occur which do not affect the net power of the Alliance; such “zero shifts” are irrelevant for the study at hand. However, a number of security challenges may simultaneously arise which make it difficult to assess the impact of any one challenge individually on the net power of the Alliance. Moreover, it is feasible for a power shift to be significant while its ownership remains dubitable, thus making it difficult to assess and formulate a policy response to the origin of this change; state-sponsored terrorism serves as one such example. This will be taken into consideration in the selection of appropriate cases for the empirical analysis which follows.

\textit{The dependent variable}

This study is interested in explaining changes in interstate security cooperation. To be sure, “change” is an inherently ambiguous term and could manifest itself in various ways, from direct involvement in combat operations to symbolic developments taking place merely at the political level. However, the scope of this variable is narrowed substantially by the puzzle presented in the introductory chapter, namely discrepancies in the nature and degree of out-of-area cooperation among Alliance partners across space and time. Based upon this delimitation, the dependent variable under study in this analysis is defined as change in Allied out-of-area engagement.

Four points deserve specific mention with respect to variation on the dependent variable. First, \textit{engagement} is defined here as the use of military, political, diplomatic, or economic instruments in response to a given shift in relative power. As this study is concerned with

\textsuperscript{87} As Chua (2007) notes, regional instability can precede, or on occasion even beget, the rise or fall of regional powers. Such a structural development within an area which also fulfills the second indicator listed above – one posing a direct challenge to NATO’s strategic interests or to a member state’s security – would therefore suggest a net power loss for the Alliance.

\textsuperscript{88} Limitations on the strategic interests of the Alliance refer to those which affect all NATO members, although this must not necessarily be the same interest across all participating states.
interstate security cooperation, however, one prerequisite for a policy outcome to be considered engagement is that any use of non-military instruments (i.e., political or economic instruments) must be accompanied by an explicit retention of a military option for future policy decisions with respect to a given power shift. Second, Allied engagement refers to a common action on the part of NATO member states; this refers ideally to engagements authorized by the North Atlantic Council. Yet considering the forms of cooperation proposed by the models above — flexible cooperation under the alliance adaptation model as well as prescriptive delegation under the hegemonic legitimacy model specifically propose variations on cooperation which do not necessarily foresee an Alliance acting in unison —, other forms could likewise be deemed Allied engagement. Military action involving multiple NATO states is one such form as long as one of the following two conditions is satisfied: a) the action must not have been authorized by another international institution (e.g., under UN or EU mandate) or b) it must be executed in conjunction with a NAC-authorized action. The third point is that out-of-area engagement refers to policy arising in response to an out-of-area power shift. As security challenges may endanger the safety of one or more NATO member states, power shifts beyond NATO’s borders may in fact provoke defensive engagement within the Treaty area itself. Thus, the dependent variable looks both at extra-Alliance involvement as well as territorial defense resulting from external regional power shifts. Finally, while the three models all rely on intervening variables at the sub-systemic level to account for changes in the dependent variable, they each convey three distinct “stories” of cooperation. For this reason, the nomenclature used to describe the resulting forms of cooperation varies. This does not, however, detract from testing the three models in their own right, as the policy outcomes which each predicts has been explicitly specified in the discussion above and are all subsumed under the umbrella of the dependent variable.

**Aggregate strategic assessment fit**

The intervening variable advanced in the first model, aggregate strategic assessment fit, is defined as the degree of compatibility in individual member state evaluations of the threats,

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89 In cases for which a military option is not explicitly retained, an Alliance response is referred to as involvement rather than engagement.
risks, or opportunities produced by a given shift in relative power. Two measures exist for this variable. The degree of ambiguity on a given power shift in the information available to Alliance members is the first of these. Substantial consistency in the intelligence available to all partners will serve to substantiate evaluations on the nature of a particular challenge, facilitating thereby the aggregation of these shared assessments to the Alliance level. In contrast, inconsistencies in intelligence from one state to the next increase ambiguity with respect to the particular challenge, impeding thereby the aggregation of strategic assessment. As to the logic of action behind this measure, actors sharing an understanding of risks, threats, and opportunities invariably pursue a more inclusive approach to cooperation. In contrast, greater differences of opinion lead to more ad hoc policy outcomes (Rynning 2005, 13). This measure can best be operationalized by analyzing the degree of consistency between the strategic assessments of individual Allies during the policy-making process; primary sources such as NATO and national press conferences as well as NAC communiqués serve this purpose well. One general point worth mentioning is that information must not necessarily be objective to be shared; in other words, aggregate strategic assessment does not speak to the accuracy of information upon which the assessment is based. In practice, however, a larger alliance invariably has access to greater amounts of data with which to assess security challenges; this likely leads to greater accuracy in aggregated assessments or, alternatively, to a high level of misfit.

The second measure of assessment fit is the degree of motive compatibility among alliance member states. Strategic assessments of a specific security environment are influenced by the underling motives of the actor making the assessment. The revisionist state, for example, is motivated primarily by its drive for either limited or unlimited aims. As such, it analyzes a given strategic environment by weighing the opportunities to be had from “gaining by aggression” against its propensity for risk acceptance. In contrast, the status quo actor is typically motivated by its goal of self-preservation. Strategic assessments of such a state

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90 See page 78.
91 As von Hlatky (2008) notes, strategic assessment can differ among alliance partners with power asymmetries, “because they are not prone to the same insecurities.” Yet this would not affect the reliability of this measure, as aggregation implies shared strategic assessment.
therefore look instead at the risks and threats within an environment and consider the responses necessary in order to maximize security (e.g., balancing, buckpassing). Degree of motive compatibility thus measures the agreement among alliance partners as to the objectives underscoring their individual strategic assessments. In other words, do Allies evaluate a given power shift through a status quo or revisionist perspective? At this point, it must be said that the motives which underline the strategic assessment of a particular environment are not necessarily analogous to the character of the state doing the assessment. Status quo states can indeed pursue revisionist objectives within isolated cases just as revisionist states can be motivated at times by the pursuit of security. This is especially true within a regional context, as regional policies generally have far fewer constraints than is the case at the systemic level. For example, although most scholars view the US as a status quo actor, its assessments of the strategic environment within the Persian Gulf at the end of 2002 were arguably motivated by revisionist objectives of initiating regime change within Iraq. For this reason, the degree of motive compatibility is an important measure of assessment fit even in a status quo alliance such as NATO. Accordingly, a high degree of motive compatibility across individual assessments would help facilitate aggregation of an Alliance assessment, while a low degree of motive compatibility would undermine this. This measure can best be operationalized by analyzing the rationale underlying the strategic assessments of individual Allies during the policy-making process; primary sources such as NATO and national press conferences as well as NAC communiqués likewise serve this purpose well.

*Elite consensus*

The second intervening variable tested in this analysis, elite consensus is the level of agreement among Alliance elite with respect to the goals for specific cases of Alliance intervention and the desired strategy for achieving these foreign policy objectives. As the argument goes, the

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92 See page 82.
93 Naturally, the question arises as to who actually represents NATO’s elites. For instance, as the most senior political governing body within the Organization, the North Atlantic Council would be one obvious place to look when defining elites. Yet NAC can be held at both the level of the Permanent Representatives (PermReps) or of member state officials such as the Ministers of State, Ministers of Defense, or Heads of Government. The question then is whom one considers “NAC” to be. The operationalization of this variable based on the three measures
higher the degree of consensus among elites, the greater a state’s mobilization capacity and the 
more adaptive the corresponding response to a power shift. Elite consensus is based on three 
measures, the first being the degree of motive compatibility as outlined in the first model. 
While member states must not necessarily concur on their respective assessments of a power 
shift (the first measure of aggregate assessment fit), they must be in agreement on the motives 
underlying their assessments. As Schweller notes, “The most important determinant of 
alignment decisions is the compatibility of political goals [i.e., motives]...” (Schweller 1998, 22). 
As Lamborn argues, however, elite consensus is fundamentally a function of a “mix of 
international and domestic incentives attached to different options, actors’ risk-taking 
preferences, their time horizons, and how they discount costs and benefits” (1997, 212). 
As such, while compatibility of motives represents a necessary condition for elite consensus – and, 
thus, also adaptive behavior –, it is not sufficient in and of itself. Elite consensus therefore lends 
itself to two additional measures: the degree of policy remedy (PR) compatibility and the 
degree of domestic political risks (DPR) compatibility. PR compatibility refers to agreement 
among Alliance members as to the specific strategy necessary to address, or remedy, a given 
power shift. High compatibility between Allies’ desired strategies leads to greater consensus 
among key actors, while low compatibility brings fragmentation. In contrast, DPR compatibility 
refers to agreement among Alliance members as to the “domestic risks and costs associated 
with the range of policy [remedies] to balance a threat” (Schweller 2006, 48). Accordingly, high 
compatibility between members’ assessments of the domestic political risks promotes 
consensus, while low compatibility hinders consensus. The logic of action behind both of these 
measures is that elites are key players in the policy-making process who have considerable 

discussed here overcomes this challenge, however, by focusing on the positions expressed by national 
representatives during the policy-making process (i.e., motives, policy remedies, domestic political risks) rather 
than on the specific individuals expressing these positions. 
94 See also Schweller (2006, 48). 
95 In his 2006 analysis, Schweller contends that policy elites must also agree that an external threat exists and on 
the nature and extent of the threat” (2006, 48). This, however, is related to his specific analysis and not an 
underlying assumption of the alliance mobilization model itself. To be certain, aggregate strategic assessment fit is 
not necessary for states to pursue adaptive behavior. Elite consensus within an alliance can in fact exist based on 
parochial strategic assessments if partner states choose to pursue flexible cooperation. On the other hand, the 
alliance mobilization model contends that flexible cooperation will invariably prove maladaptive if Alliance 
partners do not share common motives. For this reason, shared motives – not shared assessments – are essential 
in fostering elite consensus.
influence over policy outcomes. If there is a high degree of PR and DPR compatibility among these actors, they will be able to enact policies which are adaptive to the given security challenge. If, on the other hand, this compatibility is lacking, efficacious policy will fail to materialize, leading to maladaptive policy outcomes. Two points deserve mention at this point. First, as DPR compatibility requires that elites first agree on the range of policy remedies in order to then assess the associated domestic politics risks involved with such remedies, PR compatibility is necessary for DPR compatibility to be present. In and of itself, however, PR compatibility is not a sufficient indicator of elite consensus; all three measures must be present for elite consensus to emerge. The second point is that degrees of PR and DPR compatibility are conceptual boundaries. In assessing these, is it therefore crucial whether they can be seen as predominantly high or low for a given power shift. PR compatibility can best be operationalized by exploring consistencies in the policy remedies proposed by individual member states during the policy-making process. DPR compatibility can best be operationalized by examining the domestic implications discussed as regards potential NATO remedies in discussions both at the Alliance and national levels. These data are also available from NATO and national primary sources.

_Hegemonic legitimacy_

Hegemonic legitimacy is an abstract concept and undoubtedly presents complexity with respect to its measuring. One alternative proposed by Hearit, however, is to focus not on measuring legitimacy directly, but instead to infer legitimacy by exploring an actor’s ability to “extract resources necessary... (e.g., scarce materials, patronage, political approval)” (1995, 2). Hybels concurs, purporting that to measure legitimacy, one must examine the relevant stakeholders (i.e., the hegemon and its allies) and how “each influences the flow of resources crucial to the organization’s establishment, growth and survival...” (1995, 244). Based on this, one means by which to measure hegemonic legitimacy within NATO is to explore the ability of respective stakeholders to influence the flow of resources through the Alliance. With respect to the hegemon, this involves the extraction of resources. For example, to what degree is the US able to encourage Alliance partners to contribute material resources (e.g., military support) or political resources (e.g., diplomatic support) to further its strategic objectives expressed at the
interstate (i.e., NATO) level? Assessing hegemonic legitimacy from the perspective of allied states, in turn, would involve exploring secondary states’ support or resistance to the extraction of resources by the hegemon through the alliance. For instance, what efforts were undertaken by the allies to promote or counter the allocation of material or political resources in furthering the strategic objectives of the US expressed at the interstate level. As such, the mechanism through which hegemonic legitimacy (i.e., the intervening variable) functions is known as resource extraction.  

Resource extraction can be defined as the influence by a participating hegemon over the extraction of alliance resources (i.e., military, economic and political instruments) to deal with a given security challenge. Two measures highlight the nature of resource extraction in a given case: hegemonic expectations for extraction and partner acceptance of extraction. Hegemonic expectations for extraction refer to the demands made by the hegemon over alliance resources. According to this measure, a hegemon enjoying a high degree of legitimacy will express greater demands on the extraction of alliance resources. The logic of action here is based on the rational actor assumption that states seek to counter a given power shift expending the least amount of resources possible. Under legitimated cooperation, a hegemon would therefore attempt to prescribe action with a heavy preference for using alliance resources, resulting in high expectations for resource extraction. In contrast, the illegitimate hegemon would be more reserved in its demands, seeking instead to position itself to appease its partners while potentially assuming a heavier share of the costs needed to counter a security challenge. The second measure, partner acceptance of extraction, refers to the willingness of allied states to honour recognized hegemonic solicitations for alliance resources in dealing with a given security challenge. Under legitimated cooperation, partner states “follow” the policy leads set by the hegemon, while “checking” the policy preferences of the hegemon under legitimizing cooperation. As such, partners recognizing a hegemon’s legitimacy are more willing to allow for the allocation of alliance resources in line with hegemonic expectations than are partners which view hegemonic claims as illegitimate. Hence, resource extraction gauges the nature of cooperation between the hegemon and its allies (e.g., cooperation as accommodating

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96 Resource extraction has been a much researched topic among neoclassical realist scholars. Jeffrey Taliaferro has been particularly prolific in this respect; see, for instance, Taliaferro (2006, 2009a, 2009b).
or contentious) and views the policy-making process as a strategic instrument of the respective member states. These measures can best be operationalized by examining requests made by the hegemon during the policy-making process (extraction expectations) and the substantive contributions made by partner states through Alliance policy outcomes (partner acceptance of solicitations).

2.4.2. Hypotheses

H\textsubscript{1a}: A power shift leads to inclusive cooperation, if there is high assessment fit within the alliance.

H\textsubscript{1b}: A power shift leads to flexible cooperation, if there is low assessment fit within the alliance.

H\textsubscript{2a}: Given a consensus-based regime, a power shift leads to adaptive cooperation, if there is high elite consensus within the alliance.

H\textsubscript{2b}: Given a consensus-based regime, a power shift leads to maladaptive cooperation, if there is low elite consensus within the alliance.

H\textsubscript{3a}: A power shift leads to hegemonic prescription, if there is high hegemonic legitimacy within the alliance.

H\textsubscript{3b}: A power shift leads to hegemonic positionalism, if there is low hegemonic legitimacy within the alliance.

H\textsubscript{0a}: The degree of aggregate strategic assessment fit has no discernable impact on changes in Allied out-of-area engagement.

H\textsubscript{0b}: Given a consensus-based regime, the degree of elite consensus has no discernable impact on changes in Allied out-of-area engagement.

H\textsubscript{0c}: The degree of hegemonic legitimacy has no discernable impact on changes in Allied out-of-area engagement.
### Table 2.5. – Overview of neoclassical realist models for explaining alliance cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervening variable</th>
<th>Alliance adaptation model</th>
<th>Alliance mobilization model</th>
<th>Hegemonic legitimacy model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervening variable</strong></td>
<td>aggregate strategic assessment fit</td>
<td>elite consensus&lt;sup&gt;97&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>hegemonic legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>alliance adaptation</td>
<td>alliance mobilization capacity</td>
<td>resource extraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measures</strong></td>
<td>ambiguity of change in Alliance regional net power, degree of motive compatibility</td>
<td>degree of motive compatibility, degree of PR compatibility, degree of DPR compatibility</td>
<td>hegemonic extraction expectations, partner acceptance of extraction,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance</strong></td>
<td>low assessment fit, high assessment fit</td>
<td>low elite consensus, high elite consensus</td>
<td>low hegemonic legitimacy, high hegemonic legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy outcomes</strong></td>
<td>inclusive cooperation, flexible cooperation</td>
<td>adaptive cooperation, maladaptive cooperation</td>
<td>hegemonic prescription, hegemonic positionalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>97</sup> While Schweller elucidates four intervening variables which affect the alignment behavior of states (see page 82), the alliance mobilization model focuses solely on the intervening impact of elite consensus on interstate security cooperation in this analysis for two reasons. First, the Alliance has functioned as a consensus-based regime since its foundation, and choosing NATO as the unit of analysis therefore controls for a second intervening variable discussed above, alliance regime type. Moreover, Schweller notes that “elite consensus is the most necessary of necessary causes of balancing behavior” (2006, 48). For purposes of brevity, elite consensus can thus be seen as a lowest common denominator for assessing this model’s rigor in explaining Alliance policy outcomes.
2.4.3. Case selection

Cases were selected for inclusion in the empirical analysis on four criteria. The first two criteria are derived from methodological considerations, namely selecting cases based on both the independent and intervening variables. The models to be tested in this analysis contend that outcomes in interstate security cooperation are a function not only of regional power shifts but also three distinct intervening variables arising in the Alliance policy-making process. In order to assess the individual rigor of these models, the first two criteria are that the cases must exhibit variation on both the independent (regional shifts in relative power) and intervening variables (aggregate fit, elite consensus, and hegemonic legitimacy). The third criterion relates to the crucial case design applied in this analysis, namely that the cases chosen for inclusion must include at least one most-likely and one least-likely case. The final criterion relates to the empirical puzzle presented in the introduction, namely discrepancies in alliance cooperation across space and time. To address this puzzle, the cases must also present variation across regions and with respect to when the accompanying power shifts occurred.

The universe of cases within this analysis is represented by instances of armed, interstate conflict or substantial threats of armed, interstate conflict since the end of the Cold War. One point which warrants further consideration here deals with the objective outlined in the forth criterion above, namely explaining discrepancies in alliance cooperation across space and time. As such, cases originating in various regions must be selected to approach this objective. This sets as a prerequisite, however, that the cases chosen can in fact speak to the question of alliance cooperation. As such, the universe of cases must be geographically limited to those areas which could conceivably see Alliance out-of-area engagement (dependent variable). Three regions are therefore of relevance: Africa, the Middle East and non-NATO Europe. To be sure, two of the three regions offer more useful starting points for a promising selection of cases: the Balkans and the BMENA. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, both regions exhibit similar constellations of member state interests, which would help control for differences in interests

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An increasing number of scholars have begun to explore the importance of non-state actors on international relations (Grygiel 2009; Lemke 2008). Despite this, I have chosen to focus solely on the role of state actors in defining cases for inclusion in this study.
when testing the impact of power shifts on Alliance policy outcomes. Moreover, these areas are arguably two of the most strategically relevant regions for the Organization at present. Not only do they share common borders with Alliance territory, several observers in fact contend that NATO’s ability to respond to security challenges within these regions could “make or break the Alliance” (Hockenos 2009).\textsuperscript{99} A further decisive point which speaks to their value is that they are analytically useful. Both regions have seen a number of cases for whose selection based on the first criterion – variation on shifts in relative power – are unambiguous. Moreover, the cases within each region are easily comparable. In contrast, the nature of conflicts (e.g., intertribal warfare) as well as “the interaction of power and space” is uniquely different in Africa, making generalizations across regions using African cases difficult at best (Herbst 2000). Thus, the universe of cases will be geographically limited to instances of armed interstate conflict or threats of armed interstate conflict between two or more actors in the Greater Middle East and non-NATO Europe since the end of the Cold War.

With the universe of cases narrowed, I applied the four methodological criteria listed above. The first criterion – variation on shifts in relative power – is easily assessed based on the qualitative measures for the independent variable discussed above.\textsuperscript{100} The second criterion – variation on aggregate fit, elite consensus, and hegemonic legitimacy – poses a considerable challenge, however, as the intervening variables are too complex and not quantifiable, making for difficulty in coding the universe of cases in a clearly arranged manner. To resolve this while still avoiding selection bias, I introduce a proxy for the intervening variables called degree of case salience, which is the prominence of a given case within the Alliance policy-making process. The logic behind this proxy is that a case’s salience on NATO’s agenda reflects the level of discussion and debate over the given conflict and that this discussion presents opportunities for potential disagreement among Alliance partners; a case not mentioned is rarely contentious or is simply avoided to evade anticipated dispute. For this reason, case salience serves as a useful proxy for the intervening variables, all of which highlight an element of contestation among Alliance partners. To measure case salience, I make use of NATO’s electronic archive, an

\textsuperscript{99} See also comments by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in an interview from 3 August 2009 (Lekic 2009).

\textsuperscript{100} See pages 103-4.
on-line searchable index of NATO documents which includes press releases, official texts, audio and video interviews, event descriptions, internal news reports, and opinions. For each case, I performed a search of the above-listed documents for results which directly deal with the conflicts in question. This produced a quantitative value which I use as a rough approximation of the cases’ salience within the Organization. To determine the degree of salience, I then calculated the median of the values; any result below the median was considered to have low salience, and results above the median were deemed to have high salience. This produced the values found in Appendix A, which I then considered in selecting the cases for inclusion in this analysis.

Based upon these findings and the criteria outlined above, three cases were chosen for inclusion in the empirical analysis. The first case is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which involves a substantial and discernable regional net power loss for NATO, yet no potential intra-Alliance conflict. As our theoretical priors (i.e., structural arguments based on power) would predict NATO engagement to counter such a challenge, this conflict represents a most likely case. The second conflict addresses the Bosnian crisis from 1992 to 1995. To be certain, this case was accompanied by a concomitant, systemic net power gain for the Alliance brought about by the end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia’s efforts at maintaining its regional position in no way posed a net power loss for NATO, but it did demonstrate the potential regional challenge Belgrade created for Alliance aspirations at increasing both its credibility and authority within the Balkans. Bosnia thus serves as an example of a net power gain with no potential intra-Alliance conflict. This represents a least likely case for NATO engagement, as our theoretical priors predict that a status quo alliance would seek to simply maintain, not increase, its regional influence in such a case. The final conflict looks at Iran’s uranium enrichment program since 2002. The Iran conflict is unique in the sense that it shows a gradual and prolonged net power loss for the Organization. Though not a most likely case – due to the gradual nature of the power loss –, the Iran case enjoyed a high degree of salience within NATO. This reveals the potential for intra-Alliance conflict based on the proxy variable and was included to fulfill the

101 The results included data through 1 March 2009.
102 The median was used in place of the mean due to the extreme range of the results in question (Slovenia with 1, Afghanistan with 1,226).
second criterion for case selection, namely variation on the intervening variables. Table 2.6 offers an overview of the group of cases chosen for the empirical analysis which follows.

**Table 2.6. – Overview of Selected Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Δ Alliance regional net power</th>
<th>Type of case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, 1990-1991</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>most likely, low salience conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia, 1992-1995</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>least likely, low salience conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, 2002-</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>high salience conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2.4.5. Structure of the empirical analysis**

The empirical analysis (Part II) which follows is divided into three chapters. The first two chapters explore Alliance policy in response to two conflicts which occurred during the 1990s. Chapter 3 examines NATO’s reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (case 1), while chapter 4 sheds light on the Organization’s reaction to the Bosnian crisis from 1992 to 1995 (case 2). Chapter 5 concludes the empirical analysis by directing attention to Iran’s uranium enrichment program starting in 2002 (cases 3). To allow for comparison across cases, I have applied a standardized approach to the empirical analysis, which seeks to flesh out the measures for the independent, intervening, and dependent variables in each case. For each conflict, the objective will be to assess the efficacy of the three NCR theories of interstate security cooperation presented above. To this end, each chapter will conclude by summarizing the theoretical implications of the individual case findings.
Part II

Analyzing Alliance
Out-of-Area Cooperation
Chapter 3
The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 1990-1991

In the words of one observer, the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 represented “the most shocking event in the Arab world in the last 20 years” (Sadowski 1990). Though the reasons put forward by Iraq to substantiate its invasion were widely disputed, the implications of its action were unmistakable; Baghdad’s bellicosity soundly disrupted the balance of power within the region, exacerbating thereby the volatility of an already fragile region. The economic and political consequences of Iraqi action were unambiguous. Still experiencing severe economic problems from the Iraq-Iran War ending only a few years prior, Iraq had overnight nearly doubled its crude reserves, providing it with considerable leverage over global oil prices and exports. More disconcerting, however, Hussein also commanded the largest army in the Gulf, and his incursion into Kuwait prompted trepidation within the region that his bid for power would end only with regional dominance (O’Neill 1990). For economic reasons, many feared that neighboring Saudi Arabia rested squarely on Baghdad’s radar screen; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s decision to dispatch additional troops to the Saudi Kingdom shortly after Kuwait’s fall underscored this fact (Kifner 1990). For political reasons, Iraq’s archrivals Syria and Israel seemed particularly imperiled. Even given an unforeseeable resolution to the immediate crisis, long-term consequences loomed large: “For years, US and Western analysts have warned that the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies and the tiny Gulf sheikdoms around the Saudi peninsula are fragile anachronisms ripe for overthrow” (Mann 1990). Hussein’s test of the Gulf’s fragile balance severely aggravated already delicate domestic political tensions. These factors substantiated the claims of many analysts that Iraq’s invasion had perilously destabilized the region and unleashed the likely potential for long-term political, economic and security conflicts in the years to come.

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103 Iraq justified its invasion of Kuwait around five central arguments. These included Iraqi debts owed to Kuwait, oil politics, Kuwait’s favorable economic position, border disputes and Arab nationalism, and diplomatic confrontation. For an insightful overview, see, Karsh and Rautsi (1991). Despite the widespread condemnation of Iraq’s invasion on the part of neighboring Gulf states, it is worth noting that the Palestinian authority was one of the few political groups which largely supported Iraq during the conflict. For an analysis of the Palestinian response, refer to Frank (1994).
Both direct and indirect challenges confirmed the inherent danger Iraq posed for the Alliance. Baghdad’s military posture signified a direct and indisputable challenge especially for Turkey. Not only did the Iraqis have formidable offensive air and missile capabilities, but there was additional cause to believe that they intended to acquire longer-range arms. Hussein had also demonstrated his resolve in using chemical and biological weapons as well as his expressed interest in acquiring nuclear materials (Howe 1991, 248). Finally, there was considerable fear within Turkey that Hussein would provoke radical, separatist Kurdish sentiments, fueling thereby increased instability along their shared border. These reasons led to “substantial” concern over the security of NATO’s southern ally (Kuniholm 1991, 43-6).

Alliance concerns were not limited to the security of Turkey, however. In the words of then-US Secretary of State James Baker, “Iraq’s aggression in the tinderbox of the Middle East certainly poses a danger...that could be as important as any direct threat to NATO territory.” This indirect danger involved broader Alliance strategic interests within the region, the most significant being NATO concerns that Iraq could make use of the petro-weapon:

“[T]he manipulation for political purposes of the price of petroleum from the Persian Gulf and access to it...presents a serious threat to international security...If Iraq had achieved hegemony in the Gulf it still could have used control of the price of oil as a source of immense financial power and to accelerate acquisition of advanced weapons. Iraq would then pose an even greater threat..., with imponderable consequences for Europe’s security” (Howe 1991, 248).

The concern among NATO officials was clear; the oil resources under Iraqi command provided the Arab state with a powerful instrument by which to “underwrite political blackmail,” a possibility with grave and far-reaching global economic implications. These factors served to underscore numerous assessments that Iraq’s attack on Kuwait indeed represented a dramatic shift in relative power within the Greater Middle East. In the following section, I examine the framing of NATO objectives in response to the Iraq conflict to cast light on the strategic assessments and motives of the Allies, allowing thereby for an evaluation of the alliance adaptation model of cooperation outlined in chapter 2.

