Policing Football in Sweden

Stott, Clifford; Havelund, Jonas; Lundberg, Filip; Khan, Sammyh; Joern, Lise; Hoggertt, James; Rasmussen, Kristian; Vestergren, Sara

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ENABLE is a research project that draws together an international network of key stakeholders and experts in football safety and security. The primary task of the project has been to undertake a programme of evidence gathering in order to analyse, identify and develop good practice in the management of crowds attending Swedish Professional Football matches.

POLICING FOOTBALL IN SWEDEN

ENABLING AN EVIDENCE BASED APPROACH.
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Address for correspondence: Professor Clifford Stott, School of Psychology, University of Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG UK. Email: c.stott@keele.ac.uk
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Foreword

Writing on behalf of the ENABLE project team we hope that this report makes a useful contribution to meeting the safety and security challenges being confronted by football in Sweden. The ENABLE project has been established to provide a comprehensive, evidence based and objective analysis of these challenges and to explore the many complex and often inter-related factors that impinge upon them. We have taken this approach so that relevant policy makers have a clear understanding of the nature of these problems and a series of evidence based recommendations about how potential solutions might best be constructed.

This is the first full report from the second phase of the ENABLE project. It is focused directly on the issue of policing and written to be read in full. It provides some critical analysis of existing practices, as well as exploring current strengths and opportunities for further development. We acknowledge the openness, transparency and support of the many Swedish police officers and organisations that have facilitated our observations and provided access to their policing operations. Without this support much of the research we discuss in the report would simply not have been possible. Such transparency and openness is a hallmark of leading edge and democratic policing and in this regard alone the support and collaboration we have been privileged to receive positions the Swedish Police service as world leading. We hope our critical analysis is received in terms of the progressive contribution it is seeking to make and as such provides a basis for the ongoing development of evidence based policy and good practice.

We extend our sincerest gratitude to Gålöstiftelsen and Länsstyrelsen Stockholm for their financial support and to the many people that have participated directly in our project activities. Our goal has been to create research, but it has also been to provide a platform where the multiple stakeholders involved in football safety and security feel that they have had opportunity to voice their perspectives and concerns. We hope that we have achieved this, at least to some extent. Our longer term objective is to compliment this initial programme of research and collaboration with data and analysis focused on other perspectives and other stakeholders, including fans themselves. Nonetheless it is clear and self-evident that we should begin the research process by addressing the issue of policing in order that we can contribute to important debates and opportunities as we progress into the second year of Phase Two.

Professor Clifford Stott

Co-Director Keele University Police Academic Collaboration (K-PAC)
Scientific Director ENABLE
The ENABLE Project

Overview

ENABLE is a research project that draws together an international network of key stakeholders and experts in football safety and security. The primary task of the project has been to undertake a programme of evidence gathering in order to analyse, identify and develop good practice in the management of crowds attending Swedish Professional Football matches. The project formally began in September 2014 with its first observation, which was made possible using seed-corn funding from Djurgårdens IF and the United Kingdom’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Phase One of the project then ran across the 2015 Allsvenskan season. During Phase One a series of further observations were conducted. During this first phase further funding was obtained to support the project from Länsstyrelsen Stockholm (Stockholm County Administrative Board). This allowed for expansion of the project toward the latter stages of the 2015 season incorporating other stakeholders from the UK and Denmark, including representatives from the UK’s College of Policing and Sussex Police. In late 2015 ENABLE applied to Gålöstiftelsen for substantial funding to allow for Phase Two developments and in September 2015 the project was awarded a grant of 8.0 million SEK. This funding will be used to support project activity from November 1st 2015 to October 31st 2019, subject to adequate performance and review. As a consequence of this substantial investment ENABLE has constructed Phase Two, a major programme of work built around five distinct work-programmes. Work Programme 3 (WP3) is focused specifically on Policing and Stewarding and has delivered a Workshop in Göteborg in February 2016 and undertaken an additional five field observations between March 6th and May 9th 2016.

On the basis of these observations this report makes a series of recommendations specifically for the future development of football policing in Sweden. In summary, the absence of Dialogue Police in the context of policing football crowds, and their adaptation into Evenemangs Police exclusively in Stockholm, represents a departure from and breakdown of the Special Police Tactic (SPT). There is therefore some requirement to consider the regional variability in supporter engagement and to coordinate this capability under a single national strategic and tactical approach. Given the effectiveness of Evenemangs Police in this context consideration should be given to the introduction of similar football related Dialogue Police units in the policing regions outside of Stockholm involved in the policing of football. The EVENT police concept is in the early stages of its development but our observations do suggest that these units add to police capability to deliver a graded tactical capability. However, the current lack of clarity concerning the tactic is undermining its legitimacy and capacity. The specialist engagement skills provided by EVENT units can develop over time with regular deployment but would benefit from a clear and coherent concept, competency profile and training framework. Importantly, we suggest that EVENT policing needs to be seen as an evolution of the SPT as a whole, and therefore part of an evolving national concept for policing crowds of all types.
**History and Context.**

**The Special Police Tactic**

**Origins**

Before discussing the data and its analysis its first necessary to set this project within a broader context of the contemporary history of the policing of football crowds in Sweden. It is the case that a series of ‘riots’ across three days surrounding an EU and then EU-US international summit in Göteborg in 2001 served as a ‘watershed’ moment for progressive reforms to the policing of crowds in Sweden. A subsequent official inquiry into those riots recognised a series of police failures of coordination, organisation, flexibility and dialogue, that either provoked or otherwise contributed to the escalation of these ‘riots’ (SOU, 2002). As a direct consequence of the report, the SPT was developed in order to create a single coherent and nationally coordinated strategic and tactical approach to the policing of crowds across Sweden, such that specialised units from different police counties across the country could be mobilised to work together more effectively. The delivery of this centrally coordinated, nationally adopted and uniformly applied approach to the policing of crowds is the core rationale for the SPT (Adang, 2012).

The SPT is based directly on the Danish Police Mobile Concept, itself developed in the wake of serious rioting in the Nørrebro district of Copenhagen in 1993 (Adang, 2012, Wahlström, 2016). However, to a large extent it is an approach that corresponds with those adopted elsewhere in Europe, including the UK. In summary, the SPT is designed to achieve flexible situational adaptation through mobility via the use of small squads of officers moving in lightly armoured vehicles with clear chains of command. These units are trained in the use of high level force, utilise protective equipment (body armour, helmets, shields, batons, etc.) and are prepared to work in extremely dangerous and stressful situations such as riots. In the Swedish context these squads are commonly referred to by their radio call sign DELTA. These are mobilised as groups that consist of one commander and seven officers. An ‘Avdelning’ (a detachment, section or DELTA unit) consists of four groups and a ‘Bronze’ commander. In large operations the deployment can be escalated to a ‘Division’, which consists of four ‘Avdelningar’. The operational commander, ‘Polisinsatschefen’ or the Silver commander, usually also has a separate command vehicle.

**Theory**

During the early stages of its construction the National Police Academy held a series of conferences and established a training curriculum for officers involved in the delivery of the SPT. The National Police Board also supervised a three-year research project

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1 SPT training and equipment were provided in the Stockholm, Göteborg and Skåne counties (now Stockholm, West and South regions) given these are the areas that contain all of Sweden's major urban conurbations.

2 The first author of this report was involved in delivering lectures during these conferences and training events.
designed specifically to evaluate, inform and empower its implementation (Adang, 2012). According to Adang (2012) during 2005-06 the National Police Academy trained 51 special tactics tutors in the mobile operations concept, who subsequently trained 1200 police officers that constituted the Special National Reinforcement Unit. From 2006 onwards commanders and other specialist units were trained and the SPT went fully operational from 2007 when specialist reinforced vehicles were delivered and their drivers trained. Thus, education, research and theoretical knowledge has always been central to the effective implementation and development of the SPT.

Reflecting this close relationship to research and theory the SPT draws heavily upon the Elaborated Social Identity Model, which is used as the theoretical framework for understanding the underlying social psychological dynamics of crowds (for an overview see Stott, 2009). In summary this approach proposes that collective action within crowds is made possible through the shared salience of a social identity among participants. This identity is essentially a form of shared self-definition among crowd participants of their position within and, relationship to, a set of surrounding intragroup and intergroup relationships. This identity then defines what is possible and legitimate social action given the specific contextual situation. Social identities emerge from and are made psychologically salient through an interaction between background beliefs and the behavioural and structural realities of the social and intergroup context. As such, identities are dynamic and can be easily shaped and reshaped through the changing intergroup interactions that occur during crowd events themselves.

Given their authority and role, the police, specifically their tactics and actions, are often fundamentally important in shaping the nature of the interactions that take place during crowd events. Fears about the dangers posed by a potentially hostile crowd can lead the police to act toward gathering crowds aggressively and assertively. This action can be undifferentiated and sometimes disproportionate in the use of force which in turn can create an oppositional identity amongst crowd participants, a form of collective psychology that can counter-productively both legitimise and empower collective antagonism and confrontation toward the police. Such processes are historical so can frame and feed hostilities toward police and other groups (e.g. opposing groups of football fans) across time and events. Moreover, these processes are not simply or merely confined to interactions with the police but can and also operate between opposing sets of fans.

According to this theoretical approach there is nothing inevitable about crowd conflict. Rather ‘disorder’ often requires a whole series of specific patterns of interaction revolving around the dynamics of legitimacy and power before it can and does takes place. Consequently, the effectiveness of policing can be measured in terms of its capacity to manage these interactions and dynamics in ways that avoid the escalation of conflict. Thus, this theoretical and research framework is used to support two core SPT concepts designed to shape policing at a strategic and tactical level. The first, referred to as the Conflict Reducing Principles, are laid out more fully in Reicher, Stott, Cronin and Adang (2004). In summary, these are strategic principles ensuring that police have knowledge about the nature of the cultural identities of those within the crowd. The second is to use
this knowledge to orient policing toward the Facilitation of those behaviours and intentions judged as legitimate. The third is ensuring that effective Communication is achieved with crowd participants throughout the event. Finally, if use of force is judged necessary that it should be based upon Differentiation wherever possible and not targeted against crowds indiscriminately. These principles then underpin a second concept referred to as the Graded Tactical Approach, defined as policing tactics that are adjusted appropriately to situational demands.

Human Rights: crowds, protests and football

The SPT is also based around a fundamental commitment by the Polismyndigheten toward the policing of crowds in a democracy, therefore in a manner that is oriented toward the maintenance of human rights. Consequently, the SPT is an approach that recognises, implicitly at least, police obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). It is important to acknowledge that within the ECHR there is no specific right protecting protest, rather the ‘right to protest’ emerges from the combination of three specific rights that are contained within the ECHR: Article 9 protecting freedom of thought, conscience and religion along with the right to manifest that religion or belief; Article 10 which protects the freedom of expression and Article 11 the freedom of association or assembly. It is the interaction between these three articles that when combined constitute the right to assemble and express beliefs (i.e. protest) peacefully. At the same time, protesters cannot simply demonstrate where and when they choose. For example, these rights only apply in public places and any attempt to hold a peaceful assembly on private land for example can be considered a contravention of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, which provides that every person (i.e. the owner of the land) is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions including their property.

Articles 9, 10 and 11 are not absolute but qualified rights and therefore the police are entitled – indeed often obliged – to impose restrictions on these freedoms where necessary. Nonetheless any interference with these rights must accordingly be imposed proportionately, in pursuit of legitimate aims and in accordance with the law. Moreover, the ECHR is applied universally. Consequently, it is not just the right of those who wish to assemble to protest that are protected under the ECHR, but also others including those who may be affected by that assembly including residents, property owners, workers, spectators, and indeed police officers. For example, Article 2 of Protocol 4 protects the freedom of movement. Thus, while the right to peaceful assembly is protected, where this occurs it can infringe others’ rights to the freedom of movement. Of course the precise ways in which the rights protected under the ECHR apply are shaped by the specific legislative context of the nation state. Nonetheless as a general principle the ECHR creates both negative and positive obligations for the police. Thus, with respect to Article 11, the police have the negative duty not to act in a manner that unnecessarily restricts peaceful assembly. At the same time, they also have a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate steps to facilitate and protect those who want to peacefully exercise this right. Moreover, any use of force must be proportionate, where proportionality is measured against the availability of realistic opportunities for alternatives having been
explored. In effect, adherence to the ECHR sets out a different understanding of the legal principles and context surrounding public order policing. Policing crowds is no longer merely a question of preventing crime and ‘disorder’ but also of balancing, facilitating and protecting fundamental democratic freedoms (Stott & Gorringe, 2014).

One consequence of the emergence of the SPT is therefore a fundamental change in the policing approach to crowd events. Policing is no longer merely concerned with controlling potential ‘disorder’, but managing this potentiality within a legal framework of sometimes competing and contradictory rights; a framework that requires the police to actively facilitate peaceful assembly, the freedom of expression and the right to freedom of beliefs, privacy and so on. It is clear that to date the analysis of these rights, shifts and challenges has been largely confined to the policing of political demonstrations. However, they are introduced here because it is necessary to recognise that this framework of rights and duties are also enjoyed by and applicable to those participating in other types of crowd events. In other words, police negative and positive duties in this regard do not just apply to policing demonstration crowds, but can be, and arguably should be, also applied – like the SPT itself – to the policing of football crowds (James & Pearson, 2015).

Dialogue

Despite a clear focus on and capacity for the use of force within the SPT, the ‘graded approach’, by definition, requires a dialogue and communication (i.e. liaison) based primary tactical intervention capability. As outlined above there is both a scientific and ECHR derived legal rationale for why such dialogue tactics should be available to police commanders (Stott, 2009; Stott & Gorringe, 2014). The primary role of dialogue tactics at an operational level is to provide a communication link between crowd participants and police commanders with the combined goals of understanding and facilitating crowd participant’s legitimate intentions, providing a capacity for ongoing dynamic risk assessment and therefore empowering police capability to identify emerging risks to public order and react to them in a rapid, proportionate and dialogue led manner (Adang, 2012, Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). Moreover, the very inclusion of Dialogue Police from the early stages of an operation demonstrates clear police commitment to the use of alternative measures. As a consequence, if use of force does become necessary at a later stage, it is more likely to be judged as proportionate under judicial scrutiny.

Consequently, specialised units of Dialogue Police were developed to work in parallel with DELTA units as an integral component of the SPT (Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). The Dialogue Police are specialist units that are deliberately non-coercive, operate with very high level of discretion and focus on working with groups likely to be present within protest crowd events in order to build relationships of trust and confidence with them. In so doing, the Dialogue Police are able to improve two-way communication and the capacity to resolve problems through negotiation between crowd participants and police before, during and after crowd events. Despite initial difficulties regarding implementation (Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011), the Dialogue police have become
embedded, if somewhat embattled\(^3\), units across those policing regions within Sweden that adopt the SPT. It is increasingly recognised that these forms of specialist communication based tactical interventions do enhance police dynamic risk assessment and improve information flow thus also enhancing situational awareness among commanders. This in turn empowers proportionate policing and helps deliver a graded tactical approach. Dialogue Police also help promote perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd participants in ways that empowers conflict reduction through crowd ‘self-regulation’ (Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011, Stott, 2009; Stott, Scothern & Gorringe, 2013).

**Development of the SPT in Football**

Given the investment made in the approach, the nationally coordinated SPT is now firmly embedded within and across the three police regions that include the major urban centres in Sweden, primarily Stockholm, Western (Göteborg) and Southern Regions (Helsingborg and Malmö)\(^4\). Yet, as with research in this area, the development, education and application of the SPT has focused almost entirely on the policing of protest crowds. Nonetheless, it is arguable that the greatest level of demand actually made upon the SPT is due to the regular and ongoing challenges confronted in the policing of Swedish football crowds. It is perhaps for this reason that it is within this domain that the SPT has a series of issues regarding its application and where it has recently undergone some significant and potentially far reaching developments.

**Evenemangs, Supporter and EVENT Police**

As noted above Dialogue Police have always been, and remain, an integral component of the SPT. However, it was not until early 2012 that there was recognition, formally acknowledged at a national level conference held in Hooks Herrgård, that there was a need for increased police capacity for dialogue with football supporters. In April 2012 the Stockholm Police Department appointed a unit of four Dialogue Police dedicated specifically to football. For a number of reasons this unit was not referred to as Dialogue but Evenemangs Police. However, they work directly to the same principles and are in all but name Dialogue Police for football crowds. Nonetheless Evenemangs Police have not been developed nationally, and are therefore not presently deployed by any other police regions outside of Stockholm.

Consequently, the Stockholm Region has subsequently divided its Dedicated Football Officers (DFOs) into two distinct sub-units that perform different functions. These are Evenemangs and Supporter Police. Both are deployed in civilian clothing but the Evenemangs police wear bright yellow tabards with ‘Evenemangs Polis’ written clearly across them. The role of the Evenemangs is focused on building links of trust and confidence among the fan groups and as such where possible they avoid coercion, do not

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\(^3\) For example, in 2015 the entire Stockholm Dialogue Unit threatened to resign from their roles if their working conditions were not improved.

\(^4\) On January 1st 2015 the 21 police counties of Sweden were amalgamated into a single national force organised into seven regions.
make arrest or get involved with criminal prosecutions. In contrast the Supporter Police deploy as ‘spotters’ with no identifiable police markings and focus primarily on criminal intelligence; the surveillance, identification and prosecution. Both spotters and Evenemangs police travel regularly to home and away fixtures of the three major Stockholm clubs throughout the season, but are only deployed at the invitation of the host policing operation for away fixtures, where they liaise as a unit between fans and the host police.

In Western and Southern Regions, the approach to supporter engagement is different. First, these regions do not operate Evenemangs units or any other form of Dialogue Police in relation to football crowds. Second, in these Regions specialised supporter engagement is delivered through units of ‘Supporter Police’, which to some large extent share similarities with UK ‘spotters’. The development of these units can be traced back to the 1992 European Championships. However, in contrast to Supporter Police in Stockholm, in the Western and Southern Regions officers in these units deploy wearing police uniform and tabards, with the words Supporter Police clearly displayed. Individual officers within these units combine within a single role the functions of criminal intelligence, surveillance, coercion, liaison and prosecution (e.g. gathering evidence, providing testimonies in court trials, pursuing stadium bans, etc.).

In March 2014, as a consequence of reflections upon the police operations surrounding the incidents involving the death of a fan (Rikspolisstyrelsen, 2014:15), the police in Helsingborg developed a new experimental deployment of officers they referred to via their radio call sign of INDIA. These officers were designed specifically to enhance the Graded Tactical Approach by empowering proactive communication led supporter engagement. The approach was informed by the Danish ‘Event Police’ concept (Havelund, Ilum, Jensen, Nielsen, Rasmussen & Stott, 2010). As with DELTA units, the officers populating the Helsingborg INDIA units had good levels of cohesion and were effective at managing stressful situations since they had a history of working together in high risk environments. They were configured in much the same way as DELTAs but were given a different style of uniform and briefed to provide a more active role in engaging with fans, proactively using communication and oriented toward facilitation and dialogue rather than use of force.

The immediate outcome was understood to be very effective, assisting police commanders in Helsingborg to empower and enhance communication based tactical interventions. As a consequence, a decision was taken at a national level to roll out this new approach, trialling it in Sweden’s other major urban centres. However, there was no supporting formally recognised conceptual framework defining the exact role of these officers nor their required competencies and skills. Additionally, the roll out was not supported with a corresponding training package for these officers to become familiarised with their new role and function. Moreover, the new units have been categorised in different ways in different operations, as either MIKE police, after their initial radio call sign in Stockholm, but also as DELTA units and more generically as EVENT police. This report will refer to these deployments as EVENT units.
Football fan culture and identity

Finally, it is important to reflect upon fan culture in Sweden. Historically clubs in Sweden have been, and to some extent remain, multi-sports organisations. In the mid-90s Swedish clubs were given the opportunity to separate their football sections into Limited companies. During this process Riksidrottsförbundet, inserted a ‘50+1’ rule in order to ensure that the football clubs remained majority owned by their members. There have been various attempts to remove this rule but action by the Svenska Fotbollssupporterunionen (SFSU) among others has led to a situation where fan ownership is currently the dominant model for club governance in Sweden and therefore fans have a very significant influence on policy decisions. Also Under Article 35 of UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, clubs across Europe are required to appoint a Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO) to ensure a proper and constructive discourse with their fans. The outcome of this in Sweden is the development of a coordinated programme of investment and education by by Swedish Elite Football and the major Swedish clubs, in a particular form of SLO oriented toward conflict de-escalation. The SLOs work to establish good links of communication between supporter organisations and the clubs. The SLOs often act as a primary contact point to the police particularly with regard to negotiating gathering points and routes for fan ‘marches’.

Football clubs in Sweden have a number of different supporter groups. Most of the spectators attending a match are ‘ordinary’ supporters who are not affiliated to any kind of formal membership group or otherwise affiliate with the official supporter groups of their club. However, supporter culture in Sweden revolves around two very influential forms of loosely organised groups and identities. The most visible and arguably most powerful of these types of independent organisations are the ‘Ultras’. One of the most visible ways of expression of the ultra’s ‘identity’ is their use of coordinated chanting, large visual displays, banners and pyrotechnics inside and outside of stadiums. Moreover, Ultras are often central to organising, ‘stewarding’ and leading large fan marches to and from stadiums and have a complex relationship to violent confrontation. For example, Malmö FF has an independent supporter group called the Supras Malmö, formed in 2003 from a coalition of independent supporters and Ultras. It would be inaccurate to assume that this group actively pursues violent confrontations with opposition fans. However, at times the different Ultras within and between clubs can be openly hostile to one another and do on occasion become involved in confrontational situations.

The ‘Ultras’ are generally distinct from a third category of ‘hooligan’ groups who focus less on visual and auditory displays and more on actively seeking either pre-arranged or spontaneous confrontations with other hooligan groups. Hooligan groups in Sweden are highly organised. They operate informal ‘League tables’ of some measure of their power, organisation and fighting prowess and, to determine their position in these ‘tables’, regularly organise pre-arranged confrontations in remote areas some distance away from stadiums in terms of location and time. Also hooligan groups in Sweden have collaborative affiliations to those attached to clubs in Denmark and other parts of Europe.
These different groups, their boundaries and affiliations dynamic by nature, have a major impact on the dynamics of football crowd events and have been associated with a series of tragic incidents including the death of Tony Deogan, a Stockholm based member of IFK Göteborg's ‘hooligan’ group the ‘Wisemen’ in 2002, and the already noted death of a 43-year-old Djurgårdens supporter in Helsingborg. For these and other reasons football match days in Sweden create special conditions for the police and sometimes also a sense of negative expectation in the city where the game is hosted. This is particularly true for historically tense ‘local derby’ fixtures that tend to attract large crowds, relatively large numbers of ‘away’ fans, of which many have a history of antagonism and conflict. However, it would be inaccurate to assess the mere presence of ‘hooligans’ or ‘Ultras’ as necessary or sufficient for ‘disorder’ to occur. Rather there appears to be a complex and meaningful series of processes involved that if successfully understood can be managed in ways that undermine the often considerable potential for conflict that presents itself in the football context in Sweden.

The National Strategy

Following a series of high profile incidents, a National Strategy was developed in Sweden involving various stakeholders. The strategy was published in 2014 and will be in operation until 2017. A core objective of the strategy is to create an environment in Swedish football that is “welcoming, safe, secure” and has “atmospheric arrangements for all”. It was designed to develop and prioritize collaboration between the various stakeholders in order: to strengthen positive supporter culture; increase the collaborative partner’s ability to manage sports events in order to: reduce insecurity, crime, disorder and the need for police resources; and reduce risk supporters and to counteract recruitment to “risk” fan culture. In order to achieve these objectives of the strategy presents a number of practical and guiding measures that form the basis of the operational work on regional and local levels. The measures selected are: to focus on the supporter culture; to establish and implement a plan for collaboration; to introduce a common communications plan; to work actively on pyrotechnics use; to work actively on alcohol and drug use; and organize closures and access orders (i.e. stadium bans). In order to strengthen positive supporter culture, the aim is to utilize the collaboration to find better ways to respond, support and encourage the good behavior of individuals within that culture. Importantly, from the perspective of the policing, the strategy acknowledges that a key goal is for the Swedish police forces in Stockholm, Western and Southern regions to focus on the conflict reducing principles and implement them more fully through developing and deepening graded police work. The strategy therefore to some extent underpins the development of the new EVENT concept. The National Strategy has itself been subjected to formal review so we will not touch upon it further within this report.

Methodological Approach

ENABLE is designed to contribute directly to the evidence based transformation in stakeholder practices in respect to safety and security in Swedish football. As such, the project adopts a non-linear approach to the research process that challenges the
conventional constructions of the boundaries and nature of what is traditionally considered as ‘research’. Instead ENABLE adopts a knowledge co-production framework that rejects the traditional emphasis on the precise specification of research questions. Moreover, the methods and epistemology necessary to produce ‘evidence’ are less of a central focus. Most important are the qualities of the partnership and leadership that are enabled through the research process, accompanied by the incorporation of reflective learning and commitment to the development that is possible through collective participation from relevant stakeholders. Consequently, ENABLE is a project that has been created specifically to provide a platform for multiple stakeholders to engage in knowledge co-production and to do so in the face of complex challenges that are dynamic and often unpredictable.

The emphasis within ENABLE upon parallel processes of research and transformation has made the project ideally suited to a methodology referred to as Participant Action Research (PAR); an approach widely adopted in healthcare settings but also increasingly applied to a range of policing and criminal justice issues (e.g. Stott, West & Radburn, 2016). The central aim is to provide a platform for enhanced quality of practice by empowering stakeholders through engagement with research and implementation processes. Rather than a strictly defined method it is a research framework with the specific purpose of informing and influencing practice. Thus, the project has adopted a definition of PAR as a research framework involving academics and practitioners designed for improving practice as part of the process of change. The approach has involved academic researchers and practitioners working in collaborative relationships of knowledge co-production and exchange in order to create a platform in which evidence based reflection could occur and on this basis that development could take place. Accordingly, the project has adopted three core components in that the research was participatory, oriented toward empowering democratic forms of practice and designed to address the ‘theory-practice gap’; addressing the latter by adopting an ethnographic case study format enabling an in depth and detailed case analysis of twelve safety and security operations. These included the following fixtures. In 2014: IFK Göteborg v Djurgårdens IF, September. In 2015: AIK v Hammarby IF, March; Hammarby IF v Djurgårdens IF, April; IFK Göteborg v IF Elfsborg, June; Djurgårdens IF v Hammarby IF, August; IFK Göteborg v Hammarby IF, September; Hammarby IF v Helsingborg IF, October. In 2016: Djurgårdens IF v Hammarby IF, March; Hammarby IF v Helsingborg IF, April; AIK v IFK Göteborg, April; Helsingborg IF v Malmö FF, May, IFK Göteborg v Djurgårdens IF, May.

In this respect the project implemented an ideographic mode of research where the intention is to provide an accurate account of the nature of the events in question and on this basis to provoke consideration of more generalizable principles of good practice. Our observations involved multiple stakeholders drawn from our key partners. These included academics from the University of Keele in the UK and from the University of Southern Denmark in Odense. Also participating were experienced police officers from the Stockholm, Western and Southern Police regions in Sweden and from East Jutland in Denmark. Participants were also included from the UK’s College of Policing, along with representatives from Hampshire, Sussex, West Midlands and Staffordshire Police as well as Supporter Liaison Officers from a number of football clubs in Sweden, Denmark and
the UK. The observations also included stadium safety and security managers from football clubs in Sweden and from Stoke City F.C. and Cardiff City F.C in the UK as well as Brøndby IF in Denmark. The project's working language is English.