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104 This assessed is echoed in the fact that Turkish defense spending increased by $1.4 billion in 1991, in part as a direct response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Stein 1992, 172).
3.1. Framing policy objectives

To be certain, the invasion of Kuwait caught NATO off guard. Iraqi provocation in the immediate wake of the Alliance’s Cold War “victory” threw into doubt wide-held expectations that the end of the East-West dispute signaled “a new world order far more stable and secure than any we all have known” (Bush 1990c). Less than one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, war was once again squarely on the agenda of Western policymakers. As US Secretary Baker pointed out, “Hopes have been jeopardized that as the Cold War winds down, a new era of freedom and peace will begin for all nations...Far sooner than anyone could have predicted...the members of NATO must adapt to a different situation outside of Europe, this one full of peril.” Initially NATO reaction was shrouded in uncertainty. Though Allies early on expressed no hesitation as to whether the Organization (and its members) should respond to the conflict, they were quite undecided as to what the exact nature of an intervention could be. Debate over NATO’s out-of-area role was unresolved. Indeed, little impetus had existed prior to the end of the Cold War for earnest deliberation on this question, and the precipitous timing of the Gulf conflict allowed little time for consensus on a new out-of-area protocol to materialize. Alliance partners were therefore faced not only with addressing the immediate crisis, but they also were compelled to face two more fundamental questions which had long been tabled: Was the Alliance legally capable of intervening in regions outside the Treaty area, and if so, how could such intervention best logistically transpire? The Gulf crisis therefore presented an arduous challenge for the Allies in the sense that they needed to not only formulate a common strategy for the predicament at hand, but to do so while also addressing questions as to NATO’s future role in the post-Cold War era.

The Alliance recognizes the Iraqi threat

Despite the untimely nature of Kuwait’s invasion, NATO was quick in its response. On the day of the Iraqi incursion, the Political Committee (PC) held a 90-minute special session to evaluate the crisis unfolding in the Gulf. At the end of this meeting, it released a general statement noting Baghdad’s “clear violation of the charter of the United Nations” (NATO Political Committee 1990). The Committee further decided to convene on a daily basis to share
information and assess initial developments with respect to the crisis. As the advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on political questions, the PC also suggested NAC quickly assemble to exchange the positions of the individual member states and to formulate a common approach to the crisis.

In the week following the invasion, the Council met three times to consult on the emerging challenge. In its meeting on 3 August, Alliance partners expressed unanimous agreement that Baghdad had violated international law, posing a threat to regional stability and warranting the mandatory sanctions implemented by UN Security Council Resolution 660 on the day prior (Drozdiak 1990a). The position of the Council was echoed by a number of Allies following the NAC meeting. Secretary Baker declared that a “new danger has arisen, coming from a distant place but with the capacity to strike all of us” and urged NATO foreign ministers to take necessary steps to address this threat (Hoffman and Drozdiak 1990). British Foreign Office Minister William Waldegrave declared Hussein’s aggression “a very serious act which we unreservedly condemn, a breach of the United Nations charter,” and Turkish Minister Sukru Yurur referred to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as “a threat to the maintenance of friendship in the region” (BBC 1990).

Following a two-day pause, NAC reconvened on 6 August to continue consultations and evaluation of the crisis. After the meeting, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni di Michelis noted consensus among the Allies in rejecting Baghdad’s annexation of Kuwait and recognizing the need for immediate efforts to confront the evident threat posed by Iraqi aggression. In like manner, US Ambassador to NATO William Taft observed that the “Allies were consulting and harmonizing national positions on the Iraqi threat to the alliance’s security interests,” expressing also American satisfaction with the Organization’s efforts (Marshall 1990). In the words of one commentator, initial NATO meetings were pivotal in that they underscored a shared recognition among Alliance partners that “[Europe’s] interests are just as threatened those of the United States” (The Independent 1990). President Bush echoed the unequivocal unity of Allied assessments of the Iraqi threat following this second NAC session: “And I think the alliance, the NATO alliance, is thinking exactly the same way on this...there seems to be a united front out there that says Iraq...committed brutal, naked aggression” (Bush 1990b). The
consequence of such messages was clear. NATO had convened swiftly following Kuwait’s annexation to share information and assess the perceived challenges posed by the emerging crisis, and this resulted in the formulation of an aggregated security assessment shared by all Alliance members: “Iraq’s invasion and brutal occupation of Kuwait represent a flagrant violation of international law and...pose a fundamental challenge to international order... Iraq’s behavior threatens peace. It jeopardizes the unprecedented opportunity for...global peace and stability” (NATO 1990).

**Alliance objectives become clear**

Having convened twice to assess the ongoing developments within the Gulf, the North Atlantic Council met once again on 10 August to agree on the objectives which would frame an eventual NATO response. Four goals were specifically iterated: endorsing a swift resolution to the conflict while ensuring stability throughout the rest of the crisis, underscoring Alliance unity, and involving the Organization actively in bringing about this peace.

NATO officials were lucid in accentuating their final objective of achieving a peaceful settlement to the crisis coupled with the prerequisite liberation of Kuwait. As White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater commented following NAC’s first meeting on 3 August, the Alliance continues “to seek the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.” NATO’s immediate objectives were much more instrumental, however: to promote “stability in crisis.” As previously mentioned, one of the chief concerns of the Alliance was that Iraq’s aggression might not stop merely with the annexation of Kuwait. It was feared that Hussein, in fact, had grander ambitions which could potentially lead to an extension of the conflict to include neighboring states. Thus, NATO sought as its first objective to maintain regional stability at its current state with the end goal being a return to the preexisting status quo. The Alliance recognized two aspects as key for maintaining this current stability. It had to fulfill existing treaty commitments to protect Turkey and also contain Iraqi expansionism. At the onset of the crisis, various intelligence reports suggested that Iraq was amassing forces along the Turkish border in response to Ankara’s compliance with UN-mandated economic sanctions. This prompted a swift
response from NATO states which expressed unwavering resolve to defend the Treaty area by protecting their southern partner. On 9 August, Secretary Baker traveled to Ankara at the request of the Turkish government for a public show of Alliance support. Following this meeting, White House Press Secretary Fitzwater confirmed American and Alliance solidarity with Turkey, stating that NATO “is committed to protecting all its members. An attack against one is an attack against all.” This position was repeated by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner on 10 August: “The allies expressed full solidarity with Turkey. It is clear that an attack on Turkey would be considered as an attack on all member nations” (Friedman 1990b). Second, NATO states wished to curtail continued Iraqi aggression. Despite a non-aggression pact signed between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1989, there was particular apprehension within the Alliance that Baghdad in fact coveted the resource-rich kingdom. As one analyst notes, “It would not be outrageous to suggest that Saddam might be considering military action against Saudi Arabia” (Duncan 1990). On 6 August, US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney traveled to Jeddah to confirm Washington’s pledge to protect the neighboring states by repelling any attempts at a Saudi invasion. To be sure, transatlantic partners shared this stance and likewise offered immediate support. British Defence Minister Tom King praised the “multinational effort” to defend Saudi Arabia and expressed the conviction of the Alliance to ensure the region’s stability: “[It is] a valuable contribution to defend the integrity of Saudi Arabia and any other threatened states whilst, by peaceful and economic means, we achieve the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait” (Wintour 1990).

NATO’s third objective was likewise clear: NATO must act in unison in developing its response to the crisis in the Middle East. There were two reasons for this. First, the fact that Ankara’s safety seemed directly challenged by the real possibility of an Iraqi attack required Alliance partners to express solidarity under Article V treaty obligations. Any armed offensive against Turkey would invariably require a response by the Organization, and demonstrating solid Alliance unity from the beginning of the conflict could serve to dissuade Baghdad from taking steps which would elicit an obligatory NATO response. More importantly, however, was the impact the crisis had on broader questions about the future of the Alliance. If the end of the Cold War had incited considerable deliberation on the value of NATO’s continued existence, the
annexation of Kuwait laid the first foundations for quelling this debate: “...Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has exposed Western Europe's inability or reluctance to project its power much beyond its own borders. And having long needed Washington to protect it from the Soviet Union, it now counts on the United States to tame a dictator who consolidated his power thanks in part to European armaments and credits” (Riding 1990d). For almost one year, the Allies had been grappling with defining NATO’s responsibilities and tasks in a post-Cold War era, as evidenced in the London Declaration from July 1990. Almost overnight, however, an opportunity emerged for the Alliance to prove its worth. As many looked to NATO for a solution to the Gulf conflict, the Organization’s ability to act in unison was central to seizing on this opportunity.

As such, NATO partners were careful to not only encourage a high degree of consensus in planning the Organization’s response, but they also strived to demonstrate the extent of this consensus publicly. Following the NAC meeting on 10 August, for example, Secretary General Wörner announced that there was “unanimous conviction” within the Alliance to address the crisis together. One example of this show of unity came as the US informed NATO partners of its plan to send a large number of troops to Saudi Arabia, evoking a united reaction of support from Alliance members. This was echoed at the level of the Organization as well, with Secretary General Wörner noting there was “full consensus” that “the Allies must demonstrate solidarity with those who are being threatened and those who are taking action.” As one observer noted, the essence of the initial three NAC meetings was the same, namely to accentuate the common stance of the Allies: “NATO representatives emphasized the need to show a united front to counter Iraq's aggression,” adding that “US officials say they have been surprised by the unanimous support the European allies have given to tough economic sanctions and even military action against Iraq” (Drozdiak 1990b).

The final objective advanced at the NAC meeting on 10 August was ambitious yet vague. In line with the three goals discussed above, the Alliance felt compelled to take an active and direct role in confronting Baghdad. In the first two Council meetings, no member states expressed overt concern about involvement in a conflict which did not involve the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact (Drozdiak 1990b). According to General Secretary Wörner, the Allies had reached full agreement on the necessity of countering Iraq’s bellicose actions for the sake of
“our national and collective security.” Involvement was desired, yet the question remained as to how this objective could best be defined. Two decisions were made: political engagement and a military option.

With respect to a NATO contribution in checking Iraqi aggression, it was argued by many within the Alliance that the most valuable weapon the Alliance could potentially offer as a first response at pressuring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait was the united diplomatic and economic influence of its sixteen member states. In fact, this was the value added Washington had hoped for and acknowledged at the beginning of the conflict. Citing an American official at NATO, Riding (1990a) notes that it was generally accepted early on in Washington that “NATO’s political role is crucial” in building a multinational retort to Baghdad. Although the US and several individual European states had expressed an early interest in sending troops to the Gulf, the option seemed initially unviable in an Alliance context. As one analyst observed, “several of America’s allies, while supporting what Mr. Bush says, would still like to draw a more distinct line, and to pause for breath, between enforcing the United Nations embargo and deciding what to do about Mr. Hussein’s regime” (The Economist 1990, 34). While vociferously expressing solidarity with the US, certain continental members nevertheless sought to avoid an abrupt show of military force on the part of the Organization itself. Some Allies had instead expressed an initial interest in allowing UN-imposed economic sanctions to play out, hoping that they would prove effective if coupled with a gradual escalation of NATO pressure. Thus, political engagement was seen as the primary instrument for an effective Alliance involvement.

However, NATO’s objective to become actively involved in resolving the conflict invariably necessitated an explicit option for a military response at a given point in the future. Having demanded nothing less than the “complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces and restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty” (Hoffman and Drozdiak 1990), certain partners conveyed concern that a guarded approach could prove careless should the Alliance not back up their demands with concrete military substance. As such, the predilection for a cautious NATO strategy of involvement was met with a US caveat which was anything but ambivalent. The allies must demonstrate their commitment to “responsibility-sharing,” with Secretary Baker provocatively suggesting that in the long-term, sheer economic and political support to US-led efforts would
not be enough: “The billions of dollars pledged are invaluable...But all the money in the world cannot create the airlift and sealift capabilities required today to move heavy forces into place and to return refugees home... [Europe] can help by making ships and planes available for this critical need.” While the United States was in fact prepared to act unilaterally, NATO partners were expected to stand at its side. Washington seemed content with the Organization’s role being limited at first to merely political involvement, but there was strong pressure geared at drawing “the West Europeans more into the military alignment against Baghdad...” (Friedman 1990a). As this demonstrates, the US was clear in expressing expectations for resource extraction to its partners early on in the conflict.

The US stance worked; member states agreed to support a “strong” NATO involvement, first politically and, if necessary, militarily – after considering and studying formally the various requests made and with individual partners responding “each in its own way” (Wörner 1990). Despite the proviso underlying this military option, the Alliance was successful in establishing a common approach for intervention. Based on the clear objectives defined by the Allies in the initial phases of the Gulf crisis, it can be said that the motives underlying NATO’s assessment of the Iraqi threat were status quo in nature, enjoyed a high degree of compatibility among Alliance partners, and materialized into objectives which sought to promote regional stability, encourage Allied unity, and actively engage the Organization within the ensuing crisis.

3.2. Proposed policy remedies

Once Alliance partners had assessed the nature of the Gulf conflict and devised general strategic objectives, substantial policy recommendations began to appear. Three particular remedies materialized which sought – borrowing on Secretary General Ismay’s prominent iteration – to get NATO out-of-area, the coalition framework in, and to keep the Iraqis down. In this section, these policy recommendations will be discussed to examine two measures for the alliance mobilization model outlined above: the degree of compatibility among the Allies with respect to political remedies and domestic political risks.

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105 See also Baker (1990).
**Going out-of-area**

Although the out-of-area debate was nothing new for the Alliance, the Gulf crisis added a new dimension to these discussions in the sense that it represented the first out-of-area crisis facing a post-Cold War, unsuspecting NATO. This served to give proponents of an “out-of-area NATO” talking points which had previously been lacking. As McInnes observers, Iraq’s aggression went a long way in stimulating a willingness on the part of the Allies “to support military operations out-of-area...NATO has reoriented itself away from a concern with the simple scenario of direct aggression by the Soviet Union to reacting to a variety of possible crises and contingencies on its periphery or beyond...” (1994, 27-8). Indeed, reaction from within the Organization confirms such claims. In December 1990, a US State Department report to European partners maintained that challenges to NATO security in the post-Cold War era would increasingly originate outside Alliance borders and suggested that developments such as those in the Middle East should “help [NATO] rise above the old and sterile debates about ‘out-of-area’ roles.” This was confirmed in a post-Cold War evaluation of early response planning, which showed that as early as August 1990, member states had recognized that “the stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance” (NAC 1991). In like manner, an official report on the Organization’s strategy concluded that the Gulf crises made abundantly clear an existential need for the Alliance to concern itself with extraterritorial security challenges: “In future, NATO will be called upon to defend Alliance interests [original in bold] as much as defend the territory of its member states” (NAA 1993, 6). As these studies reveal, the Iraq conflict provided new impetus to the out-of-area debate.

Specifically, the Gulf crisis altered this debate in two respects. It first substantiated arguments made for years that extra-territorial challenges could indeed pose a real threat to Alliance interests. The question was no longer whether NATO had an interest outside its Treaty borders; Iraqi bellicosity set the stage for an Alliance which sought to project stability, both within the Treaty area as well as beyond. As Winrow asserts, “In addition to providing collective defence, the Alliance is now, according to NATO officials, increasingly concerned with projecting stability beyond its borders.” In effect, the Alliance recognized at the onset of the Gulf crisis the potential utility of an “active out-of-area policy not solely restricted to the...defense dimension”
Instead, the new issue dealt with the logistics of a possible out-of-area response by the Alliance: What types of response to extra-territorial challenges were both appropriate and feasible in a post-Cold War era?

With the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, initial arguments were prevalent that NATO had no mandate to respond to Kuwait’s invasion, because it did not directly impact the Treaty area. Specifically, such claims were based on the alleged geographical restriction on the use of NATO’s military assets and capabilities derived from Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty:

“For the purposes of Article 5 [engagement in response to an armed attack], an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

However, most scholars in fact contend that the Washington treaty placed no explicit geographical limitation on NATO actions. Proponents of a global NATO brought such sentiments to light during Alliance policy debates in fall 1990, arguing for instance that out-of-area engagements were legally justified under Articles 3 (i.e., treaty “Parties...will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”) and 4 (i.e., “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”) (Reed 1987, 230). They also traced their claims back to NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report, which identified the strategic importance of non-territorial stability for Allied interests, and to the more recent NAC meeting in December 1989 at which NATO members reiterated the Organization’s right to some kind of out-of-area role.

As other observers pointed out, NATO’s historical aversion to going out-of-area had more to do with practical considerations rather than legal limitations. With the presence of a strong Soviet threat adjacent to Alliance territory, NATO as a whole was relatively unconcerned with distant conflicts throughout the Cold War. Winrow noted this, asserting that the centrality of

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106 See also Winrow (1996, 46) and Young (1991).
European security and the persistent need to maintain a “credible defence and deterrence posture in central Europe” meant that the Alliance itself sought to avoid an entanglement of essential military resources in distracting engagements outside the Treaty area (1994, 618-22). As Scott astutely points out, “With the great Soviet bear staring at you from across the table, one does not worry too much about the crumbs the mice are stealing from the floor” (1993, 232).

A final group of advocates tried not so much to justify an out-of-area role for the Alliance, but tried instead to show existing policy precedence for such intervention. As they explained, NATO had on occasion already concerned itself with extra-territorial challenges. For example, some Alliance partners agreed to restricted out-of-area involvement in the 1980s after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution: “…Several allies participated in mine clearing operations in the Red Sea and protected international shipping in the Persian Gulf.” Moreover, “the US air strike on Libya in 1986 was launched after suspected Libyan terrorist involvement in Europe” (Winrow 1996, 46). They further referenced an official report of the North Atlantic Assembly four years prior which confirmed that “the security of the Allies does extend boundaries beyond NATO” and recognized thereby “threats out-of-area” (NAA 1986). Although conceding that such endeavours remained overwhelmingly ad hoc in nature, they were nonetheless adamant about the Organization’s “right to go abroad.”

The second way the Gulf conflict altered the out-of-area debate is that deliberation emerged not as a hypothetical aspiration of the Alliance, but in the context of a concrete security challenge with perceptible consequences for the Alliance. Though policy remedy debates accentuated all too well evident tensions among Alliance partners over the specifics of going out-of-area, member states shared a strong conviction that Kuwaiti sovereignty had to be ensured for the stability of the whole region as well as in the Alliance’s strategic interests. Riding (1990a), for example, acknowledges the “unusual unanimity” among Allies in planning an appropriate response and cites one American official as saying that support within NATO for a multinational military response to Iraq’s incursion had garnished “…more unanimity on this point than I can remember before in this house.” This claim was confirmed at the start of policy negotiations by Secretary General Wörner, who stressed the Alliance’s determination to
actively confront out-of-area threats and maintained that direct engagement outside of Alliance territory remained a real consideration: “The NATO Treaty does not limit the scope of our security planning or coordination; nor does it exclude all joint action” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1990). This observation signaled the first remedy NATO proposed to tackle the Iraqi incursion, namely a clear recognition on the part of the Allies of both an interest and need to go out-of-area. The only question which remained, however, was how such an engagement would be framed, and the practical answer came in the second remedy proposed, the elaboration of an Alliance coalition framework.

The push for a coalition framework
Under stark pressure from several continental partners (specifically, the UK and the Netherlands) as well as an expressed interest on the part of the Americans for a common Alliance response, the coalition framework quickly gained favor in NATO circles as one instrument with which to project a desired stabilizing presence within the Gulf without pushing for a potentially contentious, inclusive approach (Dean 1991, 33). In essence, the idea of the coalition was based on the assumptions that in order to prove effective, NATO out-of-area cooperation would need to be both voluntary and flexible. It had to be voluntary in the sense that Allies could “opt in” on their own volition. In contrast to Article V responses which oblige Allies to act in the defense of the Treaty area, out-of-area participation would be contingent upon domestic sensitivities such as public support for or political opposition to such action. Moreover, it had to be flexible, meaning that partners could choose the nature and duration of specific contributions on an ad hoc basis. Essentially, this was a necessary step to preserve NATO’s principle of “action by consensus.” By allowing for varied levels of participation, coalition engagement provided a means by which reluctant states could avoid high-level commitments (e.g., deployment of combat forces or equipment) while still demonstrating a strong show of support through other forms of responsibility-sharing (e.g., financial contributions). Sherwood (1990) argues that policymaker’s decision to promote a coalition framework for engagement established a practice of “informal consultation and ad hoc

coordination” which could offer the Alliance unheralded strength in confronting out-of-area challenges by allowing action while not jeopardizing core Alliance commitments (i.e., defense of NATO territory). Thus, the coalition framework was widely supported as a viable response in the Gulf conflict, as it allowed the Alliance to respond promptly and in unison based on the voluntary contributions.

One additional benefit of the coalition framework is that it lent itself well to addressing the varied domestic political risks of the individual member states, specifically those associated with the possibility of a protracted NATO engagement. Public support was particularly guarded in some of the member states. In Western Germany, for example, the public expressed a “restrained reaction” to the prospects of war, as there was a greater preoccupation with impending Germany unification. Similarly in France, President Mitterrand’s caution was said to be “finding approval with the public” (MacLeod 1990). As one Belgian diplomat noted, many partner states “would have trouble sending ground forces because of public resistance” (Kamen 1990). For other Allies, support seemed considerably stronger. In the UK, an NOP survey found that close to 90 percent of the public supported intervention through both a naval blockade and the deployment of ground forces to the region (Ford 1990), and the Bush Administration’s deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia in mid-August enjoyed the initial support of close to three out of four Americans (Garrett 1990). With respect to the formulation of a NATO response, however, there was a shared sentiment by all NATO member states that a prolonged conflict could have drastic political implications back home. According to a poll released on 15 November, for example, support for US military involvement in the Gulf had already eroded considerably since August, with a majority reporting that Washington should “rely on economic sanctions against Iraq and not exercise [its] military option ‘no matter how long it takes’” (Gailey 1990). As Kamber (1990) noted, “If in a month or two months [the end of the war] has not happened, and yet we are losing lives,” intervention could have severe political consequences in the long term. These concerns were indisputably shared by the Allies, thus demonstrating a high compatibility of the domestic political risks associated with NATO engagement.

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108 See also Howe (1991, 248) and Scott (1993, 228).
However, Alliance partners likewise recognized that the political risks of engagement had to be weighed against—and, in fact, were considerably lower than—the economic risks of non-engagement. In the words of Secretary Baker, intervention was all but necessary due to domestic economic interests: “If you want to sum it up in one word, it is jobs...Because an economic recession, worldwide, caused by the control of one nation, one dictator, of the West’s economic lifeline will result in the loss of jobs on the part of American citizens.” One observer saw similar concerns coming out of Downing Street: “Thatcher’s determination...in the Gulf reflected her government’s fears that, unless urgent action was taken, spiraling oil prices would wreck plans to bring British inflation down” (MacLeod 1990). Indeed, such realizations led to consensus that NATO members were obliged to respond, yet inclusive engagement on the part of the Organization was seen as impractical due to considerable domestic pressures (Kamp 1995, 123). In the eyes of Alliance policymakers, the answer to balancing these risks was an arrangement which offered the possibility for active engagement while nevertheless affording a solid exit clause; the coalition framework proved to be this answer.

Get the Iraqis out of Kuwait
Finally, the Alliance’s third policy remedy was unambiguous: a resolution to the crisis could involve nothing less than an unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and recognition by Baghdad of the inviolable sovereignty of its annexed neighbor. As evidence of their common resolve, the Allies expressed united support for the military responses of individual member states from the beginning of the conflict. As one of the first Western allies to respond to the invasion, West Germany offered an “open-ended commitment” to the United States and its other allies, promising both economic and military aid “in the spirit of international solidarity” (Binder 1990, 6). This support continued throughout the escalation of conflict, with Bonn reiterating its support for the US-led coalition and opposing additional negotiations with Baghdad in a resolution adopted by the German Parliament on 14 January. Having stressed its independent role in resolving the crisis—sending, for instance, 12 special envoys to 24 Arab countries following the immediate aftermath of the attack on Kuwait—France likewise professed its solidarity with the US early in the conflict, supporting Washington not only with a presence in the Gulf second only to that of the United Kingdom (Khadduri and
Ghareeb 2001) but also by joining in costly diplomatic sanctions against Iraq. During a press conference in mid-September to announce an increase in his country’s troop presence within the Gulf, President Mitterrand confirmed this commitment to US-led military efforts, calling Iraq a “bellicose state which poorly estimates the risks of its actions” by “probing allied solidarity.” The European Community echoed such sentiments, with its Presidency declaring that the West’s “extended hand was refused. The responsibility for what happens next lies with the Iraqi government” (Poos 1991). As this discussion of the three Council recommendations demonstrates, there was a conclusively high degree of compatibility in the policy remedies advanced by the Allies at the beginning of the Gulf crisis.

3.3. Examining policy outputs

This high degree of compatibility becomes all the more evident when looking at the speed and scope of substantial policy outputs which emerged in response to the crisis. The section which follows explores these as regards the two strategies for NATO involvement outlined in the NAC objectives discussed in section 3.1: political engagement and the military option. The objective hereby will be to assess partner willingness to answer US solicitations, the second measure for hegemonic legitimacy.

Political involvement

To be certain, an Allied response to the invasion of Kuwait came swiftly. On 2 August 1990, President Bush signed an executive order banning trade with Iraq and freezing Iraqi assets; on the same day, the UK and France follow suit. On 6 August, the UN Security Council adopted its second resolution addressing the Iraqi incursion (UNSCR 661), placing severe economic sanctions on Baghdad. Referring to the resolution, President Bush commented that the Security Council decision had shown “an awful lot of muscle...[and] the will of the nations around the world” (Bush 1990b). Prime Minister Thatcher remarked that she could not “remember a time when the world had acted so strongly together,” and Secretary General Wörner noted, “This is

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109 By joining the US-led trade embargo against Iraq, France risked losing $4.5 billion in debts owed to it by Baghdad (Riding 1990b).
the moment for the West to show cohesion, determination” (BBC 1990). NATO members did just that, immediately announcing unwavering support for the sanctions. These developments coincided with a national address on 7 August, in which President Bush announced the deployment of US troops to the Gulf under Operation Desert Shield to enforce a line which had been “drawn in the sand.” In response, British Defense Minister King announced UK assistance to American efforts by sending air and ground forces to the region. Within weeks, a number of other NATO partner states likewise declared their support for the “wholly defensive” US mission, offering personnel, equipment and/or economic resources for the effort. France, which simultaneously launched its own diplomatic endeavor aimed at a peaceful resolution to the conflict, offered “unyielding support” for the US operation. Even Turkey, “which earlier had given evasive answers on whether it was prepared to halt oil shipments through its territory, banned the loading of Iraqi oil at its Mediterranean jetties” (Constantine and Strobel 1990). Observers praised the significant unity of NATO partners, with Michael Kelly – a former member of the Reagan administration – calling Alliance efforts “95% effective.”