For each observation, the teams were drawn together on the day of or the day before the fixture and briefed on the context and aims of the project along with its methodology. Each observation was supported by the Swedish Police National Development Unit and the host police force and therefore observers had access to aspects of the policing operation both inside and outside of stadia. On the day of the fixture the observation team worked in small groups attending briefings, interviewing participants and making observations across the operational footprint of the event. On most occasions one of the Swedish police observers would have access to a police radio and would record significant content. Observers would pay particular attention to areas where fans gathered and focus on any issue that was of significance to the police or the research goals of the project. As the fixture approached the team would gravitate toward the stadium and continue observations inside during the match. After the fixture further observations would take place around key areas of interest such as transport hubs. The team was then drawn together the following day into a workshop where extensive discussion was undertaken. This discussion focused on drawing out and triangulating the data so that we were able to gain a clear and objective account of the chronological order and nature of the event as this related to safety and security issues. The discussions were recorded and transcribed. During these discussions the team also began to develop some preliminary theoretical analysis of the implications and significance of these events for operationally relevant issues. These discussions were then revisited for further analysis. This latter analysis formed the structure of a series of preliminary reports, where data was cross-checked and validated. This report has been designed to draw together the data and analysis from all the observations outlined above and to draw out some of the issues and key themes derived from an analyses of the events. Some of the episodes have already been discussed and described in detail in the preliminary reports. These descriptions are used as case studies to exemplify the core analytical and thematic issues that have been derived from all observations.

Analysis

Having outlined the background context and history of the Swedish policing approach to crowd events the report now turns to the thematic analysis of the data obtained from the observations. The report sets this data out in terms of a series of themes that have emerged from the analysis and which relate loosely in chronological order from pre-event planning to post match incidents.

Policing Strategy

There can be no doubt that there is widespread commitment to the SPT among senior commanders throughout Sweden and its underlying principles invariantly underpinned police strategic approaches in all of the observations we conducted in all three regions. In this respect these SPT concepts have evidently become successfully embedded within
police organisations across the main urban centres in Sweden. However, the police strategies we observed focused primarily upon the prevention of crime and disorder and while references were made to the facilitation positive supporter culture, it was rarely specified exactly what this meant or how such empowerment was or could be achieved. Moreover, there was rarely any explicit reference to police obligations and duties with regard to the maintenance and protection of human rights. We can equally assert on the basis of our observations that there are issues to be addressed in terms of empowering the translation of SPT derived concepts and strategies into operational deployments.

Pre-Event Planning

Segregation

It is perhaps implicit recognition of a relationship between geographical space and risk that security operations ubiquitously focus on the segregation of fans into entirely different geographical locations. Policing operations we observed were then focused primarily on attempts to maintain this segregation as far as it possible to achieve this, particularly those groups of fans categorised by police as ‘risk’. For example, at the Friends Arena for a fixture between AIK and IFK Göteborg in April 2016, away fans were requested by both police and club to gather in Gamla Stan (‘the Old Town’). The police, club and bus company then struck agreements that provided buses to take the supporters free of charge directly to a segregated entrance underneath the upper walkway that surrounds the Friends Arena. In this way it was possible to almost entirely segregate the two sets of fans. However, despite the fact that there had been no tensions between the two fan groups on that day, on arrival at the Arena the Göteborg fans were met by DELTA officers whose aggressive stance was noted by our observers. Indeed, one of our observers was assertively instructed by one of the officers that he was not allowed to take photographs. It was not clear on what legal basis this instruction was issued. Moreover, the Göteborg SLO expressed concerns to these officers about the fact they were gathered together talking to each other, rather than spread out and working to create a welcoming environment by talking with the fans that were present. These suggestions were dismissed, the officers remained huddled together in a group, deploying only as the buses arrived to create a cordon at the bottom of the stairway facing the fans. When standing in the cordon one of the officers pulled on gloves in what appeared to our observers to be a symbolic display of his assertive authority. In contrast, EVENT police, who had travelled on the buses with these fans, mingled with and among the fans engaging in conversation with some of them.

At the Tele2 Arena in Stockholm the various stakeholders also collaborate to engineer the infrastructure in such a manner as to create separate thoroughfares, T-Bana metro stations, and entry points for ‘home’ and away fans. By making use of temporary fencing it then becomes possible to create entirely separate physical spaces in the immediate vicinity of the stadium and then position police resources in locations that increase opportunities for preventing large groups of opposing fans from moving from one sector to another and therefore from coming into contact, in particular if these groups contained fans categorised as ‘Ultras’ or ‘hooligans’. However, there were a number of examples
where this segregation broke down or was otherwise not achieved. As these situations arose there were often few if any police present within these ‘segregated’ areas to manage the subsequent interactions that then took place. For example, just prior to one of the Stockholm Derbies between Djurgårdens and Hammarby large groups of Djurgårdens fans populated two bars on either side of the Arenagången (the pedestrian walkway leading to the Arena). As Hammarby fans walked between these bars hostile interactions developed that on occasion escalated into violent confrontations. This pattern of interaction went on for some considerable time before any police moved into the area to manage the situation and prevent any further escalations.

Negotiated Management

During our observations police capabilities to segregate potentially hostile fans groups were delivered most effectively through pre-event planning processes that involved regular meetings between police commanders and SLOs. Stockholm Police have a small group of well-trained and experienced public order commanders who will take on the role of ‘Silver’ commander at ‘high-risk’ matches, each commander specialising with one of the three major Stockholm clubs. The SLOs therefore have a high level point of contact to the senior tactical commander and regularly take advantage of this relationship ahead of relevant fixtures. This route of communication and dialogue enables the SLOs to liaise with the commanders about the likely behaviour of the fans. This higher level contact is facilitated through further regular contact between fans, SLOs and the Evenemangs police “talking about everything including preparing the choreography”. Such processes appear to provide a much better understanding of and capability for the police to predict potential risks and then negotiate through the SLOs to try to alleviate those risks both before and during the events themselves. In effect using negotiated compliance to achieve proactive segregation.

For example, in April 2015 Hammarby played Djurgårdens. This was the first fixture between the two clubs since they had both moved to the shared Tele2 Arena and therefore the first time Djurgårdens fans had been ‘away’ at their own stadium. The key strategic objectives set by the Gold commander included ensuring that the fixture was played at the time it was intended. It was also an aim to ensure that the policing approach should be based upon the national strategic model of the conflict reducing principles and graded police profile. Third, a core objective for the police was to ensure the effective handling of disturbances and to prioritise dealing with these firstly around the arena, secondly on the transport infrastructure and thirdly at other gathering places. The fourth goal of the policing operation was to ensure the rapid dissemination of information about police action – particularly in situations of conflict – so supporters will be aware as quickly as possible why police were acting in the way that they were.

One of the key areas of concern for the police revolved around a large pre-arranged gathering of Djurgårdens ‘risk’ fans in the bar En Arena. The gathering had taken place in that location because the fans had requested to go there as the bar is owned and run by a Djurgårdens fan. The good links through the SLO to the police permitted a negotiation to be undertaken that ultimately located these ‘risk’ fans in a single location that was known
to the police and could be relatively easily managed. At this time the relationship between the police and the Hammarby SLO had been significantly undermined by a police decision to remove an Evenemangs officer who had developed a good working relationship with the fans. As a direct outcome of this breakdown in communication Hammarby fans had decided, without consultation with the police, to gather in bar called Slakthuset, which was only around 200 metres away from the En Arena. There was no legal basis for the police to prevent either gathering.

Nonetheless, the experienced ‘Silver’ commander had trust and confidence in the dialogue concept and as result of his good lines of communication with Djurgårdens fans through the SLO decided to facilitate the gathering at the En Arena. There were also two experienced ‘Bronze’ Commanders available to him, who also had good relationships of trust and confidence with the Djurgårdens SLOs. Through these relationships the command team negotiated before the event to allow the Djurgårdens fans to define the route that they wanted to take from the gathering in order to march to the Tele2 Arena. It was evident that the march was going to be a point of ‘high risk’ given it would be forced to go through areas heavily populated by Hammarby fans. Moreover, given the negotiated agreements that were in place to facilitate the march, the Silver commander took a decision to police it as he would if it were a protest. In other words, the commander facilitated the assembly and oriented tactically to protect it from attack, despite the fact this was one of the largest gatherings of Djurgårdens ‘risk’ fans the police in Stockholm had ever experienced.

Correspondingly, our observations recorded evidence of a strong ‘self-regulation’ culture within the gathering and the march, which may itself be an outcome of this structural commitment to dialogue. For example, by late afternoon large numbers of Hammarby supporters had gathered in the Slakthuset. At around 5.30 pm a group of around 150 Hammarby fans left the Slakthuset and attempted to head in the direction of the En Arena via Hallvägen. The police rapidly mobilised some of the nearby DELTA units along with an ‘arrest team’ of ROMEO officers who were operating in the vicinity. As the Hammarby fans arrived at the junction with Palmfeltsvägen the DELTA units formed a cordon, which prevented the Hammarby fans from walking along the road that would have taken them directly in front of the En Arena. The Hammarby fans then took an alternative route via Bolidenvägen, along a pedestrian walkway into Konstgjutarvägen, a road parallel to Palmfeltsvägen that was still visible to the Djurgårdens fans in the En Arena but much further away and separated by the railway line. However, it would have been relatively easy for the Djurgårdens fans to confront the other group as the two roads were connected via the Globen T-bana station immediately opposite the En Arena. While the two fan groups exchanged insulting gestures and chants, as the Hammarby fans passed the station there was no serious attempt by the Djurgårdens fans to leave the bar and the Hammarby fans continued walking and presented no further issues for the police.

At around 5.45 pm as expected, fans in the En Arena began to gather outside the bar and prepared to march toward a previously agreed route to the Tele2 Arena. As approximately 500 supporters grouped up outside the bar six or seven of these fans started to play a clearly influential role marshalling and choreographing the other fans. It
was evident to our observers that this group had obvious authority among the rest of the fans. Given the route had been pre-arranged along Rökerigatan the police had placed low plastic fencing, which created a physical but largely symbolic barrier across each and every access route into the area where the Slakthuset was located. Behind the netting in each roadway police ‘riot’ vans had been placed and DELTA police were present in full riot gear but were facing away from the march toward the area where Hammarby fans were gathered, symbolically positioning themselves as protecting the march. There was also a unit of plain clothed police ROMEO officers within the Hammarby area moving around on foot trying to intercept any Hammarby fans attempting to confront the march.

Despite these measures there were various points at which Hammarby fans did move into the ‘controlled’ spaces and gesture toward the Djurgårdens fans to come and confront them. One incident in particular involved a well-known and prominent Hammarby hooligan who came out of the rear of the Slakthuset and approached the fence. There were initially no police in this area so he stood for some time defiantly gesturing toward the fans on the march to come across and confront him. This had the effect of provoking a number of the Djurgårdens fans who made serious attempts to cross and pull down the netting. As a consequence, DELTA units did turn toward and confront the Djurgårdens fans. However, at this point the influential fans that had been marshalling and leading the march walked back from the front of it, intervened and aggressively compelled the Djurgårdens fans to continue toward the stadium. Those fans that had previously been confronting the police lines complied and the situation rapidly calmed.

Tactical Dialogue

There can be little argument that the above situations posed some very serious threats to public order and that in this respect alone the policing of them acts as a model of good practice since the event passed off without any serious incident. We suggest that this was to some extent due to the operational commander’s ability to utilise dialogue within the planning processes. But planning also impacts upon events through resourcing. Football policing operations in Sweden invariantly mobilise DELTA units supported by specialist units of supporter police, mounted police, dogs and plain clothed ROMEO units, and when available also Evenemangs and from 2015 the EVENT police, units. Thus, the majority of resources deployed are units whose tactical orientation invariantly tends toward four core capabilities: surveillance, deterrence, coercion and arrest. During our observations such resources would always far outnumber those resources oriented primarily toward supporter engagement, dialogue and communication.

The resources specifically dedicated to supporter engagement were not just lower in number proportionately, they were often under resourced and also more haphazardly coordinated. For example, during the Djurgårdens v Hammarby fixture discussed above there were in excess of 350 police officers mobilised and of these 19 were EVENT officers. Also senior commanders utilising EVENT police were often unable to populate the role with officers who had volunteered, so the planning department mobilised DELTA officers to the role, some of whom would be deploying as EVENT officers for the first time. Moreover, these officers were provided with only a loose specification of the nature of this
new role in the briefing and had no specific training. They were often left with little understanding of what it was they were actually supposed to do. It was often the case that these officers would then demonstrate very little commitment to the role and engage in relatively low levels of proactive engagement. In fact, on various occasions our observations record EVENT officers gravitating toward their colleagues and engaging in conversation with each other rather than with fans. Moreover, due to limited numbers of EVENT officers they were invariably allocated exclusively to the policing of ‘away’ fans leaving no basis for similar engagements with ‘home’ fans. Equally, the Stockholm Evenemangs Unit currently only has three full time staff. As a consequence, despite the strategic commitment to supporter engagement, the ability to deliver it is constrained, simply because the resources needed to deliver the strategy are proportionately very low.

These problems were exemplified during a set of interactions that developed prior to another one of the Stockholm derbies at the Tele 2 Arena. During the few hours prior to the match a group of approximately 150 ‘risk’ fans had, as predicted by the police, gathered at Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren in Arenagången. The position of the bar enabled these ‘risk’ fans to control most of the area around Arenagången and Globentorget. They had also positioned people at strategic viewing posts in order to monitor any movements towards Arenagången. Our observations record the atmosphere as confrontational. The group gathered outside Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren were not drinking heavily and some had wrapped strapping around their fists, which our observers interpreted as indications that they were preparing to fight. Despite the obvious threat this group posed there were no EVENT or Evenemangs police in the vicinity. The Evenemangs unit was short staffed due to holiday arrangements and had been deployed to a gathering of ‘ordinary’ fans elsewhere. The EVENT unit had also been deployed exclusively to the away fans, who themselves were gathered some distance away. This left the area between the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station and the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren empty of police. As such the level of police engagement with the ‘risk’ group or with any of the Hammarby fans that were passing by them was essentially non-existent. However, a group of plain clothed ROMEO officers had gathered on the Globen T-Bana crossway, they appeared to focus exclusively upon observing, monitoring and preparing to react to the group from distance.