As the ultimatum for Iraqi withdrawal set out in UNSC Resolution 661 – 15 January 1991 – neared, the Alliance feverishly increased efforts at political engagement. After the breakdown of US diplomatic efforts in early January 1991, European member states assumed a more prominent role in this process. For example, the foreign ministers of the European Community called an emergency meeting in Luxembourg on 4 January, offering direct dialogue with Baghdad in an effort to resolve the crisis. This was key not so much because of its effectiveness – in fact, officials noted the decisive failure of continental efforts –, but rather for its timing; collective European diplomacy had not begun at the start of the conflict, but was rather an ancillary gesture on the coattails of US-initiated talks. When asked the reason for the belated response, one of the representatives from the French delegation, Michel Vauzelle, announced that Europe had waited so as to “not interfere with American diplomacy.” As this demonstrates, Allied efforts were aimed at augmenting and promoting US-led diplomacy, and this coordination was in line with the third objective proposed by the Council which called for solid NATO involvement in resolving the Gulf conflict.
Making good on the military option

Though formulated initially as a military option, the use of Alliance assets and capabilities in response to the Gulf crisis quickly became more than mere contingency. In fact, the Organization’s military involvement was marked by both a direct and indirect reaction, and the direct response began to materialize within several weeks of the NAC meeting on 10 August. Known formally as *Operation Southern Guard*, its mission was “to be ready to counter any threat that may develop in the Southern Region of Allied Command Europe [i.e., Turkey] as a result of the Middle East crisis.” Still in the planning phases, the Alliance justified *Southern Guard* on the basis of an Alliance-wide recognition of the need to uphold Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which specifies that members will “consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Limited strictly to the defense of NATO territory, *Southern Guard* was to become NATO’s first explicit operation undertaken to guarantee the integrity of Alliance territory.

In the beginning of September, concrete plans for the operation began to solidify, and the execution of *Southern Guard* occurred over the course of four months. NAC’s decision to initiate this operation was taken under consultation with the DPC and was based primarily on three core contingencies: the potential for missile or air attacks on territory in southeastern Turkey, the prospects of a disruption of strategic traffic or communication within the Mediterranean and to NATO area bases, and the possibility of terrorist activities throughout the southern Treaty area. To address this first concern, NATO deployed Airborne Early-Warning aircraft (NAEW) to southeastern Turkey within one week of Iraqi hostilities. Known as *Operation Anchor Guard*, NAEW was dispatched to safeguard southern Turkey against a possible incursion as a retaliatory gesture for the ongoing buildup of US and multinational forces in Saudi Arabia and the broader Persian Gulf. As efforts at a diplomatic solution to the conflict stalled and the ultimatum for Iraqi withdrawal neared, NAEW’s watch over Turkish airspace was greatly expanded and ran uninterruptedly. At the same time, as apprehension

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110 NAEW is also more commonly known at the national level as AWACS, or Airborne Warning and Control Systems.  
111 UN Security Council Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990, issued a withdrawal deadline of 15 January 1991 and further authorized “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660.”
over Turkey’s security increased, the DPC approved Turkish requests on 2 January 1991 for the deployment of Mobile Force-Air (AMF-A) assets, consisting of three squadrons of short-range reconnaissance and attack aircraft (Riding 1991). Two “firsts” marked the significance of this measure. To start, a considerable number of AMF-A assets were comprised of German AlphaJets. “Strenuously endorsed by the United States” (Riding 1991), Germany’s contribution of 18 jet fighters and approximately 270 pilots and support workers represented “the first German military unit to be sent to a distant war zone since World War II” (Kinzer 1991). The second significance of this move was that it marked AMF-A’s first operational deployment in NATO history. Originally conceptualized in 1960 as a small multinational force which could be deployed to any threatened area in Allied Command Europe territory, AMF-A was to be a deterrent against the Soviet threat yet had never seen deployment throughout the Cold War.

With the start of coalition intervention at the end of January 1991, Southern Guard reached its apex. Moreover, NATO defense measures to protect Turkey under Anchor Guard increased based on an expansion of NAEW air defense. By 20 January, American and Dutch deployment of Patriot missiles afforded long-range anti-air defense to strategically vital regions. Three batteries of medium-range I-HAWK surface-to-air missiles were also added to protect NATO’s command-and-control at Diyarbakir by the Netherlands and Germany, and Bonn further augmented Turkish air defenses by installing a Roland missile unit at Erhac. In addition to NAEW, auxiliary components supplemented Anchor Guard, including the deployment of six American F-15C fighters to NATO command, a further 100 US aircraft for use under Turkish authority, the establishment of a well-blanketed, land-based air defense and radar communications network, and the provision of biological and chemical defense assets as well as ground and counter-air ordnance. In all, nine Allies contributed resources to Turkey’s defense, yet the level of Alliance support was undeniably universal. As Cox notes, many of NATO’s European partners “followed the US lead” in taking an assertive stance against the Iraqi threat through direct participation in Alliance activities (1993, 285).

Another core objective of Southern Guard was to monitor air and sea routes throughout the Mediterranean as well as the Gulf and Red Sea, deterring thereby potential disruptions to

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112 Additional contributions to the AMF-A squadrons included 18 Belgian Mirage V and 6 Italian RF-104G fighters.
113 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the UK, and the US
Alliance/coalition efforts; this materialized through a second program nicknamed MedNet. Twelve NATO states contributed to MedNet through a combination of naval surface, air, and underwater forces to cope with potential threats such as Iraqi merchant ships or terrorist attacks on Allied interests. The operation was comprised of three components. First, MedNet performed pro-active exercise, patrol, and surveillance activities in the Mediterranean’s critical transport routes with three centers of operations: Bentley, to the southwest of Crete; Daimler, to Sicily’s south; and Jaguar, at the mouth of the Suez Canal. A second decisive component of the operations involved command, control, and communication. Specifically, NATO employed the US Mobile Universal Link Translator System, a system which provided live radar visuals of all surface and air movements within the Mediterranean. This system was successful at coupling Alliance defense centers across the region, thus facilitating a direct uplink between NATO, coalition and allied national air defense networks. Finally, MedNet initiated extensive mine countermeasure (MCM) activities from 23 January forward; this undertaking made use of Alliance Standing Naval Force Channel (SNFC) assets from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK, and it was the first operational deployment within a conflict in its history.

Southern Guard and its accompanying operations exhibited the overwhelming level of solidarity among the Allies with respect to defending the Treaty area. Fourteen of NATO’s 16 member states participated directly in the response, contributing assets, personnel, and/or military forces to the endeavor. The result was a diverse effort “shaped simultaneously to meet peace (in the Northern and Central Regions), crisis (in most of the Southern Region), and war (in the Southern Region’s extreme eastern sector” (Howe 1991, 249). Yet the Organization’s presence within the Middle East throughout the conflict did not simply involve the direct implementation of Southern Guard. To be certain, the Alliance had a strong, indirect contribution through coalition participation as well.

In general, it can be said that NATO’s indirect response to the Gulf crisis had two fundamental aspects. First, individual Alliance partners responded surprisingly quickly. Within one week, NATO’s “Big Three” had decisively answered Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Along with US deployment of troops, the United Kingdom agreed to send troops and to reinforce its naval

114 Luxembourg contributed financial support to the effort, while Iceland – which has no armed forces – provided staunch diplomatic backing.
readiness within the region, and France increased its number of warships in the Gulf to three. At the same time, Spain and Italy announced their willingness to allow the US Air Force use of their respective territories for the refuelling of air missions to the Gulf (Riding 1990c). The Netherlands joined the effort of the Big Three shortly thereafter, sending two frigates to the Gulf in the final weeks of August 1990. The principle objective of this initial troop deployment to the region was defined by the US and recognized by NAC on 10 August: to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential invasion, a scenario which could have feasibly led to an oil crisis similar to those in 1973 and 1979 (Stein 1992, 168-9).\footnote{115}

As the crisis progressed, however, pressure mounted for greater NATO coordination. In response, European Allies convened a meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) at the end of August 1990 to discuss ways by which to harmonize the transatlantic response. As one US Senate expert on NATO affairs concluded after the meeting, the Allies nevertheless failed to “gamely...orchestrate” a united involvement (Wines 1991). This compelled Washington to once again iterate its expectations for greater “responsibility-sharing” through “substantive military commitments” on the part of its partners. In response, NATO’s Secretary General noted that the members had agreed to earnestly consider these requests, stating that “there was a unanimous conviction that more can and should still be done. The allies will consider and study favourably this request.” By mid-September 1990, US demands bore fruit. All but two NATO partners agreed to contribute assets, troops and/or capabilities to military action within the Gulf through participation in a multinational coalition. For example, Belgium provided Egypt with aircraft for humanitarian efforts (e.g., the evacuation of refugees), Greece sent three sealift vessels, and Norway supplied large provisions of humanitarian aid, promising to address “specific military requests” in parliamentary debates. Though the Kohl government “agreed unanimously that a military operation in the gulf region would be contrary to the Constitution [Grundgesetz]” (Riding 1990d), West Germany nevertheless committed extensive air- and sealift support to the coalitional framework, pledging over $6.5 billion to the overall effort (Walsh 1991, 49).

\footnote{115 It was not until President Bush ordered the deployment of an additional 150,000 troops to the region on 8 November that the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait became a primary objective of the US administration.}
This led to the second cornerstone of NATO’s indirect response to the Gulf crisis, namely a coordinated effort to provide logistical and tactical support to the US-led, multinational coalition of the willing. To be certain, the coalition involved in liberating Kuwait beginning on 17 January 1991 was not a NATO arrangement. It was instead a multinational formation of land, air and sea forces including more than 956,000 troops from 36 states. As such, one could argue that NATO’s indirect role discussed above was in reality no more than an interstate undertaking with little relevance for the Alliance itself. According to Veltri (2004), however, NATO’s actual role in the coalition was arguably more assiduous. Twelve of NATO’s 16 members contributed to *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, comprising thereby almost 80% of overall force strength (Hernandez et al. 1999).\(^{116}\) More importantly, however, the Alliance provided direct communications and logistical support to the coalition. During the air campaign, for instance, US aircraft en route to Iraq made regular use of NAEW radio frequencies to check in with command. In an unprecedented move, NATO responded by switching from routine surveillance and reporting to enabling a full combat support role. The Alliance also aided with the marshalling of US forces, relaying confirmatory Air Tasking Orders for Coalition forces when possible. Such developments prompted many analysts to conclude that the Alliance had in fact assumed “a combat support posture” during the course of coalition operations (Paul 1992; Dennis 2007). *Veenhof (1992)* confirms these claims, asserting that NATO indeed assisted in the coalition’s air campaign on an informal and flexible basis. This speaks to the fact that NATO indeed circuitously took part in coalitional operations. As this illustrates, Alliance partners made good on their promise to reserve a military option for involvement, and the substantive policies of the Allies throughout the crisis demonstrated their high degree of acceptance for hegemonic resource extraction.

\(^{116}\) Number of troops defined as those serving on active duty in the Gulf War Theater between 2 August 1990 and 13 June 1991. Portugal contributed equipment to US-led operations, and NATO’s three non-participatory states provided financial assistance (Germany, Luxembourg and Iceland). The case of Turkey is special, however, as they agreed – in consultation with the US – to station 100,000 troops on their southern borders, thus forcing Hussein to divert a considerable number of troops from defending other regions against the attacking coalition (Bahcheli 1994, 435). Other significant coalition contributions of more than 10,000 troops came from Middle Eastern states directly affected in some way by the conflict: Saudi Arabia (#2 with 100,000 troops), Egypt (#4 with 33,600), Syria (#6 with 14,500), and Morocco (#7 with 13,000).
3.4. Evaluating NATO’s response

From the analysis above, several conclusions are evident as regards NATO’s reaction to the Gulf conflict. First, the Allies responded immediately to the crisis and were successful at aggregating a common assessment of the threat, developing key objectives based on collective motives for maintaining the status quo, and devising shared policy remedies for confronting Iraqi aggression. The response manifested itself in two forms. The Organization participated directly through an institutionalized and formally-structured operation known as *Southern Guard*, which had as its objective the protection of the Treaty area by ensuring the security of its most southern Alliance partner, Turkey. NATO’s second response involved indirect participation within the Gulf by providing logistical and tactical support to US-led operations, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Moreover, twelve Alliance partners assumed an active role in *Shield* and *Storm* by contributing military assets and/or capabilities, and the remaining states contributed secondarily through financial support. Some observers seem divided on whether NATO’s indirect role in the Gulf crisis represents a lucid illustration of “Alliance” cooperation or whether this role should instead be understood as a multinational response coincidentally involving a significant number of Allied states. Kaplan favours the former argument and contends that the Organization should take “appropriate satisfaction from its indirect engagement,” arguing in fact that this role “inspired most of the allies in the spring of 1991 to expand their vision of NATO’s functions” (Kaplan 1993, 9). Regardless which argument one takes, what can certainly be said is that *all* Allies contributed to the direct and/or indirect responses to varying degrees. As such, NATO’s response to the Gulf crisis can unequivocally be seen as inclusive in nature.

A second conclusion deals with the success of NATO policy outputs in confronting the Iraqi threat. Without a doubt, Alliance partners were decisive in achieving the objectives outlined during the initial NAC meetings in early August. First, the Allies were pivotal at supporting a swift resolution to the conflict through the Organization’s indirect involvement in the Gulf, ensuring thereby a containment of Iraqi antagonism which could feasibly lead to further regional instability. The Allies also succeeded at defending Turkey from a potential Iraqi attack, upholding commitments to protecting NATO’s Treaty area. Both of these objectives were further accomplished while ensuring a high degree of Alliance consensus throughout the
conflict. In other words, Alliance efforts were adaptive in dealing with the security challenges arising during the Gulf crisis.

Finally, many analysts suggest that in formulating a reply to the invasion of Kuwait, NATO’s European partners arguably “waited for the Bush Administration to define the West’s response to the crisis,” with Europe then “closing ranks” behind Washington (Riding 1990d). Indeed, the US expressed its clear expectations for strong NATO involvement in response to Iraqi aggression, and this came across plainly in the planning of an Alliance military option during the Council’s early meetings in August. Allied support for this strong engagement is unquestionable when one examines the substantial policy outcomes undertaken by the Organization over the course of the conflict. In fact, NATO’s military role within the Gulf was viewed as a success in Washington. In the words of US General Schwarzkopf, Commander of American forces in the Gulf, “…I don’t want to sound like I am advocating something, but you know, NATO was a great success [in its engagement in the Gulf]” (1990, 2). To be certain, Allied support was not without hesitation, as certain states expressed concern over the feasibility of a military response on the part of the Organization. In Bonn, for example, discussions in the Reichstag were heated as to whether German support for such a move – even excluding direct involvement due to constitutional restrictions – represented a significant and thus, undesirable, deviation from West Germany’s post-World War II foreign policy strategy. Despite this a “strong” NATO response did emerge, illustrating Washington’s success at prescribing Alliance policy.

3.5. Evaluating NCR theories

As this analysis demonstrates, the Iraq crisis was a destabilizing conflict which represented a regional net power loss for NATO due to its direct challenge both to Alliance interests (e.g., its impact on access to oil) and the security of its most southern member state. NATO responded to this challenge quickly, aggregating a common strategic assessment based on shared motives. In addressing this threat, the Allies likewise displayed high compatibility in both policy remedies and domestic political risks. Finally, the US expressed clear expectations, and NATO policy
outputs fit well to these expectations, revealing the willingness of continental states to answer American solicitations.

With respect to the theoretical implications of this case study, it can thus be said that the Organization’s net power loss mobilized an unambiguous response: power begot balancing. At the same time, however, the three neoclassical realist models outlined in chapter 2 prove equally efficacious at accounting for NATO policy outcomes: high assessment fit promoted inclusive cooperation ($H_{1a}$), high elite consensus resulted in adaptive cooperation ($H_{2a}$), and high hegemonic legitimacy led to hegemonic prescription ($H_{3a}$). As such, the three models do well at grasping the dynamics involved in the Alliance policy-making process over the course of the Gulf conflict.
Chapter 4
The Bosnia Conflict, 1992-1995

To be certain, the end of the Cold War had a dramatic impact on the Alliance’s influence across Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union’s abrupt fall left NATO standing as a victorious military alliance second to none, and the resultant political and military vacuum on its eastern flank represented an unprecedented power shift in the Organization’s favor at the beginning of the 1990s. One region within which NATO sought to exercise its increased sway was southeastern Europe. Despite this, several factors challenged these regional power gains. Indeed, the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gave way to a chain reaction of volatility throughout the Balkans. In June 1991, two republics, Croatia and Slovenia, declared their independence from Yugoslavia, provoking armed conflict with Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) forces. Nationalist sentiments and ethnic tensions erupted, and Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed their neighbors’ lead in pushing for succession in September 1991 and April 1992, respectively. Following the Bosnian referendum for independence, war broke out between the Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats, posing additional peril for an already fragile region.

These developments presented a considerable hurdle for NATO’s ambitions to play a more assertive role within southeastern Europe. Two problems were particularly disconcerting for Alliance partners. First, many feared that developments within the Balkans could lead to widespread instability throughout Eastern Europe. As one observer noted, Alliance partners were apprehensive that the Yugoslav crisis “is pushing that ethnically volatile Balkan republic toward a breakup that could have destabilizing echoes elsewhere in Eastern Europe and possibly cause armed strife with Yugoslavia’s neighbors” (Goshko 1991). These concerns were repeated by Lord David Owen, EU co-chairman of the Conference for the former Yugoslavia at a NATO meeting on 4 December 1992, at which Owen informed Allies to “make contingency plans for a possible extension of the war in the Balkans...he described the developments in that region as grave and somber and told the ambassadors the West ‘had better be ready to deal with the consequences’” (Evans 1992). Owen’s blunt

Throughout this analysis, Bosnia and Herzegovina will also be referred to interchangeably as Bosnia and BiH.
appraisal accentuated a security challenge recognized in NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept, namely “the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from...ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and Eastern Europe...” Such developments could “lead to crises iminical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance” (NAC 1991). One particular concern of the Alliance was the prospect that instability and conflict could flow over into Macedonia and thereby threaten the stability of NATO members Greece and Turkey (Freedman 1992).

A second concern for the Alliance was Yugoslavia’s waning regional influence in southeastern Europe. As demonstrated by its response to the independence movements unfolding across the various republics, Belgrade displayed a belligerent reluctance to accept its relative power loss. At times, this determination to remain a prominent regional actor stood in sharp contradiction to Alliance policy. One example of this came following the full recognition by most NATO states of Bosnian independence on 7 April 1992. At face value, this move placed substantial political pressure on the JNA to withdraw from Bosnia, which it formally did. Serb forces reorganized within Bosnia, however, and formed the Army of Republika Srpska. The conflict therefore persisted, with Republika Srpska being generously aided by Yugoslav financial and logistical assistance (Malcolm 1994). This illustrates the fact that Belgrade’s aspirations presented a considerable stumbling block for NATO efforts at exercising increased authority within the region. While Yugoslavia clearly posed no direct challenge to Alliance power, Balkan instability in the early 1990s coupled with Belgrade’s resolve to maintain its regional position signified a potential challenge to NATO strategic interests in the sense that resulting conflicts could undermine the Alliance’s newly gained influence. This had a discernable impact on dynamics of NATO cooperation as will be discussed below.

4.1. Framing policy objectives

From the perspective of the Allies, the Balkans conflict was both anticlimactic and challenging. It was anticlimactic in the sense that it “ran against the spirit of integration and cooperation
which prevailed in the international community following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989...” (Gow 1997, 3). The ensuing crisis demonstrated that post-Cold War conflict was not only possible in other regions of the world (e.g., as demonstrated through the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990), but that such problems could “hit home” as well. Moreover, the conflict represented an unprecedented challenge for NATO’s members, specifically the US: “In the spring of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis became acute..., but dealing simultaneously with both Desert Storm and the death throes of the Soviet Union had exhausted Washington...‘Even a great power has difficulty in dealing with more than one crisis at a time’” (Holbrooke 1998, 26). The Bosnian War thrust Europe into an explosive international conflict,\(^\text{118}\) for which NATO was decidedly unprepared. While presenting a potential challenge to Alliance interests, the question remained as to the exact role the Organization would play in addressing the crisis. In the section which follows, I examine this question with emphasis on the initial assessments and motives of Alliance partners, providing thereby a basis for evaluating the alliance adaptation model.

**Allied assessments (partially) shared...**

NATO partners were quick in formulating assessments following the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict and its challenge to NATO authority, and several interesting results emerged. First, the Allies recognized that the ensuing crisis in fact presented notable opportunities for its members. On the back of the Maastricht Treaty – signed on 7 February 1992 –, European partners were keen on demonstrating that the newly-established European Union could successfully tackle a major security challenge in Southern Europe. This ambition was voiced by the President of the Council of the European Union in 1991, Jacques Poos, who boldly asserted, “This is the hour of Europe...If one problem can be solved by the Europeans it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and...it is not up to anybody else” (Poos 1991). Moreover, European leaders saw in Bosnia the opportunity to “demonstrate the new confidence and alleged strength of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy,” especially after CFSP’s credibility had been damaged following a series of confrontations between its member states.

\(^\text{118}\) There has been considerable debate as to whether the Yugoslav Wars were truly an international conflict or a civil war. In their ruling of 26 February 2007, however, the ICJ determined the Bosnia War to be international in nature, thus my reliance on this terminology here.
over issues such as Germany’s threat to unilaterally recognize Croatia and the Policy’s inability to address the naming dispute between Greece and Macedonia (Gow 1997, 319). In other words, continental partners saw Bosnia as a chance to exhibit Europe’s prowess as a significant international (and security) actor in the post-Cold War era. The US likewise saw an opportunity in the crisis, but of a more instrumental nature. Specifically, questions related to burden-sharing had long dominated the transatlantic relationship, and with the Soviet threat decidedly gone, Washington sought to see Europe take on a greater responsibility for its own security. As Glitman notes, “The US leadership, anxious to demonstrate domestically that the US would not have to continue shouldering most of the burden in the post-Cold War era, was equally concerned that the Europeans should accept the task of stabilizing Yugoslavia.” Indeed, the Bush Administration was confident in its partners’ ability to do just that, as most observers argued that “promising access to the EC market would provide the Europeans with sufficient leverage to induce the Yugoslavs to work out the consequences of their separation” (Glitman 1996, 68). In the words of US Secretary of State James Baker, “It was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power. Yugoslavia was as good a first try as any” (1995, 637). Thus, while the Allies agreed that the Bosnian conflict presented several opportunities, their individual assessments placed relevance on different opportunities.

Of course, NATO partners recognized a number of risks emerging out of the Bosnian crisis as well. One particular challenge which was common in members’ assessments was a concern over the potential implications turmoil in Macedonia could have on the security of neighboring Greece or even Turkey. After the outbreak of war in Bosnia, Greece dispatched 30,000 extra troops to its border with Macedonia in the fall of 1992 (Barrett 1992), partly on fears of internal political instability within the republic (Nankivell 1992). In the words of one commentator, “…the war, so far confined to northern Yugoslavia, could yet make Macedonia the next Bosnia and spread to the whole territory and neighborhood of southern Yugoslavia” (“The Next

119 The heated “name dispute” likewise added to tensions between Macedonia and Greece at that time, as the EC was considering the recognition of Macedonia on the recommendation of Robert Badinter, head of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia, in January 1992. Greece staunchly objected to such moves.
A chief concern in Washington was that if Milosevic were to attack Kosovo, the conflict could conceivably incite a wider war, drawing in not only Macedonia, but perhaps Greece and Turkey as well (Weymouth 1992). Alliance partners were in unison over the assessment of this risk, as indicated by NATO’s decision to sell surplus assets to Turkey and Greece under a program termed “Cascade” in 1993 to underscore their security “should the war in former Yugoslavia spill over into Macedonia or Kosovo” (Block 1993).

Allied assessments differed, however, with respect to the broader implications of the Bosnian conflict. Ironically, these differences were based on diverging assessments of the fundamental vision for the Alliance at the end of the Cold War; two perspectives emerged on either side of the Atlantic, and these were, ironically, both anchored in NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept. For the Europeans, the primary objective of the post-Cold War Alliance was to promote enduring stability within a united Europe: “Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged” (NAC 1991, pt. 15). Continental partners thus asserted that in the face of no discernable threat, the NATO should seek to consolidate democracy in Eastern and Southern Europe as a means to create a more secure Europe. Any challenge to this objective invariably posed a risk to the Alliance, and the crisis in Bosnia was one such risk.

In contrast, early US reaction to the Balkans crisis was shaped most poignantly by America’s chief security priority in the aftermath of the Cold War, namely dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union. While Washington agreed that a “just and lasting peaceful order in Europe” was central to the Alliance’s mission, it maintained that no such state could be lasting without first dealing with a convulsing Soviet Union: “In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation...” The Organization must take Moscow “into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved” (NAC 1991, pt. 10). In other words, it was vital to first rule out the Soviet threat before considering it in fact dead. Washington viewed the Bosnian crisis as a challenge because

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120 This objective fits in well with neoclassical realist assumptions that increases in relative material power serve as a strong incentive for expansive foreign policies. As Rose points out, neoclassical realists “note, in Thucydides’ formula, that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’” (1998, 146).
of the dangers it held at revitalizing this perishing threat. For Moscow, the breakup of Yugoslavia was a daunting “horror mirror” of its own internal upheaval, and events within the Balkans not only reflected upon, but could in fact negatively influence the impending Soviet dissolution (Arbatova 1994). According to one scholar, “Washington was concerned that Western acquiescence to Yugoslavia’s disintegration...might serve as a precedent for ethnic groups in Russia to rise up against Moscow, risking widespread chaos” (1996, 67). Owen shares similar sentiments, maintaining that “Yeltsin has been under a great deal of pressure from nationalist elements within the Russian parliament over his Yugoslav diplomacy...There are many similarities in the former Soviet Union to what has happened in the former Yugoslavia” (1993, 6). For this reason, the initial years of the Yugoslav crisis represented a period of “international readjustment and redefining identity” both for the US and Russia (Gow 1997, 185), and Washington’s assessment of the Balkans challenge was inextricably linked to its broader strategy of dealing with the Soviet dissolution: cautious, yet active cooperation with Moscow to diminish chances of renewed Russian militarism. With the Cold War over, this was the sole way to win Soviet acceptance of – or at least acquiescence to – a “just and lasting order” which invariably had Washington positioned as its keeper. As this demonstrates, the Allies indeed shared an assessment of the Bosnian conflict which highlighted both opportunities and risks. On the potential risk it posed for Greece and Turkey, the member states were in unison. While partners’ assessments focused on different challenges with respect to the opportunities and broader implications of the crisis, they in fact agreed that the conflict posed a latent hurdle to gains in NATO’s regional influence within the Balkans at the end of the Cold War. This thus illustrates compatibility in the first measure of aggregate strategic assessment fit, i.e., there was little ambiguity with respect to the impact of the Bosnia conflict on Alliance regional net power.

...but motives collide

Continental partners viewed the Cold War’s exit with guarded optimism. On the one hand, they looked optimistically to the fall of communism, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the fall of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, they glanced cautiously at the rise of a unified Germany,
the political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, and the outbreak of war in the Balkans. These conflicting developments were nevertheless reconcilable by the belief that the basis for stability lies in an ability to transcend national interests in favor of transnational cooperation (Kagan 2002, 3). In their view, the source of continental stability after the Second World War was not primarily power, but rather the ability of Europe, under the leadership of the United States, to unite in a cooperative endeavor, allowing thereby relations to continue peacefully. With the “rediscovery of Central Europe,” continental partners sought to resolve conflicting nascent developments by promoting pan-European stability under the watchful eye of the newly-established European Union (Judt 1990). As one observer notes, “Western Europe can be expected to explore actively what it sees as dramatic new political possibilities in Eastern Europe…[and] will also assert more boldly its independence of the United States on a number of foreign policy issues” (Hormats 1989, 72). Three motives underscored the continental assessments of the Bosnian crisis: to demonstrate European independence, to highlight the value of international institutions, and to promote a united Europe.

In contrast, the US looked to post-Cold War developments with hopeful skepticism. While Europeans saw cooperation as the principal source of stability, the US saw this stability rooted in power: “The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where…true security and defense…depend on the possession and use of military might” (Kagan 2002, 3). As such, the US would never rest soundly on assumptions that Europe could handle major security challenges independently; from a US perspective, it was only imposing and persistent American power which successfully maintained continental peace following the Second World War. In like manner, America doubted the value of international institutions, particularly those of a regional, European focus; after all, European conflicts were the drivers of two world wars, both of which ended only after a reluctant America entered theater. Finally, “mired history” suggested that prospects for European unity, especially one of a pan-European nature, were fanciful. In fact, the US had never advocated a united Europe, rather merely a stabile Europe. American might was the key to this stability. Thus, while Europeans boasted that the hour of Europe had arrived, the US looked at early developments with reservation. Though Washington sought greater burden-sharing and “a
division of labor at the lower end of the spectrum of defense and security activities” (Cornish 1997, 37), the most assured way to guarantee stability was to ride out the storm, adjust course slowly, and keep a solid anchor on the continental shore. This revealed the central motive driving American assessments of the Bosnian conflict: to maintain American authority within Europe. As one analyst points out, transatlantic assessments of the crisis thus encountered a collision of motives “between the post-World War II global order and the emerging post-cold war European order” (Lind 1991). As such, transatlantic assessments of the Bosnian conflict invariably revealed incompatibility on the second measure of aggregate strategic assessment fit (i.e., fundamentally different motives). Due to incompatible Allied motives, elite consensus as measured in chapter 2 was invariably low over the course of the Bosnia conflict. The following section shall therefore explore policy outputs with the expressed goal of shedding light on the measures of hegemonic legitimacy.

4.2. Examining policy outputs

NATO’s role in the Bosnian crisis can generally be divided into two phases. At the start of the crisis, the Bush Administration was preoccupied with “fighting an economic dog” domestically and, following the Gulf War, the US expressed its reluctance to become entangled in another overseas conflict in June 1991. Based on Allied assessments and as long as Europe could prove efficacious in dealing with the crisis, Washington preferred to assume a minor role within the Balkans. As such, the US iterated its expectations for munificent European extractions to deal with the conflict. To be sure, these requests were received positively on the continent. As Poos acclaimed in July, Bosnia represented “Europe’s hour” to shine, and as such, Alliance partners were eager to answer American solicitations by stepping into the driver’s seat. Though never truly absent from the conflict, it was agreed on both sides of the Atlantic that the US would not play an active role in the response. NATO’s policy was therefore one of “even-handedness” at the beginning of the crisis, entrusting the central role for peacekeeping to its continental partners (Rynning 2005, 26-8). The transatlantic approach to dealing with the

121 This is in reference to a statement made by then US Secretary of State James Baker on the Administration’s position toward the Bosnian War, in which he asserts that Washington had “no dog in this fight” (Baker 1991).
Bosnian crisis was therefore initially characterized by delegation to its European members. In the remainder of this section, I explore key developments of Allied involvement to determine whether the Alliance’s approach remained one of delegation or whether a subsequent form of intervention emerged. In the event the latter holds true, I will also examine if this change was accompanied by a corresponding shift in hegemonic legitimacy.

Initial Allied involvement within the conflict

European engagement within the Bosnian conflict materialized in June 1992 under UN Security Council Resolution 758, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to provide security to the airport in Sarajevo. A substantial role for the Protection Force in Bosnia came in September under UNSCR 770, which extended its mandate to the protection of humanitarian aid throughout the republic as well as protection of refugees as requested by the Red Cross. With the participation of 39 countries in total, European states were to take on a central role in the organization of UNPROFOR. As UN troops had proven partially effective at stabilizing the conflict in Croatia, it was hoped that the Force could provide stability within Bosnia as well.

Two specific shortcomings nevertheless presented considerable challenges to UNPROFOR operations. First, UNPROFOR lacked essential resources and the institutional structure necessary for effective operation. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that its mandate was limited to keeping peace in an area where peace did not exist. While somewhat effective in averting the worst of humanitarian disasters, the mission proved ineffective at reversing aggression and at stabilizing the area (Goulding 1993). However, this was exacerbated by inadequate organization and contributions from participating states. With the Alliance maintaining its distance, the main responsibility for resource and command provision fell on the nine participating European states. Yet many national governments in Europe felt no immediate incentive to assume a leadership position for the mandate. For example, though having no

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122 UNPROFOR’s initial mandate came on 21 February 1992 under UN Security Council Resolution 743, which set up a UN peacekeeping force in Croatia with two central objectives: to secure the conditions necessary for peace negotiations and to provide for the security of three United Nations Protected Areas.
123 Though not directly related to the Alliance’s role in the Bosnian crisis, the difficulties surrounding the European response is essential to understanding NATO’s subsequent reaction. I therefore review this briefly here.
troops in UNPROFOR, India contributed to its command by providing Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar as Force Commander and Head of Mission from March 1992 to March 1993. India stepped up to the plate to fill “this totally European command” due to “reluctance” on the part of larger European players such as France and the UK. According to Nambiar, this fact pointed to a “failure to forge a sense of solidarity and a sense of dedication” within the operation (Chopra 2006). Such operational challenges as well as Europe’s inability to effectively pool adequate assets and capabilities led to a second challenge for UNPROFOR, namely that its European contributors placed emphasis on diplomatic brokering as a means for resolving the conflict. These efforts nonetheless met with failure. The EU-organized referendum on Bosnian independence on 29 February and 1 March 1992 mobilized nationalist fractions against each other (Rynning 2005, 25) and was seen by many analysts as one of the final catalysts on the path toward war.124 In like manner, the UN-EU brokered Vance-Owen peace plan – which at first was arguably the most promising and thorough of early diplomatic efforts – was defeated when the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb assembly agreed not to support the plan in May 1993.125 Such events coupled with a number of mission losses contributed to a growing “credibility trap” not only with respect to Europe’s ability to command UNPROFOR, but more generally for NATO’s passivity in light of the growing crisis (Alterman 1993).

Indeed, the Alliance was not absent at the beginning of the conflict; on the contrary, NATO began to play a support role within the ensuing crisis as early as summer 1992.126 Though

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124 As the organizers of the referendum, the EU fell under heavy criticism for not having done more to encourage Serb participation in and support of the referendum. Final overall turnout was between 64 and 67%, with very few Serbs taking part in the vote. Many observers contend that this lack of Serb participation in the referendum contributed to the perceived illegitimacy of the results, with 99.43% voting in favor of independence (Judah and Bone 1992).

125 There were four main peace proposals presented throughout the Bosnian conflict, of which the first three ended in failure. The EU was tacitly seen as the main diplomatic actor sponsoring the first three: the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan, the Vance-Owen Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. Indeed, NATO advanced contingencies for the deployment of up to 80,000 troops to assist in the execution of the Vance-Owen Plan, and the Alliance became a fundamental advocate for introducing an “element of coercion into [the UN’s] policy of conflict resolution” (Rynning 2005, 26). Some scholars nevertheless argue that such efforts were “symbolic” in nature, as Europe unquestionably assumed the leading role throughout the negotiations process (Guicherd 1993).

126 It is also worth noting that the US as an independent actor was not absent from the conflict very long either. Washington became symbolically involved in April 1992, when the Bush Administration recognized the independence of Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. As Gow observers, this return to the scene was to a large degree “the result of criticism that it had not been providing leadership of the Western world…” (1997, 88). According to Zimmermann, this move on the part of the US represented initial signs that Western consensus for a European-led
not expressly involved in the UN Sanction Assistance Missions, the Organization aided in overseeing compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions – specifically, the weapons embargo set out in UNSCR 713 (25 September 1991) as well as UNSCR 757 (30 May 1992) –, assisting the WEU in monitoring shipments within the Adriatic Sea through *Operations Maritime Monitor* and *Maritime Guard*. Operation *Maritime Monitor* was agreed upon by the NAC and DPC on 15 July 1992 and involved the deployment of a naval force contingency from STANAVFORMED with the expressed objective of conducting “surveillance, identification and reporting of maritime traffic in areas to be defined in international waters in the Adriatic Sea.” *Maritime Monitor* began on 16 July with operations off the coast of Montenegro and ceased on 22 November with the start of *Maritime Guard*. The second operation represented an extension of *Monitor’s* arms embargo and added a component to enforce newly added economic sanctions against FRY. This resulted in an extension of *Guard’s* mandate on 28 April 1993 to support the implementation of paragraphs 28 and 29 of UNSCR 820, prohibiting most commercial traffic from entering the territorial waters of the FRY. In both operations, the Alliance made use of American AWACS air assets to assist in the monitoring of Bosnian and maritime airspace (Kaufman 2002, 79-81).

A third example of NATO involvement had its origins in October 1992, when Alliance AWACS aircraft began patrolling the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially, the Organization’s role was limited simply to monitoring and reporting violations of the UN-mandated no-fly zone under *Operation Sky Watch*. On 31 March 1993, however, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 816, which sanctioned an enforcement of the no-fly zone. This mandate resulted in the Alliance’s authorization of an enforcement operation known as *Deny Flight* on 12 April, which replaced *Sky Watch*. Over the next several months, NATO added additional operational elements to *Deny Flight*. In July 1993, NAC agreed to provide “protective airpower in case of attack against UNPROFOR in performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests” under a supplementary element known as Close Air Support (Bredal 2001, 60). The Alliance then followed up on this with a declaration in August, stating that NATO “has now decided to make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of

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peace endeavor was slowly beginning to unravel (1995, 192). Many observers contend, however, that Washington’s early moves were mostly token gestures with little substantive involvement.
Sarajevo and other areas continues, including wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance, stronger measures including air strikes against those responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (NATO 1993). Other supplementary elements included Offensive Air Support (OAS), Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and the Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB), demonstrating the prolific organizational structure which underscored Deny Flight.

Despite this, many analysts argue that Deny Flight was in act more symbolic than effectual due to three factors. First, it was argued that there was no consensus within the Alliance on the objective of the operation. According to the then US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, there was specifically little agreement among the Allies on the need for a robust use of airpower (Owen 1997, 9). Second, while Deny Flight’s organization was substantial in quantity, a number of observers assert that it was nevertheless weak. NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) as well as Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) were responsible for Deny Flight, yet both were undermanned and poorly equipped to accommodate an operation of this scope (Davis 1997). These two factors were symptomatic of a third, larger challenge, however, namely the lack of political will within the Alliance in support of Deny Flight. For NATO’s continental partners, this involved a reluctance to use military power to enforce UN sanctions: “Most of the member governments...were determined to restrict the intervention to peacemaking operations and, consequently, to avoid any military operations that would appear to favor one Bosnian faction over the other” (Owen 1997, 11). With a weighted preference in favor of a diplomatic solution to the conflict, many analysts claim that European members were too “fight-shy” to render consensus for Deny Flight under their watch. As for the Americans, commitment to the European-led effort was at the most half-hearted. As one commentator noted, “The Clinton policy initiatives have been palliatives... [It] should be seen as a cut-rate card, an attempted reassurance that despite absence in Bosnia, the United States really cares” (Ryan 1993). Thus, early NATO efforts represented more facades of transatlantic unity; in

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127 It is worth noting here that as NATO’s involvement grew over the following two years, Deny Flight became much more effective in achieving its objective of enforcing the no-fly zone. However, this came on the back of subsequent developments within the Alliance, specifically Operation Deliberate Force (discussed below), without which many argue such an improvement would not have occurred.
reality, problems with early Alliance initiatives were indicative of stark differences among the Allies as to the best strategy for ending the crisis.

One example of such differences found substantial expression through the first significant US proposal which materialized in the first half of 1993, the so-called “lift-and-strike” plan. Lift-and-strike foresaw a lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims – which had tacitly served as a significant advantage for Serbia, having inherited the Yugoslav army – and the simultaneous bombing of strategic Bosnian Serb positions. However, lift-and-strike failed to enjoy the support of European allies. The general concern within Europe was that “one must not add war to war”; lift-and-strike, it was argued, would invariably elicit a preemptive attack by the Serbs which the Bosnian Muslims would be ill-prepared to counter, and this would serve only to aggravate an already perilous situation. Thus, a gap “opened up between American and European policy,” with continental partners insisting on diplomacy while the White House criticized this as “stalling” (The Herald 1993). According to one scholar, this difference in strategy represented a “secondary cause for the perpetuation of the war” and highlighted the growing “Euro-American malaise” (Cogan 2001, 69).

Delegation begets tension

This dilemma underscored the sobering fact that in the first years of the crisis, transatlantic consensus actually grew increasingly divergent rather than coming closer together. NATO partners on both sides of the Atlantic were initially keen on Europe playing the lead role, and the US delegated responsibility to its European allies, which in turn expressed a weighted preference for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. By the summer of 1993, however, the failure of EU-sponsored peace initiatives appeared to necessitate greater military involvement. On the one hand, continental partners in fact grew increasingly reluctant to go it alone, and there were substantial calls on the part of countries like the UK and Germany –

128 In fact, Daalder (2000) notes that all policy options were back on the table by April 1993 save the deployment of US ground forces; two substantive options gained greatest prominence within the Administration, however: lift-and-strike and a cease-fire backed by protection of Muslim enclaves.
129 For example, Europe’s first significant action was to dispatch a mediating mission to the Balkans in July 1991.
130 Both the Vance-Owen and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plans faltered after failing to get the backing of rival factions in Bosnia.
although Bonn actually had no troops under UNPROFOR operations – for greater NATO engagement, and even France expressed a growing desire for “a more transatlantic presence” in the Bosnian conflict:

“France also looked on with disappointment at the poor performance shown by European governments in former Yugoslavia and became uncomfortably aware that the scope for European cooperation without some sort of US involvement might be much more limited than France had hoped and expected” (Cornish 1997, 44).

At the same time, policymakers in Washington had likewise recognized the difficulty European-led efforts had in dealing with the crisis. In fact, a number of officials within the Administration were convinced that the US would have to assume a more substantial role in order to facilitate a resolution to the conflict. In a letter sent to the President from the State Department, for example, a number of officials affirmed that efforts to end the conflict “through political and economic pressures such as sanctions and intense diplomatic engagement” had been futile. They continued by urging the White House “to try to change the course of US policy by advocating the use of military force” (Gordon 1993), and initial signs from the Administration indicated a fundamental willingness to do just that (Daalder 2000a, 14).

Washington indeed seemed poised to extirpate prescriptive delegation in favor of prescriptive activism and to assume the lead role in the intervention. To be certain, this scenario met with notable resistance among some continental partners. While Europe expressed an interest in a more assertive US presence, it was mostly hoped that this presence would provide increased bargaining leverage with which to threaten American reprisal should Belgrade not agree to a peace settlement; diplomacy remained Europe’s policy preference. Some partners were therefore apprehensive that US activism would immediately translate into military intervention. This was especially a concern for France, which having withdrawn from the integrated military structure in 1966 had no veto over Alliance defense planning decisions (BACS 1997). This led to two specific moves which further escalated tensions within the Alliance. In June 1993, a “dual-key procedure” was adopted on European initiative within NAC, which required both UN and NATO approval before the Organization could launch offensive air strikes. According to one analyst, the central reason for this move involved a concern about the “Americanisation of the intervention’s air option...Part of the dual-key arrangement was about
controlling a powerful and politically sensitive ‘weapon’ in the coalition’s arsenal, and part of it was about controlling the holders of that weapon” (Owen 1997). At the same time, the UN undertook an initiative codenamed Operation Lifeline, which was a campaign to lessen pressure, particularly from Washington, for military action (Bone and Phillips 1993).

As this illustrates, fundamentally different views on the desired strategy for intervention actually led to increased conflict between Washington, which showed a preference for military action, and European partners, which continued to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis: “The acrimony that has emerged over the disaster in Bosnia has been compared to the strains placed on the alliance when the United States sided against Britain and France over their attempt to seize the Suez Canal in 1956.” (Sloan 1995, 225) The consequence of this was clear: By August 1993, NATO was essentially incapacitated by tensions between partner states which had erected institutional barriers to military intervention and a reluctant hegemon still unconvinced that there was in fact a dog worth fighting. According to one scholar, this undermined the Alliance’s ability to devise an effective policy toward the crisis, with the effect being to actually prolong the conflict (Boyd 1995, 33).

**Necessity begets activism**

With Alliance partners already exhibiting considerable disagreement over the desired course of action in dealing with the Serbs, spring 1994 signaled NATO’s low point in the crisis. On 10 April, the Alliance undertook an air-to-ground strike against a Serb artillery command near Goražde. Coordinated by British Special Forces under NATO command, the strike was ordered to caution Serbs from approaching the United Nations Protection Area (UNPA) in the predominantly Muslim city of Goražde. Additional strikes were carried out on 11 April to once again hold back a Serb offensive. These engagements represented two of the first combat missions in the history of NATO, and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs heralded Alliance action as having been “prompt and necessary” (Hurd 1994). In actuality, the strike proved surprisingly unsuccessful. When the Serb incursion resumed, the Organization failed to agree on a

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131 See also Holbrooke (1996).
132 One additional intervention occurred when four Bosnian Serb fighter aircraft violated the no-fly zone on 28 February and were subsequently shot down by US F-16 jets on patrol within the protected airspace.
coordinated follow-up strike, serving a particularly hard blow to Alliance credibility (Sudetic 1994b). As Rynning notes, “NATO’s intervention was indecisive. In the days following the NATO strikes, Serb forces occupied all strategic points around Goražde and within days took over the city...NATO planes were patrolling the skies when Serb forces took the town but the order for action was never given” (2005, 2). Examining these events, Kaufman contends that the main dilemma for NATO by mid-1994 was that its role “was still largely undefined” (1998, 26). The general ineffectiveness of the air campaign was the result of internal conflicts over the use of military force as well as the enacted “dual key system” (Kaufman 2002, 104).

It was at this point that a discernable policy shift materialized and the second phase of NATO involvement commenced. With the conflict at a decided impasse and European-led UN efforts stalled, Washington pushed for a decisive shift in Alliance approach from one of prescriptive delegation to hegemonic activism. This was based a three-point strategy. The Administration would first back a widened diplomatic effort with two core objectives in mind. In line with its chief post-Cold War security priority of dealing carefully with Moscow, the White House sought to placate potential Russian concerns about American activism within the Balkans. Moreover, involving Russia would allow the US to seize upon Russia's deep humiliation over winning Serbian cease-fire pledges which subsequently were not honored (Scioliino 1994). At the same time, this diplomatic gesture was likewise sought to cajole European partners who were still concerned with the “Americanization” of the conflict. While France in fact recognized a growing need for American activism, other partners still remained uncertain. The UK and Germany were particularly skeptical and Canada was adamantly opposed to airstrikes. Thus, an ongoing diplomatic effort would be necessary to overcome the “dual-key dilemma,” thus allowing Washington to make use of its military option. This resulted in the formation of the “Contact Group” on 19 April 1994, comprised of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As Leigh-Phippard notes, “The initiative for the Group originated...at a time when the Americans were showing a greater willingness to be fully involved” within the Balkans, pointing thereby to signs of increased US activism (1998, 307).

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133 See page 181-2.
The second point in Washington’s strategy was to facilitate Alliance-wide support for the use of NATO military power to compel Serb acceptance of a peace settlement. Having laid a diplomatic basis for the conflict’s resolution, Washington acted swiftly to move the Organization toward action, and this resulted in a NAC ultimatum on 22 April:

“The Council reaffirmed the readiness of the Alliance...that unless Bosnian Serb actions in and around the safe area of Goražde (UN Security Council Resolution 824, paragraph 3) immediately ceases...CINCSOUTH [Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe] is authorized to conduct airstrikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and military targets...” (NAC 1994).

According to Pentagon officials, “NATO plans to carry out punishing air strikes...demonstrate that the alliance is capable of making them pay a heavy price...The objective of the raids would not be to send a political signal...Rather, the point would be to hit Serbian forces surrounding the town hard enough to deter them from continuing their attacks” (Gordon 1994). To be certain, the Council’s April ultimatum was not significant in actually ending the conflict. While Bosnian Serbs did comply with NATO’s demands by withdrawing from around Goražde on 27 April, fighting resumed a few months later in August.¹³⁴ Noteworthy, however, is that US assertiveness for military strikes starting in April faced little resistance from Alliance partners. Once Washington decided to take the helm, it once again placed expectations on its partners – this time not to lead but instead to follow. The response was unambiguous: European partners demonstrated a high willingness to comply with US solicitations.

Once these two steps met success, the final point in Washington's strategy was to eliminate the “dual-key dilemma.” In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali at the beginning of October, NATO officials expressed concern about restrictions on Alliance air strikes and formally requested radical changes to the Organization’s mandate, including the right to carry out more aggressive air campaigns with no advance warning (Cohen 1994a). An event in November served as a catalyst for even harsher US objections to the second key. In response to Bosnian Serb incursions in the UNPA around Bihać, NATO launched an air assault against a Serb airfield on 21 November in what one observer called a “largely cosmetic

¹³⁴ It is worth noting that NAC's April ultimatum was the third such demand issued by the Alliance. Previous attempts to coerce enforcement had failed, but as NATO Lieutenant General Michael Rose stated, enforcement of the previous ultimatums had been lackadaisical: “We are not going to start a war for one broken-down tank”; see Cohen (1994b).
exercise” (Polman 1994). In turn, Serb forces took more than 250 UNPROFOR soldiers hostage, a situation the Alliance claimed was difficult to prevent due to UN restraints placed on NATO’s use of force (Sudetic 1994a).

This provoked outrage in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill which had switched solidly in Republican hands after the Congressional elections on 8 November. Following the hostage debacle, US Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole asserted, for example, that “if NATO has to take orders from the United Nations, I do not see any reason for its existence” (Cornwell 1994). With political pressure mounting, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke reiterated the Administration’s staunch rejection to the dual-key system at a meeting of the Atlantic Council in early December: “The dual key turns out to be a dual veto...and there has not been one single satisfactory situation...” According to Holbrooke, the system took two international organizations “with totally different missions and mandates, and asks one to serve the other in some uneasy interaction, and then gives each organization the ability to veto or reshape the use of the other” (quoted in Sieff 1994). With the agreement of rival factions to a four-month cease-fire in Bosnia on 19 December, US pressure to eliminate the dual-key system was temporarily placed on hold. Indeed, tensions within Bosnia had subsided considerably throughout the cease-fire despite the parties’ failure to agree to an extension of the agreement. With its expiration on 1 May 1995 and in anticipation of an outbreak of renewed violence, however, Holbrooke once again stepped up Washington’s rhetoric against the second key: “…Now that the four months have ended, as far as the United States is concerned, the use of NATO air power remains a viable option...the horrendous dual-key arrangement between NATO and the UN... amounts to a dual veto in practice and inhibits us severely” (Barber 1995). This demonstrated continued American insistence that the dual-key be dropped, thereby allowing NATO alone the right to decide on air strikes over Bosnia.

The final straw for the dual-key system came in early July with the massacre at Srebrenica. Serb forces under General Ratko Mladic entered the Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia.136

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135 There were, in fact, some violations of the cease-fire, especially within the area around Bihać. In mid-February, for instance, an escalation in fighting broke out in this region, although never completely escalating to pre-1995 levels; see Cohen (1995).

136 For a thorough overview of the Srebrenica massacre, see Rohde (1998).
Bosnia, took 400 Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers hostage and carried out “the biggest single mass murder in Europe since World War II” (Holbrooke 1998, 69). The UN mission stood by helplessly as the offensive continued, and NATO was unable to intervene effectively due to resistance from The Hague. Srebrenica’s fall was a shock to the Alliance, not only because of the Organization’s impotence at defending against the attack, but also because it emboldened further Serb attacks on other enclaves. In response to a Krajina Serb attack on Bihać, a “crisis meeting” was held in London on 21 July, with the US delegation presenting its plan for the “eleventh-hour revival of NATO” (71): The Alliance would draw “a line in the sand” around Goražde and eliminate the dual key over Goražde and Sarajevo. Western partners agreed to American terms, thus achieving the third point of the US strategy. As one observer noted, London was seen by many as the “turning point” for Western engagement in the conflict (Darnton 1995).

With the agreement at London finalized, NAC drew up and authorized two contingency plans for a sustained air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs at the end of July, Operations Deliberate Force and Dead Eye. At the same time, the White House drew up a seven-point initiative at the beginning of August for a “comprehensive peace settlement.” As Holbrooke observes, this represented something of a last-ditch effort on the part of Washington: “By sending his National Security Advisor, the President…was saying: this is it – the real, and perhaps last, American push for peace” (1998, 74). However, Serb attacks did not stop, and the marketplace at Sarajevo was attacked on 28 August 1995, killing 37. NATO reacted; two days later and with the seven-point initiative unanswered, the Alliance ordered the commencement of Alliance operations. Deliberate Force began on 30 August and consisted of a series of air strikes on Bosnian Serb military targets which sought to force Serb compliance with the cease fire agreements outlined by UNPROFOR; Dead Eye started on 9 September with the objective of suppressing the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system. Deliberate Force and Dead Eye would come to be the largest military action in Alliance history at that time. NATO’s escalated response paid off, and the Bosnian Serbs conceded to Western demands at the end of September 1995. With this, Deliberate Force and Dead Eye were ended on 20 September, and it

137 The Alliance did call in air strikes on 12 July, but these were limited due to Dutch requests and failed to stop the Serb offensive.
was these operations which are most often credited for bringing about the Dayton negotiations in November 1995. Kaufman praised NATO efforts, asserting that the Alliance had proven “both effective and tied to the creation of a defensible peace plan” (1998, 27). As another observer noted, Washington’s switch from a policy of prescriptive delegation to activism not only proved successful, it served to reinforce US legitimacy: “The United States today is again Europe’s leader; there is no other” (Pfaff 1995).

4.3. Evaluating NATO’s response

While the Bosnian conflict was a regionally destabilizing event, it presented no direct challenge to NATO partners. The crisis instead infringed on two strategic interests of the Alliance. First, it awakened Allied attention in that it undercut explicit Alliance objectives put forward in the 1991 Strategic Concept to curtail instabilities arising from ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. More importantly, however, the escalation of Serb aggression against BiH – which was, in fact, symptomatic of Yugoslavia’s ambitions throughout the Balkans as a whole – increasingly posed an obstacle to NATO’s efforts to exercise greater influence throughout southeastern Europe. While not a net power loss for the Organization, the Bosnian conflict did in fact undermine its credibility and authority in a regional context, and this held the potential of curtailing NATO’s relative power gains at the end of the Cold War. Despite this, no immediate Alliance engagement resulted. During cease-fire negotiations in the fall of 1991, NATO’s Supreme Commander, John Galvin, had in fact drafted contingency plans for a possible NATO involvement, but neither the US nor its Allies seemed prepared for a military intervention on the part of the Organization (Zimmermann 1995). Instead, Alliance partners pursued flexible involvement based on US delegation to its European partners. As Rynning notes, “The United States initially sought to delegate this security task to the Europeans, most of whom were happy to demonstrate the strength of the EU’s new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” (2005, 25). Holbrooke concurs, noting Washington’s desire to “turn major security issue

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138 Alliance involvement remained solid after Dayton, specifically through Operation Joint Endeavour, also known as the Implementation Force (IFOR). Deployment of the IFOR force began on 16 December 1995 after both NAC approval and UN authorization under UNSCR 1031, and the formal transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR took place on 20 December.
entirely over to the Europeans” (Holbrooke 1998, 28). This approach nevertheless proved short of its mark, with Bosnian Serb aggression in fact escalating. As such, NATO’s initial response proved maladaptive.