Although police strategy had as one of its objectives to “keep the supporters segregated before, during and after the match (especially the risk supporters)” a number of ‘away’ supporters had legitimately been able to purchase tickets in ‘home’ sections of the stadium. As such the away fans with ‘home’ section tickets inevitably had to access entrances allocated to home fans and therefore needed to access the stadium via Gullmarsplan T-Bana station and walk down Arenagången, passing directly past the ‘risk’ group gathered outside the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren. In the main these ‘away’ fans were ordinary fans including family groups and as such were largely ignored by the ‘risk’ group. However, one male fan, who appeared drunk, did pass by the bar singing support for the ‘away’ team. He was approached by a group of four of five of the ‘risk’ group, who walked across and violently assaulted him. He fell to the ground and the ‘risk’ fans continued their assault. The ROMEO unit did not react to this episode, whereas a ‘home’ fan SLO, who
was within the group gathered outside the bar, ran across to rescue the ‘away’ fan and calm the situation.

Around five minutes after the assault three empty (except for their driver) blue police carrier vans drove from their location in a cordon on Globentorget toward the Arenagången and drove past the ‘risk’ gathered outside the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren. The vans turned around and drove back to their original location. It was not clear what the purpose of this manoeuvre was other than to act as some form of deterrent. Shortly afterwards a DELTA group arrived and some of the officers positioned themselves outside the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren facing but not otherwise interacting with the group of fans, thereby creating a cordon around them. Shortly after this a mounted unit trotted past the ‘risk’ group. Throughout no direct verbal interaction took place with any of the group gathered outside the bar, nor with ‘away’ fans passing them along the Arenagången. Once again, this episode demonstrates the problems of delivering de-escalation via supporter engagement, without the use of specialist units specifically oriented to that role. The episode also demonstrates once again how the absolute ‘segregation’ strategy was ultimately flawed, given both ‘home’ and ‘away’ fans had to progress through an area set aside for ‘home’ fans in order to access the stadium. In that context, despite the obvious tensions, there was very little in the way of police deployment in the vicinity of the rising threat. It seems self-evident that EVENT police could have been deployed into the Arenagången, specifically the area between the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station and the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren, to actively engage fans approaching the risk group in order to moderate the interactions and potentially prevent assaults; but given the limited number of EVENT police were allocated to policing ‘away’ fans elsewhere this simply was not possible. Finally, the small number of Evenemangs police also meant there was no capacity for them to engage with this group to work with the SLO in an attempt to build links and promote a positive supporter culture of ‘self-regulation’ among them.

Risk assessment and mobilisation

As already outlined, it is our view that the general approach to policing football crowds in Sweden is built upon the foundation of SPT strategic principles. But our research identified potentially important issues with how this strategy is being applied. We will now develop this argument by exploring how differences in the application of the SPT in the football context also emerge as a direct outcome of the pre-event risk assessment process. We assert that these differences are undermining the coherent development of the SPT as a nationally coordinated approach. Moreover, we will explore how high levels of police resource are sometimes applied to an event that bear little relationship to the very low levels of risk that actually materialise. This pattern of inconsistency raises further important questions about the levels of national co-ordination that are being achieved and the kinds of investment that are needed, in particular to enable the development of a coherent and systematic intelligence product to assist commanders in making more accurate assessments of risk, given these assessments subsequently play critically important roles in determining the levels of resources that are actually and ultimately applied.
Police risk assessments in Sweden directly inform police operational planning in the football context via a binary categorisation system that creates two qualitatively different types of police mobilisation. If an event is understood by police to pose serious threat and risk, then it is classified as a ‘special event’. This classification appears to be largely determined by the history of the experience of police officers in dealing with that fan group on previous occasions. As one police observer commented regarding their planning for a ‘special event’, that it was based on, “history, history of commotion and bangers, pyro, masking, not taking corrections from officers, shoving officers when officers trying to get close to them to correct them. Shoving them in quite an aggressive tone on the Ultras part, when they arrived last time and the time before that as well. So, preparation for to take care of a problem that hasn’t been taken care of for like 5 years in a row when they played here”. This classification then allows the police to mobilise trained resources from across, and if necessary beyond, the wider policing region. However, if the perceived threat and risk is low then the event does not justify the ‘special event’ categorisation and the policing, if necessary at all, is handled by the local police Division. The vast bulk of our observations focused upon ‘special events’, so our overall analysis draws primarily from these. Nonetheless, there were important issues arising from the few policed events we observed that did not merit this categorisation.

The two ‘non-special events’ we observed were based at the Tele2 Arena in Stockholm during a period within which the city was developing its EVENT unit. For both of the events the policing operations adopted a strategy that was completely in line with the SPT, in that it sought to apply the Conflict Reducing Principles through a Graded Tactical Response based upon facilitation and engagement. Nonetheless there was as usual a concentration on the core police function of preventing crime and disorder. To achieve these goals, the local Division mobilised DELTA units to deal with what had already been acknowledged to be events posing little if any risk. These units were deployed primarily in and around the Arenagången, but did not become operational until just one hour prior to the fixture. Moreover, throughout their deployment our observations record that these DELTA units engaged in very low levels of interaction, despite the fact that thousands of fans were gathered in or progressing through this area. Our observation teams noted that these scenarios would have been ideal opportunities to deploy EVENT police in order to allow them to exploit the lack of tension and develop their engagement skills and otherwise assist them in developing positive relationships with fans. The Evenemangs Police, who were deployed, certainly made clear to us that for them the capacity to engage with fans offered by such low risk contexts was extremely valuable.

For example, prior to one of the fixtures at the Tele2 Arena, at approximately 13:55 a large number of ‘Ultras’ affiliated to the home team had gathered in two bars by the Gullmarsplan. There were no police officers observed in this location until a police vehicle containing a DELTA group drove past, then returned and parked up slightly away from the bars. Our observations record that no officers got out and there was no engagement between the officers and the supporters in the bar. At around 14.15 a group of approximately 40 fans began walking towards the stadium, no officers followed or
otherwise engaged with them. At around this time another observation team observed a second group of fans, some wearing insignia affiliating them with the home club’s ‘hooligan’ group, gathered in the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren, on the Arenagängen. Within the group was one of the home club’s off-duty SLOs. As they passed, the SLO recognised and embraced one of the observation team, who was an off-duty EVENT officer known to him. This interaction demonstrates that positive engagement opportunities in this context were available. Yet, a short time afterwards a group of DELTA officers drew up outside the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren in a police vehicle. They did not get out or otherwise engage with the fans. The only uniformed officers seen on foot in this area at that time were at the top of the steps further along the Arenagängen toward the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station. Here two officers were engaged in surveillance and enforcement activity, preventing anyone with alcohol containers from continuing onwards. At approximately 14:15 the officers in the van parked near to Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren drove forward to the pedestrian crossing, got out of the van, attached helmets to their belts and walked in pairs from there to the Arena. Our observations record that these officers did not engage in verbal interaction with anyone during this walk.

It seems evident then that EVENT units may have been better positioned to achieve the SPT aligned strategic goals of the policing operation in this ‘low risk’ scenario, and by implication deliver the graded policing called for. Given the low risk classification it seems more appropriate to use EVENT units than it does DELTAs, who after all are trained to specialise in high-end use of force. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that EVENT units have been developed. However, EVENT police are a specialist unit that is mobilised centrally and therefore its officers are not necessarily located specifically within the Division responsible for the Tele2 Arena and as such are only mobilised for ‘special events’ by Central rather than Divisional Operational Planning. Consequently, none had been mobilised into either of these events and subsequently these important development, engagement and coherence opportunities were missed simply because of the nature of risk assessment and its relationship to the force planning, organisational structure and mobilisation processes. It seems important then that consideration is given to how EVENT units can be more fully integrated into, and made available for, ‘low risk’ events that do not justify the ‘special event’ classification.

Police Accountability

Police risk assessments are to a large extent informed by intelligence reports and briefings but are also based to some considerable extent upon historical antagonism between the supporters of specific clubs. Initial risk assessments, made shortly after fixtures are announced, are based largely on historical data but as the events approach further information becomes available based upon ticket sales, travel arrangements and police intelligence. For the policing operations we observed, there were important issues relating to the sometimes superficial quality of these risk assessments in terms of the meaningful and operationally relevant information they provided. But also there were operations where police commanders appeared to be reluctant to take account of information arriving nearer to the events when that information indicated that the event was now much lower in risk than had previously been anticipated. Such reluctance to
‘downgrade’ risk assessment may to some extent be a feature of the accountability pressures governing police decision making.

For example, on at least one occasion our observations record that the assessment of risk available to the police indicated that a ‘special event’ no longer justified that classification. The fixture involved a long and expensive journey on a Monday night for away fans, who themselves had two much more attractive fixtures to attend on either side of this one. Ticket sales were low and the intelligence reports indicated that only small numbers of ‘risk’ fans would attend and that they would do so with little if any intention of seeking out confrontations. Despite all of these indications the local commander still utilised approximately 150 officers to police the event. It may be that this decision was to some extent informed by the previous fixture involving the home club, where disorder had taken place which had been given very high levels of publicity in national and international media. As such there were clear accountability issue for the police, where deployment of large numbers of officers were judged to be needed despite clear indications that the fixture itself posed very low risk. While this is understandable it does point toward the importance of understanding that ‘risk’ in this environment of policing, and the subsequent levels of resources that are deployed, is not exclusively about the likelihood that disorder may or may not take place. Rather, it is also about the political pressures and reputational damage that force commanders are faced with should even minor problems develop in the context of these relatively high profile and media focused events.

The complexity of ‘risk’: geographical space, identity and ‘territory’

Across all our observations groups of home and away supporters tended to gather in pubs some hours before the fixture with the primary focus on socialising, drinking and collectively expressing support for their club. These gatherings tended to occur in locations that were ‘traditional’ gathering places for fans or were otherwise symbolically meaningful for the supporter groups involved. For example, for fixtures in Stockholm Hammarby fans would tend to gather in the Medborgarplatsen. The name ‘Citizen Square’ (Medborgarplatsen) neatly captures the working class roots and identity of the club and it is a place with bars and restaurants located in the heart of Södermalm district within southern Stockholm, an area with which the club has been historically associated. Given this historical association between place and identity, it would be unusual if not unheard of for fans of a visiting team to gather anywhere near to Medborgarplatsen and to do so would almost certainly be interpreted as a major provocation, particularly if the opposing fans were affiliated to an antagonistic ultra or hooligan group.

Equally, ‘away’ fans visiting from cities outside Stockholm tended to gather in specific bars and pubs in the Gamla Stan. What is evident then, is that when fans congregate, the geographical location of their gathering has a profound impact on police and opposition fans’ perceptions of its legitimacy, the dynamics of their interactions and the likelihood of confrontation. In this sense geographical location, or psychological ‘territory’, appears to be related directly to the dynamics of football related conflict across Sweden. For example, it was evident that one of the major sources of tension between fans of
Hammarby and Djurgårdens football clubs, during the period of our observations, revolved around the perceived ‘ownership’ of ‘territory’ surrounding the Tele2 Arena during ‘home’ and ‘away’ fixtures. These tensions appear to date back to 2013 with the adoption of the Tele2 Arena in Southern Stockholm as a shared venue for both clubs. It is the case that sections of the Hammarby fan base see and refer to the Tele2 arena as their own new Söderstadion. As such Djurgårdens IF are portrayed as ‘homeless’ interlopers with no legitimate right to be present in a stadium and area of the city that Hammarby fans have traditionally seen as their own.

It was evident that during our observations a key site of this dispute evolved in and around the main routes to and from the Arena, in particular from Gullmarsplan and Globen T-Bana stations and the main pedestrian avenue to the stadium, the Arenagången. Indeed, we have already discussed the incidents during the first Hammarby home fixture against Djurgårdens when a group of some 500 Djurgårdens risk fans gathered in the bar En Arena that is located right in the heart of the area allocated to home fans. We noted how tensions emerged when a large group of Hammarby fans moved from another bar close by and attempted to walk directly past the En Arena but were prevented from doing so by police. It was evident during this incident that there was a great deal of ‘symbolic interaction’ between the two groups who appeared to be posturing toward each other in these displays of location and status. Correspondingly, a central aspect of the policing operation in preventing confrontation at this event revolved around police capacity to negotiate a ‘back route’ from the En Arena for the Djurgårdens fans to march to the stadium.

It would appear that this dispute over ‘territory’ then flowed into the dynamics of ‘risk’ at the subsequent derby fixture where Hammarby were the ‘away’ team. Here a large group of Hammarby fans, including a number known to be affiliated to their hooligan group the KGB, gathered in the Medborgarplatsen. However, on the train journey from the city centre an emergency cord was pulled on the train as it passed through Gullmarsplan T-Bana. This enabled a large crowd of around 200 Hammarby fans to exit the station, evade police cordons and access the Arenagången, where they initiated a series of violent assaults. Moreover, we have already explored how at a corresponding fixture the following season Djurgården’s ‘hooligan’ group - the DFG - mobilised into Arenagången. We understand on the basis of interview data that many of the ‘risk’ fans who had mobilised into this gathering had done so to “protect their area” from any Hammarby attacks. Moreover, on the same day a large group violently attacked a gathering of Hammarby supporters adjacent to the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station. It is interesting to note that Gullmarsplan is a location that is in close proximity to - if not inside - areas of the city that would be seen by Djurgårdens fans as ‘their territory’ during home fixtures, not least of all because the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station is the main officially allocated thoroughfare for Djurgårdens fans arriving at the Arena when they are the ‘home’ team.

A fuller account of this incident and its surrounding policing operation, the role of dialogue and ‘self-regulation’ in preventing an escalation is available in the ENABLE Phase 1 interim report.
What these observations suggest is that the kinds of ‘risks’ that fans pose to ‘public order’ is the outcome of an ongoing, dynamic and historical process. Thus, rather than conceptualising specific groups as inherently posing ‘risk’ it is important to understand the historically located meanings and evolving nature of fan group interactions. In this way it is possible to more accurately predict the locations where ‘risk’ is likely to emerge and to interact with these processes in an attempt to manage and moderate them using pro-active communication based forms of intervention. Such an approach would be more consistent with the Knowledge principles of the SPT but such contextualisation was not a salient feature of intelligence briefings on any of those that we observed.