In 1994, however, a dramatic change of course accentuated the transatlantic approach, and the second phase of NATO’s response began. To be certain, this was not due to a shift in motives. The US was still driven by a desire to maintain American authority within Europe, while continental partners still sought to demonstrate European independence, highlight the value of international institutions, and promote a united Europe. In like manner, this shift was not due to hegemonic positionalism, as Washington still enjoyed strong hegemonic legitimacy within the Alliance. Instead, this change was the result of a shift from prescriptive delegation to prescriptive activism. Responding to the apparent difficulty of European partners to adequately address the conflict, Washington advanced a three-point strategy based on diplomatic and military engagement. This resulted in inclusive engagement as exemplified in Deliberate Force and enjoyed the support of continental partners, and the Serb challenge was quickly defused. This served to shore up NATO’s influence within the region and can thus be seen as adaptive behavior.

4.4. Evaluating NCR theories

This allows us to now assess the individual theories for interstate security cooperation advanced in chapter 2. To be sure, the Bosnian conflict is more disconcerting for structural explanations than the Iraq case. If a regional power shift should provoke a corresponding reaction on the part of the Alliance, what accounts for the significant delay? As regards the three theories under study here, the alliance adaptation and alliance mobilization models account for the first phase of Alliance intervention, anticipating an Allied response marked by flexible cooperation and maladaptive cooperation, respectively. They do not seem able to explain the dramatic shift in spring 1994, though, as the continued presence of both low assessment fit and low elite consensus would envisage a continuation of flexible and maladaptive cooperation. This was not the case, however, as NATO intervention became inclusive and proved decisively adaptive. For this reason, it is not possible to reject the null
hypotheses $H_{0a}$ and $H_{0b}$. In contrast, the hegemonic legitimacy model appears more promising. Throughout the Bosnian conflict, US legitimacy remained high. Due to differences in assessment motives and miscalculations of the security challenge, Washington nevertheless advocated a policy of prescriptive delegation during the first phase, which its continental partners enthusiastically accepted. By spring 1994, however, it was clear that European partners could not resolve the conflict on their own, and this boded poorly for Alliance aspirations to exercise increased influence within the Balkans. Consequently, NATO switched to an approach defined by prescriptive activism, which proved successful in ending the conflict. The hegemonic legitimacy model thus seems well-poised to explain the Alliance’s delayed response, providing substantial backing for $H_{3a}$.

4.5. On hegemonic prescription

Though the analysis above has allowed for an evaluation of the individual theories’ efficacy in explaining Alliance cooperation in the Bosnia case, the process by which NATO’s intervention developed leads to several questions worthy of further consideration. I address these below.

Why initial delegation?

If hegemonic activism ultimately proved necessary to counter a potential undermining of NATO’s regional influence, what accounts for the Alliance delegation to its European partners? Scholars have advanced several explanations for this. As Mandelbaum notes, the beginning of the 1990s saw the Alliance preoccupied with the Gulf conflict, and “little high-level NATO attention was available for a conflict in the Balkans” (1996, 30). Moreover, not much political will existed on either side of the Atlantic for the deployment of NATO ground forces (Kaufman 1998, 25). At the same time, two Alliance-level concerns influenced Washington’s preference for delegation. First, the US sought to reap the benefits from a policy of “appeasement by delegation.” With the end of the Cold War, continental members expressed their interest in taking a more active role in the provision of European security. For the hegemon, this served both an immediate and a long-term interest. As regards the Bosnian conflict, it meant that Europe was willing to absorb the main share of responsibility in countering the Serb challenge.
In addition, a positive outcome in the Bosnian case could likely resolve not only the long-labored burden-sharing debate, but also the more recent debate on European security and defense identity.\textsuperscript{139} If “appeasement by delegation” proved successful, continental partners could bask in their achievements while still maintaining strong Alliance ties, thus allowing America to maintain its anchor on Europe’s shore. As such, delegation seemed the most favorable option for both the US and its Allies. The second concern was inevitably tied to America’s preoccupation with the stability of an uncertain post-Cold War system. Specifically, the US weighed the challenge to Alliance authority in the Balkans against the prospects of awakening a still powerful, yet hibernating Russian threat by actively involving itself in Moscow’s near abroad. Hormats perceptively describes this dilemma in dealing with the West’s formal rival at the Cold War’s exit, asserting that “a backlash in [Russia] is still possible...The West will need to be alert to such contingencies, even though optimism now reigns” (Hormats 1989, 90). Thus, while at face value the US seemed sympathetic to underscoring NATO influence in Eastern Europe throughout the Bosnian conflict, its primary objective by delegating was to assume an inconspicuous role so as to tread lightly on Moscow’s heals (Boyd 1995, 33).\textsuperscript{140}

\textit{Why activism in 1994?}

What, then, accounts for the timing of this dramatic shift from delegation to activism in the spring of 1994? According to Gow, NATO involvement only came once the US recognized the necessity of greater participation (1997, 307). Invariably, this “necessity” was related to a desire to reaffirm both its authority as the leader of the Alliance and NATO’s newfound gains on its eastern front. With the fall of the Soviet Union, US hegemonic legitimacy had arguably reached a new high. The West’s de facto “victory” and the emergence of the US as a unipolar power solidified American claims to the helm of the Atlantic Alliance: “The alliance’s heavy

\textsuperscript{139} The notion of a European security and defense identity can be formally traced back to a declaration made by the member states of the WEU on 10 December 1991 at a meeting in Maastricht: “WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters...in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence” (WEU 1991).

\textsuperscript{140} It is worth noting here that although the Russian Federation was in fact a member of the Contact Group, the US failed to co-opt with Russia to any significant degree throughout the process (Boyd 1995, 36). This marginalization of contact during the conflict represents another example of US attempts to mitigate potential conflict with its former rival in the politically-sensitive region.
dependence on US [power] gave the United States a decisive voice in decisions about European security. Within Europe, the United States exercised extraordinary influence” (Sloan 1995, 220). Yet the Cold War’s end brought with it the realization that legitimacy was no longer synonymous with an automaticity of NATO cohesion. For Washington, “delegating Bosnia” thus seemed a pragmatic approach by which to both ensure continued legitimacy as well as to underscore Alliance cohesion. Indeed, the first years of the Bosnian conflict demonstrate that the US enjoyed unprecedented latitude in extracting Alliance resources. Despite this, Alliance cohesion gradually came under increased pressure once delegation proved futile. According to Holbrooke, delegation was, in fact, never a viable policy option, as its perceived efficacy was based on erroneous Alliance assessments of the task at hand: “…Europe and the United States proved to be equally misguided. Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the United States; Washington believed that, with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe…” (1998, 29). In other words, the Organization’s initial approach toward the Bosnian conflict can best be attributed to miscalculations on the part of both Europeans and Americans as to the severity of the crisis and its potential for escalation, suggesting that action came only after a challenge to NATO cohesion – and invariably, US legitimacy – materialized. Hegemonic activism, when it did arrive, was not (merely) for the sake of Bosnia or broader regional stability. Rather, it was deemed necessary to underscore the cohesion of a post-Cold War Alliance (Dowd 1999, 65).
Chapter 5

The Iran Conflict, 2002-

In 2000, a policy paper released by the Project for the New American Century (2000), a conservative American think tank based in Washington, D.C., asserted that Iraq, Iran and North Korea were actively pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear arms. These claims seemed substantiated in August 2002 when an Iranian dissident group known as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) disclosed the existence of two facilities at Arak and Natanz which were being used for nuclear fuel and heavy water production. On the one hand, this revelation appeared in fact to offer little new intelligence for government officials, with various reports suggesting that “US agencies had reported the same information to policymakers, in classified form, well before the resistance group went public with it” (Hosenball 2005). On the other hand, the NCRI’s report served to fuel increased tensions and provoked substantial threats of military action against Tehran. According to one observer, the US decisively “edged closer to confrontation” with Iran following the dissemination of the report (Borger 2002). A second analysis confirmed this “threat of war,” arguing that the US could be expected “to step up their pressures...and accusations against Iran” (BBC 2002). Indeed, the US National Security Strategy released in September 2002 suggested a possible military option based on the Administration’s newly iterated policy of pre-emption: “As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and her friends by hoping for the best.” At the same time, tensions likewise escalated between Israel and Iran. In October, Iranian forces based in Lebanon were equipped with ballistic missiles which were capable of striking Tel Aviv; sources state that this move was in response to claims that Israel was considering a “pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear installations,” prompting Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to declare that Iranian forces “are ready to repel any attack to our independence, territorial integrity” (Mahnaimi 2002). As these substantial threats of armed international clashes demonstrated, 2002 signaled the emergence of a new GME conflict surrounding Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
Unlike in the case of Iraq, however, the Iranian conflict was initially accompanied by no immediate and discernable net power loss for the Alliance. The initial challenge was specifically mitigated by three factors. First, at the disclosure of its enrichment program, Tehran evidenced a willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the peaceful nature of its program. While the IAEA admitted a “number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement” (IAEA 2003b), the Agency determined that Iran was in the process of rectifying these failures. In a follow-up statement in August 2003, the Director General reported that “Iran has demonstrated an increased degree of co-operation in relation to the amount and detail of information provided to the Agency and in allowing access requested by the Agency to additional locations and the taking of associated environmental samples. The decision by Iran to start the negotiations with the Agency for the conclusion of an Additional Protocol is also a positive step” (IAEA 2003a). These efforts demonstrated a willingness on the part of Iran to allow for international oversight, and this was echoed by President Khatami’s offer in October 2003 to “offer whatever cooperation was needed to show its nuclear program was to produce electricity” (Norton-Taylor 2003a). According to IAEA officials, this showed signs of increased transparency, thus allaying speculative concerns about the covert nature of the program. Second, Iran had in fact not broken any international agreements, particularly with respect to the implementation of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. According to the Agreement, Tehran was not required to provide access to its facilities nor was it even required to declare their existence until six months prior to introducing nuclear materials. Instead, the reported breaches to the Agreement were less fundamental in nature, and this made for a high degree of uncertainty in assessing the long-term implications of Iranian failures. Finally, the situation in Iraq effectively served to “relativize” concerns over Tehran’s uranium program. If American claims that Baghdad was pursuing its own program to develop weapons of mass destruction proved true, this would surely be more destabilizing than a similar Iranian program. In any case, preoccupations with Iraq and the likelihood for a US-led intervention against Baghdad lessened the severity of the Iranian case. For these reasons, as
the Iranian conflict emerged in 2002, it seemed to pose no immediate and substantial net power loss for NATO as was the case in the Iraq conflict discussed in chapter 3.

5.1. Assessing the Iranian program

The conflict with Iran began against the backdrop of a drastically transformed NATO. First, the strategic environment had changed considerably since the early 1990s. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 served to direct NATO’s attention to the dangers of vaguer, non-state security risks, and these quickly found place among the foreign policy priorities of a number of member states. Following Bush’s labeling of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address, for example, the Administration asserted its determination “to make sure that these regimes do not get these weapons of mass destruction” (Rice 2002). Second, the Alliance had also enlarged; in March 1999, three new members – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – joined NATO and a sizeable group of Eastern European countries were currently participating in Membership Action Plans, expecting accession over the next few years. Moreover, NATO had become increasingly active since the end of the Iraq conflict. For example, the Alliance had participated in a number of conflicts in southeastern Europe, which had not only helped to solidify its relevance in a post-Cold War era but which likewise underscored the Organization’s determination and, indeed its ability, to go – and remain – out-of-area. A poignant example of this was NATO’s role in Afghanistan. A number of Allied states had actively been participating in US-led Operation Enduring Freedom as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established on 20 December 2001 under UN Security Council Resolution 1386. Though NATO’s role in Afghanistan was still indirect, developments pointed to a greater involvement on the part of the Alliance in the near future.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century represented a drastically altered security landscape, within which the Alliance as well as its individual member states had demonstrated greater enthusiasm in addressing out-of-area security challenges than was the case in the early 1990s.

\textsuperscript{141} An active role for NATO in Afghanistan came in August 2003 when it assumed command over the UN-mandated ISAF.
The question remains, however, as to how this out-of-area role for the Alliance played out specifically in the Iran conflict and the implications this has with respect to testing the three theories of security cooperation explored in this analysis. In the section which follows, I examine initial Allied assessments of the Iran conflict to determine the degree of NATO’s aggregate assessment fit.

An evident misfit in strategic assessment
In the case of Iran, greater enthusiasm for out-of-area intervention did not facilitate agreement in strategic assessments of Alliance partners. In formulating their assessments, member states made use of both domestic and international intelligence in the initial phase of the conflict, with regular IAEA reports being one particular instrument used for this purpose. Though the Allies relied on the same reports, their interpretations proved drastically different. Pointing to the June 2003 IAEA report, for example, the US maintained that Iran had not been in full compliance with NPT safeguards agreements, failing to inform the Agency about new facilities including design and waste storage systems, the importation of natural uranium in 1991, and the use and location of these materials (ElBaradei 2003b). Washington alleged that irregularities in Tehran’s claims to be pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as stipulated in Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were thus substantiated. This view was summed up in the comments of then-US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton: “There is awareness of the threat posed by Iran and consensus [in Washington] that threat has to be eliminated” (Norton-Taylor 2003b). According to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, “The United States believes that Iran’s nuclear development program ‘had an intent to produce a nuclear weapon’” (Fuller 2003). Such statements clearly elucidate early US assessments of the Iranian challenge: Tehran sought to acquire nuclear technology for military purposes and therefore posed a threat to the safety of the US and its Allies.

In contrast, continental assessments were considerably more tempered. Although US concerns over “irregularities and intransparency” in Iran’s program enjoyed sympathy within Europe, many Alliance partners argued that early IAEA reports in fact indicated “no evidence” of a nuclear weapons program. It was still “too early to say” what the objective nature of
Iranian activities were, but they expressed optimism over Tehran’s apparent willingness to take part in constructive diplomacy (Straw 2003). Unlike their US counterparts, European officials viewed Tehran’s posture as “honest” and its willingness to “continue all the way to the end [with negotiations]” promising, mitigating thereby concerns about the long-term military objectives of its initiative (Solana 2003). In other words, continental Allies seemed unconvinced that initial IAEA findings backed Washington’s claims of a covert military undertaking by Tehran. This posture elicited harsh critique from Washington, with Secretary Powell (2003) expressing his fundamental disagreement with European assessments: “I would not have gone quite as far.” According to one observer, such comments underscored the diverging paths coming from both sides of the Atlantic as well as Washington’s “despair of Europe’s feebleness” in its assessment of the Iranian threat (IAEA 2003a). This demonstrates the considerable discrepancies in the strategic assessments of Alliance partners at the outset of the conflict.

Early assessments likewise underscored disagreement among the Allies over motives. US appraisals, on the one hand, were driven to a large extent by revisionist ambitions. Various analysts report that the Bush Administration had actively promoted a policy of regime change within Tehran since the delineation of its National Security Strategy in September 2002. One observer claimed that a new approach toward Iran had emerged within Washington which might involve the “covert or overt pursuit of regime change” (LaFranchi 2003). This echoed comments by Flynt Leverett, former senior director for Middle East affairs of the National Security Council, who reported in May 2003 that influential officials “in the administration are pushing the regime change option.” Moreover, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as well as Deputy Secretaries Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith openly expressed their preference for a government shift in Tehran (Pratt 2003). Such policies invariably played a key role in American policy toward Iraq, and many argued that these considerations likely influenced early Administration assessments of the Iranian conflict as well. On the other hand, European partners rejected the expressed interest by some within the Bush Administration who promoted regime change in Tehran (Goldenberg 2003). In a speech before the House of Lords on 18 March 2003, former British cabinet minister Lord Michael Jopling declared that such revisionist motives had taken “a stranglehold on the Pentagon and seem, as well, to have a
compliant armlock on the President himself.” As one analyst notes, Jopling’s sentiments were widely shared by various governments across Europe (Kimball 2003), evident in the comments of key European officials. For example, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw expressed his profound disagreement when asked about calls for regime change in Iran, arguing that “it would be the gravest possible error to think in that way.” French Foreign Ministry spokesperson François Rivasseau echoed this view, noting that “France, like British Foreign Secretary [Straw] who had described this as a grave error, rejects such a stance” (Binyon and Eeles 2002). Dismissing arguments for regime change as “unconstructive,” continental assessments were instead based on decidedly more status quo motives of pursuing dialogue and negotiation with Tehran to guarantee IAEA access to Iranian facilities and to promote transparency in an effort to avoid nuclear proliferation. As this reveals, divergent motives underlined the strategic assessments of Alliance partners on the Iranian challenge. According to the alliance adaptation model, this therefore signaled a low degree of aggregated assessment fit within NATO. Conflicting motives also point to low elite consensus based on the alliance mobilization model.\textsuperscript{142} I therefore turn to the measures for hegemonic legitimacy below to draw the final model of alliance cooperation into this analysis.

5.2. Explicating hegemonic expectations

From the beginning of the conflict, the US position was clear. The Bush Administration advocated a tough stance against Iran, insisting that non-compliance with NPT agreements must result in strong reproof. NATO partners were asked to play a pivotal role in this respect, and Washington delineated three key expectations for an Alliance contribution. First, the US expected its Allies to assume an instrumental role in pursuing diplomatic talks with Tehran on behalf of broader Western interests. With the severing of diplomatic ties in 1979, US relations with Iran had been decidedly cold, and Bush’s labeling of Tehran as part of the “axis of evil” weakened these relations even further. NATO’s continental partners, however, had a decisive

\textsuperscript{142} As discussed in chapter 2, shared motives represent an essential element for measuring elite consensus. As motives proved divergent in the Allies’ initial response to the Iran conflict, it is therefore unnecessary to explore the compatibility of policy remedies and domestic political risks.

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advantage on which Washington sought to capitalize: “Europe...has had diplomatic relations with the leadership in Tehran for over two decades, and there is a growing trade relationship of importance to both sides, but especially to Iran. For some European countries, especially Germany, ties... go back centuries” (Kimmitt 2003). Thus, the US solicited partner states to undertake a particularly strong effort at engaging Tehran in negotiations to secure IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear facilities.

A second expectation iterated by Washington was its hope that Alliance partners would support increased political pressure on Iran by threatening credible negative incentives for non-compliance. On the one hand, this pressure involved European support – in collaboration with Russia and the IAEA – at persuading the Iranians “to allow the intrusive inspections of nuclear plants upon which America...has been insisting” (Woollacott 2003). Part of this plan would allow, however, for the possibility of intervention by the UN Security Council “if [Iran] continues with a nuclear weapons program” (Washington Post 2003). On the other hand, Washington also asserted its anticipation that partners would be willing to levy strict economic sanctions against Tehran should it fail to comply with NPT guidelines. Unlike the United States which had gradually tightened sanctions since initially imposing them in 1979, Europe still had considerable economic ties with Iran, and administration officials sought to secure support from Alliance partners for the possibility of stern sanctions. This would provide the US with a substantial economic stick over Tehran, which it alone did not wield. Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher confirmed this strategy when asked whether the US supported sanctions and investment restrictions, saying that they were necessary “given recent revelations about Iran’s nuclear programs and efforts being made through the International Atomic Energy Agency to deal with the threat Iran poses” and expressing the government’s anticipation that partner states would follow suit (Boucher 2003).

Finally, the US insisted on Allied unity with respect to the “range of possible responses” in confronting Tehran. To be sure, Washington likely preferred a diplomatic solution to the conflict for two reasons. First, a number of analysts have since pointed to the strain placed on the US military by its sizeable commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan at the time the Iranian conflict surfaced, maintaining that these prior engagements left the United States with “only
limited ground force capability ready to respond to other contingencies” (Perry 2006, 3). Moreover, the Bush Administration was well aware of the objections by many Alliance partners to a military alternative. Due to preexisting military obligations and keen to avoid another transatlantic rift in the aftermath of Iraq, Washington thus expressed a preference for multilateral involvement in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. However, administration officials voiced their conviction that achieving a positive diplomatic outcome would necessitate a convincing military option with which to persuade Tehran to come to the bargaining table. For this reason, Washington was unwilling to rule out a military response against Iran and insisted that its continental partners openly avoid countering its assertive stance. Indeed, this expectation was so unambiguously expressed that it elicited acknowledgement from several European states. According to the British Foreign Office, for example, “The United States is increasingly impatient and favors a more confrontational approach, preferably isolation, but, failing all else, conceivably military [action]” (La Guardia 2003). Based on the three elements discussed here, it can be said that the US expressed clear expectations for resource extraction in confronting Iran. In the following section, I turn to a discussion of the initial Alliance response to determine whether continental partners answered these American solicitations affirmatively.

5.3. An initial response shrouded in conflict

Following the report released by the NCRI in August 2002 and increasingly heated rhetoric by skeptical observers in Washington, calls were made for Tehran to respond to accusations surrounding its nuclear program. On 16 September 2002, the President of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, H.E. Reza Aghazadeh, addressed the IAEA General Conference in Vienna and confirmed his country’s pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program:

“Iran is embarking on a long-term plan, based on the merits of energy mix, to construct nuclear power plants...The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of its Islamic tenets, beliefs and human affinity, has always condemned the possession of weapons of mass destruction...My country has maintained its strong and active ties with the organization and has submitted all its nuclear activities including the Bushehr Power Plant Project to the supervision of the Agency. Complete transparency of my country’s nuclear activities is a serious commitment endorsed by my government” (Aghazadeh 2002).
The response to Aghazadeh’s declaration was lackluster for two reasons. The first explanation had to do with US reliance on IAEA mechanisms to address Iran’s program. Preoccupied in Iraq and bearing the weight of damage to its reputation caused by its unilateral intervention against Baghdad, the United States viewed the IAEA as a feasible means by which to effectively confront Iran with political pressure while simultaneously demonstrating a willingness to do so in a multilateral context (DiFilippo 2006, 113-4). As such, the IAEA became a primary instrument of the US to substantiate its allegations against Iran – rather than relying on national intelligence estimates, which were proving dubious with respect to Iraq’s WMD program – and to advocate the need for a swift and united international response. At the time of Aghazadeh’s statement, however, the IAEA was becoming substantially preoccupied in a second, simultaneous crisis. In discussions with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly at the beginning of October 2002, North Korea admitted to a covert nuclear arms program, sparking calls for complete disclosure from the IAEA and filling the Agency’s docket with a heavy workload for months to come. As such, both the Agency and Washington were forced to look elsewhere, as attention to Tehran took a backseat to that cast on Pyongyang.

The second reason for the trivial response involved Washington’s attention to a third member of the axis of evil, namely Iraq. As Washington placed itself on a parallel collision course with Baghdad, a number of NATO partners began to assert their staunch objection to the possible use of force. This resulted in a palpable transatlantic discord, and an embittered transatlantic rift between pro- and anti-intervention camps led to an Allied stalemate. For example, while French President Chirac was instrumental in achieving unanimous support for a first resolution against Iraq (UNSCR 1441) on 9 November, both France and Germany resisted calls from the UK and the US for a second Resolution authorizing the use of force on Baghdad. Thus, the Iraq conflict served as an additional factor which detracted attention away from the Iranian case, as Washington sought to deal both with an imminent military confrontation and the untimely inconvenience of a transatlantic fissure.

Director General ElBaradei’s visit to Tehran in February 2003 represented the first notable response to Iran’s nuclear program. As ElBaradei acknowledged following the meetings, “Iran

\[143\] As cited in Rynning (2005, 140), Chirac made an exerted effort to secure the support of Syria, which was a rotating member of the Council at the time, on the Resolution.
affirmed its obligations under the NPT to use all nuclear technology in the country exclusively for peaceful purposes... it agreed to amend the Subsidiary Arrangements of its safeguards agreement, thereby committing Iran to provide design information on all new nuclear facilities at a much earlier date” (ElBaradei 2003a). The inherent optimism in ElBaradei’s analysis received a generally warm reception in Europe, but was met with considerably greater skepticism in Washington which hoped for a tough stance against Tehran. The situation in Iraq and efforts at dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program served as distractions from the Iranian case, however, until the Director General’s June report which reported that Iran “has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed” (IAEA 2003a). In response to the Director’s report, the Board likewise expressed their position that Iran’s activities represented a “matter of concern” and articulated their wish that Tehran cooperate in resolving discrepancies in compliance (IAEA 2003b). These findings were welcomed in Washington, which had announced an end to combat operations against conventional forces in Iraq six weeks prior and seemed ready to tighten its position toward the Iranian government.

Part of this tougher stance included exerting greater pressure on Tehran, and Washington called in on the expectations placed on its Allies to facilitate this objective. In part, Europe relied. With respect to the first expectation for greater involvement, continental partners took the lead at initiating increased dialogue with Iran, including offering positive incentives for compliance with UN-supervised inspections. According to British Foreign Minister Straw, “The UK and EU have a policy of constructive [diplomacy] with Iran, but...we are all very concerned to see progress and particularly for Iran to better cooperate with the IAEA.” One commentator added that while NATO’s European allies seemed “more circumspect than Washington in accusing Tehran of conducting a secret nuclear program,” they nevertheless “linked Iranian cooperation on nuclear inspections to progress in implementing a trade and cooperation agreement under negotiation between Europe and Iran” (Dobbs 2003). EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg confirmed this claim, noting that trade with Iran and inspections were “interdependent” issues. A second sign of Europe’s willingness to answer Washington’s
solicitations for help in negotiating with Iran came in October 2003, as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom sent their foreign ministers to Tehran. Known as the EU-3, the group was successful at concluding the so-called “Tehran Declaration,” which obliged Iran to sign an “Additional Protocol” and voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment. In exchange, the EU-3 agreed that “once international concerns, including those of the three governments, are fully resolved Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas” (Iran 2003, pt. 3d). As these developments demonstrate, continental partners were willing to accept hegemonic extraction with respect to the Washington’s first request, namely that Europe play an instrumental role in engaging Tehran on behalf of broader Western interests.

However, American expectations for confronting Iran did not stop merely with progress in constructive diplomacy. For instance, one observer noting the position of the Bush Administration commented that the Tehran Declaration “is a very important step forward, but it is not the end of the road that is going to take Iran away from nuclear weapons” (Kimball 2003). This revealed the general sentiment within the White House that dealing with Iran could not simply be done through diplomacy alone. Instead, the US likewise sought to increase pressure by threatening economic sanctions and the reservation of a military option should Tehran fail to follow through with its compliance. However, continental enthusiasm toward US solicitations for additional measures was decidedly lacking. For the Allies, the Tehran Declaration served as solid confirmation of the progress to be had through negotiations alone, and European partners widely agreed that coercion could in fact provoke an undesirable response on the part of Iran. This led to a sharp reprise by the EU-3 of Washington’s calls for stiffer action, with Gaffney noting that Europe had “pledged to preclude the United States from doing anything...either via the UN Security Council or through covert or military means.” This was seen by many analysts as a sign that America’s veto-wielding Security Council partners were “determined to thwart UN action” toward either economic sanctions or military action, providing Bush with little leeway to “internationalize” the Iranian conflict (Gaffney 2003). Germany, for example, was “staunchly reluctant” to accept any reference to the possible use of force in formulating a common strategy toward weapons of mass destruction at a summit in Salonika on 17 June (Black and Steele 2003).
Notwithstanding obvious European skepticism, Washington ratcheted up calls for a move from mere diplomacy to coercion on the back of a the IAEA’s February 2004 report which expressed the Agency’s renewed concern over Iran’s continued lack of transparency.\textsuperscript{144} Despite the Director General’s critique and increased pressure from Washington for negative incentives against Tehran, continental partners seemed undeterred in their preference for a diplomatic resolution, dismissing as “unconstructive” the “hardline approach of the Bush Administration.” Though the US proved successful at finally pushing through an IAEA resolution in March 2004, which deplored Tehran for its failure to fully disclose its activities, it expressed dissatisfaction with the conciliatory tone of the March resolution as well as a follow-up resolution in June, instead calling for noteworthy negative incentives. As a result of ongoing US pressure, the IAEA adopted a tougher resolution in September 2004, which emphasized the Agency’s deep regret that Tehran had partly reversed “the implementation of...voluntary decisions to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, notified to the Agency on 29 December 2003 and 24 February 2004” (IAEA 2004b). While insisting on Tehran’s compliance, the September resolution nevertheless fell considerably short of US expectations in that it failed to put forward a deadline for Iranian compliance with NPT obligations that could invite a referral to the UN Security Council. This was in large part due to Alliance partners – particularly France, the UK, and Germany – which pushed for a more assuaging approach vis-à-vis Tehran.

The lowest common denominator among transatlantic partners with respect to further efforts in dealing with Iran instead focused on continued diplomacy rather than coercion. Under the auspices of the EU-3, the triumvirate once again backed “intensified dialogue” with Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and succeeded at reaching consensus on the so-called Paris Agreement on 15 November 2004, according to which Tehran agreed to a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program and the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol as a confidence-building gesture (IAEA 2004a). As was the case with the

\textsuperscript{144} The Director General specifically criticized three key aspects of Iran’s program: the existence of highly-enriched uranium at two sites – the most pressing concern of the IAEA –, information on the design and research of P-2 centrifuges, and the possession of polonium-210. According to ElBaradei, this raised suspicion as to whether Tehran’s declaration from October 2003, which states that it had reported “the full scope of Iranian nuclear activities” including “complete centrifuge R&D chronology,” actually represented an actual reflection of Iranian ambitions (ElBaradei 2003b).

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Tehran Agreement, the EU-3 interpreted the Paris accords as an additional sign that diplomatic endeavors were bearing fruit, and this emboldened their repudiation of ever further calls from Washington for a more bellicose stance.

According to the third model explored in this analysis, the Allies’ unwillingness to accept hegemonic solicitation as regards the second and third expectations underscored the low degree of hegemonic legitimacy within the Alliance during the early stages of the Iranian conflict (DiFilippo 2006, 116). By 2004, the “Iran rift” between NATO partners was more apparent than ever, as the US recognized a sustained inability to sway continental members to a more assertive posture. In November 2004, for example, President Chirac accentuated the need for a more assertive Europe in an “ever more multipolar world,” a phrase which was widely seen as a potential challenge to NATO cooperation. In a similar fashion, Norwegian Prime Minister Magne Bondevik pointed out that the divisions between America and Europe was leading “toward a growing consolidation in Europe,” which could well give impetus to forums for interstate cooperation other than the Organization itself. Invariably, these developments placed considerable strain on Washington’s efforts to prescribe a confrontational approach among Alliance partners for dealing with Iran. The final blow to American efforts at prescribing a “Western approach” came at the Munich Security Conference in February 2005 with a provocative call by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to overhaul US-European relations. Arguing that the Alliance was “no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate policies,” Schröder asserted that the Organization “in its current form does justice neither to the [European] Union’s growing importance nor to the new demands on transatlantic cooperation” (Schröder 2005a). His plan was accompanied by a concomitant plea on the part of German Defense Minister Peter Struck for the US to moderate its demands for a tough stance on Iran: “I strongly encourage the US administration to actively support the Europeans’ diplomatic efforts...We must overcome Iran’s massive isolation for Iran will only abandon its nuclear ambitions for good if not only its economic but also its legitimate security interests are safeguarded” (Struck 2005). As this demonstrates, aversion to US hawkishness on Iran was considerable at the beginning of 2005, and some
continental partners even expressed a subtle willingness to check American preferences for a harsh stance vis-à-vis Tehran.

Indeed, these developments provoked a substantial, conciliatory gesture on the part of Washington. Though Washington rejected Schröder’s proposal outright and brushed aside claims that NATO was outdated, Munich signaled a significant move by the US toward a more cooperative stance in its approach to the Iranian conflict. In his speech before conference participants, Secretary Rumsfeld “lavishly praised” both NATO and its European members (Dempsey 2005), acknowledging the value America placed on the Alliance as the “most impressive military alliance in the history of mankind” (Rumsfeld 2005). He conceded, however, that opportunities for cooperation existed outside the Alliance framework and expressed the Bush Administration’s interest in supporting continental efforts to “proceed on its own diplomatic path” for dealing with Iran. Though the US remained doubtful over the effectiveness of European-led diplomatic initiatives, Munich revealed Washington’s attempts at budging in a policy direction decidedly more in line with European preferences in an effort to cajole growing Allied dissatisfaction. This development thus supports the claims made by the hegemonic legitimacy model that low legitimacy results in hegemonic positionalism.

5.4. The gradual development of a prolonged power loss

Despite disparities in the policy approaches sought by the US and its partners as well as the resulting Washington’s positionalism aimed at placating its continental Allies, developments within the conflict in fact point to an ongoing, albeit prolonged, net power shift to NATO’s detriment since the beginning of the crisis in 2002. While initial evidence of this can be observed in the IAEA’s first discouraging report from June 2003, three events in the second half of 2005 accentuated the Alliance’s ensuing power loss. First, the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the sixth President of the Islamic Republic represented a major setback for negotiation efforts spearheaded by the EU-3. The political leader of a coalition of conservative political groups known as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran, Ahmadinejad was seen as the

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145 It is worth mentioning, however, that Rumsfeld unequivocally announced Washington’s right to intervene unilaterally or in coalitions of the willing if future security developments so required.
less likely of the two run-off candidates to work at defusing the ensuing conflicts through earnest negotiation with the West. While Ahmadinejad’s opponent, Akbar Rafsanjani, also ardently advocated the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program, he had previously served as President from 1989 to 1997. At that time, Rafsanjani was widely seen as having a track record of seeking dialogue with the US and was also known for his “economy-first” approach. It was hoped that his election in 2005 would direct Tehran’s priority to economic and domestic policy and make for a more calculable Iranian foreign policy which sought to cooperate internationally (El-Labbad 2005). Yet the election of Ahmadinejad represented a less predictable variable which could well bring with it negative implications for the ongoing negotiations process. In a press statement following the confirmation of election results, British Foreign Secretary Straw confirmed this apprehension: “I hope that under Mr Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, Iran will take early steps to address international concerns about its nuclear programme...” (Straw 2005b). Straw’s statement echoed the general fear among Alliance partners that Iran’s new president would not only renge on negotiations, but that he would instead aggravate the situation by hastening the pace of his country’s nuclear program. As two observers noted, Iran’s new president-elect would likely challenge “western leaders by vowing to resist international pressure to abandon the country’s nuclear programme...” (Tait and MacAskill 2005). In the summer of 2005, the political climate in Tehran thus seemed much less conducive to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.

Political developments coming out of Tehran in fall 2005 served as a second sign of NATO’s gradual net power loss within the region. In August, Iran resumed uranium enrichment in defiance of IAEA agreements. Deemed as a “breach of the Paris Agreement” by the UK Foreign Ministry (Ryan 2005), the Iranian government’s decision to remove seals at its facility in Isfahan provoked immediate rebuke from NATO partners. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer warned of “a miscalculation in Tehran,” and a US State Department spokesperson stated, “If Iran does violate the terms of the Paris agreement [by resuming enrichment], then that would be extremely concerning. It would result in us looking at options of moving forward on other actions” (Hemming 2005). An additional source for increased conflict came in October, as Ahmadinejad declared at a conference in Tehran that “the eradication of Israel will soon be
realized...Israel must be wiped off the map” (Ahmadinejad 2005). Calls of condemnation ensued, with the British Foreign Office describing the President’s comments “deeply disturbing and sickening” and the French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy summoning the Iranian ambassador to Quai d’Orsay for an explanation of the statement (Salhan 2005). The comments also prompted Israel’s Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom to assert that Tehran’s regime represented a “clear and present danger” to the region. According to one observer, such political developments coming out of Iran altered the stakes considerably: “The Americans have always contended that the development of Iranian nuclear power was a front for producing a nuclear bomb...They have always been suspicious of Tehran and things came to a head last month when the IAEA found that Iran was no longer in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty” (Royle 2005). These actions revealed that Tehran’s boldness and the ominous prospects it presented for diplomatic progress inevitably reflected a growing potential for prolonged and destabilizing conflict.

Finally, while not specifically challenging the security of any Alliance partners directly, Tehran’s posture posed a gradually increasing challenge to NATO’s strategic interests within the region for three reasons. First, there was fear that Iran’s defiance of NPT agreements would create a “cascade effect” among other nations in the GME: “Allowing Iran to subvert the NPT successfully from inside would deal the treaty a fatal blow. And in a volatile region, even just the enduring suspicion of Iran’s nuclear intentions could tempt others – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey – to reconsider their non-nuclear vows too” (Economist 2003). Moreover, the US’s substantial military presence within the Middle East created greater potential for conflict with Tehran. As one scholar notes, Iran has “...a permanent new neighbor called the United States, a neighbor that has transformed its over-the-horizon, proxy-based presence into a direct political and physical presence...The US and Iran have gradually exhausted the space for proxy wars between them, and now stand on the threshold of either further and more serious confrontation or reconciliation” (Mesbah 2004, 129). Thus, geographical proximity and its inherent potential for added conflict added to the challenge placed on Alliance interests. Lastly,

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146 NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer also noted the relevance of this three years later: “…de Hoop Scheffer has warned that more nations may follow the examples of Iran and North Korea and work to develop nuclear weapons (2008b).
reliable evidence had surfaced by the end of 2005 to implicate Iran in the continuing insurgency in Iraq. As one observer noted, Tehran was supporting Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, a Shiite insurgency leader in Iraq, by supplying his network with weapons and funding (De Borchgrave 2005). Such claims were substantiated in comments made by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who called on Iran to play the role of the “good neighbor” toward Iraq, as well as British Foreign Minister Straw, who asserted Whitehall’s suspicion that Iran was responsible for recent attacks on UK soldiers: “What we have presented to the Iranians is evidence which, in our judgment, clearly links the improvised explosive devices which have been used against British and other troops, mainly in the south of Iraq, to Hezbollah and to Iran” (Straw 2005a). With NATO’s recent establishment of its Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) in December 2004, suspected Iranian involvement in the insurgency could therefore have implications on the safety of Alliance personnel; this served to raise additional red flags within the Organization. As such, the gradual unfolding nature of the Iran conflict demonstrated not only an increasingly unstable turn in the crisis, but it also highlighted a growing challenge to NATO’s strategic interests within the region. Taken together, these factors pointed to an ensuing net power loss for the Alliance within the GME from the beginning of the conflict onward, with 2005 serving as one lucid example of this trend.

5.5. Reassessing Iranian efforts

To be certain, the increasing visibility of a power loss in the GME was accompanied by a gradual shift in Alliance policy. Such change became particularly evident following the start of President Bush’s second term in 2005. First, a new strategic assessment of the conflict came on the heels of a discernable shift in US motives vis-à-vis Iran. There was growing consensus within Washington that the Administration’s revisionist posture aimed at regime change in Tehran was neither feasible nor in the broader interests of the US. It was not feasible in the sense that plans aimed at regime change were exceptionally complex, carried a number of potential risks, and could not guarantee an efficacious outcome (Haass 2005). Moreover, the posture was not in line with broader American interests in promoting a common Atlantic strategy in dealing with Iran. In essence, two factors were pivotal in affecting the change in Washington’s toward Iran.
First, Bush’s second term began in 2005, and one of the chief objectives of the Administration following reelection was to begin a solid process rapprochement with European partners. On the one hand, this was seen as crucial to underscore transatlantic solidarity after the “ill-natured disputes over the Iraq War” and the evident rift over Iran which came to the fore at Munich (O’Sullivan 2005, 35). Bush pledged a “new era of transatlantic unity,” thus repeatedly striking throughout the first half of 2005 a conciliatory tone, attempting to reassure Europe of America’s willingness and desire to “move beyond the differences of the past, that we can work a lot together to achieve big objectives” (Bush 2005b). On the other hand, developments on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan led many in the Administration to the conclusion that increased commitments from Alliance partners would be necessary to alleviate the economic and military burdens being shouldered by Washington. On-going insurgency as well as problems related to US-led reconstruction efforts was presenting considerable challenges for the United States. NATO allies were largely seen as countries of first resort for economic and logistical assistance, and American officials thus sought to supplicate Alliance member states for increased burden-sharing – or at least, sustained, in the case of Iraq – on both fronts (Richard 2008). With continental partners averse, or even hostile, to the idea of regime change in Iran, the Bush Administration was forced to weigh its options in a “you-cannot-have-everything” manner.

A second factor which encouraged Washington’s motive shift in 2005 was the perceived growing complexity of the strategic environment in the Middle East. In particular, a number of secondary security challenges had begun to emerge throughout the region. For example, tensions were high with Syria as substantial evidence surfaced suggesting a potential link between Damascus and the assassination of Lebanese opposition leader Rafic Hariri on 14 February. Moreover, increased support among the Palestinians for the radical political faction Hamas, classified as a terrorist organization by the US and its Alliance partners, was seen by many observers as a further complication to achieving a durable peace to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis (Herzog 2006). Finally, ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the resulting instability it produced was another thorn in the side of Washington’s Middle Eastern policy. Successfully

147 In fact, this support resulted in the establishment of a Hamas-led government following the Palestinian parliamentary elections of 26 January 2006.
dealing with these challenges meant for the US altering its motives, and the revisionist
ambitions of Bush’s first term necessarily gave way to a policy which instead sought to simply
keep a lid on a simmering pot. Thus, in assessing the Alliance’s gradual power loss in the GME,
the US was motivated by a status quo oriented posture which fell squarely in line with those of
its European partners.

Later Allied assessments of the Iranian challenge were unambiguous: Iran posed an
increasingly significant threat to the Alliance for three reasons. The first two related to the
destabilizing impact of its nuclear program. First, Tehran had begun to directly defy obligations
it had made under the NPT. Not only did this have the potential to create a domino effect which
could mean the end to the NPT regime itself, but it also demonstrated Ahmadinejad’s unwilling
to fulfill international, legally-binding agreements. This cast a dubious shadow on the prospects
for a diplomatic solution to which Iran would adhere. This position was reflected in comments
by British Minister Straw at a meeting of the EU-3 in Berlin in early January 2006, in which he
declared that talks with Tehran had reached a “dead end,” with the three countries agreeing
that the IAEA Board was now obligated to refer the case to the UN Security Council. Second,
Iran’s stance had provoked an aggressive defense posture in Jerusalem. On the back of
Ahmadinejad’s comments calling for Israel’s destruction, relations between the two countries
had become overtly hostile, and Prime Minister Sharon declared in late 2005 that “Israel will
not accept a nuclear weapon equipped Iran.” According to Eran Lerman, Director of the
American Jewish Committee, Iran and “its rapid development of a nuclear weapons capability”
had become Israel’s chief security threat, with Israeli analysts “convinced Iran is about to
accelerate its program...” (Atkins 2005). Support for the revival of the Begin Doctrine grew
within the Knesset,148 and numerous sources confirm that Israeli Defense Forces had been
ordered on alert with plans for airstrikes against Iranian installations drafted (Butcher 2005).
This gave way to considerable fears among NATO partners that acrimonious rhetoric could
quickly spiral into a heated conflict between the two parties.

148 The Begin Doctrine was outlined by Israel’s 6th Prime Minister, Manachem Begin, who ordered the bombing of
an Iraq nuclear reactor named Osirak on 7 June 1981: “On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the people of Israel.” Right-wing Likud party candidate Benjamin
Netanyahu made reference to this doctrine in the run-up to the March 2006 Knesset elections.
Finally, Alliance partners not only agreed that Tehran represented a short-term threat, they likewise recognized the long-term challenge posed by the ongoing nuclear program. According to one analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Iran had made considerable technological progress in its initiative and “will be three years away from producing a nuclear bomb if it can feed the uranium through 1,000 centrifuges that it hopes to operate at Natanz. A 50,000-centrifuge plant being built nearby could hasten the process considerably” (Baxter and Mahnaimi 2006). Secretary Rice confirmed the shared concerns of NATO members following consultations with the EU-3, asserting that the partners were “gravely concerned” with Iran’s defiance: “It is very clear that everyone believes a very important threshold has been cleared” (Rice 2006b). As one Spanish commentator noted, the Iranian threat presented “terrifying destructive capability...on the borders of Turkey, the direct zone of influence of NATO...” (BBC 2005). In other words, there has been a very slow, unfolding power transition since the beginning of the Iran conflict, which has been accentuated by Iraq’s elimination as a regional balancer. Thus, a growing Iranian challenge to Alliance regional influence as well as the prolonged, organized process of perception and realization of this challenge on the part of NATO partners has provoked a reexamination of the conflict and resulted in the aggregation of a shared Allied assessment as outlined in the alliance adaptation model.

5.6. Evaluating elite consensus

Gaining Iranian power has also led to a transatlantic convergence on the policy remedies necessary to effectively deal with the ensuing conflict; two proposed remedies demonstrated this convergence. First, Alliance partners agreed to a multilateral, yet united, strategy on Iran. At the end of 2005, Administration officials approached European partners with a proposal for greater multilateral activism in building “a coalition to contain Iran...” (Keen 2005). Part of this proposal was the recognition by Washington of the ardent attempts by the EU-3 at engaging Tehran. At the same time, the parties acknowledged the need for a larger and more structured international response. This would take place not through the Organization, however, rather through the establishment of a “comprehension negotiations team” consisting of the US and
EU-3 as well as Russia and China in the so-called P5+1.\textsuperscript{149} As US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns noted, there was clear “consensus of a need for action,” and this was best achievable through an “international coalition against [Iran]” (Burns 2005). An added benefit of this remedy recognized by the Allies was that the only way to ensure Chinese and Russian support on a possible Security Council Resolution was to actively include them within the process. Despite NATO’s lack of direct involvement in the multinational approach, the US and EU-3 nevertheless agreed that the Alliance itself must present a united front as reflected in comments by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during a press conference in early February 2006: “It is clear as I said before that Iran is, of course, a very, very relevant subject for NATO, that Iran can be discussed in NATO” (De Hoop Scheffer 2006). Secretary Rice also expressed the shared transatlantic commitment to work closely together on confronting Tehran: “The Iran issue will now be in the domain of the Security Council as well as the IAEA. We will continue to consult closely with our European allies...in the coming days and weeks, in this new diplomatic phase” (Rice 2006c).

The second remedy which enjoyed consensus among Alliance partners was the need for increased pressure on the Iranian government to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program. Specifically, the Allies iterated calls for Tehran to stop uranium enrichment and to disclose the full extent of its nuclear research and development (Weisman and Fathi 2005). While continental partners still underscored their hope for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, European rhetoric gradually fell more in line with that of Washington, the concrete remedy being a sign-off on coercive diplomacy. This was acknowledged by Rice following an informal NAC meeting in April 2006: “We are committed to a diplomatic course that should, with enough unity and with enough strength and with enough common purpose, make it possible to convince the Iranian Government that they are not on a course that will lead to anything but isolation” (Rice 2006a). This remedy represented a drastic change in the degree of Alliance consensus on the appropriate response to the Iranian conflict. On the one hand, the Bush Administration was now prepared to directly and actively engage in multilateral diplomatic efforts with Tehran, a considerable step away from its previous position that it would not

\textsuperscript{149} Though the P5+1 saw its first official action in June 2006, the basis for the negotiations team had been around considerably longer.
participate in direct negotiations with the Iranian leadership. On the other hand, European partners, in particular France and Germany, demonstrated a willingness to accept – at least at the policy-planning phase – a more confrontational approach toward Iran, with the EU-3 agreeing to work in unison with the United States in enacting tougher measures against Iran.

Although such developments demonstrated an obvious convergence of consensus within NATO, one position nevertheless served as a source of disagreement among the Allies, namely the option of using military intervention against Iran. Despite the regional power shift, continental members expressed their concern with a “military remedy,” not primarily because of its potential for provoking greater instability within the region, but due to its domestic consequences back home: “No one doubts that air raids against Iran would present serious political and military risks...a campaign against the largest power in the Middle East would face strong domestic opposition” (Gardiner and Loconte 2006). In fact, the domestic risks of such action had already materialized in German parliamentary debates, as members of the opposition sought to capitalize on public aversion toward intervention by demanding from the government that “potential military strikes against Iran be taken off the table” (BBC 2006b).

In contrast, the US was not convinced over the severity of the domestic risks associated with a military option. To be sure, Washington recognized that an intervention could in fact have domestic consequences. For example, analysts suggested that a military confrontation could lead to supply interruptions of crude, affecting thereby already rising fuel prices: “This is a nervy time for the global oil market....nobody can accurately appraise the risks of supply interruptions. Those risks are adding a premium to the current price of oil” (Stelzer 2005). Moreover, Bush’s approval ratings were low, and entanglement in yet another armed conflict could likely push these ratings even lower. However, such problems did not present the same degree of domestic risks in Washington as they did in Europe. Bush was in his final term and had little fear of an unforgiving electorate. Indeed, some observers argued that a strike would have few, if any, discernable drawbacks: “War with Iran would...distract attention from US failures in Iraq and economic woes at home. The Republicans look certain to lose the White House in 2008 unless something drastic happens to change the political landscape – something like a second war in the Middle East, for example. This strategy could backfire, of course, but
the Republicans do not have much to lose at this point” (Kagarlitsky 2006). In planning remedies for dealing with Iran, US policymakers thus weighed the “side effects” of an intervention against the alternative of a potentially nuclear Tehran. Their calculation was clear; a military remedy presented fewer risks. Thus, Europe resisted a military remedy because of its domestic risks, while Washington advocated keeping it at least as a viable option because of its low risk relative to the alternative. This fact underscored a poignant dilemma facing the Organization at the beginning of 2005. Though Alliance partners were in agreement on their strategic assessment of the Iranian challenge, they were still encumbered by a low degree of compatibility as regards policy remedies and domestic political risks. This points to the low degree of elite consensus which dominated follow-up policy debates on Iran’s nuclear program within NATO.

5.7. Reassessing hegemonic expectations

The recognition of the Organization’s gradual power loss nevertheless had little impact on Washington’s broader expectations for Alliance extraction. The US continued to solicit its partners for assistance in the three key areas outlined above (see section 5.2), yet the parameters for these expectations were slightly altered. First, the Administration pressured continental members to maintain their instrumental role in engaging Tehran on behalf of NATO interests. As mentioned, however, this effort was to be more multilateral by facilitating greater cooperation on the part of Russia and China and including US participation. Second, Washington pushed its European partners to not only threaten credible negative incentives for non-compliance, but – given NATO’s growing power loss – to actually enact such sanctions. Moreover, the US anticipated that these would be broad, covering not only Iran’s weapons and nuclear programs but hitting instead at its financial, trade, and commercial sectors as well. As one White House official noted, “If Europe exhausts the diplomatic options, it would have the leverage of diplomatic sanctions, and economic sanctions,” given the “commercial and trade relations with Iran that most Europeans have” (Brinkley 2005). Finally, the Americans insisted once again on unity over a credible military option in confronting Tehran. President Bush
reiterated this policy preference in August 2005, maintaining that if diplomacy failed, all options must remain “on the table” (Bush 2005a).

Hegemonic expectations did change with the addition of one new expectation, however. Specifically, Washington articulated an explicit interest in assistance with the deployment of its ongoing ballistic missile defense system. As part of a strategy to address the potential threat a nuclear Iran could pose to US and Alliance security, the Bush Administration sought to extend the system’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense to blanket most of Europe. Based on analyses by the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Washington sought to station certain elements of the system on partner territory in Europe. In January 2007, US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, informed the Alliance about US efforts, noting that the Administration had made requests to the UK for “further potential contributions to the system” (Economist 2007). In February, Washington made official requests to the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic for talks on hosting ground-based inceptor installations. Based on these findings, it can be said that the US expressed clear expectations for resource extraction in its renewed efforts to confront Iran. In the following section, I will explore subsequent policy outputs to determine whether Alliance partners were willing to answer US requests for extraction, allowing for an assessment of the hegemonic legitimacy model within the context of this case.

5.8. Examining subsequent policy outputs

The Middle East’s gradual power shift resulted in a number of concrete actions coordinated by the Allies. In contrast to the approaches advocated on both sides of the Atlantic prior to 2005, these new actions reflected an evident willingness on the part of partner states to fulfill US expectations for coercive diplomacy. In response to transatlantic pressure, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution in September 2005 condemning Iran’s non-compliance and stating that the nuclear program had “given rise to questions that are within the competence of the [UN]

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150 While the idea of a US National Missile Defense (NMD) had been around in some form since the late 1950s (e.g., the so-called Nike-Zeus Program), current initiatives took off with the passing by Congress of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act. Until now, however, substantial efforts at the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element have been limited to systems on the west coast of the US to protect from missiles originating from across the Pacific, specifically from North Korea.
Security Council” (Governors 2005). On 4 February 2006, measures were once against tightened against Tehran, as the EU-3 successfully sponsored a move backed by the United States, which called on the IAEA Board to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Following up on this referral, the Council passed Resolution 1696 on 31 July, a draft sponsored by France, Germany, and the UK which demanded that Iran cease all uranium enrichment and reprocessing and to offer “full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA” (UNSC 2006b, pt. 3), receiving the full backing of the permanent members of the Council.

Observers rightly credit the Allies’ success at gathering Russian and Chinese support to their concomitant initiative to expand multilateral diplomacy with Tehran by establishing the P5+1, comprised of the EU-3 as well as China, Russia and the US. In June 2006, the group presented a proposal which included a mixture of concessions from Tehran in exchange for incentives offered by the group in six key points. Tehran rejected the proposal in August due to the stipulation that Iran suspend its enrichment-related activities. This resulted in additional coercive measures on 23 December 2006, with the passing of UNSC Resolution 1737 which levied sanctions against Iran on the supply of nuclear-related technology and materials as well as Iranian assets, once again sponsored by France, Germany and the UK.

Since 2007, Allied states have increasingly worked together within a multilateral context to increase international pressure on Iran. In March 2007, the UN Security Council passed on unanimous vote Resolution 1747, a draft once again submitted to the Council by France, Germany, and the UK which sought to widen the scope of sanctions against Iran and which

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151 This was in response to Iran’s notification to the IAEA that it had “decided to resume from 9 January 2006 those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy program which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension” and its subsequent removal of IAEA seals on equipment in at least three nuclear sites. The referral was passed by the Board of Governors by a vote of 27 to 3, with Venezuela, Syria and Cuba voting against the measure. Russia and China agreed on the stipulation that the Council would not move against Iran until March 2006. The formal report was sent to the Council, however, on 27 February 2006.