**Specialist Supporter Engagement**

In addition to a relatively imbalanced overall resource ratio, observations also confirm considerable variability in the approaches adopted by police in different regions toward specialist supporter engagement. In addition, our research also provides considerable evidence of important relationships between these different approaches and the various capacities of the policing operation to understand and manage risk and therefore to deliver effective outcomes.

**Evenemangs police**

As already noted, the Stockholm police have uniquely developed a form of football related Dialogue police, referred to as Evenemangs Police. During the observations which involved Stockholm clubs both Evenemangs and spotters would provide contributions to the police pre-event briefings and in this sense the briefings for local commanders would be better informed. The inter-relationship and levels of collaboration between Evenemangs police and spotters within the unit remains unclear although operationally they had little observed direct interaction while working in the field and therefore essentially work as independent units. Indeed, on occasion the officers work deliberately to ensure an obvious and symbolic difference between them in part through the Evenemangs officers wearing bibs and the spotters wearing no police markings. Thus, the policing approach toward football in Stockholm is built around a core commitment to identify and sanction criminal action and intent among fans. However, this spotting role is supported through a parallel, complimentary but essentially separate and additional liaison role that is deliberately oriented away from coercion toward ‘facilitation’ and dialogue.

Correspondingly, the Stockholm fans’ relationship to the different police roles is evidently juxtaposed. On the one hand it is evident that fans sometimes speak very negatively of their antagonistic relationship with spotters. On the other, although levels of engagement are different across the three major clubs in Stockholm, many fans – even those regularly classified as ‘risk’ - have relatively good relationships with Evenemangs officers in ways that convey a sense of legitimacy, trust and often even warmth. Also, we observed a relationship whereby the Evenemangs police were capable of providing high quality information about the likely behaviour, motivation, intentions and risks posed by those fans. Indeed, it was the case that Evenemangs police were often the most accurate source
of information regarding the nature, motivations and intentions of fans from and within Stockholm. Thus, in line with the conflict reducing principles, the improved quality of information enabled better prediction of fan behaviour and therefore better planning and management to alleviate any identified risks that may otherwise have arisen.

We observed various examples of the additional capabilities introduced through the use of Eventmang's police, but we focus here on a case study fixture between IFK Göteborg and Hammarby in September 2015. Just prior to the fixture at around 16.15, approximately 300 Hammarby fans who had gathered in a pub in the city centre, began to march toward the stadium following a prescribed route along Stampgatan, around to the east and then south of the stadium in order to access the away turnstiles. This circuitous route is used as a form of segregation to prevent away fans from walking more directly past the west side of the stadium, as this is an area that is invariably crowded with Göteborg fans, who very much view that 'space' as their 'territory'. As such away fans marching from the city centre are kept on the Stampgatan by police cordons on the three bridges over the canal. This forces away fans to walk along Stampgatan and then turn right toward the south side of the stadium, which is an area that can be kept relatively clear of Göteborg fans by police.

Throughout the same afternoon a large crowd of Göteborg fans had gathered in and around the Kungsportsavenyen, Göteborg's central boulevard, where it is traditional for home fans to gather before matches. In one pub a large group of Göteborg Ultras had gathered, in another a smaller group of the 'Wisemen', the latter the name attributed to the club's hooligan following. There was a relatively 'low profile' police presence in the city and our observations record that in these early stages the Göteborg Supporter Police were present outside these pubs engaged in little interaction with the Göteborg fans, despite clear and obvious opportunities to do so.

It was evident that at in terms of planning and expectation the major concern for the police commanders revolved around the expected march of Hammarby fans from the city centre to the stadium. Indeed, the police briefing had focused on the perceived threat of violence posed by these fans. In contrast there was no discussion that Göteborg fans were likely to or capable of attacking the Hammarby march and very little discussion that a Göteborg fan march would even take place. However, a march at 16.30 was announced on a supporter website some days previously and at around 16.15 a group of masked supporters moved from one of the pubs in Kungsportsavenyen, giving clear indications they were forming the head of a march. By approximately 16.30 a large crowd of Göteborg fans had gathered and began to move off following on behind the masked group. At various points flares were ignited. The individuals who lit them were not masked and easy to identify, but police did not challenge them. Other than this the march passed off without incident.

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6 For another detailed case study see ENABLE Phase 1 preliminary report and the fixture DIF v Hammarby.
By this time the Hammarby fans, who had been largely compliant with police instruction, turned right from Stampgatan into Skånegatan. As they did so the group of approximately 200 hundred masked and hooded Göteborg fans who had been at the front of the march, which had by then arrived at the west side of the stadium, moved away from the stadium and ran along the Ullevigatan toward the Hammarby fans. There was only one group of DELTA officers between the two groups, so police were outnumbered and could do nothing to stop the oncoming Göteborg fans. However, the DELTA officers along with the two Stockholm Evenemangs officers drew their batons and prepared, along with Hammarby fans, to be confronted by the oncoming Göteborg fans.

Given the considerable distances involved it took some time for the Göteborg supporters to arrive at the junction but when they arrived they ran straight into and began violently assaulting Hammarby fans. Widespread fighting broke out. The confrontation was occurring on a busy roadway and there were members of the public both in vehicles and on foot in the vicinity as well as large numbers of ordinary supporters caught up in the now very violent situation. As a consequence, one of the Evenemangs officers spoke with influential Hammarby fans and urged them to help get these people out of the situation. Our observations then record that in the vicinity of the fighting a Hammarby fan assumed that an ENABLE observer was a member of the public, approached them and offered to help guide them from the situation. In other words, in a context of ‘disorder’ the Evenemangs unit was able to draw upon their knowledge and relationships to identify influential individuals and utilised them to influence the situation toward minimising the impact of the ‘disorder’ on members of the public. It is relevant to note that minimising the impact of the event on the wider population was a core strategic goal of the Western Region’s policing operation that day.

Uniformed supporter police

In contrast to supporter police in Stockholm, these officers in the Western and Southern regions wear uniform and appear to combine criminal intelligence, surveillance, coercion prosecution and liaison functions within the same role. Our observations suggest that this approach of combining the ‘spotting’ and ‘liaison’ roles has a far weaker capacity for engagement with fans in comparison to the approach adopted in Stockholm. Indeed, in the Western region, interview data with fan representatives indicate serious antagonisms between specific supporter police officers, whereby relationships appear polarised and distant. Moreover, it was the case that during our observations levels of proactive positive engagement between some of these officers and fans was very low. For example, our observations record a number of examples of Supporter Police standing in close proximity to where fans were congregating but no verbal interaction taking place between them at all. Indeed, during one observation we noted that two Supporter Police had been mobilised from another division some distance away and had no pre-existing knowledge or relationships with the supporter groups involved in the fixture. Equally, fans have described to us their interpretation of these Supporter Police deployments as deliberate attempts at intimidation by those officers. Such accounts and observations reflect a problem of the perceived legitimacy of these officers among key elements of the fan base.
Of course, there are some of these officers who appear extremely skilled at engagement and did demonstrate high levels of friendly verbal interactions, but this was certainly not true of all officers deployed into this role. Regardless of individual variability, this form of uniformed ‘supporter police’ appears to be correlated with weaker information flow to commanders and therefore poorer dynamic risk assessment, which appears to undermine police capability to escalate and de-escalate tactical interventions appropriately. For example, as we have discussed in the above incident, there was a mobilisation of a very large group of masked and hooded fans in Kungsportsavenyen, a group who ultimately went on to initiate the attack on Hammarby fans. Several times during the police briefing for this event it was mentioned that the police had no information about the time, location, route or even the certainty of a march by the Göteborg supporters. Equally, at no point was any expectation discussed that Göteborg fans may be the source of conflict that day, and as such, the first realisation was essentially when the masked group began to run toward the Hammarby fans, by which time it was already too late to prevent the situation from escalating. Moreover, when the confrontation did eventually take place there were no uniformed Supporter Police from Göteborg observed in the vicinity throughout the confrontation. Had better information flow and dynamic risk assessment been achieved it is entirely plausible that this would have increased the likelihood that commanders would have placed DELTA units to cordon off Ullevigatan and in so doing potentially have prevented the attack from taking place.

There were other examples of this issue of diminished information flow undermining command decision making. Prior to a match between Helsingborg and Malmö in May 2016, a number of Helsingborg and FC Copenhagen ‘hooligans’ were present in the city before the expected arrival of a large crowd of Malmö fans by train. At one point many of these ‘hooligan’ fans were drinking in a bar in the main railway station. Two Helsingborg Supporter Police officers were present but stood some distance away merely undertaking a surveillance role. At no point did either of these officers approach the bar or speak with any of the fans. What is interesting is that, according to one of our observers, this was the first time since the incident involving the death of a Djurgårdens fan in Helsingborg in 2014 that Danish hooligan groups had attended a fixture in the city. In this sense their presence was a clear indication of increased risk. However, the supporter police and therefore the policing operation as a whole remained apparently entirely unaware that Danish hooligans were going to be or were actually present in the city. Moreover, a group of Malmö Ultras, understood as ‘risk’ by police, who it had been expected would arrive on a specific train, did not board that train in Malmö. No information to this effect was passed to police in Helsingborg despite the fact that Malmö Supporter Police were actually on the train. Unexpectedly, these Malmö fans arrived by road vehicle into an area in the city centre heavily populated by Helsingborg fans and were able to initiate a relatively large scale confrontation. One of our observers, from the local police in Helsingborg, noted that had information been passed about the failure of the group to board the train in Malmö, measures could have been taken to monitor the three roadways into the city from the south and therefore have potentially detected and detained the Malmö protagonists before they were able to access the city centre.
These processes culminated in a relatively large scale incident where a large crowd of Helsingborg fans had gathered by a police cordon, presumably to goad the Malmö fans arriving by train. Following the explosion of a banger, a large section of this crowd ran toward Hamntorget where the Malmö protagonists had arrived. There was then an immediate escalation in police tactics with DELTA officers wearing helmets and with batons drawn deploying into the area. There were DELTAs, horses and motorcycles present in the vicinity. Video footage shows that after these initial confrontations a DELTA group with batons drawn in Hamntorget coercing a large group of around 200 Helsingborg fans toward Stortorget pushing them away from the area where the Malmö protagonists were being detained by police. At the junction the group moved along Drottninggatan and then tried to re-enter Kungsgatan via Badhusgatan but were forced back again by a DELTA vehicle driving toward them with its sirens sounding and lights flashing. When moving back into Järnvägsgatan a group of DELTA police who were positioned there began raising batons toward some of these fans and the focus of hostility from the Helsingborg group appears to have shifted directly toward police. It was at around this time that the window of a bus shelter in Järnvägsgatan was smashed and a DELTA officer can be seen on the video kicking a Helsingborg fan.

The DELTA officers, with batons drawn, then pushed the group into Stortorget. The unit then formed a cordon at the junction with Järnvägsgatan supported by four vehicles, whilst the group of fans congregated toward the top end of the square. The video footage shows these DELTA officers moving into the square and pushing three males to the floor. There is some indication that use of force by the police at this point was disproportionate. For example, one of the three males, dressed in clothing not normally associated with football risk groups, appears to be a member of the public in the vicinity at the time, and this judgement corresponds with the view of our two observers who witnessed the event. The male was pushed over and pinned to the floor by a DELTA officer. His arm is held out while the officer knelt into his back and struck the male’s arm with a baton. What appears to be a friend of the male remonstrated with the officers, who shortly afterwards released the fan; our observers record he was not subsequently arrested or detained. At this point some Helsingborg fans became increasingly agitated with the police and Helsingborg SLO stepped in trying to mediate. Indeed, according to one of our observers the “SLO from Helsingborg came down, did a really good job trying to pull his guys down but he also tried to speak to the police, so I actually helped him trying to find [the police commander]. The SLO was very pro-active”. Shortly afterwards the situation calmed and a crowd of around three to four hundred Helsingborg fans walked together up the stairs and into the park followed by the DELTA unit.

The episode demonstrates the very real dangers in these situations for both fans and police who find themselves drawn into acts for which they may all subsequently suffer negative consequences. Moreover, such circumstances highlight the dangers of further polarisation of relationships between fans and police and the negative reputational damage that can develop as a result of a major incident of disorder occurring in a highly public context such as a busy city centre on a Sunday afternoon. The episode also demonstrates the importance of and the negative consequences that flow from poor information flow. Our observations suggest that this limitation may sometimes be the
result of polarised relationships between police and fans that develop, in part, due to the fact there has not been a formal separation between ‘spotting’ and ‘dialogue’ functions in regions outside of Stockholm.

‘EVENT’ police

Given the lack of a clear nationally adopted conceptual framework or training programme there has unsurprisingly been considerable variability in how the new EVENT units have been developed, deployed and evolved in the three major SPT regions. Our observation in Helsingborg indicated that EVENT officers in the city are perhaps the most experienced, with some having in the region of twenty separate deployments in that role at the time we conducted our observation in the city. The officers in the Helsingborg EVENT unit are also drawn coherently and systematically from operational units that already have good levels of cohesion and are selected because they are officers effective at managing stress, since they have a longstanding history of working together in high risk situations. However, in other SPT areas the development of EVENT police units began later and has been conducted in a manner that raises a number of issues regarding their effectiveness.

For example, during a ‘high risk’ fixture between Djurgårdens v Hammarby in April 2015 a unit of EVENT officers were operationalised and deployed to the Gamla Stan as the primary tactical response to a large crowd of some one thousand fans, including groups of Djurgårdens Ultras, who were gathering there. Despite their briefing outlining the engagement and communication role, it was apparent to our observers that there were relatively low levels of verbal interaction between these officers and fans. This was partly due to the fact that many of the fans were gathering inside the bars in that location and the officers were reluctant to go inside. One of the ENABLE observers interviewed EVENT officers, who expressed that they felt they needed the Evenemangs police or SLOs to act as a ‘bridge’ in opening up communication to the ordinary fans and Ultras. The difficulty the EVENT police encountered here may in some part be due to the piecemeal and novel configuration of that unit, which was drawn together and included some DELTA officers who lacked the necessary understanding, skills and belief in the concept. But it also speaks to the fact that ‘engagement’ is actually a specialist skill that requires training and systematic development over time.