152 UNSCR 1696 was passed by a vote of 14 to 1, with Qatar voting in opposition.

153 US calls for a more multilateral diplomatic effort by bringing Russia into the negotiations with Iran strikingly resembles the similar move taken during the Bosnian crisis through the establishment of the Contact Group. Although the P5+1 was fundamentally necessary in order to gain Russian and Chinese support for possible sanctions in the Security Council, it would be interesting to explore whether Washington was also motivated by concerns about stepping on Moscow’s heels if it escalated its confrontation with Tehran. After all, Russia has considerable trade and commercial ties with Iran which could be threatened by increased American intervention. If this claim proved supported, it would suggest that the US still considers regional strategies with a focus on broader geopolitical considerations, with specific sensitivity to Russia.
imposed a ban on the “supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly...on Conventional Arms to Iran” (Council 2006c, pt. 6). Following UNSCR 1747, two IAEA reports demonstrated mixed reviews on the status on Iran’s nuclear program. In November 2007, the IAEA statement confirmed “the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran,” yet it likewise noted that “since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing...As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing” (IAEA 2007, pt. 39). The Director General’s statement from 22 February 2008 similarly showed that Iran had “responded to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications” with few exceptions (IAEA 2008, pt. 52). However, one matter of serious concern to assess a possible military dimension to Iran’s program involved “studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle” (pt. 54). Based on these findings which pointed to Tehran’s continued non-compliance with resolutions calling for the suspension of its enrichment related activities, the Security Council issued Resolution 1803 on 3 March 2008, again tightening sanctions on Tehran by extending travel restrictions, limiting additional exports to Iran, and freezing the assets of further financial institutions. As with previous resolutions, UNSCR 1803 was proposed by the EU-3 upon backing by the United States. At the same time as Resolution 1803, the P5+1 likewise upped efforts at constructively engaging the Iranian government by agreeing to revise its original June 2006 proposal. The revised package was presented to Tehran at a June 2008 meeting of the P5+1 (excluding the US) and included a delineation of the specific benefits offered by the group as well as a bid for initial negotiations under a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” agreement, according to which Iran would temporarily cease enrichment in exchange for a pledge by the Six not to intensify sanctions. This meeting was followed up in July by a second summit of the Six (including the US) and Iran in Geneva. Despite counterproposals by Tehran, both meetings proved inconclusive (ACA 2009).

IAEA statements in May and from 27 September 2008 underscored the ensuing impasse, reporting that “transparency measures” had been refused by Tehran although an explicit diversion of declared nuclear materials could not unequivocally be determined. Moreover, the

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154 The alleged studies on a nuclear weaponization program originated from US intelligence sources from a laptop smuggled from Iran and provided to the US in 2004.
Board Report confirmed that Iran had not suspended its enrichment activities, in defiance of prior UNSC resolutions. As a result, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1835 on 27 September, reaffirming the Council’s previous resolutions – UNSCR 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) – which had called for an end to Iranian enrichment. UNSCR 1835 was proposed on a common initiative by the P5+1 and passed unanimously. Commenting on its significance, Secretary Rice maintained that the resolution was to “affirm the unity of the Six and to let the Iranians know that the unity is very strong.”

The Director General’s recent reports to the Board in November 2008 as well as February, June and August 2009 revealed few new developments. The Agency confirmed that uranium enrichment had continued, but the Agency has continued to verify the non-diversion of “declared nuclear materials in Iran.” In the August report, however, the Board Report declared in an unusually earnest fashion that “regrettably, the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about...outstanding issues [of concern] for over a year” (IAEA 2009, pt. 28). In response to this report, a spokesperson for the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs noted,

“The EU has made multiple offers of dialogue and negotiation with Iran. The United States has made a major gesture of openness towards Iran by proposing to establish direct contact. We are again calling on Iran to recognize the significance of these gestures and to agree to begin serious negotiations on the nuclear issue. Otherwise, in accordance with the two-pronged approach combining dialogue and firmness promoted by the Six, we will have no other choice but to seek a very substantial strengthening of sanctions” (France 2009).

Such comments highlight a perceivable trend among continental partners toward a greater acceptance of American solicitations in dealing with Tehran.

A final development likewise underscores European cooperation with US solicitations and therefore deserves mention here. From 2005 onward, Washington enjoyed increasing support from its Allies for the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe. As previously mentioned, NATO partners shared a common assessment of the Iranian challenge following its regional power shift, and this impacted the development of the missile defense initiative as well: “There’s little disagreement among allies on both sides of the Atlantic over the need for tactical missile defenses...” (Wall and Barrie 2005). American requests for Allied
assistance were contentious, however, as moves to station parts of the system in Poland and the Czech Republic received truculent opposition from Moscow. Despite this, Alliance partners increasingly signaled a willingness to consider American requests (White 2007), and this is demonstrated by the signing of NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) which was endorsed by members at the Riga Summit in November 2006, declaring that NATO must develop capability requirements “to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorism, and more particularly to contribute to the protection of the Alliance’s populations, territory,...” (NAC 2006). NATO support was formalized following the Bucharest Summit in 2008: “Instead of talking about the desirability of missile defense, we are now focusing on how to make it work. In other words, we have moved the issue of missile defense out of the abstract ideological debate and into the real world” (De Hoop Scheffer 2008a). Thus, European partners showed an increased willingness to honor certain US solicitations in the formulation of subsequent policies for addressing the Iranian challenge, specifically those solicitations which dealt with the use of coercive diplomacy and support for a ballistic missile defense system.

The limits of extraction

Despite this more positive disposition vis-à-vis American solicitations, continental partners still showed reluctance to answer US calls for extraction on two key points. First, Europe remained slow in responding to requests for harsher economic sanctions against Iran. While UN sanctions did place incremental sanctions on the movement of people and goods believed to be involved in Iranian nuclear enrichment and weapons programs, these sanctions have not been substantially expanded to broader trade and commercial activities. While Washington was quick to enact unilateral sanctions against Iran’s banking sector – with noticeable measures as early as June 2006 –, French and German officials initially responded to US pressure to do the same by arguing that such sanctions were still “premature.” Though Europe eventually supported similar measures, these remain significantly more placid than their American

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155 Another key policy document was the 1999 Strategic Concept, which stated that “The Alliance's defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defense.”

156 See, for instance, Baxter and Mahnaimi (2006).
counterparts. Speaking on the British strategy toward negative incentives, one UK official said in 2006, “We see a gradual build-up of moves that will take place over time. We are not going...to introduce punitive sanctions against Iran. That is not our approach” (The Australian 2006). Recent US threats in 2009 calling for “crippling sanctions” against Tehran have led to concerns in Washington that European partners would fail to follow suit. As one analyst notes, “If Americans are the only ones sanctioning, those sanctions will not succeed” (Sanger 2009).

The second issue reveals the true limits of extraction, namely Europe’s sustained resistance to US requests for a “military option.” As was the case during initial policy formulation, NATO’s continental partners continued to openly reject such an alternative. According to the Bush Administration, Alliance unity on a military option was pivotal to convince the Iranians that such threats were authentic, thus coaxing them to negotiations: “...the option of a military strike remains on the table – at this stage just to worry and, it is hoped, coerce Iran” (Allam 2006). American officials expressed confidence in a diplomatic solution to the conflict, but wished to keep all cards on the table, and partner backing was crucial to this strategy. Support has been lacking, however. In April 2006, for example, EU High Representative Solana dismissed suggestions that European states would stand behind preparations in Washington for an airstrike against Tehran, saying “Any military action is absolutely off the table for us” (New York Times 2006). In Berlin, the governing coalition expressed a similar position, asserting that “Germany was not planning to take part in a military strike” (BBC 2006b), and Chancellor Schröder publicly called for Bush to “take the military option from the table. We know from experience that it is for the birds” (Schröder 2005b). In fact, one of the US’s staunchest Allies rejected solicitations from Washington for NATO unity on a military option, with British Foreign Minister Straw announcing that the UK had ruled out any participation in such an approach: “[I understand...frustration with the diplomatic process. It takes a long time and is quite a subtle process. The reason we are opposed to military action is because it is an infinitely worse option and there is no justification for it” (BBC 2006a). According to one observer, a plausible explanation for this rejection was partner interest in promoting ongoing negotiations which had begun under the EU-3: “European analysts and commentators said they worried that the United States would adopt a unilateral
approach...that could undermine Europe’s delicate diplomatic efforts with Iran” (Sennott 2005). While Europe and Washington seem to have converged on extraction for the purposes of coercive diplomacy and missile defense, partners have nevertheless remained unwilling to accept US solicitations for substantial economic sanctions and possible military action against Iran. This points to a continuing low degree of hegemonic legitimacy based on the third model of alliance cooperation.

5.9. Evaluating NATO’s response

Reviewing Allied actions from 2002 onward, the US and its continental partners have made use of substantial political and limited economic instruments to confront Tehran. These initiatives were demonstrably stepped following recognition of NATO’s gradual and growing power loss, with the Organization even successful in agreeing to the development of a ballistic missile defense system within Europe. With this said, continental partners nevertheless continue to adamantly reject a military option in dealing with Iran, thereby failing to fulfill a necessary prerequisite for “engagement” (i.e., the dependent variable) as set out in Chapter 2 above.157 As such, the Iran conflict has thus far resulted in no palpable change in Alliance out-of-area engagement.

Before assessing NATO’s response to the conflict with Tehran and the efficacy of the three NCR models in explaining resultant Alliance policy, several issues deserve mention. First, while Alliance reaction to the Iranian challenge has been less pronounced than was the case during the 1991 Gulf conflict, NATO has undoubtedly been centrally involved. To be certain, the Iran case represents a significantly different scenario, as there is what might be called a “fog of threat” which hangs over Tehran’s nuclear program; this makes it difficult for NATO partners to define the exact nature of the challenge. However, a number of scholars have indeed pointed to the centrality of NATO in dealing with Tehran. Rynning, for example, claims that the Alliance has been involved in addressing the Iranian challenge through “policy flexibility” by “letting its European allies use diplomatic means to constrain Iran” (2005, 133). Kissinger likewise sees a

157 See page 104-5.
role for the Alliance, arguing that efforts have “involve[d] our allies from its inception. US and NATO policy are integrally linked. Key European allies are negotiating with Iran on the nuclear issue” (Kissinger 2009). Specifically, two factors confirm the Organization’s integral involvement within the conflict: the degree of Alliance consultations in planning policy remedies and diplomatic involvement point to an indirect role, while the use of NATO mechanisms to advance a European-based missile defense system demonstrate a direct response.

A second noteworthy point is that nascent developments point to the persistence of NATO’s net power loss within the GME. On 21 September 2009, Iran notified the IAEA that it had begun constructing a second enrichment facility which would be operational within two years. Although the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, maintained that Tehran had informed the IAEA well in advance of the requirement set out in the Safeguards Agreement (Erdbrink 2009), IAEA Director General ElBaradei asserted that “Iran was supposed to inform us on the day it was decided to construct the facility…” Moreover, recent intelligence indicates that Iran will soon reach a “nuclear threshold”: “Iran ‘is now either very near or in possession’ of enough low-enriched uranium to produce one nuclear weapon…” (Kessler and Erdbrink 2009). Glyn Davies, US chief envoy to the IAEA, noted that this “moves Iran closer to a dangerous and destabilizing possible outbreak capacity” (Davies 2009). Comments by representatives of NATO member states suggest that this development continues to pose a direct challenge to the interests of the Allies. At the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh on 25 September, for example, US President Barack Obama labeled the new site a “covert uranium enrichment facility,” underscoring “Iran’s continuing unwillingness to meet its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions and IAEA requirements” and asserting that “the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program” (Obama 2009). Moreover, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown expressed solidarity with the US position, stating that “America, the United Kingdom and France are at one...Iran must abandon any military ambitions for its nuclear program” (Brown 2009).

This observation carries with it the implication that NATO’s gradual net power loss within the BMENA appears to be attracting greater Alliance attention to Tehran’s nuclear program. At a meeting on 29 October 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted that “if
Iran actually acquires a nuclear capability, it might constitute a future potential threat to the members of our Alliance” (Rasmussen 2009), suggesting the possible need for a heightened response from the Organization. Indeed, de Wijk emphasized the centrality of Tehran’s challenge in the Organization’s decision to draft another Strategic Concept, noting that a new concept must focus on “a power struggle with the new centers of power [which] could have important repercussions for international security.” According to de Wijk (2009), the difficulties of reaching agreement with Iran signify “a clear prelude” to how such challenges might play themselves out. Thus, the Alliance could well stand poised to play a greater role within the conflict in the near future.

5.10. Evaluating NCR theories

What then do the results of this case study mean for the theory-testing exercise advanced in this analysis? First, structural accounts fall short in the case of Iran. While a discernable power shift was not clear during at the initial start of the conflict, NATO’s chronic yet evident net power loss within the GME has thus far failed to provoke a subsequent change in Alliance policy toward engagement. In contrast, the three neoclassical realist models offer conceivable explanations for why NATO has not yet pursued a policy of engagement in the Iran case. As regards the alliance adaptation model, Alliance partners did adjust to its declining relative regional power by switching from an approach defined by flexible cooperation (e.g., EU-3) to one reflecting increasingly inclusive cooperation (e.g., P5+1 with US participation). As member states lacked consensus on the policy remedies and domestic political risks which an involvement in the conflict could bring, Allied involvement nevertheless proved maladaptive, and the challenge has remained unchecked. One argument for this could be the interpretation advanced by the hegemonic legitimacy model, namely that low legitimacy prompted the US to accede in its petition for an overtly assertive stance – backed by a credible military option – vis-à-vis Tehran, following instead a policy of hegemonic positionalism for which diplomacy and harsh rhetoric have become the lowest common denominator until now. This case therefore adds credibility to hypotheses $H_{1a}$, $H_{2b}$, and $H_{3b}$. 

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Part III
Neoclassical Realism and the Study of NATO: Drawing Conclusions
Conclusion
Neoclassical Realism on NATO Cooperation:
Moving “Beyond the State”? 

This analysis asserts that explanations for NATO cooperation based on interests and power alone cannot account for substantive policy developments since the end of the Cold War. Instead, I claim that responses to regional power shifts are invariably affected by alliance-level dynamics and explore the impact of sub-systemic variables on policy outcomes by testing three distinct neoclassical realist models of interstate security cooperation. In the chapter which follows, I first reflect on the implications of the individual case studies for general trends in Alliance cooperation and explicate the findings of the theory testing endeavor for the three models presented. I subsequently turn to the concept of hegemonic legitimacy and discuss its value for nascent debates on NATO’s development. I then conclude with a discussion of the broader significance of this work on the study of alliances.

6.1. Post-Cold War developments in NATO out-of-area cooperation

While the three cases presented in this analysis in no way represent a comprehensive picture of NATO’s out-of-area policy since the Cold War’s exit, they do highlight several interesting developments which could allow one to draw inferences on discernable trends in Alliance cooperation. First, one fundamental element of NATO’s response to the invasion of Kuwait was the Allies’ indirect participation in the US-led coalition of the willing from 24 to 28 February 1991. As discussed in chapter 3, the Organization was also directly involved in responding to the crisis through an enactment of Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the role its members actively played in Turkey throughout the conflict.

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158 As discussed in chapter 3, the Organization was also directly involved in responding to the crisis through an enactment of Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the role its members actively played in Turkey throughout the conflict.
revisited through the London Declaration in July 1990, Alliance resources had not yet been adequately adapted to deal with non-Soviet security challenges by the time of Kuwait’s invasion in August 1990. Moreover, the Gulf crisis originated wholly out-of-area, and this evoked considerable debate over the limitations on NATO’s geographical scope of intervention following the Cold War. For these reasons, the coalition framework provided the necessary precursors for a successful – albeit, indirect – integration of the Organization within a broader international response. The second point relates to the coalition’s influence on NATO’s long-term, post-Cold War strategy. The comprehensive participation of Alliance members within the coalition, its brevity and unchallenged efficacy as well as NATO’s expressed determination to go out-of-area led to the eventual adoption of the coalition framework within Alliance strategy. One example of this can be seen in NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative launched in late 1993. The CJTF concept originated out of the recognition that future security challenges would be increasingly diverse and unpredictable and that this would therefore require greater flexibility in Alliance response. The concept was thus built to accommodate varied participation from member states “as necessary, using a modular approach, in order to meet the requirements of the specific mission” (NATO 2009a). As Lepgold notes, this adeptly illustrates the significance the Alliance placed on coalitions at the end of the Cold War: “The CJTF proposal...is designed to give NATO more flexibility in parceling out responsibility for military operations in and beyond Europe...the CJTF mechanism may help induce the kinds of coalitions needed to carry out [out-of-area missions]” (Lepgold 1998, 79). Undoubtedly, the Allies’ experience in the Gulf War acted as one catalyst in the development of NATO’s coalitional framework.

The first case study is also noteworthy in this respect, as it seems initially to contradict one tacit assumption Rynning (2005) makes in his discussion on the anticipated forms of Alliance security cooperation. In particular, he argues that coalitions emerge as flexible responses in strategic environments marked by security management, i.e. in conflicts defined

159 Pudas seems to agree with this claim, noting that “no military action has ever been conducted as the combined effort of a standing alliance in which the United States was a member” (e.g., NATO) (1993, 40).
by vague risks instead of by clear threats.\textsuperscript{160} To be certain, Rynning does not explicitly rule out that coalitions could conceivably form under inclusive cooperation, yet this indeed seems to be an implicit exclusion since he provides the coalition as his sole example of a flexible response to security risks. However, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resulted in inclusive cooperation, but nevertheless in part on a coalitional basis. As discussed in chapter 3 above, one explanation for this could be that NATO had not yet resolved its out-of-area debate by the time the Iraq conflict broke out, and the coalition thus served as the only means by which to coordinate “Alliance action” before this debate had been resolves. As demonstrated, though, the decision to participate in the coalition of the willing had much to do with the domestic political risks Allies sought to circumvent; the coalition framework allowed states to keep such domestic risks at bay while still participating inclusively in an Alliance response.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, the Iraq case underscores the fact the NATO cooperation since the end of the Cold War has in fact proven rather varied.

A few additional observations with respect to the varied forms of intervention deserve mention as well. Indeed, there seems to be no direct correlation between the inclusive and flexible spectrum of cooperation and a second spectrum, namely direct and indirect cooperation. In other words, one must not assume that inclusive cooperation will be direct, while flexible cooperation, in turn, is indirect. In particular, as the Alliance response to the Iraq case illustrates, indirect intervention in a conflict can in fact be inclusive in nature. Allied participation in the Gulf was indirect in the sense that it was not formally structured under the aegis of NATO. At the same time, however, it was inclusive, with all partners taking part in the intervention either through military, financial or political contributions. It is likewise worth noting that inclusive cooperation does not imply that the outcome is adaptive. This is conceptually obvious in that elite consensus (the determinant of adaptive or maladaptive cooperation) looks at measures other than merely the compatibility of motives (one of the measures used to determine inclusive or flexible cooperation); particularly, it considers policy

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{160}] For a more thorough elucidation of security challenges characterized by either strategic engagement or security management, see Rynning (2005, 10-11).
\item[\textsuperscript{161}] In fact, the coalition framework might have proved the decisive factor which led to the high degree of compatibility in domestic political risks – and thus, elite consensus itself – among the partners. This would be a fruitful topic for further research.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
remedies and domestic political risks as well. Empirically, the case of Iran seems to substantiate this distinction. As the Alliance’s net power loss gradually increased, NATO partners confronted this developing challenge through inclusive cooperation. This did not, however, prove adaptive in countering the Iranian power shift.\footnote{Another topic dealing with the question of NATO’s coalition framework which is worthy of further research involves Rynning’s suggestion that flexible coalitions tend to be – arguably out of necessity – smaller in size (2005, 12-3). This begs the question as to the implications low assessment fit could have on a steadily enlarging Alliance if it were to dominate for longer periods of time. Rynning indirectly refers to this dilemma at the end of his analysis, arguing that bringing an indiscriminate number of new members into the Alliance would dilute understanding and support for NATO’s “directional ethos” (183). He continues by noting that “NATO’s recipe for realizing the objective potential for [flexible] coalition-making is to...let a geographically limited but pluralist organization become a launching pad for operations initiated by the able and willing” (184).}

With respect to policy preferences and based on the cases examined here, it also appears that the Allies tend to advocate the use of resources available at their own disposal in proposing policy remedies to given conflicts. This could be one plausible explanation for why European states are inclined – at least in the cases explored here – to propose similar policy remedies (i.e., as a “block”) which are sometimes in contradiction to those put forward by Washington.\footnote{Certainly, this tendency for European members to advocate certain policy remedies “as a block” is not a given. Conflicts are conceivable in which clear cleavages exist among continental states as the 2003 war against Iraq demonstrated all too well. Moreover, it would be useful to explore the degree to which Europe’s Big Three (i.e., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) influence the policy preferences of other European states. It could well be that the preferences of the Three, if aligned, act as a strong incentive for other continental Allies to follow suit, thus suggesting something of a regional “follow-the-leader” phenomenon.} In the Bosnia and Iran cases, for example, continental members placed greater emphasis on the use of political and economic instruments in an effort to affect a favorable resolution to the conflicts. In contrast, the US demonstrated a proclivity for keeping the use of military instruments at least “on the table” as a possible response. As demonstrated in chapter 3, some European Allies even expressed initial reservations to the potential use of military force in responding to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Various arguments could be made for why this tendency exists. For example, one could claim that European states are fundamentally adverse to the use of military power for resolving conflicts, although the prolific use of such instruments under the auspices of ESDP since its first operations in 2003 would suggest otherwise. A second plausible argument could involve NATO’s lucid capabilities gap; specifically, European states may show a preference for non-military intervention because of their apprehension of being marginalized should Alliance policy rely too heavily on American military might. Irrespective of
the reasons for this, the Bosnian and Iranian conflicts suggest that this tendency often leads to notable elite dissensus among transatlantic partners.

A final point of interest is that the first two conflicts illustrate cases within which the Alliance undertook out-of-area engagement. In both cases, the basis for this cooperation involved the use of military instruments. Direct and indirect military intervention proved decisive in the Iraq conflict, while direct military engagement (e.g., *Operations Deny Flight* and *Deliberate Force*) was pivotal in Bosnia. Despite this, it is feasible that NATO partners could pursue adaptive cooperation alone on the basis of economic or political instruments.\(^{164}\) In the Iraq conflict, for example, Alliance members exerted considerable political and economic pressure on Baghdad from August 1990 to February 1991 with the hope this would compel Iraq to withdrawal from Kuwait. Although military force was eventually necessary in this case, non-military efforts could prove efficacious in other conflicts. One possible avenue of inquiry in this respect is to explore the impact of the Mediterranean Dialogue in influencing Libya’s decision in 2003 to abandon its WMD program.

**Evaluating the three models of interstate security cooperation**

At this point, it is possible to assess the rigor of the three neoclassical realist models of interstate security cooperation presented above in explaining NATO’s out-of-area engagement in the selected cases. First, all three models proved useful in accounting for patterns of Alliance cooperation in the Iraq and Iran cases. Of specific importance, the models did well in explicating the actual policy outcomes resulting from the region’s prolonged power shift within the Iran conflict, something which structural explanations based on power alone could not. According to the alliance adaptation model, NATO cooperation was expected to be inclusive in nature. Indeed, this was the case. All partners agreed to and participated in the planning of the ballistic missile defense system, and diplomatic efforts by the P5+1 included the US and were likewise backed by all Organization members. The hegemonic legitimacy model proves equally efficacious in accounting for NATO’s response. The starting point for this explanation rests on

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\(^{164}\) Of course, to be considered NATO “engagement” as characterized by the dependent variable in this analysis, NATO would have to explicitly retain a military option while still promoting its economic and/or political instruments. Otherwise, one could likewise study NATO “involvement” (see also footnote 89).
the claim that hegemonic legitimacy within the Alliance was weak over the course of NATO’s ongoing power loss (measured by an unwillingness of partner states to fulfill hegemonic solicitations). As a result, Washington enacted a policy of hegemonic positionalism by accepting the proposed remedies of its continental partners in lieu of its own (i.e., a focus mostly on diplomatic intervention instead of more coercive means including an explicit military option), the objective being to underscore its declining legitimacy. The alliance mobilization model actually goes one step further, not only explaining policy outcomes but explaining policy failure as well. Along this line of thought, alliance cooperation fell short of countering the region’s power shift, because partners’ policy remedies and domestic political risks were incompatible; as such, there was a low degree of elite consensus, leading thereby to maladaptive behavior. As this demonstrates, the three models do well at explaining outcomes in the first and third cases.

The Bosnian conflict paints a different picture, however. In this case, structural explanations based solely on power appear to explain early Alliance policy outcomes. The Bosnian crisis, which as demonstrated represented no net power loss for the Alliance, was initially accompanied by no corresponding engagement on the part of NATO states. However, the Alliance did become substantially active in 1995, although there was still no relative net power loss. This therefore begs the question as to why Allies eventually responded to the conflict despite no discernable power shift. Indeed, structural accounts have difficulty answering this question. In like manner, two of the models being tested appear unable to explain Alliance policy outcomes in this case. Because of the divergent motives underlying the Allies’ assessments, the alliance adaptation and alliance mobilization models predict that cooperation would be flexible and maladaptive, respectively. Instead, NATO’s response – when it did materialize – was both inclusive and adaptive. The hegemonic legitimacy model, in contrast, seems to explain this conflict quite well. Enjoying high legitimacy, the US sought an Alliance strategy marked by prescriptive delegation at the start of the conflict due both to

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165 One rejoinder proponents of the alliance adaptation model could offer is that continental motives changed over the course of the conflict from being “revisionist” – for the lack of a better word – to more “status quo” in nature. If this occurred, European motives would then be squarely in line with American motives, thus explaining the inclusive approach. This would not, however, defend the alliance mobilization model, as both policy remedies and domestic political risks remained incompatible. In any case, continental motives do not appear to have changed over the course of the conflict based on the analysis presented in chapter 4 above.
broader geopolitical considerations and the expectation that European efforts at countering the challenge to Alliance power gains would prove fruitful. As it became obvious this was not the case, Washington assumed a central role in the intervention, promoting instead a strategy of prescriptive activism.

These findings furthermore allow us to make inferences on the two crucial conflicts analyzed in this study, namely Iraq as the most likely case and Bosnia as the least likely case. In the case of Iraq, all models – including our theoretical priors (i.e., structural power explanations) – anticipate Alliance engagement as a response to Kuwait’s invasion. As demonstrated in the individual case studies, this supported a number of the alternative hypotheses advanced in chapter 2 and thus yields evidentiary support for the three neoclassical realist theories. As Levy notes, however, positive results from a most likely case lead “to only a modest shift in one’s confidence in the validity of a theory” (2008, 12). With respect to the Bosnian crisis, on the other hand, only the hegemonic legitimacy model proved efficacious in accounting for NATO’s response. The outcome in this case study provides substantial theoretical leverage to this third model, as the Bosnia conflict represented a least likely case which nevertheless enjoyed evidentiary support. In other words, the results of the case studies explored here lend strong backing to the efficacy of the hegemonic legitimacy model. I therefore elucidate more thoroughly the implications of my analysis on this promising concept in the following section.