Nonetheless, despite these initial difficulties the EVENT unit accompanied the approximately one thousand fans as they marched to the Gamla Stan T-Bana station and boarded the train with them. Interestingly, in an interview, the EVENT unit commander described how he was discouraged from deploying onto the train by a DELTA unit commander because of the perceived risks of being left ‘exposed’ in this way. Nonetheless the EVENT commander defied the orthodoxy and during the journey the EVENT unit officers were spread individually throughout the train. Our observers recorded how some officers were then able to interact with fans, some even setting limits on their boisterous actions and subsequently creating, what the unit commander and our observers, described as a ‘self-regulating’ atmosphere. Deployment in this way also helped the police to understand that this group was not posing any serious threat to
public order. Moreover, one of the police concerns about the journey of this crowd on the T-Bana was the potential use of pyrotechnics on the metro system, and it was the case that none were ultimately reported being used anywhere on the system in Stockholm on that day. Indeed, at the end of this journey members of the crowd were asked to discard pyrotechnics by police and many responded by placing them in ‘amnesty bins’.

Our SLO observers consistently reported a relatively positive reaction to EVENT police among fans. Over time we also observed development among officers consistently deployed into the role, particularly when they were doing so on a voluntary basis. However, our data also suggests that there is a significant sense of illegitimacy among some police officers about the new role. For example, very early into the project our observers became aware that the new EVENT units were being widely referred to by police colleagues using a derogatory term, the “hugging police”. In an interview with a senior DELTA commander later into the project, it was made clear to us that while DELTA officers have no objection to the EVENT concept in itself many are angered by the fact that they are being forced to deploy into it against their will. Thus, our research suggests a cultural resistance among police, that may also need to be managed. As one police officer commented: “we know that majority of [DELTA] officers have used and are going to use force. They don’t care, that’s what it’s about [for them]... and then actually, when you stop to look internally at the police force here in Sweden, all the ones we’ve worked with, the majority of the officers actually still believe in that kind of [use of force], that’s what we are there for. So we’ve got small sections of the police force at the moment trying to make a change but actually you’ve got, outside of that process, huge chunks of fans that don’t believe it and huge chunks of the Police service that don’t believe it.”

Moreover, given the lack of clarity about the role, officers and commanders would often have to work out the challenges in applying the new approach within the context of events themselves. For example, during a fixture between Göteborg and Hammarby an EVENT unit had been drawn together, briefed and deployed, but as such had diminished the number of DELTA units available to the operational commanders. As a consequence of earlier disorder both outside and inside the stadium, the operational commander took a decision during the match to deploy some of the EVENT police in protective equipment in the post-match phase to support his DELTA deployment. As such a circumstance developed where EVENT officers on one side of a cordon were in their normal uniform and on the other were deployed in essentially the same formation as a DELTA unit wearing their helmets some with batons drawn. Throughout this situation the EVENT unit officers were unclear about their roles and responsibilities and were essentially forced to work out an approach in ways that may have had negative consequences for the development of the EVENT unit as a means of engagement and its legitimacy as a concept among the officers involved.

Perhaps one of the more effective deployments of EVENT police we observed was in Helsingborg during the fixture against Malmö described above. As the train with Malmö fans arrived a group of EVENT police deployed onto the platform and ushered the fans in the direction of the south entrance. The crowd was very mixed ranging from Ultras to families with young children. It was also clear by this point that the Malmö fans motivated
toward confrontation had actually materialised elsewhere and were therefore not within this crowd, as had originally been expected. When the fans gathered outside the station, EVENT police created a cordon around them, held them in the location and prepared to walk with them toward the stadium. However, throughout this period there was little if any verbal communication from these officers. At no point did they use verbal communication to define to people present what was happening. There were clear opportunities to communicate with the crowd about police intentions to facilitate them on a march toward the stadium or to define that masks and pyrotechnics would not be tolerated. Nonetheless, when the march moved off the EVENT officers walked within, rather than outside, the crowd and we observed a whole series of inter-personal conversations initiated by officers with fans. Interestingly, a key police objective had been to prevent the use of pyrotechnics and for fans not to wear masks. The fans were compliant throughout the march to the stadium despite a number of provocations from opposition fans, and at the end of the march no bangers or pyrotechnics had been used. Indeed, as they approach the stadium fans dropped a number of pyrotechnics of the floor, indicating that they were carrying these but had actively chosen not to use them.

It is important to point out that throughout this episode there were a series of episodes that sent a rather contradictory message to the Malmö supporters. First, a unit of ROMEO Police had been deployed to the march. But their deployment in this context raised two issues that occurred on a number of occasions elsewhere. The first is the interpretation of their presence. As one of our observers noted. “Even as a bystander it’s very intimidating, these ROMEOs, they are just standing there like this [stern posture]. And obviously [the fans are] just young kids, families. I appreciate you have got Ultras and you have got to manage them. They [the ROMEO police] were just circling around in the vans. At one point they were doing manoeuvres going up one way and then down another. They were just driving around and we thought ‘what are they trying to achieve here?’ From a crowd’s point of view, they look very military the vehicles they are using as well.” Their deployment to the march may have been due to the earlier incidents described above which had increased tensions. Indeed, we understand that the ROMEOs were positioning themselves as a contingency to support EVENT police as the DELTA unit originally specified to support the march was no longer available since it had been redeployed to the confrontation. Nonetheless, as a function of their role, attitude and history many fans perceive their relationship to the ROMEO police as problematic and therefore their mere presence can act as a provocation.

Second, as the march progressed it passed adjacent to a park. The entrances to the park were blocked by DELTA groups, the officers from which were wearing helmets, some had batons drawn. They faced toward the march and our observers assumed that they were positioned there to protect the Malmö fans from attack from Helsingborg fans in the adjacent park. However, on assessing the situation behind the cordons it was apparent that there was no immediate threat. It was therefore unclear why the DELTA units had deployed in this way. As one of our police observers noted; “because the [EVENT] police had total control over the march, there was no need at all, [the DELTA group] was just giving them a sign that something is going on here”. In other words, there was a clear contradiction in the ‘signal state’ adopted by the different police units in the same
situation. However, further on it was the case that a few individual Helsingborg ‘risk’ fans were observed ‘spotting’ and ‘coordinating’ via mobile phone in visible locations around the march in the vicinity of a local school. This had the effect of provoking some of the Malmö fans on the march and thereby increased tensions. It appeared to have been possible for the ROMEO units accompanying the march to stop and question these individuals, but on various occasions that opportunity for proactive de-escalation was not taken. According to the commander of the ROMEO unit this was because they judged they did not have the legal power to arrest these individuals and that such action might provoke them toward aggression. However, given the context, such actions by both the DELTA and the ROMEO unit exemplify a problem of relating a dynamic risk assessment to actual pro-active tactical deployments in ways that lead the different units to read and proactive manage the dynamics of interaction in ways that reduce and de-escalate tensions.

Supporter Liaison Officers: Empowering self-regulation

As we have already alluded to within our descriptions of some episodes above, SLOs were observed on multiple occasions playing a key role in conflict avoidance, de-escalation and resolution. Our observations therefore support the contention that the effective management of ‘risk’ in the football context in Sweden is not merely an issue for the police. In particular, it appears to be linked to the presence of a particular model of ‘Supporter Liaison Officer’, specifically focused around conflict prevention and de-escalation. This SLO approach has been coordinated and facilitated in its development by Swedish Elite Football. The SLO role is funded by the football clubs and therefore represents the importance of a strategic and nationally coordinated investment by clubs.

Our observations support the contentions that SLOs in Sweden work to a particular code of ethical conduct that allows them to operate with high levels of discretion, have credibility among fans (including those that present ‘risk’) but also have an effective working relationship with the police. Our research also suggests that relationships between SLOs and the police can be and are empowered if they are mediated through regular contact with Evenemangs officers. It appears to be useful to have more than one SLO in the same club with different specialisms and history. For example, some SLOs were formerly highly active and influential in their club’s ultra and hooligan groups. This history appears to provide them with a great deal of legitimacy and capability to empower self-regulation among the fan groups at critical moments.

For example, just prior to one of their fixtures against Djurgården, a large crowd of Hammarby fans started marching from Gullmarsplan toward the Tele2 Arena at around 12.20, which was approximately 5-10 minutes earlier than had been expected by the police. Despite the agreements struck between the SLOs and the police it was apparent that the majority of Hammarby fans either were not aware - or actively ignored - the proposed route for the march that would have taken the supporters around the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station toward the segregated route to rear of the Arenagången. Moreover, the deployed EVENT police at Gullmarsplan seemed unaware that the increasing numbers of supporters gathering outside the pubs were an indication they
were preparing to march. As such, when the march moved off they did not respond and missed the opportunity to position themselves at its front end and were thus left at the rear, leaving the initiative to the supporters to find their own way. Consequently, the marching supporters took the most direct and obvious route through the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station, the exit from which would take them directly along Arenagången where, as described earlier, they would have passed directly by a large group of Djurgårdens ‘risk’ fans who had gathered in the Grekiska Kolgrillsbaren.

Our observations record that there was no running from the fans, therefore no indication there was a deliberate attempt to evade the police, but the change of route posed an obvious risk. It is unclear why, given that the route of the march had been anticipated, DELTA units had not been positioned at the T-Bana station to prevent the march from entering it. Nonetheless a DELTA unit was mobilised on the other side of the station and managed to block the Arenagången forcing the Hammarby marching supporters to turn to their left and go under the roadway to join the segregated route to their entrances via the rear of the Hovet Arena. At the cordon a Hammarby SLO stood in front of the police line, greeting and directing the fans under the bridge. This SLO action appeared to play an important role in avoiding any confrontation with or use of force by the DELTA unit, who had deployed wearing full protective equipment. However, shortly afterwards a number of fans - who our observer noted were affiliated with the Hammarby hooligan group, the KGB - saw an opportunity to break from the march. As they did so they encouraged others to come with them toward the Arenagången. Once again the SLO stood in the way and encouraged fans to continue toward the stadium, which they did. It was following these two important interventions by the SLO that the EVENT police arrived from the rear end of the march and headed towards the front in order to assist in directing the march in the desired direction. As the march progressed a number of firecrackers were exploded, and Smoke and Bengal flares were lit. Nonetheless, despite the later arrival of the EVENT officers it was evident that a series of points of potential conflict were avoided largely through ‘self-regulation’ encouraged and empowered by the SLOs. This one example is one of many we observed where SLOs played important roles in managing and deescalating conflict.

Public order versus public safety

Transitions to and within the stadiums

It was the case that throughout our observations the overwhelming focus in this policing context was on the management of threats to ‘security’. However, on a number of occasions our observations noted substantial risk with respect to emergent threats to public safety. These relate to various incidents concerning crowd density and poor regulation as crowds moved to, into and within stadiums, as well as the use of pyrotechnics. Moreover, within stadiums it was the case that, on a number of occasions, the use of pyrotechnics led to the temporary suspension of fixtures and negative newspaper headlines concerning the gravity of their use. This in turn led to a considerable number of high profile recommendations from those in authority about how to tackle the
issue. However, while there is a salient, obvious and ubiquitous concern with regard to the
use of pyrotechnics both in and outside arenas the issues such use poses in terms of
health and safety cannot be understood outside of a broader context and wider array of
inter-related public safety issues.

Public safety threats were also observed in term of the rapid movement of crowds through
public transport hubs. In one situation, a large crowd entering a station overwhelmed the
stewarding arrangements leading to a situation where the crowd entered through only a
few of the available entrances. This led to the overpopulation of the station platform in a
certain area. If the arrival of the crowd had been managed more effectively sections of the
crowd could have been encouraged to enter the platform using alternative entrances so
that the crowd would have been more evenly spread out along the platform. The density
of the crowd posed obvious risks to others using the station but also in terms of
supporters potentially being pushed forward onto the tracks in front of oncoming trains
arriving into the station. In this specific situation it was the case that the influx into the
station was very predictable but these safety issues had not been anticipated or
considered by the police and there was poor coordination with the station authorities. The
focus instead was primarily on the issue of preventing criminality and disorder. These
kinds of circumstances highlight the need for a more balanced strategic consideration
given to the various and broad ranging public safety issues that can and do emerge in this
context.

The marching culture and security measures placed around fans also on occa-
sion led to
situations where large crowds would arrive at stadium entry points simultaneously. During
one observation, two managed marches from different parts of the city arrived almost
simultaneously at the stadium entrance from different directions. The rapid influx of fans
arriving into a single area led to significant pressures on the stadium entry point. There
were no queuing arrangements in place (e.g. staggered ‘Disney Barriers’) and the
entrances did not use turnstiles, which meant the entry point was quickly overwhelmed.
This made it difficult, if not impossible, for stewards to check effectively for the possession
of valid tickets or to conduct searches for pyrotechnics. Moreover, once inside stadiums
there was often no regulation of movement within certain sections. As such fans were
completely free to populate an area as and where they wished. As a consequence, on
various occasions during our observations, certain sections of stadiums became very
densely crowded. Indeed, on these occasions it was so crowded that our observers were
simply not able to access these areas as supporters were ultimately forced to block isles
and stairways, some even observed standing on hand rails in order to gain sight of the
pitch. On these occasions our observers noted the clear an obvious threat to public safety.