6.2. On hegemonic legitimacy

In 1973, Victor Ehrenberg made a provocative analogy comparing NATO to the Delian League:¹⁶⁶ “[The League] was no longer an alliance...In practice, most allies, being relatively small fry, would tend to vote the way the hegemon wished. In short, a better name than Delian League would have been the Aegean Treaty Organization” (1973, 67). While Ehrenberg’s comparison was a rather unconventional allegation at that time, Washington’s unrivaled

¹⁶⁶ The Delian League was an alliance of Greek-city states led by Athens which was originally formed to counter Persian power. Soon after its establishment, however, the League’s leader began exploiting its influence within the alliance for its own foreign policy pursuits, and this eventually prompted the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War against Greek city-states led by Sparta.
position since the end of the Cold War has given rise to greater occasion for such assertions. In After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, for example, Todd writes, “Drawing a comparison between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Delian League is not farfetched, and one could extend the analogy by casting the Soviet Union in the role of the Persian aggressor” (2003, 60). Haglund expressed similar sentiments, purporting that “America has become the new Athens, the imperial protector of lesser allies, from whom little may be required or expected militarily, yet much is demanded politically and economically” (2000, 91).

In a similar fashion, Wilkinson claims that NATO provides the US with a “structure of influence” within and through which to exercise its material capability in a unipolar world (Wilkinson 1999, 143). According to such claims, the Alliance represents something of a multilateral instrument through which the US seeks to promote its power and influence.

The Bosnia case demonstrates how a legitimate hegemon can in fact make use of alliance extraction to underscore its own foreign policy preferences through legitimated cooperation. On the other hand, hegemonic legitimacy can work against the interests of a modern-day Athens as well. A hegemon can in fact be “tempered” by allies who question its authority. As the case of Iran illustrates, a hegemon may adopt an approach marked by positionalism, acceding to the policy preferences of its partners in an effort to fortify its legitimacy (i.e., legitimizing cooperation). Accordingly, the hegemonic legitimacy model foresees both constraints and opportunities for allied states – hegemon and partners alike – in security cooperation. Norris suggests two such opportunities in the context of NATO’s Yugoslav interventions: “Smaller nations saw their strategic credibility enhanced by joining hands” with the US, while “formal partnership with smaller nations allowed [the hegemon] to portray...military activities as collaborative and dim fears” of hidden aspirations (Norris 2003, 360). Yet as the Iran and Bosnia cases show, the dynamics of hegemonic legitimacy present clear constraints on the hegemon and its partners, respectively, and this discounts claims that NATO is merely the sum of American strategic interests.

Furthermore, Allied perceptions of the opportunities to be had through the dynamics of hegemonic legitimacy seem to actually outweigh potential constraints. This is exemplified in the Iran case. Though American motives in assessing Tehran’s uranium enrichment program were
initially more “revisionist” in nature (i.e., driven by a desire for regime change in Iran rather than simply maintenance of the status quo), its low legitimacy encouraged the US to pursue a strategy of positionalism rather than to risk confrontation with continental partners. This led to a discernable shift in the motives which underlined Washington’s assessments of its prolonged net power loss. At the beginning of its second term, the Bush Administration undertook significant efforts to improve its legitimacy within NATO. After confirmation as Secretary of State in January 2005, Condoleezza Rice made enthusiastic gestures toward transatlantic partners which emphasized US willingness to promote multilateral, diplomatic options in dealing with Iran, options which were decidedly in line with the policy remedies proposed by its European Allies (Purdum 2005). President Bush’s visit to Brussels at the end of February 2005 served to reaffirm this commitment to a “new” approach vis-à-vis Tehran. Assessing the change in US strategy from 2002 to 2005, Lee Hamilton, President of the Wilson Center, notes that “there has been a big shift from many of [Bush’s] earlier policies toward a more realistic, pragmatic approach” (Richard 2008, 4). Michael Cox suggests that this change was in fact part of a notable transatlantic reconciliation, arguably initiated by the hegemon’s wish to improve its legitimacy: 167 “There has been a rapprochement across the Atlantic since 2004 at the elite level of policymakers...The headline is: Compare 2008 to 2003, and lots has changed” (Jeffrey 2008, 5). As this demonstrates, Washington’s desire to underscore its legitimacy among Alliance partners took precedence over its expressed interest in a more coercive policy in dealing with Iran.

European partners appear equally interested in maintaining strong transatlantic ties despite the US’s arguably low legitimacy over the course of the Iran conflict. Three considerations seem to form the basis for continental interest in maintaining, and even improving, intra-Alliance relations with Washington. First, Europe was motivated in part by internal dynamics within the EU. The rift between “Old Europe” and “New Europe” both prior and subsequent to the invasion of Iraq had called European cohesion itself into question, and many observers considered tensions with the United States a contributing factor to this volatility. With the rejection of the European Constitution (TCE) by French and Dutch voters in

167 For a review of why legitimacy is a valuable asset for an alliance’s hegemon, see section 2.3.3 above.
May and June 2005, respectively, “uniting Europe” had assumed paramount priority both in Brussels and across European capitals. For many, uniting Europe invariably meant uniting the Euro-Atlantic area, and the resolution of transatlantic differences was often regarded as one necessary – albeit, not sufficient – prerequisite for improving internal dynamics within the EU.\footnote{This would suggest that Alliance membership and/or relations with its participating hegemon may in fact influence the legitimacy of the European Union itself. Of course, this is an intriguing topic for future research.} The second reason European partners sought to rekindle transatlantic cooperation involved the seminal importance of the United States in negotiations with Iran. Regardless of obvious differences of opinion over the preferred approach in dealing with Tehran (see chapter 5), it was nevertheless certain that any progress in resolving the conflict would require a notable degree of involvement on the part of the US. European partners therefore expressed their willingness to develop a transatlantic policy on Iran flexibly, as French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Barnier noted during an interview on 20 January 2005, the day of Bush’s second inauguration: “The French can change, and the Americans can change.”

The final reason for European interest in upholding transatlantic ties had to do with two side effects of hegemonic access. In particular, close ties to Washington guarantee partner states a greater degree of influence and security than they would otherwise enjoy. As regards influence, access to the hegemon within an Alliance context allows continental states the opportunity to promote national interests within the transatlantic agenda. If such efforts are successful, Washington’s decisive support would prove valuable in achieving these objectives. Moreover, this access gives them an implicit check over hegemonic foreign policy.\footnote{See also the discussion in section 2.3.3.} France’s return to NATO’s command structure in April 2009, reversing thereby de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from the structure over 40 years prior, exemplifies this tactic, with Sarkozy insisting that membership in the Alliance’s military command structure would “open the way for more French influence in deciding what NATO’s new missions should be after the Cold War” (Cody 2009).\footnote{It is worth noting that although Sarkozy was successful in achieving a reintegration within NATO’s military command, the plan was passionately contested by many in the National Assembly. Many legislators both on the left and right expressed their reservations that a reintegration would compromise French military independence. As a result of heavy opposition, Conservative Prime Minister Francois Fillon proposed a no-confidence motion within the Assembly, with lawmakers voting 329 to 238 in favor of the Government’s position on 17 March 2009.} At the same time, hegemonic access increases partners’ security by providing a
“fire blanket backed by power.” As German politician Joschka Fischer noted during an interview in 1996 shortly after Dayton, “What we are facing today is the fact that, for the third time this century, the Europeans are not able to solve their own problems... Only American power...is able to enforce the peace.” Hegemonic access thus represents a dependable safety net in the event regional conflicts threaten continental peace beyond Europe’s own ability to respond. Indeed, the Bosnian case seems to substantiate this claim.172

Challenges for the concept

Though hegemonic legitimacy proves useful in explaining the three cases here and likewise shows promise in explaining wider dynamics of interstate security relations, several challenges deserve mention. One issue concerns the operationalization of this concept. In particular, hegemonic legitimacy is based on the ability of a participating hegemon to extract resources from the alliance. According to the argument, a hegemon enjoying high legitimacy can easily persuade partner states to supply resources for alliance policy outputs. In contrast, a hegemon with low legitimacy will have difficulty convincing its partners to contribute such resources. This, however, is based on an implicit assumption that partner states can in fact afford the solicitations the hegemon puts forward. To be certain, partner “unwillingness” to answer hegemonic requests for resources in some cases might actually be more indicative of their inability to do so. This does not seem to pose a problem for the Iranian conflict – which has

171 Interestingly, this argument suggests a dual legitimizing dynamic is at play, whereby hegemonic access increases partner legitimacy outside of the Alliance (i.e., as a credible global actor) which in turn increases the hegemon’s intra-Alliance legitimacy.

172 A fourth argument places emphasis on the changing political climate within Europe from 2005 forward. Of particular importance in this respect were the elections of German Chancellor Angela Merkel – from the center-right CDU party – in September 2005 as well as French President Nicolas Sarkozy – sometimes referred to as “Sarko l’Americain” or “the American neo-conservative with a French passport” – in May 2007. Certainly these are plausible contributing factors to explaining this rapprochement. Yet transatlantic convergence appears to have begun even under the Schröder and Chirac governments, as plans had been laid out at a NAC meeting in summer 2003 to deploy Alliance forces for the Iraqi training mission; European commitment still remained marginal, however, in autumn 2004 on German and French concerns over the logistical and security aspects of the operation (Tyler 2004). A final point worth noting in this respect is that even with the arguable transatlantic rapprochement in recent years, some observers contend that Germany has in fact become Europe’s most inhibited partner for the US of late, representing “the leading Western skeptic in toughening economic sanctions on Iran.” According to one senior American official, “Berlin is the new Paris...that is where ‘the tough conversations’ take place” (The Economist 2008a). Nevertheless, analysts contend that Berlin’s reservations tend to be “tactical, not strategic” in nature, based more on a consideration of the domestic implications of tighter sanctions (i.e., domestic political risks) rather than on a fundamental contradiction with the US over policy toward Tehran.
been marked by low hegemonic legitimacy –, however, as European partners indeed seem able to enact more stringent economic sanctions and to keep a military option “on the table,” yet they have simply chosen not to. While alliance resource extraction is an effective and revealing means by which to measure hegemonic legitimacy, it is nevertheless worthwhile to keep this caveat in mind when exploring extraction in particular cases of alliance cooperation. A second issue involves the theoretical limitations of the concept. In particular, the model does not speak to the origins of legitimacy. In other words, while it sheds light on whether a participating hegemon enjoys legitimacy and the implications of this on alliance policy outcomes, it does not tell us anything about how gains or losses in legitimacy occur.\(^{173}\) It is feasible that hegemonic legitimacy is not only an attributing cause for interstate security cooperation (i.e., an intervening variable), it could also be caused by either cooperation or regional shifts in power (i.e., hegemonic legitimacy as a dependent variable). In the Iran case, for example, NATO’s gradual net power loss seemed to be accompanied by higher hegemonic legitimacy in the sense that alliance partners became more willing to honor US solicitations as regards sanctions and a more coercive diplomatic posture later on in the conflict than was initially the case. Whether the Alliance’s growing regional power loss itself actually begot this increased legitimacy is uncertain, but it would seem plausible that partners rely more on American power when facing discernable security threats as opposed to vaguer risks.\(^{174}\) Additional research into such questions could therefore prove fruitful.

\(^{173}\) In the discussion immediately preceding this, I explored reasons why transatlantic relations remained strong during the Iranian conflict despite low hegemonic legitimacy, mentioning the dual legitimizing dynamic of hegemonic access. This dynamic suggests one means by which hegemonic legitimacy could be underscored or even increased. This is not, however, an integral part of the model outlined in section 2.3.3.

\(^{174}\) It would also be intriguing to explore the possible influence the Obama Administration has had on hegemonic legitimacy. Leibstone (2008) notes that “an advocacy for the new US administration to swiftly rebuild relations with the EU and NATO governments” would likely further increase the legitimacy of the US in confronting challenges such as that with Tehran over its uranium enrichment program. At first glance, there appears to be a strong willingness on the part of partner states to answer solicitations by the new Administration for Alliance resources. Following President Obama’s announcement on 1 December 2009 to deploy an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed Washington’s expectations that NATO partners follow suit, declaring that Washington needs “more numbers than we have just with our own troops...” In response to this request, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed on 4 December that the Allies had agreed to offer an additional 7,000 troops: “ISAF will have at least 37,000 more soldiers in 2010 than it did this year...That is solidarity in action.”
Additional implications of hegemonic legitimacy

On a final note, the cases explored in this analysis highlight several practical implications for the hegemonic legitimacy model which are worth noting. One interesting observation deals with the forms of cooperation which emerged under legiti mated cooperation during the Bosnian conflict. According to developments in this case, it appears that hegemonic prescription oscillated between prescribed delegation and activism. As previously discussed, the US advocated an Alliance policy of delegation from the beginning of the conflict until spring 1994, at which point the hegemon pushed for prescriptive activism instead. With the resolution of the conflict, Washington seemed keen on increasingly delegating Alliance response to its continental partners. By March 2006, for instance, American troop contributions to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) were fewer than half those provided by European member states. Figures from IFOR’s replacement, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), suggest an even greater degree of delegation, with the US supplying roughly one-quarter the number of troops of its European counterparts by January 2002 (Congressional Research Service 2003).

Though not specifically covered in this analysis, a similar trend of delegation can be found in the Alliance’s response to the Kosovo conflict. Though the US was decidedly active in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia from March to June 1999, it promoted a policy of prescriptive delegation in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) which began peacekeeping operations in June 1999. In fact, the US contributed only 15 percent of the 43,000-strong Force, leading Daalder and O’Hanlon to the assertion that “…America may have run the war, but Europe is running the peace” (2000, 137). A second observation the Bosnia case highlighted is the distinction between hegemonic positionalism due to low legitimacy and a shift from prescriptive delegation to prescriptive activism. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the US maintained a high degree of hegemonic legitimacy throughout the Bosnian conflict. Washington nevertheless switched from advocating a policy of delegation to one of activism due to the growing difficulty of Alliance partners in sufficiently countering the security challenge without a more substantial American engagement. Thus, the change from delegation to activism was not due to undermined hegemonic authority but rather in order to adequately address the regional conflict.

175 It should be mentioned, however, that the US maintained command over both IFOR and SFOR throughout the duration of operations.
This discussion of prescriptive delegation prompts consideration of a further issue of interest, namely the ability of a hegemon to delegate against the will of its partners. Of course, this seems to be a feasible option in an authoritarian alliance, but the question remains as to whether such a scenario is possible in a consensus-based alliance simply due to exceptionally high hegemonic legitimacy. To be certain, this was not the case in Bosnia. European states accepted delegation with enthusiasm, and though calls for a greater US presence grew quickly, continental members still hoped merely for a moderate American role in the intervention because of their concerns of being marginalized. In other words, delegation was the favored approach of all Allies. It nevertheless seems feasible that a hegemon could in fact pursue a policy of prescriptive delegation in certain cases even to the objection of its partners – if legitimacy were high enough.  

6.3. Concluding thoughts

Methodological challenges

Before turning to a discussion of the broader significance of this study, it would first be prudent to review some of the methodological challenges this work has come across. Perhaps one of the more evident issues involves the classification of responses to specific conflicts as instances of Alliance intervention. This touches upon the question as to how one distinguishes between NATO intervention as opposed to multilateral intervention on the part of states who are coincidentally Alliance members. This is particularly relevant when intervention assumes an indirect form such as the coalition of the willing during the Gulf War or the P5+1 negotiation arrangement in the Iran conflict. In both cases, Allied states intervened as a result of the regional power shifts, but this intervention was neither endorsed nor directly advocated by the North Atlantic Council. For this reason, one must be cautious in including responses of an indirect nature when studying NATO cooperation. Despite this, two factors speak to the

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176 One final challenge is related to hegemonic positionalism and likewise warrants further consideration, namely the possibility that efforts by the hegemon at bolstering its legitimacy do not work or, in fact, serve to actually further undermine its authority.

177 Note that the term intervention is used here to refer both to NATO engagement and involvement (see footnotes 89 and 164).
inclusion of indirect responses in the given cases. First, there was universal support within the Alliance for the Gulf War coalition, and there has also been strong NATO consensus toward Western diplomatic efforts throughout the Iran conflict (i.e., EU-3 and P5+1). In the case of Iraq, all member states participated in the coalition through military, financial, or political contributions. Fewer Alliance partners have been directly involved in negotiations with Iran, but this conflict nevertheless proved highly salient within the Alliance (see Appendix A), suggesting its importance to all partner states. Moreover, these examples of indirect participation were accompanied by instances of direct intervention in both cases. In the Iraq conflict, this involved the defense of the Treaty area by protecting Turkey against a possible attack. For the case of Iran, it entailed the formal agreement of the Alliance to build a controversial ballistic missile defense system based partly in Europe. As such, the instances of indirect participation explored in the case studies above appear to truly reflect examples of NATO cooperation.

Another challenge worth noting is that my analysis can in no way be considered exhaustive due to obvious constraints on a project of this scope. For this reason, an appreciation for interstate security cooperation in general as well as for the regional variations in Alliance policy outcomes in particular would benefit from further research. One avenue of possible investigation in this respect includes positing alternative intervening variables for explaining NATO cooperation. An assumption of neoclassical realism is that a number of intervening variables can influence the policy outcomes of specific actors, and this would suggest that Alliance-level variables other than those elucidated here may cast additional light on dynamics of NATO cooperation; exploring the impact of such variables may therefore prove fruitful. A final avenue of interest for future research would seek to apply NCR models to the study of other regional conflicts. While the cases chosen here look specifically at conflicts within which the Organization’s regional power was challenged,178 neoclassical realist approaches could likewise be applied to examine instances within which no power shifts occurred; Kosovo and Afghanistan may be two good starting points. As one observer notes, “virtually everything that has been said about the Alliance’s roles and mission will sooner or later have to be reconsidered in light of [the Kosovo crisis]” (Hoekema 1999, para. 5). Looking into the relevance

178 As already illustrated, the Iraq and Iran cases represented a net power loss for the Alliance, while the Bosnia case instead signified a challenge to NATO’s regional net power gains at the end of the Cold War.
of this conflict as well as that of Afghanistan – NATO’s most extensive mission to date – could provide greater insight into dynamics of transatlantic security cooperation.

On theory and NATO

This analysis has sought to contribute to seminal debates on the origins and maintenance of interstate security cooperation by purporting the value of neoclassical realism’s application to the study of alliances. The findings above support this claim, with NCR – and specifically, the hegemonic legitimacy concept – offering rigorous insight into discrepancies in NATO’s out-of-area policy. The following concluding thoughts are framed around three core objectives: to describe what “revised” neoclassical realism focused on intra-alliance politics does, to discuss how it stands apart from other theoretical explanations which are based on power alone, and to highlight the broader implications of this approach for research on alliances.

Revised neoclassical realism essentially does at the alliance level what traditional NCR has done at the domestic level. To be sure, revised neoclassical realism shares a number of assumptions with its structural realist counterparts. It starts from the premise that states are unitary actors operating under objective conditions who pursue interstate security cooperation based on power considerations. Moreover, revised NCR holds to the structural assumption that cooperating states are invariably affected by systemic constraints and can therefore be expected to follow specific patterns of cooperation such as those predicted by balance of power arguments.

At the same time, revised NCR shares its causal logic with traditional neoclassical realism and thus sees neorealism as a determinative theory of negative action, according to which the system places significant structural limitations on the ability of states to pursue their individual policy preferences. In other words, neorealism is a theory of constraints rather than one of behavior, and this observation carries two theoretical consequences. First, revised NCR contends that cooperating states can, in fact, fail to react ideally to specific structural arrangements due to peculiarities in intra-alliance politics as well as the impact of ideas on the policy-making process. Such variables enjoy bounded influence, however, as systemic

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179 For purposes of brevity, these assumptions will not be elaborated on here. For an overview of the common assumptions which make up the core of political realism, see Schweller (1997).
constraints remain dominant. As Rathbun observes, neoclassical realism uses sub-systemic politics and ideas “in a very limited way. The state is still present, only overcome. Objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment” (2008, 296). This brings us to the second consequence, namely that if intra-alliance politics and subjectivity are afforded too much sway over policy outcomes, systemic constraints push back. In certain instances, this could even bring about policy failure. Revised NCR can therefore be seen as both distinct from and complementary to structural realism and traditional neoclassical realism.\(^{180}\) As such, the central objective of revised NCR theories is to examine how intra-alliance dynamics lead to deviations from those policy responses which would be anticipated based on power considerations alone.

To be certain, revised NCR underscores the impact of ideas on alliance policy outcomes. Regional interests such as those explored in chapter 1 and, more specifically, state motives can indeed shape the direction of cooperation due to the fact that alliance actors must at times rely on perceptions if there is incomplete information at their disposal. As the case studies demonstrate, however, such ideas gain expression not primordial to, but within, the alliance itself.\(^{181}\) Thus, the gist of the NCR models of alliance cooperation examined here is that they identify the pivotal role of perception and/or leadership in interstate security cooperation. For the hegemonic legitimacy model, for instance, perceptions of US legitimacy and its corresponding policy preferences form the basis for substantive policy outcomes. In other words, power shifts are interpreted through the Alliance policy-making process giving specific regard to the intervening role of the hegemon’s perceived authority. Generally speaking, if the US enjoys strong legitimacy, it has substantial influence over policy outcomes. If its legitimacy is challenged, however, Washington’s policy preferences may not prevail, and in contrast, continental partners may actually assume the favorable position with respect to setting NATO’s agenda. This dynamic highlights the quintessence of revised NCR in that it reveals how power and purpose become collective at the level of the alliance.

\(^{180}\) This is in line with claims by Rathbun that neoclassical realism necessarily extends, but does not refute, neorealism (2008).

\(^{181}\) As discussed above, however, revised NCR also recognizes the limits ideas have on policy outcomes in the sense that systemic constraints can punish allied states if their policies reflect overzealous ambitions.
In a sense, neoclassical realists have taken up realism’s mantle for sub-systemic politics and ideas. Most noteworthy is the use of these concepts in NCR approaches to flesh out the nuances of the concept of power (Rathbun 2008, 301). According to neoclassical realist thought, systemic factors such as the anarchical ordering principle provide states with clear incentives to seek gains in power, and alliances such as NATO represent one instrument by which to achieve this. Yet the true value of neoclassical realist theories is that they give credence to the claim that to understand power – and of course the constraints thereof –, one must invariably explore intra-Alliance politics. This highlights not only the relevance of sub-systemic variables in explaining NATO’s out-of-area policy, but it likewise accentuates the prospects for neoclassical realism to truly go “beyond the state.”
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Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Appendix A – Overview of Degree of Case Salience within NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Degree of case salience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (1990-1991)</td>
<td>low (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (2001-)</td>
<td>high (1,226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (2003)</td>
<td>high (224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (2002-)</td>
<td>high (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (2006)</td>
<td>low (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (1991)</td>
<td>low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995)</td>
<td>low (91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B – Curriculum Vitae

PERSONAL DATA

Office: Department of Political Science
University of Southern Denmark
Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark
Tel.: +45 65 50 22 13
E-mail: mag@sam.sdu.dk

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

2002-2006 M.A. (Diplom), Political Science; University of Potsdam, Germany
2000-2002 M.A. Program in International Relations; University of Florida, USA
1996-2000 B.A. Political Science & German Studies; University of Florida, USA

POSITIONS HELD

2007-2009 Ph.D. Fellow, World Politics Group, Department of Political Science
University of Southern Denmark; Odense, Denmark
2006 Visiting scholar, Department of European Politics
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology; Zurich, Switzerland
2003-2006 Research assistant, European Institute for International Economic Relations
University of Wuppertal; Wuppertal, Germany
2002-2003 Research assistant, Department of International Political Economy
University of Potsdam; Potsdam, Germany
2000-2001 Teaching assistant, IR Group, Department of Political Science
University of Florida; Gainesville, Florida, USA

PUBLICATIONS


**Scientific Research Area**

NATO and transatlantic security relations, European Security and Defense Policy, European integration theory

**Academic Conferences**

2009

Årsmøde i Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab  
Participant on panel “European and Transatlantic Security”  
Title of Paper: “Explaining Interstate Security Cooperation: Neoclassical Realist Approaches to Theorizing Alliance Policy Outcomes”; Vejle, Denmark; 22-23 October

*European Consortium for Political Research General Conference*  
Co-chair, discussant and participant on panel “Bringing Realism Back In”  
Title of Paper: “Going Beyond the State? Applying Neoclassical Realism to the Study of Interstate Security Cooperation”; Potsdam, Germany; 10-12 September

*International Studies Association Annual Convention*  
Participant on panel “NATO: Progressing or Persisting?”  
Title of Paper: “Whither NATO? A Neorealist Typology of State Behavior in a Post-Cold War World”; New York, New York, USA; 15-18 February

2008

*European Consortium for Political Research Graduate Conference*  
Discussant on panel “Theorizing Approaches to Security,”  
Participant on panel “Political Realism”  
Title of Paper: “Bringing the System Back In: Structural Realism and the ESDP”; Barcelona, Spain; 25-27 August

*Nordic Political Science Assoc. XV Conference*  
Tromsø, Norway, 6-9 August

2007

*Nordic International Studies Association Conference*  
Chair and discussant on panel “Old Europe, New Europe”  
Odense, Denmark, 23-25 May.

**Presentations and Lectures**

2009

Guest lecture, IntRpol semester introduction seminar  
“The EU as a civilian power”; Odense, Denmark, 17 September

Guest lecture, Pluralization of International Politics, University of Southern Denmark  
“New Political History”; Odense, Denmark, 30 March

Guest lecture, Politics Week, University of Southern Denmark  
“Federalism and the Separation of Powers in the US”; Odense, Denmark, 3 February

2008

Guest Lecture, Folkeuniversitet i Odense  
“US Democratic Presidential Candidates”; Odense, Denmark, 29 April

Guest lecture, International Politics and Organization, Univ. of Southern Denmark  
“Theories of European Integration”; Odense, Denmark, 14 April
Guest lecture, Comparative Politics, University of Southern Denmark
“American Political Culture”; Odense, Denmark, 1 April

Guest lecture, Konservativ Ungdom Annual Conference
“Denmark and the Defense Opt-out: Hazard or Hype?”; Odense, Denmark, 23 February

2007
Guest lecture, International Politics and Organization, Univ. of Southern Denmark
“After the Cold War: European Integration”; Odense, Denmark, 3 December

Workshop instructor, generation europa Conference
“ESDP: Steps toward Autonomy?”; Aarhus, Denmark, 29 September

Guest lecture, International Politics and Organization, Univ. of Southern Denmark
“Theories of European Integration”; Odense, Denmark, 30 March

ACADEMIC AWARDS AND HONORS

2007 Ph.D. Fellow, University of Southern Denmark; Odense, Denmark

2001-2002 Ambassadorial Scholar, Rotary International

2000 Distinguished Scholar, University of Florida

1999-2000 International Fellow, Federation of German-American Clubs

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2008 Dynamics of Transatlantic Security Relations (M.A. seminar)
University of Southern Denmark; Odense, Denmark

2007 Theories of European Integration (M.A. seminar)
University of Southern Denmark; Odense, Denmark

2001 International Relations Theory (B.A. workshop)
University of Florida; Gainesville, Florida, USA

STUDENT GUIDANCE

2009 Supervision of Master’s thesis (speciale)
Title of thesis: “The Realist Paradigm and Non-State Actors: A Possible Roll?”

Supervision of independent research paper (valgfri opgave)
Title of thesis: “Small States and the Impact on the Future of ESDP”

2008 Dynamics of Transatlantic Security Relations (M.A. seminar)
University of Southern Denmark; Odense, Denmark

Supervision of independent research paper

Supervision of independent research paper
Title of paper: “Asymmetric Balancing in the Post-Cold War Era”
Theories of European Integration (M.A. seminar)
University of Southern Denmark; Odense, Denmark