Tifo displays and pyrotechnics

Inside stadiums fan groups would often initiate impressive and coordinated displays or
Tifos, which usually involve the use of large banners, paper ‘confetti’ and pyrotechnics,
both Smoke and Bengal flares, despite the fact that the use of pyrotechnics inside
stadiums is against the law in Sweden. It is unclear to us the extent to which the banners
and paper used in these displays has been tested for being fire retardant. Nonetheless
there were a series of situations where their use also raised important safety concerns. For example, following one Tifo display, large piles of paper accumulated in the front and rear of a stadium’s lower tier, the rear unoccupied seated section being immediately below the upper tier. While the paper was almost immediately cleared from the front of the lower tier by fire marshals the paper piles were left across the entire rear of the lower section throughout the remainder of the fixture. At various times a number of Bengal flares were lit by fans occupying the front of the upper tier, directly above these piles of paper. It was apparent that if one of these flares was accidently dropped it could easily fall into these piles of paper. Given the heat at which the flares burn and the large amount of paper that was present, it seems apparent that such a situation could have led to a rapidly escalating fire that may have posed very serious safety risks. On the basis of an interview with the safety and security manager the following day, we understand that the paper was not cleared away after the Tifo because segregation netting prevented stewards from accessing this area. However, during this fixture the ‘home’ sections immediately adjacent to this netting actually contained ‘away’ fans, because the ‘home’ club actively sells tickets in these sections to ‘away’ fans in order to meet the high demand for these fixtures. In other words, the measures in place in the interests of security in this context were not just questionable regarding their necessity but may have also actually functioned to create significant increases to the risks posed to public safety.

In this regard, it is apparent from our observations that the risks to public safety posed by the use of pyrotechnics is not just a question of the pyrotechnics themselves, but the broader context in which they are used. Indeed, we observed a number of circumstances where their use posed little if any danger. In these situations, it was evident that the risks were significantly reduced because substantial measures had been put in place to manage the fire and safety risk they posed. On various occasions we observed situations where SLOs, stewards and fire marshals with fire retardant clothing, extinguishers and fire hoses were in place to deal with any problems. These ‘marshals’ were used to take control of the flares passed to them by individuals within the crowd as they burnt out and who used sand buckets to finally extinguish them. It was the case that this facilitation approach created an environment of cooperation among fans where they would work in partnership with the stadium authorities to manage and alleviate the potential risks.

Some club officials and SLOs spoke very positively about the facilitation of pyrotechnics. For example, during one observation we recorded a number of flares being let off in a standing area in the first five minutes of a match. It was noted by our observers that far from being threatening or intimidating it was more of a spectacle that added positively to the atmosphere. The standing area was not densely crowded, the flares were spread out and there did not appear to be a safety or security threat associated with their use. Indeed, on that occasion the club received no complaints about their use. The club also placed medics up into the tier above the standing area so that any issues caused by smoke could be dealt with. It was noted by the club that this ‘facilitatory’ approach to pyrotechnics in the stadium reflected a de-facto decriminalisation within the stadium; it is understood by the club to be a fundamental part of the fans identity and a visible representation and expression of their culture. The club noted that the fans have considerable authority in these stands and that by facilitating the use of pyrotechnics the
club can prevent other more serious forms of antisocial or violent behaviour. They held
the view that if the club were to ‘clamp down’ on pyrotechnics then this may negatively
polarise relationships between club and supporters and reduce the club’s ability to work
with and positively empower positive supporter culture among these fans.

Indeed, it was widely acknowledged by many police commanders that the use of
pyrotechnics is actually a relatively minor crime. As such, it would therefore often be
disproportionate for them - or anyone else - to intervene into a crowd situation to deal
with their use. To this effect a number of police strategy document explicitly acknowledge
that the police would not be adopting a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to their use. This is
particularly important given the potential for forceful tactical interventions into these
contexts to require use of force and therefore to create and escalate serious conflict and
danger to public safety. Thus, rather than intervening into crowds during displays the
police and club often stated aim is to identify as many people involved as possible and
take action subsequently. The clubs also undertake relatively strong searching regimes at
entry points. Nonetheless, there is an obvious tension between these two approaches. On
the one hand enhancing safety requires a level of facilitation and proactive cooperation
and coordination between fans and stadium authorities. On the other, repressive
measures potentially compromise such important levels of cooperation and therefore
increase the risk of harm.

Interactions between public safety issues

As such, the current situation is clearly problematic precisely because of the way in which
these issues interact, leading to situations that are sometimes clearly very dangerous. For
example, during one of the fixtures we observed another well-organized and
choreographed pyro display. Groups wearing masks moved into the front row of an
upper tier and it was obvious they were about to initiate a pyrotechnic display. There were
no police present within the section. However, a number of Ordningsvakt
were nearby
but did not seek to intervene, instead simply placing ‘smoke’ masks on their faces as they
stood and observed events develop. As expected, the fans ignited their pyrotechnics and
held them aloft, out and above a very densely crowded area in the lower tier below.
During this display one of the fans we observed was forced to drop the pyrotechnic
because it became too hot for him to hold. Luckily, it fell onto the concrete floor of the
upper tier, but it was apparent that it could have easily been dropped directly into the
densely crowded lower tier. Given the density of that crowd, in part a direct product of the
lack of regulated space in that section, the potential for burn, crushing and other physical
injury was both apparent and obvious.

In this regard, it seems to be the case that the deliberation about pyrotechnic use must be
considered within a broader debate about a wide range of safety and security issues
inside and outside stadiums. Indeed, the ‘dangerous’ use of pyrotechnics we observed

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7 These are private security guards with legal powers to use force and make arrests. They operate
in and around the stadium as part of the club’s security operation. They often deploy with
protective equipment including NATO style helmets and carry batons.
inside stadiums was to some extent a product of a complex interaction of a number of interrelated issues. For example, prior to most fixtures it was noted in the police briefings that it is the role of the police to ‘support the club’ inside the stadiums, but it was never clearly specified exactly what that meant. It is also the case that there are no formal agreements in place defining the protocols of the exact conditions under which the police would either provide support for club security or indeed otherwise reassert primacy. On multiple occasions our observers were informed that the often large groups of Ordningsvakt inside stadiums would be directly under police control in the case of an incident. Yet on interrogation there was never any clear lines of communication or command and control protocols in place and Ordningsvakt were never present at police briefings. All of these issues open up some very serious questions about the integrity of such collaborative deployments, particularly given that their weakness may ultimately be exposed at times where these problems could have very serious outcomes.

For example, during one fixture it was acknowledged that there was an area of the stadium adjacent to the ‘away’ end, where ‘risk’ fans would traditionally gather and act provocatively. Just prior to the fixture a large number of ‘home’ fans had initiated an unprovoked attack on a march of ‘away’ fans and as such there were already significant tensions in place. Inside the stadium there was some use of pyrotechnics by both ‘home’ and ‘away’ fans before the match started, but our observations record that these posed very little evident risks. However, throughout the match there was some considerable provocation towards the ‘away’ fans from ‘home’ fans in the area adjacent to the away section that had been acknowledged as a potential risk in the police briefing. This provocation and response from the ‘away’ fans increased considerably after a goal was scored. Throughout there were no Ordningsvakt or police attempting to manage these interactions and as such our observations record that it was left predominantly to the ‘away’ SLOs to try to deescalate the situation. It was in this context that an ‘away’ supporter threw a lit Bengal flare into the adjacent ‘home’ seating area. The tensions immediately escalated as the flare was thrown back into the densely crowded ‘away’ section and it was then thrown onto the pitch. The situation escalated with missiles, bangers and another flare being thrown as aggressive interactions continued between the two sections without significant police or Ordningsvakt intervention. At this point there were only two Ordningsvakt in the ‘home’ section and they were clearly overwhelmed and unable to force the ‘home’ fans away. It was at this point that ‘away’ fans then threw a flare into a family section of the stand above them, which again was thrown back down onto the pitch.

The match was suspended and it took some time to restore the situation to normality to allow the fixture to be concluded. It was some substantial time before any police were there to support the Ordningsvakt and SLOs and it was then merely Supporter and Evenemangs Police that responded. There was no significant provision of DELTA police throughout the incident. It was the case that the following day the local newspaper gave front page coverage to the incident with a picture of the flare burning in the upper tier in close proximity to a family with young children. While it is important to thoroughly condemn the use of the pyrotechnics as weapons in this way, it is evident from this incident how their dangerous use was embedded in a context of interaction. On the one
hand ‘home’ fans had initiated an unprovoked attack on ‘away’ fans outside the stadium. The aggressive interactions then continued inside the stadium all of which preceded the use of the flares. On the other, these interactions were made possible by the inability of the police or Ordningsvakt to manage these hostile interactions both outside and then inside the stadium, or support the club in managing the interactions inside the stadium. But the incident also exemplifies some of the very important questions about exactly why no police or Ordningsvakt were located in this area of the stadium given the obvious and anticipated risks that were discussed at the pre-match police briefing and also about the exact protocols under which police support is provided to the club to assist them to respond to such serious and escalating situations.

Post-match

Having addressed the broad chronology of events we conclude with a brief analysis of some of the data relating to post-match phases. Of course many of the issues that emerge relate to rapid egress of the sometimes thousands of fans from the stadiums and their dispersal from the locality within very short periods of time. This would often require allowing ‘away’ fans to access public transport hubs which may be some distance from the stadiums. Where buses were not available, this on occasion required the use of escorted marches where ‘away’ fans had to be protected by police from sporadic attempts to attack them by ‘home’ supporters. Such dynamics expose the extent to which conflict is often managed by a policing focus on the ‘away’ fans but it is ‘home’ fans that are the primary protagonists. Moreover, such conflicts also demonstrated how these tensions emerge in the context of infra-structural issues where policing is required simply to protect the freedom of movement of those fans who wish to move freely to and from stadiums but are unable to do so because they are forced to walk through ‘territory’ where opposition fans judge that it is both legitimate and possible to attack them. As we have argued above, attention to addressing such issues through designing the infra-structure around stadiums in ways that facilitate segregated movement and through flow of foot traffic could be extremely beneficial. By ‘designing out’ the potentialities of conflict in this way significant and ongoing savings could be made in terms of reducing the levels of demand made upon police resources.

The Tele2 Arena is a good example in this regard to some extent, but this is clearly a convenient after thought rather than a presumptive design solution. As we have argued, the infra-structure surrounding the stadium, with the use of fencing, can afford itself to the total segregation of foot traffic in the immediate vicinity of the ‘away’ section when Djurgårdens play as the ‘home’ team\textsuperscript{8}. However, as we have already noted there are issues with regard to the extent to which and how such segregation is maintained. For example, at a number of these fixtures ‘away’ fans dispersed from the stadium via the rear of the Globen Arena, but then both ‘away’ and ‘home’ fans sought to travel from, through or past all three of the nearby T-Bana stations of Globen, Skärmbrink or Gullmarsplan. A key aspect of post-match police deployment in this area revolved around the use of a

\textsuperscript{8} The same cannot be said of the nature of the infrastructure when Djurgårdens play at the Tele2 Arena as the ‘away’ team.
cordon of vehicles and officers of a DELTA unit positioned in Globentorget. However, the cordon merely created congestion by severely restricting through flow as ‘away’ and ‘home’ fans moved through the vicinity in their attempt to disperse. On various occasions, the cordon, with officers in full protective equipment, actually created large crowds on either side, within which the fans groups came into contact and mixed without incident. Given the apparent absence of tension it was unclear why this cordon was necessary and once again spoke to a problem linking tactical deployment to dynamic risk assessment and a lack of reference to the strategic goal of facilitation. Elsewhere as the fan groups eventually mixed, particularly as they moved into the Gullmarsplan T-Bana station, some very effective EVENT policing was seen throughout the dispersal phase, with officers actively engaging in dialogue. However, it is evident that the attempt to segregate fans post-match often merely dispersed the point at which fans actually did come into contact. Under current arrangements the segregation is often maintained with unnecessarily and aggressive styles of policing that needlessly restricted freedoms of movement and merely pushed the contact point into places where any emergent conflict may actually be more difficult to manage.

On another occasion, following a corresponding fixture, a large group of around 40-50 ‘home’ Ultras moved from the stadium and positioned themselves behind temporary fencing on the upper tier adjacent to the Quality Hotel Globen. The fencing was designed to screen the section below but there were no police officers or Ordningsvakt guarding it and it was easy for the group to simply walk around its edge, which they did and then began throwing bottles at ‘away’ fans leaving the stadium below. Shortly afterwards, police in the general vicinity of this incident detained a group of around 25 fans. As a ‘preventive measure’ those over 18 years old were placed on a bus and transported some 2-3 hours’ journey time away and left in a remote location with limited public transport possibilities. Given this was an evening match this could have posed some insurmountable difficulties for those fans in terms of getting to their place of abode. Moreover, the context of their detention was separated from the incident, in both time and location. There therefore could not have been any evidential basis that all of those detained were involved in or had sought out the earlier ‘disorder’. Indeed, it is the case that Evenemangs officers report having spoken directly to fans who have been inadvertently caught up in similar detentions, simply because they had been in the wrong place at the wrong time. These fans were apparently left with a deep sense of illegitimacy and antagonism toward the police and, as one officer described, had effectively been “turned into hooligans” by these police actions. It would appear then that the capacity of the Evenemangs police to build relationships of trust and confidence are undermined by such tactics. As such, while they may deal with the situation in the immediate context, they may actually be counter-productive in the longer term. Given the tactics in the example above grew from an incident that could have been avoided merely by placing a police officer by a gap in the fence, the detention of the fans and their subsequent treatment could easily be judged as disproportionate because less restrictive alternatives were readily available to the police. Moreover, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". There are no exceptions or limitations on this right. Article 7 also provides effective safeguards against
arbitrary punishment. Such police action may therefore currently be legal under Swedish law but is potentially open to challenge as a contravention of the ECHR.

Conclusions

When considering the historical development of the SPT it is important to recognise that it was originally driven by the need for a nationally coherent approach to the policing of protest crowds. The SPT has also been actively built through a sustained commitment to the development of a research and theory based approach and a related heavy investment in educating and equipping police officers involved in its development and delivery (Adang, 2012). In this way the Swedish Police service has been very successful in creating the nationally recognised and coordinated approach to the policing of protest crowd events called for following the 2001 Göteborg ‘riots’. However, our research suggests that given these successes it seems evident that there now needs to be a clearer focus on the ongoing evolution and use of the SPT within football. Indeed, our research suggests that it is this domain that the SPT has a series of issues regarding its application and where it has recently undergone some significant and potentially far-reaching developments.

There can be no doubt that a high level of demand is made upon the SPT due to the regular and ongoing challenges confronted in the policing of football crowds in Sweden. Indeed, in the context of our observations we have witnessed the mobilisation of thousands of police officers at what must be a considerable cost to the tax payer and which must have had a significant impact on other areas of police business. We have also observed some extremely violent and dangerous situations brought about by fans who actively sought out and provoked conflict. The SPT has been built around four conflict reducing principles of Knowledge, Facilitation, Communication, and Differentiation (Reicher et al, 2004, 2007). Moreover, the SPT is premised upon a fundamental commitment toward the policing of crowds in a democracy, therefore in a manner that is oriented toward police duties not to interfere and to otherwise actively protect basic human rights. While not readily acknowledged, police negative and positive duties in this regard do not just apply to policing demonstration crowds, but can be, and arguably should be, applied - like the SPT itself - to the policing of football crowds (James & Pearson, 2015). However, while our research acknowledges that there is a strategic commitment to the SPT among senior commanders in their approach to the policing of football across the major urban centres of Sweden our research suggests that this strategy is not always being effectively delivered in a coordinated manner at a national level.

Throughout our observations there was ubiquitous explicit recognition within the strategies of football policing operations of the centrality of the conflict reducing principles and therefore of a need to ‘facilitate’ what was referred to as ‘positive supporter culture’. However, beyond this there was often actually no clear specification of what it was precisely that was being facilitated and the emphasis at an operational level was overwhelmingly actually upon controlling ‘disorder’. This was primarily through attempts to achieve segregation through resourcing the policing operation with a tactical capacity to apply coercion and deterrence. Correspondingly, there was often very little explicit
emphasis on knowledge concerning the underlying nature of supporter culture and identities, how these might interact with the complex dynamics of ‘risk’ or how police action could engage with these dynamics in order to empower ‘positive supporter culture’ across the short, medium and longer term. In this regard it may be useful to give explicit strategic emphasis to the maintenance and balancing of Human Rights in the football context. Specifically, consideration should be given to how policing approaches relate to Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR, as these rights are applicable in this context and provide a clear framework for commanders to stipulate guidance on precisely what it is that is being facilitated, for whom and under what conditions.

The accepted definition of ‘graded policing’ in Sweden is to adjust the function, treatment and equipment to situational demands. These ‘situational demands’ are measured primarily in terms of a traffic light system with three categories of green, amber and red. The ‘graded’ approach relies upon officers, where possible, retaining normal uniform and engaging in high levels of proactive friendly interaction as the primary tactical intervention in the ‘green’ zone, characterised by the absence of any threat. As we have argued, the graded approach is based upon research and theory which suggests that these forms of non-coercive proactive intervention will assist in the avoidance of conflict by actively assisting in the generation of ‘real time’ dynamic risk assessments. In turn, this empowers effective police management of situations posing potential risk through promoting police situational awareness and more effective police decision making. Furthermore, the improved information flow increases the likelihood that any subsequent police action in situations that escalate into amber or red conditions will be proportionate and differentiated. However, it is critically important to recognise that graded tactical intervention is a basis for policing to remain legal and for reducing the potential for conflict by constructing and maintaining perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd participants. In this regard graded tactical deployment is a means to an end not an end in its own right.

As we have noted, there are consistent and systematic problems in terms of low levels of proactive verbal engagement and sometimes negative non-verbal communication from police ‘front line’ staff. Indeed, these issues were raised by all our observation teams at every event and we have outlined a few examples of these. While of course there were examples of individual officers engaging proactively and positively with fans, the general pattern indicates a significant and widespread problem with positive engagement. Moreover, while there is an obvious capability to rapidly escalate police tactical profile toward ‘high end’ coercive styles of police intervention there was a less obvious capability to proactively deescalate. Indeed, on a number of occasions, our observations noted a lack of low level proactive police response at critical opportunities in order to prevent escalations and also situations where a more forceful reactive capability was required but not available. As we have argued, these patterns across multiple events suggest significant issues with regard to delivering and achieving some of the primary strategic goals of the SPT in football. This does imply one of two possible alternatives for addressing these issues. Either significant measures are taken to re-train DELTA officers and deploy them in variable uniforms to deliver this verbal and non-verbal engagement and communication capability or recognition is given that the competency in this regard
is actually a specialist skill best delivered by EVENT units which should be further empowered and developed to deliver this important strategic and tactical goal.

The SPT is a ‘public order’ policing approach that is built around and upon the development of specific but different types of police competencies that range from communication to the use of force. The competencies regarding supporter engagement are currently being delivered in various forms in the Swedish context. Currently there are Evenemangs Police (which translates into English as EVENT Police) and spotters referred to as supporter police in Stockholm. There are also ROMEO or arrest units. Additionally, there are EVENT Police and Supporter Police, the latter performing different functions but essentially sharing the same uniform. This variability and complexity is self-evidently confusing and certainly does not sit neatly within a framework of a single, simple and coherent national framework. Moreover, there is a prima facie case that uniformed ‘Supporter Police’ struggle to construct and maintain consistently positive relationships with fans. Indeed, there are clear indicators of antagonistic relationships with some supporters, particularly those that might pose spontaneous (as opposed to premeditated) risk to public order. As a consequence, the capability of uniform supporter police to assist in the management of risk appears to be limited to providing surveillance, intelligence, deterrence and coercion functions but lack in their capacity to provide supporter liaison. Our research therefore raises a number of inter-related issues that suggest somewhat of a break down in the national coherence of the SPT as it is applied in the football context.

As we have asserted, it is the case that Dialogue Police have been an integral component of the SPT since it was originally developed. In this regard, the creation of the Evenemangs police within Stockholm is entirely consistent with the SPT and as such it remains unclear, and rather confusing, why these units are not simply referred to as Dialogue Police for football. Our analysis also suggests that there is a clear and evident benefit in separating the ‘spotter’ and ‘liaison’ roles among DFOs in Sweden. At a theoretical level the graded tactical approach is assumed to be effective because it impacts positively upon the social identities driving collective action within crowds, which then decreases the possibility of conflict through increasing the probability of ‘self-policing’ or ‘self-regulation’ among crowd participants. It is increasingly recognised that specialist communication based tactical interventions such as Dialogue Police are particularly effective in this regard (Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011; Stott, 2009; Stott, Scothern & Gorringe, 2013; Stott et al, 2011, 2016). As we have already argued the inclusion of Evenemangs police does, by definition, make the policing approach to football more consistent with the SPT. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the Evenemangs police can and do play an important role in building relationships of trust and confidence with fans - both ‘risk’ and ‘non-risk’. Our research suggests that their consistent deployment across both ‘low’ and ‘high’ risk events interacts with their personal skills and non-coercive function in order to enable them to operate with high levels of discretion. The outcome is improved capability for communication between police and supporters that enhances both planning and pre-event negotiation processes.

During the events Evenemangs police also appear to improve police capacity for dynamic risk assessment and therefore to enhance command decision making and to open up
possibilities for dialogue-based solutions to the management of unexpected situations, even in ‘high risk’ scenarios. In contrast, the form of uniformed ‘supporter police’ which seeks to combine ‘spotting’ and ‘liaison’ roles appear to be related with weaker information flow to commanders and therefore poorer dynamic risk assessment. This appears to potentially undermine police capability to escalate and de-escalate tactical interventions appropriately. Our analysis suggest that this limitation is not the result of poor professional practice on the part of individuals officers and it would be wholly inappropriate to assume that we are making this argument. Rather we are contending that this is a structural and organisation issue. In other words, the lack of capacity to operate beyond the polarised relationships between police and fans that we have observed is in part due to the fact there has not been a formal separation between ‘spotting’ and ‘dialogue’ functions among DFOs in regions outside of Stockholm.

In this regard our observations further characterise the evident effectiveness of Dialogue Police in this context. This evidence resonates with that obtained in the UK and Denmark concerning the effectiveness of these kinds of dialogue led police interventions into football crowd events (Havelund, 2011; Stott et al, 2011, 2016). Whilst Dialogue Police are, of course, not a panacea that prevents violence altogether, we have obtained considerable support for the contention the Evenemangs unit in Stockholm can and does provide a significant contribution to achieving police strategic goals. Once again, it therefore is unclear why such units only exist in Stockholm. None of the other major urban centres, that all utilise the SPT, has Dialogue Police deploying in football. This is despite the fact these regions all have Dialogue Police and regularly deploy them for protest crowd events. We could find no clear justification for why the SPT when applied to a football crowd takes such a fundamentally different form, particularly outside of Stockholm where there are evident problems with supporter engagement in this regard.

Given the powerful scientific, legal, historical and operational rationale for why Dialogue Police should be in place and the evidential benefits and increased capacities they provide our research does therefore suggest the need for the nationally coordinated development of adequately resourced Football Dialogue Police units to ensure the integrity of the SPT in this context.

As we have argued it is perhaps implicit recognition of a relationship between geographical space and ‘risk’ to ‘public order’ that the policing operations that we observed ubiquitously focused on the segregation of fans into entirely different geographical locations. We have suggested that police capabilities to segregate potentially hostile fan groups were delivered most effectively through pre-event planning processes that involved regular meetings between police commanders and SLOs. But while command level communication may be in place we suggest that the tactical resources specifically dedicated toward further empowering communication based supporter engagement were not just lower in number proportionately, they were also often under resourced and more haphazardly coordinated. We explored scenarios where it seemed self-evident that EVENT police could have been deployed to actively engage fans in order to moderate interactions and potentially prevent assaults; but the limited number of EVENT police meant they were often allocated to policing elsewhere. Moreover, we discussed how the police risk assessment process led to a binary grading
system which means that EVENT police are currently only being deployed during ‘special events’. It seems evident then that EVENT units may often be better positioned to achieve the SPT aligned strategic goals if there were more of them, the people with the necessary skills were selected to fill the role and they were available in ‘low risk’ scenarios. It seems important then that consideration is given to how EVENT units can be more fully developed and more fully integrated into both ‘special events’ and those policing operation that do not justify that classification.

An important issue throughout our fieldwork was the evolving and variable deployment of these newly formed EVENT units. The EVENT concept is in the early stages of its development but our observations do suggest that these units add to police capability to deliver a graded tactical capability. Their different uniform, operational priorities and behaviour send a clear message to fans, both verbally and non-verbally, of a positive and facilitating police attitude. Their capability to operate ‘legitimately’ within crowds positions them well to empower positive supporter behaviour and react quickly to support self-regulation. However, the current lack of clarity concerning the approach has at times led to confusion among police staff and fans about the nature of the role and considerable variability in its application across the different regions.

Our analysis suggests that the specialist engagement skills and capability provided by EVENT units can develop over time with regular deployment, but this capability would benefit from a clear and coherent concept, competency profile and training framework. Importantly, EVENT policing needs to be seen as an evolution of the SPT as a whole, a national concept for policing crowds of all types. EVENT units are an approach that have been developed in football but is one that adds to the core concepts and capability of the graded tactical approach as a whole. Therefore, to be effective it needs the kind of development support that was applied to the SPT itself in terms of formal policy development, research and education. Moreover, given some apparent resistance to this change within the police, the development might benefit from a nationally coordinated programme of change management similar to that underpinning the successful introduction of similar units in Denmark (Havelund et al, 2011).

As we have argued, the core value that EVENT police can deliver is based upon their capacity to develop positive interpersonal relationships and inter-group reputations and to convey a particular police attitude of facilitation. As such the current deployments appear somewhat limited because they have been predominantly focused upon the policing of the relatively smaller number of ‘away fans’ with officers unfamiliar with the role. This piecemeal approach means the EVENT police find difficulty engaging, because they don’t have the necessary skills or social capital. In contrast, if they were in a position to deploy with ‘home’ fans across a number events this would enable officers to become familiar with and to the fan community. This process of ‘social capital’ development would be enhanced if these officers could also be deployed into events that required a police response but did not justify the ‘special event’ categorisation. However, we would suggest that it could be even further advanced if selected groups of EVENT officers were also deployed with ‘home’ fans to ‘away’ fixtures. This would dramatically enhance their capability to develop social capital among those groups that regularly present risk to the
policing operations in other regions. Moreover, if the approach was adopted at a national level the deployment of a group of EVENT police from one region could be into a unit from another. This would reduce the need for, and therefore cost of, an EVENT group within the host jurisdiction. Over time the increased de-escalation capability that could be delivered via this nationally coordinated approach could be very beneficial in terms of unlocking the dynamics of long term conflict reduction and therefore over a period of two to three years significantly reduce policing costs at a national level (Stott, Hoggett & Pearson, 2011).

The observations in each of the major policing regions demonstrated an evident relationship between geographical location, conceptualisations of ‘territory’, supporter identity and interaction. Indeed, on the basis of our observations these inter-relating factors appear to be central to the dynamics of ‘risk’. It may be that the centrality of these factors is partly because of the way in which they feed into perceptions among fans and police of the legitimacy of the very presence of fans, gatherings or marches in those specific locations. As such, it is evident Swedish fan culture has a specific and complex form, the nature of which will continue to present police with scenarios of risk on an ongoing basis for the foreseeable future. It is evident that a fuller understanding of that culture and its underlying values and symbolic interactions will assist police to comprehend and predict risk and therefore empower the regional and local level operations to create efficiencies and capability to promote among fans ‘self-regulation’ in otherwise ‘high-risk’ situations. It is clear that some clubs and fan groups in Sweden do not have effective channels of dialogue with police. Our research suggests that where such channels do not exist it is important for both the police and the relevant clubs to invest in overcoming existing barriers to effective communication. This is precisely the challenge confronted historically by Dialogue police in the protest context, which therefore suggests that Evenemangs police could undertake this role with support from senior colleagues.

It is equally apparent that any such investment on the part of the police should be matched by a parallel commitment among clubs to their SLO function, which appears critically important in terms of providing capability for early de-escalatory interventions. Finally, it is worth noting that there is an apparent de facto decriminalisation of the use of pyrotechnics inside stadiums in Sweden. While the bulk of pyrotechnic use we observed did not appear to pose any significant threat on occasion these organised coordinated displays did combine with poor crowd management practices in ways that posed a clear threat to public safety. The current situation of criminalisation is clearly not effective and may therefore be helpful to address the issue in terms of a Health and Safety response that could work to facilitate the development of safe practice.
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